台灣與威懾的真正來源 - 為什麼美國必須安撫中國，而不僅僅是威脅中國（3/3） Bonnie S. Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas J. Christensen＠Foreign Affairs/Taimocracy翻譯 20201130

台灣與威懾的真正來源 - 為什麼美國必須安撫中國，而不僅僅是威脅中國（3/3）  Taiwan and the True Sources of Deterrence - Why America Must Reassure, Not Just Threaten, China    By Bonnie S. Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas J. Christensen＠Foreign Affairs/Taimocracy翻譯 20201130

 

DISCRETION AND DISCIPLINE  自由裁量權和紀律

As the third party to this dispute, the United States must also think carefully about its mix of threats and assurances. Its priority is to prevent the Chinese military from attacking Taiwan, but deterrence will not work if Beijing does not believe U.S. assurances. For instance, it is in the United States’ interest for China to remain hopeful that sometime in the future it might be able to resolve its differences with Taiwan without resorting to violence. China would have to persuade Taiwan’s public of the merits of some form of peaceful integration—a hard sell, but not impossible given China’s economic clout and the possibility that a more attractive government may someday emerge in Beijing. To the extent that Washington can influence Chinese President Xi Jinping’s thinking on this crucial issue, it should do so; the United States should avoid making statements or taking actions that could lead Beijing to conclude that unification can only be achieved through force.  作為這場爭端的第三方，美國也必須仔細考慮其威脅和保證的組合。它的首要任務是防止中國軍隊攻擊台灣，但如果北京不相信美國的保證，威懾就不會發揮作用。例如，中國對未來某個時候能夠不訴諸暴力解決與台灣的分歧抱持希望，這符合美國的利益。中國必須說服台灣大眾相信某種形式的和平一體化的優點——這很難說服，但鑑於中國的經濟影響力以及北京有一天可能出現一個更具吸引力的政府的可能性，這並非不可能。如果華盛頓能夠影響中國國家主席習近平在這個關鍵問題上的想法，它就應該這樣做；美國應避免發表可能導致北京得出統一只能透過武力實現的結論的言論或行動。

Consistent with its “one China” policy of not supporting an independent Taiwan or seeking to restore a formal alliance with Taipei, the U.S. government should not use in its official communications symbols of Taiwan’s sovereignty, such as the flag of the Republic of China, or refer to Taiwan as either a country or an ally, as the Trump administration did in a 2019 Defense Department report. If U.S. officials do so inadvertently, such as when U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken referred to Taiwan as a country on two occasions in 2021, a correction should be swiftly issued. An example of the laudable handling of such a blunder was the White House’s admission that it made an “honest mistake” after including the image of the Republic of China flag in a tweet about the United States supplying COVID-19 vaccines to Taiwan that same year. And since Beijing fears that Taiwan may merely be a pawn in a wider American game of containment, U.S. officials should not imply that Taiwan is a strategic asset essential to U.S. national security.  根據符合不支持台灣獨立或尋求與台北恢復正式聯盟的「一個中國」政策，美國政府不應在其官方通訊中使用台灣主權的標誌，例如台灣的中華民國國旗，或將台灣稱為國家或盟友，就像川普政府在2019 年國防部報告中所做的那樣。如果美國官員無意中這樣做，例如美國國務卿安東尼·布林肯在 2021 年兩次將台灣稱為一個國家，則應迅速予以更正。處理此類錯誤的一個值得稱讚的例子是，白宮在一條有關美國供應的推文中加入了中華民國國旗的圖像，承認自己犯了一個「無心之失」同年，向台灣運送COVID-19 疫苗。由於北京擔心台灣可能只是美國更廣泛的遏制遊戲中的棋子，美國官員不應暗示台灣是對美國國家安全至關重要的戰略資產。

The Biden administration insists that it has made no changes to the “one China” policy. But Biden’s remarks have repeatedly broken with strategic ambiguity and mischaracterized U.S. policy. During an August 2021 interview with ABC News, Biden stated, incorrectly, that the United States has a treaty commitment to defend Taiwan, comparing the U.S. “sacred commitment” to the pledges it has made to Japan and South Korea. In the most egregious misstatement of U.S. policy on Taiwan to date, Biden told reporters in November 2021 that Taiwan “is independent” and “makes its own decisions,” a description that contravenes long-standing U.S. policy that does not recognize Taiwan as an independent, sovereign state.  拜登政府堅稱「一個中國」政策沒有改變。但拜登的言論一再打破戰略模糊性並錯誤描述美國政策。2021 年 8 月接受美國廣播公司新聞採訪時，拜登錯誤地表示，美國有保衛台灣的條約承諾，並將美國的「神聖承諾」與對日本和韓國的承諾進行了比較。拜登在 2021 年 11 月對記者表示，台灣「獨立」並「自己做決定」，這是迄今為止美國對台政策最嚴重的錯誤表述，這一描述違反了美國不承認台灣獨立的長期政策，主權國家。

 

Washington’s actions and rhetoric have raised fears in Beijing.  華盛頓的行動和言論引起了北京的擔憂。

These statements do far more to undermine deterrence than they do to bolster it. Beijing has long anticipated that Washington will intervene if China tries to force unification. The Taiwan Relations Act, a law Congress passed in 1979 to define the now informal relations between Washington and Taipei after the normalization of relations between Washington and Beijing, states that “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes,” would be considered a “threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” The U.S. commitment to Taiwan does not need further clarification or beefing up, and certainly no U.S. official should invoke or even suggest anything akin to a restoration of a formal alliance. Such an unqualified commitment to Taiwan could be seen on both sides of the strait as a green light for more strident pro-independence voices in Taiwan to pursue a formal separation from China.  這些言論對威懾力的破壞遠大於對威懾力的增強。北京長期以來一直預計，如果中國試圖強行統一，華盛頓將會介入。《台灣關係法》是國會於1979 年通過的一項法律，旨在界定華盛頓與北京關係正常化後華盛頓與台北之間目前非正式的關係，該法規定「任何以和平以外的方式決定台灣未來的努力，包括透過抵抗或禁運」將被視為「對西太平洋地區和平與安全的威脅，並引起美國的嚴重關切」。美國對台灣的承諾不需要進一步澄清或加強，當然任何美國官員都不應援引或甚至建議任何類似於恢復正式聯盟的事情。這種對台灣的無條件承諾可能被海峽兩岸視為為台灣更強烈的獨立聲音尋求正式脫離中國開綠燈。

The U.S. government should provide a comprehensive and high-level statement laying out its “one China” policy and explaining why Taiwan matters to the United States in language that is comprehensible to the American people, beyond the rote repetition of the U.S. “one China” policy as comprising the Taiwan Relations Act; the three U.S.-China joint communiques in 1972, 1979, and 1982; and the Six Assurances that the Reagan administration gave to Taipei in 1982. A more complete statement, such as a speech by the national security adviser or the secretary of state, should restate the positions that Biden has reportedly made clear to Xi, including that the United States does not support Taiwan’s independence, opposes any unilateral change to the status quo by either side, does not pursue a “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” policy, and does not seek to use Taiwan as part of a strategy to contain China or embolden Taipei to push for independence. Such a statement should include the assurance provided by prior administrations that the United States will accept any outcome reached peacefully by both sides and that has the assent of the people of Taiwan.  美國政府應該提供一份全面、高級別的聲明，闡述其「一個中國」政策，並用美國人民可以理解的語言解釋為什麼台灣對美國很重要，而不僅僅是死記硬背美國「一個中國」包含《台灣關係法》的政策；1972年、1979年及1982年三個美中聯合公報；以及雷根政府1982年向台北作出的六項保證。更完整的聲明，例如國家安全顧問或國務卿的講話，應該重申拜登據報導向習近平明確表示的立場，包括美國不支持台灣獨立，反對任何一方單方面改變現狀，不奉行「兩個中國」或「一中一台」政策，不尋求將台灣作為戰略的一部分遏制中國或鼓勵台北推動獨立。這樣的聲明應包括前幾屆政府所提供的保證，即美國將接受雙方和平達成並得到台灣人民同意的任何結果。

Until recently, no Biden administration official had publicly called for the resumption of cross-strait dialogue to reduce misunderstandings and manage problems, a position that was central to U.S. policy before the Trump administration. It is welcome that American Institute in Taiwan Chair Laura Rosenberger, in a roundtable with the media in Taipei in October 2023, said that the United States supports cross-strait dialogue and called on Beijing to start a dialogue with Taiwan. Even though Beijing is responsible for the breakdown of cross-strait dialogue, the failure of the United States to encourage a return to talks has been interpreted by Beijing as further evidence that Washington does not want the two sides of the strait to settle their disputes. If Beijing believes that Washington does not truly want cross-strait tensions to be resolved, it will be much harder for the United States to deter an attack on Taiwan.  直到最近，拜登政府官員還沒有公開呼籲恢復兩岸對話，以減少誤解和管理問題，這一立場在川普政府之前是美國政策的核心。值得歡迎的是，美國在台協會主席勞拉·羅森伯格2023年10月在台北舉行的媒體圓桌會議上表示，美國支持兩岸對話，並呼籲北京與台灣展開對話。儘管北京對兩岸對話的破裂負有責任，但美國未能鼓勵恢復對話被北京解讀為華盛頓不希望兩岸解決爭端的進一步證據。如果北京認為華盛頓並不真正希望解決兩岸緊張局勢，美國將更難阻止對台灣的攻擊。

U.S. officials should also work to ensure that Taiwan does not upset the status quo. Taiwan has laudably begun to strengthen its defenses under Tsai, but her administration has also tactfully refrained from pushing pro-independence initiatives. That marks a departure from her DPP predecessor as president, Chen Shui-bian, who held a referendum in 2008 on pursuing membership in the United Nations under the name Taiwan, rather than the Republic of China, which was rightly interpreted by both Beijing and Washington as a ploy to promote independence. Since the UN is an international institution for which statehood is a requirement for membership, to apply under the name Taiwan instead of the Republic of China would assert the full sovereign separation of the island. If a future government of Taiwan or key political figures appear to be promoting such a change in the status quo, U.S. officials should voice concerns in private, in public, or both. The United States should never coordinate its Taiwan policy with Beijing, but if a rebuke to Taiwan about unilateral efforts to assert independence is delivered only privately, Washington should inform Beijing of that admonition through diplomatic channels so that American assurances remain credible.  美國官員也應努力確保台灣不會破壞現狀。值得稱讚的是，在蔡英文的領導下，台灣已經開始加強防禦，但她的政府也巧妙地避免推動支持獨立的舉措。這標誌著她與民進黨前總統陳水扁的背道而馳，陳水扁於 2008 年就以「台灣」名義，而不是中華民國，申請加入聯合國進行了全民投票，北京和華盛頓都正確地將其解讀為促進獨立的策略。由於聯合國是國際機構，其會員國地位是其必備條件，因此以台灣而非中華民國的名義提出申請，將主張該島的完全主權分離。如果未來的台灣政府或關鍵政治人物似乎正在推動改變現狀，美國官員應該私下、公開或兩者都表達擔憂。美國永遠不應該與北京協調其對台政策，但如果只是私下對台灣單方面主張獨立的行為進行譴責，華盛頓應該通過外交渠道向北京通報這一警告，以便美國的保證仍然可信。

The United States could be more transparent about the parameters of its “unofficial relationship” with Taipei, including self-imposed limits on visits to Taiwan by the U.S. president, vice president, secretary of state, and secretary of defense. Taiwan’s president and vice president have long been permitted to make transit visits through the United States en route to other countries, but they do not visit Washington. Such transits are private, unofficial, and arranged for the “safety, comfort, convenience, and dignity of the traveler,” according to the U.S. State Department. As such, these transits should not be occasions for large-scale, public, politically charged events. Following this precedent and acting consistently will make more believable the U.S. position that the United States is not treating Taiwan as it would a sovereign, independent state.  美國可以對其與台北的「非正式關係」的參數更加透明，包括對美國總統、副總統、國務卿和國防部長訪問台灣的自我限制。台灣總統和副總統長期以來都被允許過境美國前往其他國家，但他們不會訪問華盛頓。美國國務院表示，此類過境是私人的、非官方的，是為了「旅行者的安全、舒適、便利和尊嚴」而安排的。因此，這些過境不應成為大規模、公共、帶有政治色彩的活動的場合。遵循這一先例並始終如一地採取行動將使美國的立場更加可信，即美國沒有將台灣視為主權的、獨立國家。

U.S. officials, including members of Congress, should refrain from making statements that are inconsistent with the Taiwan Relations Act. Resolutions calling for the United States to recognize Taiwan as an independent sovereign state or provide an unconditional defense commitment ironically weaken deterrence by suggesting Washington intends to restore the alliance with Taipei that it abrogated in 1979. Legislation should focus on helping Taiwan defend itself and on bolstering U.S. military capabilities in East Asia in ways that are consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, while avoiding symbolic actions that do nothing to strengthen Taiwan or U.S. forces but could undermine the credibility of U.S. assurances to China.  包括國會議員在內的美國官員應避免發表不符合《台灣關係法》的言論。諷刺的是，呼籲美國承認台灣為獨立主權國家，或提供無條件國防承諾的決議暗示華盛頓打算恢復其於1979 年廢除的與台北的聯盟，從而削弱了威懾力。立法應側重於幫助台灣保衛自己，並支持台灣美國在東亞的軍事能力符合《台灣關係法》，同時避免採取像徵性行動，這些行動無助於加強台灣或美國軍隊，但可能會損害美國對中國保證的可信度。

Just as the executive branch does not send the holders of the top four positions in the U.S. government to Taiwan, similarly, as a matter of policy, Congress should not send to Taiwan the president of the Senate (who is also the vice president of the United States), the Senate president pro tempore, or the Speaker of the House. There are sufficient informal channels for these officials to give and receive messages from Taiwan and to support Taiwan without providing a convenient occasion for Beijing to ratchet up military pressure while blaming Washington and Taipei for sparking tensions. Such expressions of U.S. support for Taiwan are counterproductive as they only make the island less secure.  正如行政部門不向台灣派遣美國政府最高四位職位的官員一樣，從政策上看，國會也不應向台灣派遣參議院議長（同時也是美國參議院副議長）、參議院臨時議長或眾議院議長。這些官員有足夠的非正式管道向台灣發出和接收訊息並支持台灣，而不為北京提供便利的機會，一方面加大軍事壓力，另一方面指責華盛頓和台北引發緊張局勢。美國對台灣的這種支持只會適得其反，因為它們只會讓台灣變得更不安全。

 

TRUE DETERRENCE  真正的威懾

Some policymakers and analysts make the mistake of conflating assurances with appeasement or outright capitulation. This is wrong-headed. Alongside credible threats, credible assurances are an integral part of deterrence. Given the dramatic ongoing modernization of the Chinese military and China’s increasing assertiveness, the United States needs to strengthen its military posture in East Asia and assist in improving Taiwan’s defensive capabilities and helping the island withstand a potential blockade. The United States will need cooperation from regional allies to make necessary adjustments in its military posture. But failure to provide assurances to Beijing about the purpose of such adjustments will reduce the likelihood of allied cooperation—and make China harder to deter.  一些政策制定者和分析人士犯了將保證與綏靖或徹底投降混為一談的錯誤。這是錯誤的想法。除了可信的威脅之外，可信的保證也是威懾的一個組成部分。鑑於中國軍隊正在進行的巨大現代化以及中國日益增強的自信，美國需要加強其在東亞的軍事態勢，並協助提高台灣的防禦能力，幫助台灣抵禦潛在的封鎖。美國需要地區盟友的合作來對其軍事態勢做出必要的調整。但未能就此類調整的目的向北京提供保證將降低盟國合作的可能性，並使中國更難威懾。

Many might argue that assurances would signal weakness and invite Chinese aggression. On the contrary, these assurances would help strengthen a deterrence strategy that includes reinforcing the U.S. military presence in East Asia and hardening Taiwan’s defense. It is precisely because tough measures are needed that it is imperative that Washington and Taipei accompany them with productive diplomatic ones, assuring Beijing that it will not be punished if it forgoes the use of force.  許多人可能會認為，做出保證將表明軟弱並招致中國的侵略。相反，這些保證將有助於加強威懾戰略，包括加強美國在東亞的軍事存在和加強台灣的防禦。正是因為需要採取強硬措施，華盛頓和台北必須以富有成效的外交手段予以配合，向北京保證，如果放棄使用武力，北京將不會受到懲罰。

台灣與威懾的真正來源 - 為什麼美國必須安撫中國，而不僅僅是威脅中國（1/3）
台灣與威懾的真正來源 - 為什麼美國必須安撫中國，而不僅僅是威脅中國（2/3）
台灣與威懾的真正來源 - 為什麼美國必須安撫中國，而不僅僅是威脅中國（3/3）