2026-07-03
2026-06-05
UNCLOS體制的重層嚇阻:日菲+(台日+台菲)
日菲的EEZ與大陸棚協議,台灣方面可能沒有損害。
現狀是台日、台菲已經各有漁業協定,包括暫訂執法事項。因此,日菲的協議,只要不針對第三方(事實就是不針對第三方),就是不會影響到台菲雙方各與台灣簽訂的暫訂協議。
反而,日菲的EEZ與大陸棚協議是海洋法的「重層嚇阻」,無論是台日或台菲暫訂執法協議,都是被日菲協議所涵蓋(台灣是在台菲架構下的第二層的事實存在)。
換言之,這架構在台日、台菲各簽署漁業協定之前就已經設計好,台日、台菲的事實協議先行,然後日菲的正式法律架構再進來。否則,法律架構先進來的話,事實架構就無資格進來了。
2026-04-26
美軍與執法部隊的全球封鎖行動
聯兵部隊在全球範圍內對阿曼灣實施海上封鎖
戰爭部 20260424
上週,美國軍方對途經荷姆茲海峽的船隻實施了海上封鎖,這些船隻曾在伊朗港口與伊朗進行貿易往來,或正駛往伊朗港口。
美國戰爭部長皮特·赫格塞斯今天在五角大廈舉行的新聞發布會上表示,封鎖仍在繼續,並且變得越來越有效、越來越強大。
20260413 美國與印尼建立「重要國防夥伴關係」
【雙魚之論】
領空飛越權在戰時是非常重要的,可以節省許多交涉時間,從而能不失時機。
美國印尼防長會面 宣布建立重要國防夥伴關係
中央社 20260414
美國戰爭部長赫格塞斯今天在五角大廈會晤印尼國防部長夏弗里後宣布,與印尼建立重要國防夥伴關係。
2026-04-16
伊朗封鎖海峽,美國封鎖港口 Iran's Blockading the Strait vs. US's Blockading the Ports
【雙魚之論】
Geographically speaking, the U.S. isn't blockading the strait itself but
is instead focusing on Iranian ports using long-distance tracking. The
specifics—whether they will resort to inspections, boarding ships, or
seizures—are still unknown.
2026-04-15
赫格塞斯與印尼方面宣佈建立國防合作夥伴關係 戰爭部 20260415
【雙魚之論】
〈美印尼主要防衛合作夥伴關係(MDCP)成立聯合聲明〉
赫格塞斯與印尼方面宣佈建立國防合作夥伴關係 戰爭部 20260415
美國印尼「主要防衛合作夥伴關係」的地緣戰略影響 Geostrategic
Implications of the U.S.–Indonesia “Major Defense Cooperation Partnership”
赫格塞斯與印尼方面宣佈建立國防合作夥伴關係
戰爭部 20260415
美國陸軍部長皮特·赫格塞斯今天在五角大廈歡迎印尼國防部長沙弗里·沙姆蘇丁到訪,兩人宣布兩國建立主要國防合作夥伴關係。
該夥伴關係將作為推動美國和印尼雙邊防衛合作的框架,以維護整個印太地區的和平與穩定。
「您的來訪表明,美國陸軍部非常重視我們與印尼日益密切的安全關係——而且這種關係正在不斷發展壯大,」赫格塞斯對沙姆蘇丁說道,隨後他指出,兩國每年共同完成超過 170 次軍事演習。
〈美印尼主要防衛合作夥伴關係(MDCP)成立聯合聲明〉
【雙魚之論】
〈美印尼主要防衛合作夥伴關係(MDCP)成立聯合聲明〉
赫格塞斯與印尼方面宣佈建立國防合作夥伴關係 戰爭部 20260415
美國印尼「主要防衛合作夥伴關係」的地緣戰略影響 Geostrategic
Implications of the U.S.–Indonesia “Major Defense Cooperation Partnership”
美印尼主要防衛合作夥伴關係(MDCP)成立聯合聲明
2026年4月13日
美國戰爭部長與印尼國防部長宣布,美利堅合眾國與印度尼西亞共和國正式建立「主要防衛合作夥伴關係」(Major Defense Cooperation Partnership,簡稱 MDCP)。此宣布凸顯印尼在促進區域穩定方面的重要角色,並強調兩國雙邊防衛關係的堅實基礎與巨大潛力。
2026-04-04
美國立法保護台灣電纜 The US makes laws to protect Taiwan's marine cables from China's intentional sabotage
【雙魚之論】
The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) gray-zone sabotage tactics signifies
a form of cowardly hostility — one that dares not launch outright war yet
refuses to cease harassment.
2026-03-23
中國不停新造人工島 意在封鎖海域 non-stop making islands, Beijing can block sealanes
【雙魚之論】
When facing a rogue opponent, to avoid continuous damage without any
means of recourse, one must decide whether to maintain the conduct of a
gentleman or at least acquire the capacity for self-defense. This is precisely
the situation Vietnam faces regarding China’s persistent island-building in the
South China Sea.
2026-03-20
以海盜手法繞過制裁 Bypassing Sanctions with Pirate-Like Tactics
【雙魚之論】
Just like with “blocking,” the key to “sanctions” still lies in their
actual effective enforcement—otherwise, they are merely a piece of blank paper.
2026-03-17
陸軍幫海軍:伊朗潛艦在家被HIMARS+PrSM擊沈 Land Power Strikes Sea: Iranian Sub Sunk in Port by HIMARS + PrSM
【雙魚之論】
Using HIMARS paired with ATACMS or PrSM the US and Israel forces sunk
Iranian naval vessels in the port, including a KILO class submarine. This
represents a new application of weapons and tactics. The CCP will surely feel the
impact upon seeing this—it is essentially one of Taiwan's naval scenarios of "long-range
precision strikes at the source." The other scenario involves striking the
rocket forces' radars, launchers, rocket warehouses, and launch positions. This
shows that the army can also contributes in naval and air warfare. No wonder
the blue-white legislators in Taiwan are so insistent on blocking arms
purchases from the U.S.
2026-03-13
封鎖海峽以癱瘓美軍 Blocking the Strait of Hormuz: Paralyzing U.S. Military Operations in the Persian Gulf
封鎖海峽以癱瘓美軍 Blocking the Strait of Hormuz:
Paralyzing U.S. Military Operations in the Persian Gulf
【雙魚之論】
As I mentioned earlier, Iran launched unprovoked attacks on neutral
neighboring countries as a prelude to blocking the Strait of Hormuz. However,
it now appears that Iran's ambitions go far beyond that: it seeks to completely
seal off the strait through mine-laying and suicide drone boats, thereby fully
isolating key U.S. military facilities in the Persian Gulf. These include
Qatar's Al Udeid Air Base, Bahrain's Naval Support Activity Bahrain
(headquarters of the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet), and Kuwait's Camp Arifjan
(forward headquarters of U.S. Army Central, serving as the primary logistics,
supply, and army command center). In other words, Iran's blockade of the Strait
of Hormuz is aimed at completely paralyzing U.S. naval and land operations in
the Persian Gulf.
2026-03-11
為了封鎖海峽先攻擊鄰國---應懲罰伊朗的如意算 Punishing Iran’s Scheme: The Use of Aggression as a Pretext for Blockade
為了封鎖海峽先攻擊鄰國---應懲罰伊朗的如意算 Punishing
Iran’s Scheme: The Use of Aggression as a Pretext for Blockade
【雙魚之論】
The strategic intent behind Iran's actions has come to light. The
extensive mining of the Strait of Hormuz exposes why Iran initiated attacks
against Gulf states regardless of their
neutrality.
By manufacturing a state of war, Iran aims to establish a legal basis
for blockading the strait. Victim nations across Europe and Asia must demand punitive damages for the economic harm
incurred. This situation also provides the Japan Maritime Self-Defense
Force a pivotal role in clearing Iran’s mines.
原來如此,直到伊朗在荷姆茲海峽全面佈雷,我們才突然理解:為何伊朗要主動攻擊所有海灣國家——目的在造成武裝衝突,甚至戰爭的既存事實,以便為封鎖海峽建立法律藉口。
這樣的心思,受害國家(包括歐洲與亞洲國家)應該可以對其造成的經濟損害進行懲罰性求償。因為伊朗佈雷,日本海上自衛隊又有貢獻國際社會的機會了。
CNN:伊朗開始在荷姆茲海峽布雷 川普警告不清除將面臨軍事後果 自由 20260311
2026-03-07
海戰與戰時國際法的生動教材 Naval Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict: A Vivid Case Study
【雙魚之論】
The case of
the sunken Iranian warship and the seeking refuge in neutral ports (India/Sri
Lanka) is a practical lesson in international maritime law during wartime.
- Duty to Rescue: Protecting
survivors is a non-negotiable duty. They cannot be refused help or
targeted for military reasons, regardless of their combatant status.
- Neutral Port Limits: Refuge
in neutral ports is restricted (usually 24 hours). Neutral nations must
ensure their waters aren't used for military advantage. Rescued troops are
typically interned to preserve the host's neutral status.
- Rules of Capture: Capturing
enemy ships on the high seas is allowed but requires humane treatment of
survivors; capture of neutral vessels is strictly regulated.
伊朗軍艦被擊沈、進入中立第三國(印度、斯里蘭卡)港口尋求庇護等,是個戰時國際法的生動教材。
1. 救助優先:遇難者保護是絕對義務,不得因軍事考量拒絕或攻擊(即使敵方)。
2. 中立庇護有限:中立港口提供24小時臨時避難,但交戰方軍艦可同時停留中立港口,中立國須防止濫用;獲救戰鬥人員常被拘留以維持中立。
3. 拿捕有條件:公海拿捕敵方較自由,但須尊重遇難者;對中立方嚴格限制。
伊朗軍艦無處可去 由印度收留並安置183名船員 自由 20260307
2026-02-25
美軍破解中國「反介入」火力鐵幕的兩大絕招! 林煒舒FB 20260223
【雙魚之論】
嚴格說來,作者的內線外線作戰方式指的是陸戰隊(由內而外防禦)與海軍(分散式海上作戰)。在印太決戰的聯兵單位還有陸軍、空軍、太空軍等部隊的創新戰法並未被作者提及。
航母硬闖等於自殺?美軍破解中國「反介入」火力鐵幕的兩大絕招! 林煒舒FB
20260223
如果台海或西太平洋爆發衝突,美國的超級航空母艦會直接開進台灣海峽嗎?
答案是:絕對不會!
面對中國在沿海部署的密集「東風」反艦彈道飛彈火網(也就是俗稱的 A2/AD 反介入/區域拒止戰略),龐大的航空母艦如果貿然駛入第一島鏈的內海,簡直就是敵方雷達上最顯眼的活靶。
既然硬衝進去無異於自殺,美軍該怎麼打,才能保住台灣?
為了重塑西太平洋的戰場幾何,美軍近年來提出了顛覆傳統海戰規則的全新戰略,祭出了兩大「破局殺招」:
2026-02-08
2026-02-06
解放軍海軍穿越菲律賓群島 PLA Navy vessels transit the Philippines archipelago
【雙魚之論】
Some four or five years ago, when I was writing an article examining the
Chinese Communist Party’s expansion into the South Pacific, I pointed out that Beijing has two primary routes to achieve this objective.
The northern route passes through the Bashi Channel, follows the northern edge
of the Nanyang island chains, and leads directly to Australia. The southern
route runs through the waters south of Palawan, across the Sulu Sea—precisely
the key area discussed in this report. Both routes provide direct access to the
northern maritime approaches of Australia.
Does the CCP need Australia? The answer is unequivocally yes. Beyond gaining access to Australia’s mineral resources
and land, controlling or heavily influencing Australia would enable China to
confront the United States northward toward Hawaii, thereby constraining
the deployment and maneuverability of U.S. Indo-Pacific naval and air forces.
Chinese migrants who have relocated to and naturalized in Australia can exert
powerful influence toward this objective through electoral leverage and
economic power. During the Pacific War, Australia
committed itself fully to the defense of its homeland and to fighting alongside
its allies against Japan. Today, however, despite attaining a central position
in the AUKUS partnership and acquiring nuclear-powered, conventionally armed
submarines, Australia has shown signs of retreating from its willingness to
shoulder global defense responsibilities. This shift can only be
understood as the result of the influence exerted by Chinese immigrant
penetration into Australia’s political establishment.
This report, titled “The Philippine Navy Plans to Establish a Monitoring
Station at Tubbataha Reef,” indicates that the Philippines has at least
recognized the problem of territorial waters being intruded upon and subjected
to hydrographic surveying. Should the Philippines cease to remain vigilant, the
CCP’s next step would be to seize key Philippine islands or maritime areas
through sheer force, followed by the construction of dual-use civilian and
military naval and air facilities—exactly as it has done in the South China
Sea. Mindanao and its surrounding areas would be
the first to bear the brunt of such actions.
約4、5年前在撰寫文章探討中共對南太平洋的擴張時就指出,中共有南北兩條路徑來達成此任務:北部路徑經由巴士海峽,沿著南洋群島北側直達澳洲。南部路徑是由巴拉望島南方水道經蘇祿海,也就是本報導的關鍵地區。兩者直達澳洲北部海域。
中共需要澳洲嗎?答案是肯定的。除了取得澳洲的礦產與土地之外,就是可以往北與夏威夷對峙,牽制美國印太海空軍的調度。移居與歸化澳洲的中國人透過選票與經濟力在此任務上會發揮強大影響力。太平洋戰爭時澳洲傾全力捍衛本土也參與盟友對日作戰,現在澳洲取得AUKUS聯盟地位與核動力傳統潛艦,卻反悔不願意負擔全球防衛義務,必然是中國移民滲透澳洲政界所發揮的影響力。
本則報導「菲海軍擬於杜巴塔哈礁設監測站」表示至少菲律賓注意到領海被入侵與被水文測量的問題。假使菲律賓不再注意,中共下一步就是以實力取得菲律賓的重要島嶼或海域,並建設軍民海空軍設施,一如其在南海所為一樣。明答那峨與附近首當其衝。
Navy
eyeing Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park monitoring station
中國軍艦曾通過 菲海軍擬於杜巴塔哈礁設監測站強化安全
自由 20260206
菲律賓海軍計畫在聯合國教科文組織(UNESCO)世界遺產、靠近南海的「杜巴塔哈礁自然公園」(Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park)設立監測站,以加強蘇祿海(Sulu Sea)關鍵海域的環境保護與海事安全。中國研究船和海軍軍艦曾通過蘇祿海,最近一次是在2025年2月。
2026-01-30
海鯤號完成首次潛航測試,國民黨立委們立即增加預算解凍條件
【雙魚之論】
海鯤號完成首次潛航測試,然後國民黨立委們(馬文君、王鴻薇等)立即增加預算解凍條件:安全、裝備未全數到期等。
海鯤號完成首次潛航測試 James Tseng FB 20260130
海鯤號在昨天完成第一次潛航測試,原本,我以為這只是非常單純的一項測試,沒想到,在傍晚居然看到有人在網路上嗆聲,說如何,潛艇是回來了沒?我才驚訝的發覺到,有一批人,正期待著海鯤號的失敗,對,台灣就是有這樣一群人,認為自己是中國人,每一天都在等待台灣落後,落難,比中國爛,然後他們才會感到開心。
但,事情就是永遠不會讓這些爛人開心,昨天海鯤號在晚上六點半順利完成返航,踏出我國潛艦國造進程中非常關鍵的一步。
這次海試的重要性就是「首次淺水潛航測試」,也就是讓潛艦正式離開水面,進入實際的水下作業環境,目的是驗證船體在承受水壓時的結構完整性,並確認各項密封組件是否滴水不漏。
2026-01-17
海上民兵封鎖海域,它們就是軍隊,不必客氣 Maritime Militia is PLAN, just do whatever necessary to them
【雙魚之論】
January 11 again? Once more we see the CCP’s favorite numbers “1111.”
The most famous example was when the U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates visited
Chengdu on January 11, 2011, and the CCP announced the successful test flight
of the J-20.
The New York Times report on the massive maneuvers of China’s maritime
militia vessels—does it read like a piece of classical Chinese wuxia fiction,
or the chained ships from a historical romance?
The CCP’s maritime militia vessels look on the surface like fishing boats, yet
they do not fish. They share standardized appearances, receive fixed subsidies,
operate under the command of the PLA (Eastern Theater Command), and conduct
organized drills. They fully meet the definition of a warship under Article 29
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: “a ship
belonging to the armed forces of a State, bearing the external marks
distinguishing warships of its nationality, under the command of an officer
duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose name appears in the
appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under
regular armed forces discipline.”
Earlier, when Trump used military aircraft to strike drug-smuggling vessels
that had been designated as terrorist targets, he was effectively telling the
CCP: you want to wage war or impose a blockade through gray-zone tactics? No
chance. You were the one who first abandoned the rules and blurred the line
between military and civilian—so don’t blame me if I play rough when the time
comes.
Since
these are warships rather than civilian vessels, and are directed from behind
the scenes by the CCP, they should be dealt with directly—using incendiary
weapons—in the defense of Taiwan.
1月11日?又出現中共最愛的1111。最出名的是美國國防部長羅伯特·蓋茨(Robert
Gates)2011年1月11日訪問成都,中共宣布殲-20試飛成功,
紐約時報對中國海上民兵船巨型操演的報導,是中國古典武俠小說,還是演義小說裡面的連環船?
中共的海上民兵船,表面上像是是漁船但不捕魚。它們有一致的外觀、接受固定津貼、聽命於解放軍(東部戰區)命令且進行操演,完全符合了〈聯合國海洋法公約〉第29條「屬於一國武裝部隊、具備辨別軍艦國籍的外部標誌、由該國政府正式委任並名列相應的現役名冊或類似名冊的軍官指揮和配備有服從正規武裝部隊紀律的船員的船舶」的軍艦定義。
先前川普以軍機攻擊被定義為恐怖主義的運毒民船,就告訴中共:你想用灰色地帶遂行作戰或封鎖?門都沒有。是你先不講武德破壞軍民分際,莫怪屆時我耍流氓。
既然是軍艦不是民船,且為中共在背後指揮,在台灣保衛戰就直接使用燒夷彈對付。
漁船不只捕魚?上千中國漁船東海「大規模集結」疑排陣 美媒揭背後意涵 鏡週刊 20260117
美國《紐約時報》日前透過船舶自動識別系統(AIS)資料分析指出,中國近期在東海海域兩度出現罕見的大規模漁船集結行動。上千艘中國漁船於去年聖誕節及今年1月11日,分別在中國沿岸與日本沖繩之間的海域,排列成長距離、具幾何形狀的船陣,迫使部分商船繞道航行,引發國際關注。
報導指出,今年1月11日約有1400艘中國漁船在短時間內離港或中止捕撈,集中於東海特定海域,形成一個長度超過200海浬的長方形陣列。相關航行數據顯示,該區船隻密度極高,部分貨輪必須蛇行穿越或改道避讓,對正常航運秩序造成實際影響。
類似情況早在去年12月25日便已出現。《紐約時報》分析當天的定位資料後發現,約2000艘中國民用船隻在東海排成多個大型陣列,其中北側出現兩個平行長方形,最長達290海浬,南側則形成倒L型配置。專家認為,短短數週內在相同海域重複出現如此規模的集結,顯示並非單純漁業活動。
2025-12-29
對治「正義使命2025」:ROE、62特遣隊,與共同圖像
【雙魚之論】
The People's Liberation Army's
"Justice Mission 2025" military exercise is taking place while U.S.
forces are observing the Christmas and New Year holidays, with Russia and China
coordinating actions from north and south—directly provoking countries along the first island
chain. This represents the strongest challenge yet from China and Russia in the
Indo-Pacific region.
According to a Central News Agency report, three key terms stand out: Rules of
Engagement (ROE), Common Operational Picture, and the Navy's 62nd Task Force.
These are essential concepts for preventing the PLA from employing a "soft
soil deep digging" strategy of transitioning from training to exercises
and from exercises to actual invasion.
From the post-war era of combined defense to the present, Taiwan's military has
retained designations for combined operations. Although it has been suppressed
during the period of U.S.-China normalization, in recent years, the U.S.-Taiwan
alliance and substantive cooperation have rapidly recovered. We should pay
particular attention to the profound implications of the Navy's 62nd Task
Force, which carries the meaning of the combined operations with U.S. forces.
By inference, the Chinese Communist Party should exercise restraint.
The words "Common Operational Picture" in the report are by no means
understated; rather, they signify that Taiwan can access operational
intelligence across the entire first island chain domain, while simultaneously
providing real-time battlefield intelligence from the Taiwan theater to allied
forces, achieving a high degree of sharing and integration.
解放軍此次「正義使命2025」演習,趁美軍過聖誕節與新年之際,與俄羅斯一南一北共同行動——直接挑釁第一島鏈各國,這是中俄在印太區域至今為止最強烈的嗆聲。
根據中央社報導,其中三個關鍵詞彙格外引人注目:交戰規則(ROE)、共同圖像,以及海軍62特遣部隊。這些正是防範解放軍採取「由訓轉演、由演轉戰」軟土深掘策略的必要概念。
從戰後共同防禦時期至今,台灣軍隊仍保留共同作戰的番號。雖然曾經歷美中正常化帶來的壓抑,但近年來美台同盟關係與實質合作急速恢復。我們應特別注意海軍62特遣部隊蘊含與美軍共同作戰的深意。推論上,中共應當會有所收斂。
報導中「共同圖像」四個字,絕非輕描淡寫,而是意味著台灣能夠取得第一島鏈全域的作戰情資,同時也將台灣戰場的即時情報提供給友軍,實現高度共享與整合。
「國軍10大戰略單位包含台澎防衛作戰的作戰區,包括澎湖、花東、北、中、南、外島防衛指揮部(金門、馬祖防衛部);空軍(AOC)戰管作戰中心;及海軍的62、63特遣隊。62及63特遣隊是在戰時,海軍根據敵軍犯台狀況,將我海軍各艦隊的艦艇重新進行任務派遣,一般來說,62特遣隊是負責作戰攻擊,而63特遣隊則是62特遣隊的後援部隊。
海軍62特遣隊是國軍10大戰略單位中,專責海上殲敵的作戰單位,其番號是美軍協防台灣時,將台灣海軍納為62特遣隊,與美軍共同作戰。1942年到1944年的太平洋戰爭時,麥克阿瑟還有尼米茲將台灣劃為第62戰區,依據台美協防條例,台灣部隊若要前往菲律賓作戰,艦隊就會稱作62特遣隊,目前已經沒有台美協防條約,海軍在2018年大規模操演,還將代號命名為62特遣隊,可能是怕國人忘記,或在暗示台灣與美國之間的默契,與正好在關島、夏威夷演練的美國軍艦相互呼應。」——全球武裝衝突與軍武資料庫
國防部:共軍5演訓區侵領海基線 授權第一線依ROE應處 中央社 20251229
中共宣布對台軍演,國防部今天指出,共軍劃設5個演習區域,並將台灣12浬領海基線劃設在內,國軍會依敵情威脅程度授權海軍62特遣部隊、空作部、作戰區等第一線作戰單位,依交戰規則(ROE)及授權矩陣執行應對。