台灣與威懾的真正來源 - 為什麼美國必須安撫中國，而不僅僅是威脅中國（1/3） Bonnie S. Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas J. Christensen＠Foreign Affairs/Taimocracy翻譯 20201130

【雙魚之論】英文拷到 G / D 找中文翻譯
The academic article, written by Bonnie S. Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas J. Christensen, discuss the concept of deterrence, how it can be credible and effective. Additionally, they propose recommendations for the United States, Taiwan, and China to prevent war and highlight that doing so is in the best interests of all parties involved.
But the difficulty of expecting all three parties to contain themselves without misjudging each other suggests skepticism about the feasibility of the proposed measures.

這篇學術性文章由Bonnie S. Glaser、Jessica Chen Weiss和Thomas J. Christensen撰寫，討論了威懾的概念，以及它如何具有可信度和效力。此外，他們提出了針對美國、台灣和中國的建議，以防止戰爭，並強調這樣做符合所有相關方的最大利益。
然而，期望這三方在不誤判對方的情況下自我克制的困難，作者的建議的可行性令人懷疑。

台灣與威懾的真正來源 - 為什麼美國必須安撫中國，而不僅僅是威脅中國（1/3）  Taiwan and the True Sources of Deterrence - Why America Must Reassure, Not Just Threaten, China    By Bonnie S. Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas J. Christensen＠Foreign Affairs/Taimocracy翻譯 20201130

The growing might of China’s military and its increasingly aggressive posture toward Taiwan have made deterrence in the Taiwan Strait a tougher challenge than ever before. It is incumbent on the United States to support Taiwan’s efforts to develop a defensive “porcupine strategy.” Washington can help Taiwan’s military stockpile and train with coastal defense and air defense weapons, field a robust civil defense force, and create strategic reserves of critical materials such as food and fuel to deter and, if necessary, defeat an invasion or blockade of the island. The U.S. military should also better prepare to cope with China’s expanding arsenal of missiles that pose a threat to U.S. regional bases and even aircraft carriers by creating a stronger, more agile, and more geographically dispersed military presence in the region.  中國軍事實力的增強以及對台灣日益咄咄逼人的姿態，使台海威懾成為前所未有的嚴峻挑戰。美國有責任支持台灣制定防禦性「豪豬戰略」。華盛頓可以幫助台灣軍隊儲存和訓練海防和防空武器，部署強大的民防部隊，並建立食品和燃料等關鍵物資的戰略儲備，以阻止並在必要時擊敗對台灣的入侵或封鎖。美國軍方也應該更好地做好準備，透過在該地區建立更強大、更靈活、地理上更分散的軍事存在，應對中國不斷擴大的飛彈庫，這些飛彈對美國的地區基地甚至航空母艦構成威脅。

But deterrence is not just a matter of weapons in arsenals, boots on the ground, planes in the air, ships at sea, or strategies on the planning table. Signaling a credible military threat is only part of a successful strategy of deterrence. It also takes assurances to keep potential adversaries at bay. A threatened state has little incentive to avoid war if it fears the unacceptable consequences of not fighting. As the Nobel Prize–winning economist Thomas Schelling wrote years ago, “‘One more step and I shoot’ can be a deterrent threat only if accompanied by the implicit assurance, ‘And if you stop, I won’t.’”  但威懾不僅僅是武庫中的武器、地面上的靴子、空中的飛機、海上的船隻或規劃桌上的戰略。發出可信的軍事威脅訊號只是成功威懾戰略的一部分。它還需要確保將潛在的對手拒之門外。如果一個受威脅的國家擔心不打仗會帶來不可接受的後果，那麼它就沒有動力避免戰爭。正如諾貝爾獎得主經濟學家托馬斯·謝林多年前所寫的那樣，「『再往前一步我就開槍』這樣的威脅只有在伴隨著隱含的保證『如果你停下來，我就不會開槍』的情況下才能產生威懾效果。」

In truth, the more powerful and credible one’s threat of military action, the more important and the more difficult it is to credibly assure the potential adversary. The three parties involved in the Taiwan Strait are not providing one another with sufficient assurances. For example, to enhance deterrence, Washington must make clear that it opposes any unilateral change to the status quo, not only an attempt by Beijing to compel unification but also a political move by Taipei to pursue independence. And as the United States works with Taiwan to strengthen its security, it must avoid giving the impression that it is moving toward restoring formal diplomatic relations or a defense alliance with the island. Combined with a conditional and credible threat of a military response by the United States and Taiwan to the use of force, such assurances will help prevent a war.  事實上，軍事行動威脅越強大、越可信，向潛在對手提供可信的保證就越重要，也越困難。台海三方並未提供彼此足夠的保證。例如，為了加強威懾，華盛頓必須明確表示反對任何單方面改變現狀的行為，不僅是北京強迫統一的企圖，也是台北追求獨立的政治舉動。美國與台灣合作加強安全時，必須避免給人留下其正在恢復正式外交關係或與島嶼建立防務聯盟的印象。再加上美國和台灣有條件且可信地將對威脅使用武力做出軍事反應，這種保證將有助於防止戰爭。

Ill-advised statements made in the past by former and current U.S. officials suggesting that the United States should formally recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state or restore a clear alliance commitment to defend the island would, if adopted, undercut assurances and weaken deterrence as surely as would a lack of military readiness. U.S. military threats will lose their potency if Chinese leaders believe that the United States will take advantage of their restraint to promote Taiwan’s formal independence or to prevent unification under any circumstances, even if it were to result from peaceful, uncoerced negotiation. Beijing may determine that refraining from an attack would mean it would forever lose the possibility of unification or would allow the United States to restore something akin to a defense alliance with Taiwan. And if China comes to that conclusion, then Washington’s focus on beefing up military power in the region may still fail to prevent a war.  前任和現任美國官員過去曾發表過不明智的言論，建議美國應正式承認台灣為主權國家或恢復保衛島嶼的明確聯盟承諾，一旦獲得通過，就會削弱保證並削弱威懾力，就像缺乏軍事準備一樣。如果中國領導人相信美國會利用他們的克制來促進台灣的正式獨立或在任何情況下阻止台灣的統一，即使這是透過和平、非脅迫的談判實現的，那麼美國的軍事威脅就會失去效力。北京可能會認為，不發動攻擊將意味著它將永遠失去統一的可能性，或者將允許美國恢復與台灣類似的防禦聯盟。如果中國得出這樣的結論，那麼華盛頓對加強該地區軍事力量的關注可能仍然無法阻止戰爭。

 

DAMNED IF THEY DO, DAMNED IF THEY DON’T  如果他們這樣做就該死，如果他們不這樣做就該死

Although the logic of deterrence through brute strength is intuitively appealing, both theory and history show that the threat of punishment fails to deter if it is not paired with assurances that those same military capabilities will not be used to in some way hurt the other side. “The purpose of combining conditional assurances with conditional threats,” the political scientist Reid Pauly has noted, is to “present a choice; one that does not lead the target to believe they are ‘damned if they do, and damned if they don’t.’”  儘管透過蠻力進行威懾的邏輯直觀上很有吸引力，但理論和歷史都表明，如果不保證這些相同的軍事能力不會被用來以某種方式傷害對方，那麼懲罰威脅就無法起到威懾作用。政治學家Reid Pauly指出，「將有條件保證與有條件威脅相結合的目的是」提出一種選擇；不會讓目標相信他們『如果這樣做就糟了，如果不那樣做就糟了。』」

For effective deterrence, both threats and assurances must be credible. As the scholars Matthew Cebul, Allan Dafoe, and Nuno Monteiro have noted, “Power boosts the credibility of threats but undermines that of assurances.” This dynamic is what political scientists have long described as the security dilemma. To issue credible threats and assurances simultaneously, leaders must cultivate “a reputation for restraint in the face of compliance” rather than simply a reputation for unconditionally inflicting punishment. And it is precisely because the United States should bolster and diversify its military presence in the region and help strengthen Taiwan’s defenses that it must also provide clearer and more persistently conveyed assurances.  為了有效威懾，威脅和保證都必須可信。正如學者Matthew Cebul、Allan Dafoe和Nuno Monteiro 所指出的那樣，「權力提高了威脅的可信度，但卻削弱了保證的可信度。」這種動態就是政治學家長期以來所描述的安全困境。為了同時發出可信的威脅和保證，領導者必須培養「面對做乖時克制的聲譽」，而不僅僅是無條件施加懲罰的聲譽。正是因為美國應該加強在該地區的軍事存在並使其多樣化，並幫助加強台灣的防禦，所以它還必須提供更明確、更持久的保證。

Beijing, Taipei, and Washington are all focused on demonstrating resolve and building convincing wartime capabilities to signal their preparedness and willingness to use force. Beijing hopes to prevent Taiwan from further consolidating its separation from the mainland, while Taipei and Washington hope to deter Beijing from attacking Taiwan to force unification. Yet all three parties have neglected corresponding efforts to signal to one another that these military preparations are not meant to alter the status quo or to preclude the prospect of an eventual peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences. To be sure, leaders on all sides have, to some extent, continued to offer assurances to one another. Senior Biden administration officials have reaffirmed that the United States does not support Taiwan’s independence; Chinese leaders have reiterated that “peaceful reunification” remains their preferred option (although they tend to regard coercive efforts, short of war, as still peaceful); and leaders in Taipei have refrained from pushing for formal independence. Unfortunately, officials in all three capitals have also expanded the scope of what they believe are legitimate measures to signal resolve in response to perceived threats, fueling a potentially dangerous spiral of actions and reactions. Beijing, Taipei, and Washington have not reiterated key statements that once made an eventual peaceful resolution at least conceivable. Such assurances were never meant to promote a near-term resolution or to specify the details of any eventual resolution; they were meant to convey that there still might be peaceful ways of settling cross-strait differences.  北京、台北和華盛頓都致力於展示決心並建立令人信服的戰時能力，以表明他們已做好使用武力的準備和意願。北京希望阻止台灣進一步鞏固與大陸的分離，而台北和華盛頓則希望阻止北京攻擊台灣以強制統一。然而，三方都忽略了相應的努力，以向對方發出這樣的信號：這些軍事準備並不是為了改變現狀，也不是為了排除兩岸分歧最終和平解決的前景。平心而論，各方領導人在某種程度上繼續相互保證。拜登政府高級官員重申，美國不支持台灣獨立；中國領導人重申，「和平統一」仍然是他們的首選（儘管他們傾向於認為，除了戰爭之外的強制努力仍然是和平的）；台北領導人沒有推動正式獨立。不幸的是，這三個國家首都的官員也擴大了他們認為的合法措施的範圍，以表明應對威脅的決心，從而加劇了潛在危險的行動和反應。北京、台北和華盛頓尚未重申曾經使最終和平解決至少成為可能的關鍵聲明。此類保證絕不意味著促進近期解決方案或具體說明任何最終解決方案的細節；它們的目的是傳達，仍然可能有和平的方式來解決兩岸分歧。

For instance, Beijing’s proposals regarding the governance of a future Taiwan unified with the mainland have grown less generous over time. The “one country, two systems” offer that Beijing made in a 1993 white paper included allowing the island to “have its own administrative and legislative powers, an independent judiciary, and the right of adjudication” as well as “its own party, political, military, economic, and financial affairs,” and a pledge that Beijing would not send troops or administrative personnel to be stationed in Taiwan. The former assurance disappeared in China’s 2000 white paper on the topic, and the latter was removed in its 2022 iteration. “One country, two systems” was never a popular concept in Taiwan, and it has become even less so now that Beijing has tightened its hold on Hong Kong, where it had pioneered the approach. Combined with increasingly aggressive and frequent Chinese military operations near Taiwan, the failure to offer more attractive options for Taiwan’s future only makes Beijing seem both more threatening and less trustworthy.  例如，隨著時間的推移，北京關於未來台灣與大陸統一的治理建議變得越來越不慷慨。北京在1993年的白皮書中提出的「一個國家，兩種制度」包括允許台灣「擁有自己的行政權、立法權、獨立的司法權和審判權」以及「自己的政黨、政治、軍事、經濟和金融事務”，並承諾北京不會派遣軍隊或行政人員駐紮台灣。前者的保證在中國 2000 年關於該主題的白皮書中消失了，後者在 2022 年的迭代中被刪除。「一個國家，兩種制度」在台灣從來都不是一個流行的概念，現在北京加強了對香港的控制，這一概念變得更加不流行。再加上中國在台灣附近日益咄咄逼人、頻繁的軍事行動，未能為台灣的未來提供更具吸引力的選擇，只會讓北京顯得更具威脅性，也更不值得信任。

 

Military threats alone may fail to prevent a war over Taiwan.  僅靠軍事威脅可能無法阻止台灣問題的戰爭。

As for Taiwan, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party has a long tradition of supporting independence, but since 1999 it has ceased calling for the creation of a Republic of Taiwan and instead maintains that Taiwan, formally known as the Republic of China, is already an independent sovereign state. The current DPP president, Tsai Ing-wen, has refrained from seeking formal independence and has sought to alleviate Beijing’s worst fears, adhering to her 2016 pledge to act in accordance with the Republic of China’s constitution, which defines China as including both sides of the strait. At the same time, she has refused to accept the “1992 Consensus,” an alleged understanding between representatives of Beijing and the KMT (Kuomintang, the Chinese Nationalist Party) that mainland China and Taiwan belong to one and the same country even as they disagreed about whether that country was the Republic of China or the People’s Republic of China.  至於台灣，執政的民進黨有支持獨立的悠久傳統，但自1999年以來，它不再呼籲建立台灣共和國，而是堅稱台灣（正式名稱為中華民國）已經是一個獨立的主權國家。現任民進黨主席蔡英文沒有尋求正式獨立，而是尋求減輕北京方面最嚴重的擔憂，恪守她 2016 年承諾按照中華民國憲法行事，該憲法將中國定義為包括兩岸。海峽。同時，她拒絕接受「1992年共識」，即北京和國民黨代表之間所謂的諒解，即中國大陸和台灣屬於同一個國家，儘管雙方意見不同關於那個國家是中華民國還是中華人民共和國。

DPP members and many scholars dispute that such a consensus ever existed. Still, Beijing accuses Tsai of altering the status quo by failing to accept the 1992 consensus, which her rivals in the KMT continue to endorse. And although she has resisted pressure from radicals in her own party to pursue measures that would likely be interpreted in Beijing as moves in the direction of independence—such as ceasing to use the Republic of China national anthem or insisting on the use of the moniker “Taiwan” rather than “Chinese Taipei” at international sporting events—Tsai has allowed the teaching of Taiwan’s history separate from the history of China in high schools.  民進黨黨員和許多學者質疑是否有這樣的共識。儘管如此，北京仍指責蔡英文未能接受 1992 年達成的共識，從而改變了現狀，而她在國民黨的競爭對手仍然支持這一共識。儘管她頂住了黨內激進分子的壓力，要求她採取可能被北京解讀為走向獨立的措施，例如停止使用「中華民國」國歌，或堅持在國際體育賽事中使用「台灣」而不是「中華台北」的綽號——蔡英文允許在高中將台灣歷史的教學與中國歷史分開。

And questions remain about the sustainability of Taiwan’s restraint in the future. The current DPP vice president and front-runner in the presidential election scheduled for January 13, 2024, Lai Ching-te, has in the past advocated for independence more stridently than Tsai, describing himself in 2017 as a “political worker for Taiwan independence.” More recently in July 2023, Lai told supporters at a campaign event that his party’s ambition is to have a sitting president of Taiwan “enter the White House,” which implies his goal is to upgrade Taiwan’s relationship with the United States, raising alarm in Beijing and prompting a request for clarification from Washington.  台灣未來的克制能否持續仍存疑問。現任民進黨副總統、定於 2024 年 1 月 13 日舉行的總統選舉的領先者賴清德過去比蔡英文更強烈地主張台獨，並在 2017 年將自己描述為「台獨政治工作者」。 最近的2023 年7 月，賴智在一次競選活動中告訴支持者，他的政黨的目標是讓台灣現任總統「進入白宮」，這意味著他的目標是升級台灣與美國的關係，這引起了北京的警惕並促使華盛頓要求澄清。

台灣與威懾的真正來源 - 為什麼美國必須安撫中國，而不僅僅是威脅中國（1/3）
台灣與威懾的真正來源 - 為什麼美國必須安撫中國，而不僅僅是威脅中國（2/3）
台灣與威懾的真正來源 - 為什麼美國必須安撫中國，而不僅僅是威脅中國（3/3）