台灣與威懾的真正來源 - 為什麼美國必須安撫中國，而不僅僅是威脅中國（2/3） Bonnie S. Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas J. Christensen＠Foreign Affairs/Taimocracy翻譯 20201130

台灣與威懾的真正來源 - 為什麼美國必須安撫中國，而不僅僅是威脅中國（2/3）  Taiwan and the True Sources of Deterrence - Why America Must Reassure, Not Just Threaten, China    By Bonnie S. Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas J. Christensen＠Foreign Affairs/Taimocracy翻譯 20201130 

As for the United States, the Biden administration has regularly reiterated that it “does not support Taiwan independence” and opposes unilateral changes to the status quo by either side. These statements are consistent with the traditional U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” in which the United States avoids specifying under what conditions it would intervene in a cross-strait conflict and thereby does not give a green light to independence advocates in Taiwan or provoke Beijing by appearing to restore the U.S. alliance commitment to Taiwan. But the credibility of those statements has been called into question by Biden’s repeated insistence that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense if attacked because it made a commitment to do so, even though the United States has not had a formal obligation to defend Taiwan since it abrogated the alliance with Taipei in 1979 as a precondition to normalizing diplomatic relations with Beijing. Biden administration officials have also noticeably failed to confirm that the United States would accept any peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences achieved through negotiations and without coercion. The Biden administration’s omission of this assurance has increased Beijing’s suspicions that Washington would never accept any form of cross-strait integration, even if achieved through nonviolent means. So have statements by Ely Ratner, the assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific affairs, that Taiwan is “located at a critical node within the First Island Chain” in the Western Pacific, implying that the island is strategically indispensable to the defense of U.S. allies and thus no form of unification would be acceptable to the United States.  至於美國，拜登政府多次重申「不支持台獨」，反對任何一方單方面改變現狀。這些言論符合美國傳統的「戰略模糊」政策，即美國避免具體說明在什麼條件下介入兩岸衝突，從而不為台獨分子開綠燈，也不通過挑釁北京。似乎恢復了美國對台灣的同盟承諾。但這些聲明的可信度受到質疑，因為拜登一再堅稱，如果台灣受到攻擊，美國將保衛台灣，因為美國曾承諾這樣做，儘管自那以來美國並沒有正式的保衛台灣的義務。1979 年，它廢除了與台北的同盟關係，以此作為與北京實現外交關係正常化的先決條件。拜登政府官員也明顯未能證實美國會接受任何透過談判、在沒有脅迫的情況下和平解決兩岸分歧的方案。拜登政府沒有做出這項保證，這增加了北京方面的懷疑，即華盛頓永遠不會接受任何形式的兩岸融合，即使是透過非暴力手段實現的。負責印太事務的助理國防部長Ely Ratner也曾表示，台灣位於西太平洋「第一島鏈的關鍵節點」，這意味著台灣對於美國的防禦來說在戰略上是不可或缺的盟友，因此美國不會接受任何形式的統一。

Chinese officials no doubt perceive Washington’s efforts to strengthen ties with Taiwan and pursue a stronger military posture in the region as a serious demonstration of resolve. But U.S. actions, paired with the rhetoric of American officials, have also raised fears in Beijing that the United States seeks to “use Taiwan to contain China,” as China’s State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi charged at a press conference in August 2022, and to restore something akin to the alliance that existed with Taipei before 1979. Some analysts in Beijing fear that recent U.S. attempts to reopen high-level diplomatic channels with Beijing merely mask continued efforts to weaken China and prevent even peaceful unification from ever occurring. Such fears are exacerbated by statements by members of the U.S. Congress, former senior officials, and leading scholars who call for everything from restoring official relations with Taiwan to resurrecting the U.S. alliance with it to stationing large numbers of U.S. forces on the island.  中國官員無疑認為華盛頓加強與台灣關係並在該地區採取更強硬軍事姿態的努力是堅定決心的體現。但美國的行動，加上美國官員的言論，也引起了北京的擔憂，擔心美國試圖「利用台灣遏制中國」，正如中國國務委員兼外交部長王毅在2022 年8 月的新聞發布會上所指責的那樣，並恢復類似於1979年之前與台北的聯盟關係。北京的一些分析人士擔心，美國最近試圖與北京重新開放高層外交管道，只會掩蓋其削弱中國、甚至阻止和平統一的持續努力。美國國會議員、前高級官員和著名學者的言論加劇了這種擔憂，他們呼籲採取各種措施，從恢復與台灣的官方關係到恢復美國與台灣的聯盟，再到在台灣部署大量美軍。

 

DOUBTS AND FEARS IN THE STRAIT  海峽兩岸的疑慮與恐懼

 

To shore up peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, all sides must recognize that credible assurance is essential for effective deterrence. Credible assurance is not a reward or a carrot. It is a guarantee that a threat is fully conditional on the behavior of its target. Such assurances are not the same as trust-building measures, which are incremental compromises made in a gradual and reciprocal manner. By contrast, an assurance does not have to be reciprocated, as it is not a concession or an effort to build trust. It can and should be made unilaterally to strengthen deterrence, as long as it does not weaken the credibility or capacity to respond to perceived threats. On its own, a credible assurance would strengthen deterrence. If reciprocated, it could, over time, build trust among the parties and reduce tensions.  維護台海和平穩定，各方必須認識到，有效威懾離不開可信保證。可信的保證不是獎勵或胡蘿蔔。它保證威脅完全取決於目標的行為。這種保證與建立信任措施不同，後者是以漸進和互惠的方式做出的漸進妥協。相比之下，保證不必得到回報，因為它不是讓步或建立信任的努力。只要不削弱應對感知威脅的可信度或能力，就可以而且應該單方面加強威懾。可靠的保證本身就會增強威懾力。如果得到回報，隨著時間的推移，它可以在各方之間建立信任並緩解緊張局勢。[1]

Beijing has long threatened to adopt “nonpeaceful” means if Taipei appears to be pursuing permanent separation or formal independence. But the Chinese military buildup and intense military drills near Taiwan have fueled fears that Beijing is shifting from a policy of deterring any pursuit of independence by Taiwan to compelling unification through coercion or military force. As these doubts and suspicions multiply, all sides will lose the incentive to avoid provocative moves. When Beijing fails to reassure Taipei that its military preparations are not a harbinger of a coming attack, it undercuts incentives for people in Taiwan to support moderation by its political leaders. The lack of credible Chinese assurances also strengthens the hand of American politicians and commentators who want to scrap strategic ambiguity, upgrade ties with Taiwan from unofficial to official relations, and restore defense commitments to the island akin to those that obtained before 1979.  北京長期以來一直威脅，如果台北尋求永久分離或正式獨立，北京將採取「非和平」手段。但中國在台灣附近的軍事集結和密集軍事演習引發了人們的擔憂，即北京正在從阻止台灣尋求獨立的政策轉向透過脅迫或軍事力量強制統一。隨著這些疑慮和懷疑的增加，各方將失去避免挑釁行動的動機。當北京未能向台北保證其軍事準備並非即將到來的襲擊的先兆時，就會削弱台灣人民支持其政治領導人採取溫和態度的動力。中國缺乏可信的保證也增強了美國政界人士和評論家的勢力，他們希望消除戰略模糊性，將與台灣的關係從非正式關係升級為正式關係，並恢復對台灣的國防承諾，類似於1979年之前的承諾。

To strengthen the credibility of Beijing’s commitment to a peaceful process, China should dial back its military operations near Taiwan. Having used such operations to register displeasure with U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, Chinese air and naval exercises should be reset to the two-decade practice of tacitly observing the Taiwan Strait centerline. Beijing also codified into a 2005 law its right to use force against Taiwan if it perceives that peaceful unification is no longer possible. The vague conditions and implied impatience of such a threat have failed to convince people in Taiwan that the island will not be attacked as long as they do not attempt to permanently separate from China. Without such an assurance, Taipei has less reason to refrain from pursuing unilateral changes in the status quo. China should revise this language to incorporate the assurance that as long as Taiwan does not pursue formal independence, Beijing will not use force. If Beijing’s leaders truly prefer peaceful unification with Taiwan, as they continue to claim, they should keep the door open to precisely that outcome.  為了增強北京致力於和平進程的可信度，中國應該減少在台灣附近的軍事行動。在利用此類行動表達對美國眾議院議長裴洛西2022年8月訪問台灣的不滿之後，中國的海空演習應該恢復到二十年來默認遵守台灣海峽中心線的做法。北京也將2005年的一項法律寫入了一項法律，如果它認為和平統一不再可能，它有權對台灣使用武力。這種威脅的模糊條件和隱含的不耐煩未能讓台灣人民相信，只要他們不試圖與中國永久分離，台灣就不會受到攻擊。如果沒有這樣的保證，台北就沒有理由不單方面改變現狀。中國應該修改這項措辭，納入這樣的保證：只要台灣不追求正式獨立，北京就不會使用武力。如果北京領導人確實像他們繼續聲稱的那樣希望與台灣和平統一，那麼他們應該為這一結果敞開大門。

For its part, Taiwan must accompany needed measures to bolster its defense with credible assurances to Beijing that as long as the Chinese military refrains from attacking Taiwan, Taipei will not pursue independence or permanent separation. Taiwan should refrain from potentially provocative actions, such as holding a referendum to change its official name, the Republic of China, or revising its territorial claims to exclude mainland China—changes that would indicate a declaration of formal independence. Regardless of who is elected Taiwan’s next president, Taipei will need to convincingly reassure Beijing that it has no intention of fundamentally altering the status quo. But the need for such guarantees will grow in the event of the victory of Lai, the DPP candidate; Chinese officials deeply mistrust him since he has endorsed the pursuit of formal independence for Taiwan in the past. The pledge that Lai made, in an October 2023 speech in Taipei at a dinner attended by nearly 100 foreign dignitaries and guests, to maintain Tsai’s cross-strait policy, with its emphasis on refusing both to bow to Chinese pressure and to provoke Beijing, is a good start. If elected, Lai could use his inaugural address to reaffirm the commitments Tsai made in her inaugural speech in 2016 to conduct cross-strait affairs in accordance with the Republic of China’s constitution and the 1992 act governing relations between the two sides of the strait, Taipei’s law on how the island should manage relations with Beijing.  就台灣而言，在採取必要措施加強防禦的同時，也必須向北京做出可靠保證，即只要中國軍隊不攻擊台灣，台北就不會追求獨立或永久分離。台灣應避免採取潛在的挑釁性行動，例如舉行公投以更改其正式名稱「中華民國」，或修改其領土主張以將中國大陸排除在外——這些變化將表明正式宣布獨立。無論誰當選台灣下一任總統，台北都需要令人信服地向北京保證，它無意從根本上改變現狀。但如果民進黨候選人賴清德獲勝，對此類保證的需求將會增加；中國官員對他深感不信任，因為他過去曾支持台灣尋求正式獨立。2023 年 10 月，賴智在台北舉行的有近 100 名外國政要和嘉賓出席的晚宴上發表講話，承諾維持蔡英文的兩岸政策，強調拒絕屈服於中國壓力和挑釁北京。一個好的開始。如果當選，賴智可以在就職演說中重申蔡英文在2016年就職演說中的承諾，即按照中華民國憲法和1992年兩岸關係條例、台北市政府處理兩岸事務。關於台灣如何處理與北京關係的法律。

As Taiwan strengthens its military deterrent—including by increasing its ability to withstand a blockade and to defeat an invading Chinese force—it must also implement additional measures to reinforce the credibility of its assurances. In August, Lai took a step in the right direction when he made his stance on the naming question clear: “President Tsai has used the term Republic of China (Taiwan) to describe our country. I will continue to do so in the future.” This and other statements provide China with rhetorical assurance, but because his party’s 1991 charter still calls for the creation of a “Republic of Taiwan” and a new constitution, doubts persist in Beijing about his willingness to hold to this position as president. If he wins the election, Lai should consider revisiting a proposal made by DPP legislators in 2014 to suspend the independence clause in the 1991 party charter, a nonbinding and reversible step that would give any rhetorical commitment to the status quo more weight and credibility. Such a step could also be part of a gradual, reciprocal process to reduce tensions and build trust, as advocated by Richard Bush, the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan.  隨著台灣加強其軍事威懾——包括提高其抵禦封鎖和擊敗入侵的中國軍隊的能力——它還必須採取更多措施來增強其保證的可信度。 8月，賴清德在命名問題上明確表態，朝著正確的方向邁出了一步：「蔡總統用中華民國（台灣）這個詞來形容我們的國家。今後我也會繼續這樣做。」這項聲明和其他聲明為中國提供了口頭保證，但由於民進黨 1991 年的黨章仍然呼籲建立「台灣共和國」和一部新憲法，北京方面仍然對他是否願意堅守此一立場表示懷疑。如果賴清德贏得選舉，他應該考慮重新審視民進黨立委2014年提出的暫停1991年黨章中的獨立條款的提議，這是一個不具約束力和可逆的步驟，將使任何對現狀的口頭承諾更具分量和可信度。正如美國在台協會前主席理卜睿哲所倡導的那樣，這一步驟也可能是緩和緊張局勢、建立信任的漸進互惠進程的一部分。

Just as the United States must not rule out the possibility of an eventual peaceful integration of the two sides of the strait (as long as such a move has the assent of the people of Taiwan), Taipei should also not take actions that would permanently foreclose that outcome. To deter war, Taiwan must allow leaders in Beijing to believe that peaceful unification remains possible.  正如美國不能排除兩岸最終和平融合的可能性（只要這一舉動得到台灣人民的同意），台北也不應該採取永久排除台灣的行動的那個結果。為了阻止戰爭，台灣必須讓北京領導人相信和平統一仍然是可能的。

台灣與威懾的真正來源 - 為什麼美國必須安撫中國，而不僅僅是威脅中國（1/3）
台灣與威懾的真正來源 - 為什麼美國必須安撫中國，而不僅僅是威脅中國（2/3）
台灣與威懾的真正來源 - 為什麼美國必須安撫中國，而不僅僅是威脅中國（3/3）

---

[1]  這段引伸說明強調在台灣海峽維持和平穩定的過程中，各方必須認識到可信的保證對於有效的威懾至關重要。以下是對這段的進一步解釋：

1.     Credible Assurance in Deterrence（威懾中的可信保證）:

·       在威懾的背景下，可信的保證意味著向目標提供的威脅是有條件的，其實施取決於目標行為的條件。這種保證不是一種獎勵或誘因，而是對威脅的明確條件性保障。

2.     Assurance vs. Trust-Building Measures（保證與建立信任措施的區別）:

·       這段指出，可信的保證不同於建立信任的措施。建立信任的措施通常是在逐漸和互惠的基礎上進行的漸進性妥協。相反，可信的保證不必進行互惠，因為它不是一種讓步或建立信任的努力。這樣的保證可以單方面提出，以加強威懾，只要它不削弱對感知威脅的可信性或應對的能力。

3.     Unilateral Nature of Credible Assurance（可信保證的單方面性質）:

·       強調了可信保證的單方面性質，即它可以單方面提出，而不必等待對方的回應。這不僅不是一種讓步，更不是建立信任的手段，而是為了強化威懾而採取的措施。

4.     Strengthening Deterrence and Building Trust（強化威懾與建立信任）:

·       指出單獨的可信保證將強化威懾效果。如果這樣的保證獲得回應，它有可能隨著時間的推移建立各方之間的信任，進而減緩緊張局勢。

總的來說，這段文字強調了可信的保證在威懾和建立信任方面的重要性，並強調了其在不同層面上的區別。