Who is to blame: Henry Kissinger, or Zbigniew Brzeziński? by HoonTing

Richard Nixon’s “ASIA AFTER VIET NAM”

Who is to blame: Henry Kissinger, or Zbigniew Brzeziński?　by HoonTing
Henry Kissinger passed away on November 29 at the age of 100. He is a historical figure in the U.S. diplomatic field, particularly in post-Korean War history. His notable achievements include ending the Vietnam War and facilitating the opening of U.S. normalization with the People's Republic of China (PRC), among other accomplishments. Despite his achievements, he remains a controversial figure.

"Kissinger's China-Soviet Strategy" and "Mao's Balance with U.S. against USSR" resonated in the late 1960s, especially in the late 1970s when the U.S. and China mutually relied on each other to counter the potential invasion of the USSR on China.

However, it was Zbigniew Brzeziński, a Polish-American scholar, counselor to President Lyndon Johnson, and national security advisor to President Jimmy Carter, who was in charge of the U.S. normalization with the PRC in 1979.

Kissinger and Brzeziński adhered to separate doctrines. Kissinger followed the conventional model of the "Concert of Europe" in the 19th century, while Brzeziński stood in the geopolitical tradition from Halford Mackinder to Nicholas Spykman. These represented different approaches to international relations that they were responsible for.  And theoretically Brzeziński was superior, while pragmatically Kissinger held the key.

One point that many scholars overlook is that, according to documents, Kissinger wrote a note to the White House personnel indicating the need for a deliberate risk control mechanism before the U.S.-PRC normalization process. The substitute draft presented to Congress by the Carter Administration, originally The Taiwan Omnibus Bill, lacked security clauses to fill the void left by the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty (SAMDT). This would have posed a significant danger to U.S. national interests in the region. Why at all Brzeziński, who believed in geopolitics, ignored it?

Thanks to Congressmen like Barry Goldwater and many others, the Taiwan Relations Act was introduced and passed. This suggests that Brzeziński may have been too hasty, for unclear reasons, in overlooking dealing with critical and subtle issues.

While Kissinger may not have been as rushed as Brzeziński, his later focus as a major US lobbyist for the PRC and a founder of the new era China school in the U.S. earned him the title of "Chinese Old Friend," indicating his influence and connections.

Evaluating Henry Kissinger is no easy task. His achievements can be divided into two parts: firstly, solving major problems in the 1970s and ushering in a new era that contributed to the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War. Secondly, as a lobbyist for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), he disguised and shifted the focus of U.S. national security from being cautious towards the CCP, as noted in Nixon's article before his inauguration as U.S. President, “ASIA AFTER VIET NAM” to other concerns.

季辛吉於11月29日辭世，享年100歲。他是美國外交領域的歷史人物，尤其在韓戰後歷史上佔有一席之地。他的顯著成就包括結束越戰，促成美國與中華人民共和國（PRC）正常化的開展，以及其他一些成就。儘管有這些成就，他仍是一位具有爭議性的人物。

「季辛吉的聯中制蘇」和「毛澤東在聯美制蘇」在1960年代末，特別是在1970年代末，共鳴不已，當時美國和中國互相依賴，以防犯蘇聯對中國的潛在入侵。

然而，波蘭裔美國學者、詹森總統顧問，以及卡特總統國家安全事務顧問的布里辛斯基，負責1979年美國與中華人民共和國的正常化。

季辛吉和布里辛斯基奉行不同的學說。季辛吉遵從19世紀的「歐洲協調」傳統模式，而布里辛斯基則契合從哈福德·麥金德到尼古拉斯·斯皮克曼的地緣政治傳統。這代表了他們負責的國際關係的不同取向。理論上，布里辛斯基優越，而實際上，季辛吉掌握關鍵。

很多學者忽略的一點是，據文件顯示，季辛吉曾向白宮人員寫過一封信，指出開始美中正常化程序前，必須設置一個有意的的風險控制機制。由卡特政府提交給國會的替代草案，原名〈臺灣綜合法案〉（Taiwan Omnibus Bill），在填補〈中美共同防禦條約〉留下的空白時缺乏安全條款。這將對美國在該地區的國家利益造成重大危險。為什麼信仰地緣政治的布里辛斯基會忽視這一點呢？

感謝像高華德等國會議員，〈臺灣關係法〉得以提出並通過。這表明布里辛斯基可能因不明原因而過於匆忙，忽視了處理關鍵且微妙的問題。

儘管季辛吉可能不像布里辛斯基那樣匆忙，但他後來作為中華人民共和國的主要美國游說者和美國新時代中國學的創始人，贏得了「中國人的老朋友」稱號，顯示了他的影響力和人脈。

評價亨利·季辛吉並非易事。他的成就可分為兩個部分：首先，在1970年代解決重大問題，開啟一個促成蘇聯崩潰並結束冷戰的新時代。其次，作為中國共產黨的遊說者，他掩飾並轉移了美國國家安全的焦點，從對中共的警惕，正如尼克森在就任美國總統前的文章《越南戰爭後的亞洲》中所指出的那樣，轉向其他問題。

 

“ASIA AFTER VIET NAM.”