19671001〈越戰後的亞洲〉 尼克森撰/2020727 Taimocracy翻譯

 ASIA AFTER VIET NAM

By Richard M. Nixon

越戰後的亞洲

尼克森撰 / Taimocracy翻譯 20200727

Foreign Affairs 19671001

 

The war in Viet Nam has for so long dominated our field of vision that it has distorted our picture of Asia.  A small country on the rim of the continent has filled the screen of our minds; but it does not fill the map.  Sometimes dramatically, but more often quietly, the rest of Asia has been undergoing a profound, an exciting and on balance an extraordinarily promising transformation.  One key to this transformation is the emergence of Asian regionalism; another is the development of a number of the Asian economies; another is gathering disaffection with all the old isms that have so long imprisoned so many minds and so many governments.  By and large the non-communist Asian governments are looking for solutions that work, rather than solutions that fit a preconceived set of doctrines and dogmas. 越戰長期以來一直主導著我們的視野，以致於扭曲了我們對亞洲的整體瞭解。亞洲大陸邊緣的一個小國充斥我們的思想；實際上，它並非地圖的全部。其他亞洲國家正在靜靜的、但驚天動地的經歷一個既驚奇、平衡又極富希望的轉型。此轉型的關鍵之一是「亞洲區域主義」；另一個關鍵，是部分亞洲經濟體的發展；再一個，是人們不滿於長期監禁思想的過時主義和對政府施政。大體而言，非共產主義的亞洲國家政府，正在尋找有效的解決方案，而不是尋找符合預設的教義和教條主義的解決方案。 

Most of them also recognize a common danger, and see its source as Peking.  Taken together, these developments present an extraordinary set of opportunities for a U.S. policy which must begin to look beyond Viet Nam.  In looking toward the future, however, we should not ignore the vital role Viet Nam has played in making these developments possible.  Whatever one may think of the “domino” theory, it is beyond question that without the American commitment in Viet Nam Asia would be a far different place today. 亞洲各國大多數人認識到共同危險的源頭是北京。整體來說，這些事態發展，為美國政策提供了非凡與連串的機遇，我們的眼界必須開始超越越南一國，關照全亞洲。但是，在展望未來時，我們不應忽視越南在使這些發展成為可能的過程中，所發揮的重要角色。不管人們對骨牌理論有何看法，毫無疑問，如果沒有美國對越南的承諾，今天的亞洲情況將大為不同。 

The U.S. presence has provided tangible and highly visible proof that communism is not necessarily the wave of Asia's future.  This was a vital factor in the turnaround in Indonesia, where a tendency toward fatalism is a national characteristic.  It provided a shield behind which the anti-communist forces found the courage and the capacity to stage their counter-coup and, at the final moment, to rescue their country from the Chinese orbit.  And, with its 1oo million people, and its 3,000-mile arc of islands containing the region's richest hoard of natural resources, Indonesia constitutes by far the greatest prize in the Southeast Asian area. 美國的駐留（軍）提供了切實可見的證據，表明：共產主義並不一定是亞洲未來的潮流。這是具有宿命論傾向民族特色的印尼，能實現轉變的重要因素。它提供了一個盾牌，反共部隊在此盾牌下獲得了展開反政變的勇氣和能力，並在最後時刻，從中國軌道上解救了自己的國家。而且，印尼擁有一億計的人口，並且擁有包含該地區最豐富的自然資源的3000英里長的島弧，是迄今為止東南亞地區最大的成就。 

Beyond this, Viet Nam has diverted Peking from such other potential targets as India, Thailand and Malaysia.  It has bought vitally needed time for governments that were weak or unstable or leaning toward Peking as a hedge against the future—time which has allowed them to attempt to cope with their own insurrections while pressing ahead with their political, economic and military development.  From Japan to India, Asian leaders know why we are in Viet Nam and, privately if not publicly, they urge us to see it through to a satisfactory conclusion. 此外，越南已將北京眼光從其他潛在目標（如印度，泰國和馬來西亞）轉移過來。這些政府不管是脆弱，不穩定或親北京，越南替這些政府爭取了因應未來的寶貴時間，使他們可以嘗試應對國內的叛亂，同時推進政治，經濟和軍事發展。從日本到印度，亞洲領導人知道我們（美國）為什麼要進入越南，並且私下地（即使不是公開地）也敦促我們，做出令人滿意的結論。 

II 

Many argue that an Atlantic axis is natural and necessary, but maintain, in effect, that Kipling was right, and that the Asian peoples are so “different” that Asia itself is only peripherally an American concern.  This represents a racial and cultural chauvinism that does little credit to American ideals, and it shows little appreciation either of the westward thrust of American interests or of the dynamics of world development. 許多人認為，大西洋軸線是自然而必要的，但實際上卻證明了吉卜林(Rudyard Kipling)是對的[1]，亞洲人民（與歐美）非常不同，以至於亞洲本身僅是美國人關注的邊緣事項之一—這觀點代表著種族主義和文化沙文主義，對美國的理想沒多大幫助，對美國利益西向的推力，或對世界發展動力，也很少貢獻。 

During the final third of the twentieth century, Asia, not Europe or Latin America, will pose the greatest danger of a confrontation which could escalate into World War lll.  At the same time, the fact that the United States has now fought three Asian wars in the space of a generation is grimly but truly symbolic of the deepening involvement of the United States what happens on the other side of the Pacific—which modern transportation and communications have brought closer to us today than Europe was in the years immediately preceding World War II. 在二十世紀的最後三分之一，亞洲（而非歐洲或拉丁美洲）將構成對抗的最大危險，這種對抗可能會升級為第三次世界大戰。同時，在一代人的時間裡，美國已經打了三場亞洲戰爭，情勢嚴峻，但象徵在太平洋彼岸的美國日益參與亞洲。透過現代交通運輸和通信，現在的美國與亞洲，比第二次世界大戰之前的美國與歐洲更親密。 

The United States is a Pacific power.  Europe has been withdrawing the remnants of empire, but the United States, with its coast reaching in an arc from Mexico to the Bering Straits, is one anchor of a vast Pacific community.  Both our interests and our ideals propel us westward across the Pacific, not as conquerors but as partners, linked by the sea not only with those oriental nations on Asia's Pacific littoral but at the same time with occidental Australia and New Zealand, and with the island nations between. 美國是太平洋大國。歐洲一直在從帝國的殘餘中後撤，但從墨西哥到白令海峽，美國的海岸呈弧形延伸，是太平洋廣大社區的重鎮之一。我們的利益和理想，都推動我們向西跨越太平洋，不是作為征服者而是作為夥伴，透過海洋不僅與亞洲太平洋沿岸的那些遠東國家，而且與西方國家的澳大利亞、紐西蘭，及與中間的島嶼國家連在一起。 

Since World War II, a new Asia has been emerging with startling rapidity; indeed, Asia is changing more swiftly than any other part of the world.  All around the rim of China nations are becoming Western without ceasing to be Asian. 從二次世界大戰以來，一新的亞洲以驚人的速度出現。的確，亞洲比世界上任何其他地區變化更快。中國周邊國家在仍保有亞洲特性下，成為西方世界的一員。 

The dominant development in Asia immediately after World War II was decolonization, with its admixture of intense nationalism.  But the old nationalist slogans have less meaning for today's young than they had for their fathers.  Having never known a "colonialist," they find colonialists unconvincing as scapegoats for the present ills of their societies.  If dissatisfied with conditions as they see them, the young tend to blame those now in power. 第二次世界大戰後，亞洲的主要發展是，伴隨強烈民族主義的脫殖民化。但對今天的年輕人而言，古老的民族主義口號，比對他們的父親而言缺乏意義。年輕人從來沒有碰過「殖民者」，想以「殖民主義」口號轉移社會弊端，根本無法說服他們。年輕人如果不滿意他們所看到的狀況，往往就指責那些當權者。 

As the sharp anti-colonial focus blurs, the old nationalism is evolving into a more complex, multi-layered set of concepts and attitudes.  On the one hand are a multitude of local and tribal identifications—the Montagnards in Viet Nam, the Han tribes in Burma, the provincial and linguistic separatisms that constantly claw at the fabric of Indian unity.  On the other hand, there is a reaching-out by the governing élites, and particularly the young, for something larger, more like an Asian regionalism. 隨著尖銳的反殖民主義日益模糊，傳統民族主義正變得更複雜、多層次的概念和態度。一方面是許多本地和部落認同，如越南的蒙塔格納德人，緬甸的漢族部落，省和語言分裂主義，不斷地影響著越南（原文為Indian）的團結。另一方面，執政的精英們，尤其是年輕菁英，正在嘗試更廣大的領域，如亞洲區域主義。 

The developing coherence of Asian regional thinking is reflected in a disposition to consider problems and loyalties in regional terms, and to evolve regional approaches to development needs and to the evolution of a new world order.  This is not excessively chauvinistic, but rather in the nature of a coalescing confidence, a recognition that Asia can become a counterbalance to the West, and an increasing disposition to seek Asian solutions to Asian problems through cooperative action. 亞洲區域思想發展反映出，從區域條件來考慮問題和認同，並以區域方法針對需求的發展，和新世界秩序的演化。這絕非盲目的，而是發自本質上的信心匯整，認識到亞洲可與西方保持平衡，以及願意透過合作行動解決亞洲問題。 

Along with the rising complex of national, sub-regional and regional identification and pride, there is also an acute sense of common danger—a factor which serves as catalyst to the others. 隨著不斷增強的國家，次區域和區域認同與自豪，人們還敏銳的認識到共同的危險，這一因素是其他因素的催化劑。 

The common danger from Communist China is now in the process of shifting the Asian governments' center of concern.  During the colonial and immediately post-colonial eras, Asians stood opposed primarily to the West, which represented the intruding align power.  But now the West has abandoned its colonial role, and it no longer threatens the independence of the Asian nations.  Red China, however, does, and its threat is clear, present and repeatedly and insistently expressed.  The message has not been lost on Asia's leaders.  They recognize that the West, and particularly the United States, now represents not an oppressor but a protector.  And they recognize their need for protection. 面臨共同危險共產主義中國，現在正在轉移亞洲政府關注的焦點。在殖民時期和後殖民時代，亞洲人主要是反對西方，西方代表著入侵的共同勢力。但現在，西方已放棄其殖民統治，它不再威脅亞洲國家的獨立。但，紅色中國卻成為威脅，它的威脅是明確的，現前的，持續不斷的。它給亞洲領導人的訊息未曾稍減。亞洲領導人認識到，西方，尤其是美國，現在不再是壓迫者，而是保護者。他們認識到他們需要被保護。 

This does not mean that the old resentments and distrusts have vanished, or that new ones will not arise.  It does, however, mean that there has been an important shift in the balance of their perceptions about the balance of danger, and this shift has important implications for the future. 這並不意味著舊的怨恨和不信任已經消失，或者不會出現新的怨恨和不信任。但是，這確實意味著他們對「危險平衡」的認知已發生了重要變化，並且這種變化對未來具有重要意義。 

One of the legacies of Viet Nam almost certainly will be a deep reluctance on the part of the United States to become involved once again in a similar intervention on a similar basis.  The war has imposed severe strains on the United States, not only militarily and economically but socially and politically as well. 幾乎可以肯定，越南的影響之一將是：美國非常不願意再次介入類似的干預。戰爭不僅在軍事和經濟上，而且在社會和政治上都給美國帶來了沉重的壓力。 

Bitter dissension has torn the fabric of American intellectual life, and whatever the outcome of the war the tear may be a long time mending.  If another friendly country should be faced with an externally supported communist insurrection—whether in Asia, or in Africa or even Latin America—there is serious question whether the American public or the American Congress would now support a unilateral American intervention, even at the request of the host government.  This makes it vitally in their own interest that the nations in the path of China's ambitions move quickly to establish an indigenous Asian framework for their own future security. 痛苦的分歧已經撕毀了美國知識分子的生活，無論戰爭結果如何，這種撕裂可能需要很長時間去修補。嚴重的是：若其他友好國家面對境外勢力所支持的共產主義叛亂（無論是在亞洲，非洲還是拉丁美洲），即使提出了要求，美國人民或美國國會，是否支持美國單方面介入干預？至關重要的是，被中國野心看中的國家，應出於當地國政府自身利益的考慮，迅速採取行動，為自己的未來安全建立亞洲本土框架。 

In doing so, they need to fashion arrangements able to deal both with old-style wars and with new—with traditional wars, in which armies cross over national boundaries, and with the called "wars of national liberation," in which they burrow under national boundaries. 為此，他們需要制訂既能處理舊式戰爭，又能處理新式戰爭的安排，既可處理跨越國界的傳統戰爭，又可處理國境內所謂的「民族解放戰爭」。 

I am not arguing that the day is past when the United States would respond militarily to communist threats in the less stable parts of the world, or that a unilateral response to a unilateral request for help is out of the question.  But other nations must recognize that the role of the United States as world policeman is likely to be limited in the future.  To ensure that a U.S. response will be forthcoming if needed, machinery must be created that is capable of meeting two conditions: (a) a collective effort by the nations of the region to contain the threat by themselves; and, if that effort fails, (b) a collective request to the United States for assistance.  This is important not only from the respective national standpoints, but also from the standpoint of avoiding nuclear collision. 我不是說美國不會再對世界上不穩定地區的共產主義威脅作出軍事反應，或者美國不再對各國要求為單一事件做反應。而是其他國家必須認識到：美國作為世界警察的角色，將來可能會受到限制。為了確保在需要時能夠對美國做出回應，必須創建能夠滿足兩個條件的機制：（a）地區的各國共同努力，自行控制威脅；（b）集體向美國提出請求援助。這不僅從各自國家的角度來看都是重要的，而且從避免核衝突的角度來看也很重要。  

Nations not possessing great power can indulge in the luxury of criticism of others; those possessing it have the responsibility of decision.  Faced with a clear challenge, the decision not to use one's power must be as deliberate as the decision to use it.  The consequences can be fully as far-reaching and fully as irrevocable. 無強大力量的國家，可（不負責任的）盡情批評他人，但擁有強大力量者，卻有決策的責任。面對明確的挑戰，決定使用或不使用權力，都必須同樣縝密—後果可能是深遠切無法挽回的。 

If another world war is to be prevented, every step possible must be taken to avert direct confrontations between the nuclear powers.  To achieve this, it is essential to minimize the number of occasions on which the great powers have to decide whether Or not to commit their forces.  These choices cannot be eliminated, but they can be reduced by the development of regional defense pacts, in which nations undertake, among themselves, to attempt to contain aggression in their own areas. 如果要防止另一場世界大戰，必須採取一切可能的步驟，來避免核大國間直接對抗。為實現這目標，大國必須減少行使自己力量的機會。透過制定區域防禦條約，即由各國相互承諾去遏制區域內侵略，可減少大國必須自己行使力量的機會，即便不能完全消除這可能。 

If the initial response to a threatened aggression, of whichever type—whether across the border or under it—can be made by lesser powers in the immediate area and thus within the path of aggression, one of two things can be achieved: either they can in fact contain it by themselves, in which case the United States is spared involvement and thus the world is spared the consequences of great-power action; or, if they cannot, the ultimate choice can be presented to the United States in clear-cut terms, by nations which would automatically become allies in whatever response might prove necessary.  To put it another way, the regional pact becomes a buffer separating the distant great power from the immediate threat.  Only if the buffer proves insufficient does the great power become involved, and then in terms that make victory more attainable and the enterprise more palatable. 如果對侵略威脅的最初反應，無論是跨國還是國境內，無論哪種類型，都可先由鄰近較小國家在事件範圍內為之。這兩件事情可以做到：一是，以一己之力遏制於國內，但美國隨時準備介入，這樣世界就可免於大國行動的後果；二是，當他們無法以一己之力遏制，美國可在確切的、任何必要條件的下提出最終選擇，包括這些國家「自動成為美國盟友」。換句話說，區域條約是大國能避免立即威脅的緩衝。只有在緩衝區失敗的情況下，大國才介入，然後，才更能勝利，戰果更大。 

This is particularly important when the threat takes the form of an externally supported guerrilla action, as we have faced in Viet Nam, as is even now being mounted in Thailand, and as could be launched in any of a half-dozen other spots in the Chinese shadow.  Viet Nam has shown how difficult it is to make clear the distinction between this and an ordinary factional civil war, and how subject the assisting power is to charges of having intervened in an internal matter.  Viet Nam's neighbors know that the war there is not internal, but our own allies in Europe have difficulty grasping the fact. 當威脅是由外部所支持的游擊行動形式出現時，這一點尤其重要。就像我們在越南所面臨的那樣，甚至現在泰國也面臨這種威脅，有可能在中國陰影下的其他六個地點出現。越南的例子表明了，要搞清事件是外部勢力或一般派系內戰，或外部勢力介入多深是非常困難的。鄰國知道：越南的戰爭不是內部的，而我們的歐洲盟友們，卻很難體會這一事實。 

The fragmenting of the communist world has lent credence to the frequently heard argument that a communist advance by proxy, as we have seen attempted in Viet Nam, is of only peripheral importance; that with the weakening of rigid central control of the communist world, local fights between communist and non-communist factions are a local matter.  This ignores, however, the fact that with the decentralization of communist control has come an appropriately tailored shift in communist tactics.  National communism poses a different kind of threat than did the old-style international communism, but by being subtler it is in some ways more dangerous. 共產主義世界的分裂使人們經常聽到這一論點：正如我們在越南所見，共產主義者透過代理人前進僅具有外圍意義。隨著共產主義世界嚴格的中央控制能力減弱，共產主義與非共產主義間的局部鬥爭成為當地事務。但這論點忽略了一個事實：隨著共產主義控制權的下放，共產主義策略也做適當調整。「國家共產主義」與「傳統國際共產主義」的威脅不同，因其更為狡猾，在某方面而言，它更加危險。 

SEATO was useful and appropriate to its time, but it was Western in origin and drew its strength from the United States and Europe.  It has weakened to the point at which it is little more than an institutional embodiment of an American commitment, and a somewhat anachronistic relic of the days when France and Britain were active members.  Asia today needs its own security undertakings, reflecting the new realities of Asian independence and Asian needs. 「東南亞公約組織」很有用且切合當時，但它起源於西方並從美國和歐洲汲取力量。它已經削弱到某種程度，僅是美國的承諾體現在制度上，及是過去法英兩國仍舊活躍時的遺物。今天的亞洲需要自己的安全事業，反映出亞洲獨立和亞洲需求的新現實。 

Thus far, despite a pattern of rapidly increasing cooperation in cultural and economic affairs, the Asian nations have been unwilling to form a military grouping designed to forestall the Chinese threat, even though several have bilateral arrangements with the United States.  But an appropriate foundation-stone exists on which to build: the Asian and Pacific Council.  ASPAC held its first ministerial-level meeting in Seoul in June 1966, and its second in Bangkok in July 1967.  It has carefully limited itself to strengthening regional cooperation in economic, cultural and social matters, and its members have voiced strong feelings that, as Japan's Foreign Minister Takeo Miki put it at the Bangkok meeting, it should not be made "a body to promote anticommunist campaigns." 迄今為止，儘管在文化和經濟事務中合作迅速增加，但亞洲國家仍不願組建一支旨在阻止中國威脅的軍事編組，即使其中一些國家與美國達成了雙邊安排。但是，有個既存的適當基礎可用：「亞洲及太平洋理事會」(Asia and Pacific Council, ASPAC)，它於1966年6月在首爾舉行第一次部長級會議，1967年7月在曼谷舉行第二屆部長級會議。它謹慎地局限在經濟，文化和社會事務範圍加強區域合作，其成員表達了如日本外交大臣三木武夫在曼谷會議上表示，不應將其定為「促進反共運動的架構」的強烈意向。 

Despite ASPAC's present cultural and economic orientation, however, the solidifying awareness of China's threat should make it possible—if the need for a regional alliance is put in sufficiently compelling terms—to develop it into an alliance actively dedicated to concerting whatever efforts might be necessary to maintain the security of the region.  And ASPAC is peculiarly well situated to play such a role.  Its members (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, South Viet Nam, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, with Laos as an observer) all are acutely conscious of the Chinese threat.  All except Malaysia have military ties with the United States.  It has the distinct advantage of including Australia and New Zealand, which share the danger and would be able to contribute substantially to its strength, without an unbalancing great-power presence. 儘管ASPAC顯現文化和經濟的性質，但，若增強對中國威脅的認識，以充分有力的條件進行區域聯盟的說服，則有可能將其發展為積極採取協調行動以維護該地區安全的聯盟。而且，ASPAC特別適合發揮這樣的角色。其成員（韓國，日本，台灣，泰國，馬來西亞，南越，菲律賓，澳大利亞和紐西蘭，而寮國則為觀察員）都敏銳地意識到了中國的威脅。除馬來西亞外，所有其他國家都與美國有軍事關係。它具有包括澳大利亞和紐西蘭在內的獨特優勢，它們共同承擔著危險，並且能夠在不失去「大國勢力平衡」的情況下，對其實力做出重大貢獻。 

I do not mean to minimize the difficulties of winning acceptance of such a concept.  In Japan, public opinion still lags behind official awareness of military needs.  The avowedly neutralist nations under China's cloud would be reluctant, at present, to join any such grouping.  But looking further down the road we can project either an erosion of their neutralism or the formation of their own loose association or associations, which might be tied into a militarily oriented ASPAC on an interlocking or cooperative basis.  One can hope that even India might finally be persuaded to give its support, having itself been the target of overt Chinese aggression, and still cherishing as it does a desire to play a substantial role beyond its own borders.

然而，我不會小看推廣概念的困難。在日本，輿論仍然落後於官方對軍事需求的認識。那些在中國的烏雲下公開宣稱中立的國家，目前仍不願加入任何這類陣營。但展望未來，我們可預測：若非削減其中立主義，就是形成他們自己的一個或多個鬆散的聯盟，在交錯或合作的基礎上，與以軍事為導向的ASPAC連結。我們能期待，即使印度本身已明顯成為中國侵略的目標，但它仍期盼在境外發揮實質性角色，我們甚至可以支持印度的方式來說服印度。 

III 

Military security has to rest, ultimately, on economic and political stability.  One of the effects of the rapidity of change in the world today is that there can no longer be static stability; there can only be dynamic stability.  A nation or society that fails to keep pace with change is in danger of flying apart.  It is important that we recognize this, but equally important that in trying to maintain a dynamic stability we remember that the stability is as important as the dynamism. 軍事安全最終必須取決於經濟和政治穩定。當今世界瞬息萬變的影響之一是，不會再有靜態穩定；世界不再是一成不變的；只有動態穩定性。一個無法跟上變革步伐的國家或社會，面臨分裂的危險。我們認識到這一點很重要，但同樣重要的是，在嘗試保持動態穩定性時，我們要記住，穩定性與動態性一樣重要。 

If a given set of ends is deemed desirable, then from the standpoint of those dedicated to peace and an essential stability in world order the desideratum is to reach those ends by evolutionary rather than revolutionary means.  Looking at the pattern of change in non-communist Asia, we find that the professed aims of the revolutionaries are in fact being achieved by an evolutionary process.  This offers a dramatic opportunity to draw the distinction between the fact of a revolutionary result and the process of revolutionary change.  The Asian nations are showing that evolutionary change can be as exciting as revolutionary change.  Having revolutionized the aims of their societies, they are showing what can be achieved within a framework of dynamic stability. 如果認為設定的目標是切合需求，則從致力於和平與世界秩序基本穩定的人們的立場出發，會希望透過演變，而不是革命的方式達到目標。縱觀「非共亞洲」的變化模式，我們發現：宣稱革命性的目標，實際上是透過演變的過程來實現。這提供了一個戲劇性的機會，來區分「革命的結果」和「革命的過程」。亞洲國家展示：演變與革命一樣令人精彩。在劇烈改變社會目標後，他們展示了：在動態穩定框架內可達成的成果。 

The “people,” in the broadest sense, have become an entity to be served rather than used.  In much of Asia, this change represents a revolution of no less magnitude than the revolution that created the industrial West, or that in the years following World War II transformed empires into new and struggling nations.  It is precisely the promise of this reversal that has been at the heart of communist rhetoric, and at the heart of the popular and intellectual appeal which that rhetoric achieved. 從最廣泛的意義上講，「人民」一詞已成為「被服務」的對象，而不是「被利用」的實體。這種亞洲大部分地區演變所達到的革命效果，絕不遜於工業西方的革命，或二次大戰後帝國轉型為新興國家。這種逆轉的希望，一直是共產主義宣傳的核心，也是贏取大眾和知識份子吸引力的核心。 

Not all the governments of non-communist Asia fit the Western ideal of parliamentary democracy—far from it.  But Americans must recognize that a highly sophisticated, highly advanced political system, which required many centuries to develop in the West, may not be best for other nations which have far different traditions and are still in an earlier stage of development.  What matters is that these governments are consciously, deliberately and programmatically developing in the direction of greater liberty, greater abundance, broader choice and increased popular involvement in the processes of government. 並非所有「非共亞洲」國家的政府都符合西方議會民主的理想，當然不會是這樣。但，美國人必須認識到：一個高度複雜，高度先進的政治制度，連在西方都需要發展幾個世紀，對那些有著截然不同的傳統，並且仍處於發展初期的國家來說，期望一蹴可及並非最好的選擇。重要的是，這些政府正在邁向更多自由，更富裕，更廣泛選擇，及增加公眾參與政治。 

Poverty that was accepted for centuries as the norm is accepted no longer.  In a sense it could be said that a new chapter is being written in the winning of the West: in this case, a winning of the promise of Western technology and Western organization by the nations of the East.  The cultural clash has had its costs and produced its strains, but out of it is coming a modernization of ancient civilizations that promises to leap the centuries. 人們不再容忍數百年來被視為理所當然的貧窮。從某種意義上可說，西方取得歷史性勝利：在這情況下，東方國家贏得西方的技術和西方的組織。文化的相會已付出代價並產生壓力，隨之而來的是，古老文明現代化，且發展將會跨越幾個世紀。 

The process produces transitional anomalies—such as the Indian woman squatting in the mud, forming cow-dung patties with her hands and laying them out to dry, while a transistor radio in her lap plays music from a Delhi station.  It takes a long time to bring visions of the future to the far villages—but time is needed to make those visions credible, and make them achievable.  Too wide a gap between reality and expectation always produces an explosive situation, and the fact that what the leaders know is possible is unknown to the great mass of the peasantry helps buy time to make the possible achievable.  But the important thing is that the leaders do know what is possible, and by and large they are determined to make it happen. 此過程會產生階段性異常現象，如印度婦女蹲在泥濘中，用手形成牛糞餅將它們晾乾，而膝蓋上的晶體收音機則播放德里車站的音樂。將未來願景帶到偏遠村莊，需要花費很長的時間；要使這些願景可信並使其成為現實，更需要時間。現實與期望之間的差距過大，總是會產生爆炸性局勢，而領導者知道演變是可能的，廣大農民卻不知道，這現象有助於領導者搶到時間使改革成功。但重要的是領導人要確實知道什麼是可能的，且總體說來，他們有決心實現這一目標。 

Whether that process is going to proceed at a pace fast enough to keep one step ahead of the pressure of rising expectations is one of the great questions and challenges of the years ahead.  But there is solid ground for hope.  The successful Asian nations have been writing extraordinary records.  To call their performance an economic miracle would be something of a semantic imprecision; it would also be a disservice.  Precisely because the origins and ingredients of that success are not miraculous, it offers hope to those which have not yet turned the corner. 這個過程是否將以足夠快的速度進行，領先於人們對期望值不斷上升的壓力，這是未來幾年的重大問題和挑戰之一。但是已經有了很有希望的堅實基礎。成功的亞洲國家一直在創造非凡記錄。把它們的政績稱為經濟奇蹟，不僅在語義上不精確，也是一種損害。正是因為成功的來源和因素並非偶然，它為那些尚未走出困境的人們提供了希望。 

India still is a staggering giant, Burma flirts with economic chaos, and the Philippines, caught in a conflict of cultures and in search of an identity, lives in a precarious economic and social balance.  But the most exciting trends in economic development today are being recorded by those Asian nations that have accepted the keys of progress and used them.  Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, Korea, Singapore and Malaysia all have been recording sustained economic growth rates of 7 percent a year or more; Japan has sustained a remarkable average of 9 percent a year since 1950, and an average 16.7 percent per year increase in exports over the same period.  Thailand shifted into a period of rapid growth in 1958 and has averaged 7 percent a year since.  South Korea, despite the unflattering estimates of its people's abilities by the average G.I. during the Korean War, is shooting ahead at a growth rate that has averaged 8 percent a year since 1963, with an average 42 percent a year increase in its exports. 印度仍然是一個令人驚異的巨人，緬甸陷入經濟混亂中，菲律賓在文化衝突並尋求認同，且活在不穩定的經濟和社會平衡中。但，當今那些接受進步要領並加以利用的亞洲國家，正在形塑當今經濟發展中最令人興奮的趨勢。日本，香港，台灣，泰國，韓國，新加坡和馬來西亞，都達到每年7％或以上持續的經濟增長；自1950年以來，日本的年平均增長率一直保持驚人的9％，同期出口年均增長16.7％。泰國於1958年進入快速增長期，此後平均每年增長7％。儘管韓國在朝鮮戰爭期間平均G.I.，自1963年以來，該國以每年平均8％的速度向前發展，其出口平均每年增長42％。  

These rapidly advancing countries vary widely in their social traditions and political systems, but their methods of economic management have certain traits in common: a prime reliance on private enterprise and on the pricing mechanisms of the market as the chief determinant of business decisions; a pacing of monetary expansion to match growth in output; receptivity to private capital investment, both domestic and foreign, including such incentives as tax advantages and quick government clearance of proposed projects; imaginative national programs for dealing with social problems; and, not least, a generally restrained posture in government planning, with the government's role suggestive rather than coercive.  These nations have, in short, discovered and applied the lessons of America's own economic success. 這些迅速發展的國家間，社會傳統和政治制度上差異很大，但是它們的經濟管理方法具有某些共同點：主要是依賴私營企業和價格機制，而市場是企業決策的主要決定因素。貨幣擴張步伐，以適應產出增長；對國內外私人資本投資的接受程度，包括稅收優惠和對擬議項目的政府快速審核等激勵措施；解決社會問題富有想像力的國家方案；尤其重要的是，在政府規劃中大體上受約束的態勢表明：政府的角色只具有鼓勵性的，而非強制性。簡而言之，這些國家發現並運用了美國自身的經濟成功經驗。 

IV 

Any discussion of Asia's future must ultimately focus on the respective roles of four giants: India, the world's most populous non-communist nation; Japan, Asia's principal industrial and economic power; China, the world's most populous nation and Asia's most immediate threat; and the United States, the greatest Pacific power.  (Although the U.S.S.R. occupies much of the land map of Asia, its principal focus is toward the west and its vast Asian lands are an appendage of European Russia.) 任何有關亞洲未來的討論，都必須最聚焦於（印日中美）四巨頭的各自角色：印度，世界上人口最多的非共國家；日本，亞洲的主要工業和經濟大國；中國，世界上人口最多的國家，也是亞洲最直接的威脅；而美國，是太平洋上最強的國家。（儘管蘇聯佔據亞洲的大部份土地，但它主要重點是西向，其廣闊的亞洲土地是歐洲俄羅斯的附屬物而已。） 

India is both challenging and frustrating: challenging because of its promise, frustrating because of its performance.  It suffers from escalating overpopulation, from too much emphasis on industrialization and not enough on agriculture, and from too doctrinaire a reliance on government enterprise instead of private enterprise.  Many are deeply pessimistic about its future.  One has to remember, however, that in the past five years India has fought two wars and faced two catastrophic droughts.  On both the population and the agricultural fronts, India's present leaders at least are trying.  And the essential factor, from the standpoint of U.S. policy, is that a nation of nearly half a billion people is seeking ways to wrench itself forward without a sacrifice of basic freedoms; in exceedingly difficult circumstances, the ideal of revolutionary change is being tested.  For the most populous representative democracy in the world to fail, while Communist China—surmounting its troubles—succeeded, would be a disaster of worldwide proportions.  Thus the United States must do two things: (1) continue its aid and support for Indian economic objectives; and (2) do its best to persuade the Indian Government to shift its means and adjust its institutions so that those objectives can be more quickly and more effectively secured, drawing from the lessons not only of the United States but also of India's more successful neighbors, including Pakistan. 印度既充滿挑戰又挫折：因其美好承諾而充滿挑戰，因其表現不佳而挫折。它因人口過剩、因過分重視工業化、因農業生產不足，及過於依賴公有企業而非私營企業的原則而深受其苦。許多人對印度的未來深表悲觀。但必須記住：過去五年中，印度進行兩次戰爭，面臨兩次災難性的乾旱。印度現任領導人至少都在努力對抗人口和農業問題。從美國政策的角度來看，最重要的因素是，一個擁有近五億人口的國家正在尋求方法：在不犧牲基本自由的情況下向前邁進。在極其困難的情況下，劇烈變革的理想正受到考驗。讓世界上人口最多的代議制民主制失敗，反而讓共產主義中國（克服其麻煩而）成功了，將是一場全世界性的災難。因此，美國必須做兩件事：（1）繼續為印度的經濟目標提供援助和支持；（2）盡最大的努力說服印度政府改變其手段並調整其機構，借鑑美國經驗，而且還要借鑑印度較成功的鄰國的經驗，包括巴基斯坦，以便更快，更有效地確保實現這些目標。 

Japan has been edging cautiously and discreetly toward a wider leadership role, acutely conscious at every step that bitter memories of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere might rise to haunt her if she pressed too hard or too eagerly.  But what would not have been possible ten, or even five, years ago is becoming possible today.  Half the people now living in Asia have been born since World War II, and the new generation has neither the old guilts (in the case of the Japanese themselves) nor the old fears born of conquest. 日本一直小心謹慎地朝著更廣泛的領導角色前進，敏銳地意識到，如果日本太逼或太緊迫，「大東亞共榮圈」的痛苦回憶可能會困擾它。但是，十年甚至五年前仍不可能實現的事情，如今已成為可能。現在生活在亞洲的人有一半是戰後出生的，新一代既沒有舊罪惡感（對於日本人本身），也沒有過去從征服中產生的恐懼感。 

The natural momentum of Japan's growth, the industry of her people and the advanced state of her society must inevitably propel Japan into a more conspicuous position of leadership.  Japan's industrial complex, expanding by 14 percent annually since 1950, already is comparable to that of West Germany or the United Kingdom.  Japan's gross national product ($95 billion) is substantially greater than that of mainland China, with seven times the population.  Japan is expected soon to rank as the world's third-strongest economic power, trailing only the United States and the Soviet Union.  Along with this dramatic economic surge, Japan will surely want to play a greater role both diplomatically and militarily in maintaining the balance in Asia.  As the Prime Minister of one neighboring country put it: "The Japanese are a great people, and no great people will accept as their destiny making better transistor radios and teaching the underdeveloped how to grow better rice." 日本自然的增長動力，人民的工業和社會的先進狀態，不可避免地會將日本推向更顯著的領導地位。自1950年以來，日本的工業設施以每年14％的速度增長，已可媲美西德或英國。日本的國民生產總值（950億美元）大大高於中國大陸，而後者的人口是日本的七倍。預計日本將很快成為世界第三強經濟大國，僅次於美國和蘇聯。隨著經濟的飛速發展，日本必定希望在外交和軍事上扮演更大的角色，以維持亞洲的平衡。正如一個鄰國首相所說：「日本人是偉大的民族，沒有偉大的人民願意滿足於製造更好的晶體收音機、傳授落後國家種植更好的水稻而已。」 

This greater role will entail, among other things, a modification of the present terms of the Japanese Constitution, which specifically provides that "land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained." (Japan's 275000 men presently under arms are called "Self-Defense Forces.") Twenty years ago it was considered unthinkable that Japan should acquire even a conventional military capability.  Five years ago, while some Japanese thought about it, they did not talk about it. 除其他事項外，這一更大的角色需要修改日本憲法現行條款，該條款明確規定「不保持陸海空軍及其他戰爭力量。」（日本目前有被稱為「自衛隊」的275,000名武裝人員。）20年前，人們認為：日本即使要獲得常規軍事能力，也被認為超乎想像之外。五年前，雖然部份日本人思考此議題，但並沒有談論它。 

Today a substantial majority of Japanese still oppose the idea, but it is openly discussed and debated.  Looking toward the future, one must recognize that it simply is not realistic to expect a nation moving into the first rank of major powers to be totally dependent for its own security on another nation, however close the ties.  Japan's whole society has been restructured since World War II.  While there still are traces of fanaticism, its politics at least on form to the democratic ideal.  Not to trust Japan today with its own armed forces and with responsibility for its own defense could be to place its people and its government under a disability which, whatever its roots in painful recent history, ill accords with the role Japan must play in helping secure the common safety of non-communist Asia. 今天，絕大多數日本人仍然反對這個想法，但是已可公開討論和辯論。展望未來，人們必須認識到：期望一個大國將自身安全完全依賴另一個國家，無論關係如何緊密，都是不切實際。從二次大戰以來，日本進行了整個社會的重組。儘管仍然有狂熱的痕跡，但其政治至少符合民主理想。今天，不論其根源於近代痛苦的歷史，限制日本的武裝部隊和對自己的國防責任，而使其人民和政府置於無能之地，與其在確保「非共的亞洲」共同安全可發揮的角色不符。 

Any American policy toward Asia must come urgently to grips with the reality of China.  This does not mean, as many would simplistically have it, rushing to grant recognition to Peking, to admit it to the United Nations and to ply it with offers of trade—all of which would serve to confirm its rulers in their present course.  It does mean recognizing the present and potential danger from Communist China, and taking measures designed o meet that danger.  It also means distinguishing carefully between long-range and short-range policies, and fashioning short-range programs so as to advance Our long-range goals. 中國是一種現實，美國對亞洲的任何政策都必須注意這點。但這並不像許多人一樣，意味著要簡單地爭相承認北京，使其加入聯合國並提供貿易優惠，所有這些都將鼓勵其統治者強化目前的路線。這確實意味著我們要認識到中國共產黨當前和潛在的危險，並採取措施以應對這種危險。這也意味著要認真區分長期政策和短期政策，並要制訂短期計劃以推進我們的長期目標。 

Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors.  There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation.  But we could go disastrously wrong if, in pursuing this long-range goal, we failed in the short range to read the lessons of history. 長遠來看，我們根本無法永遠把中國留在國際大家庭之外，讓它在角落滋長幻想，珍惜仇恨心並威脅鄰國。在這個小小的星球上，沒有任何地方能讓十億有潛在能力的人在憤怒中孤立生活。但是，如果我們在追求長期目標同時，在短期內未能記取歷史教訓，那麼我們可能會犯下災難性的錯誤。 

The world cannot be safe until China changes.  Thus our aim, to the extent that we can influence events, should be to induce change.  The way to do this is to persuade China that it must change: that it cannot satisfy its imperial ambitions, and that its own national interest requires a turning away from foreign adventuring and a turning inward toward the solution of its own domestic problems. 除非中國改變，否則世界不會安全。因此，我們的目標應該是，在可以影響事件的範圍內，誘發改變。方法是說服中國它必須改變：它不能有無止盡的帝國野心，其國家利益需要從對外冒進，轉為解決自己的國內問題。 

If the challenge posed by the Soviet Union after World War II was not precisely similar, it was sufficiently so to offer a valid precedent and a valuable lesson.  Moscow finally changed when it, too, found that change was necessary.  This was essentially a change of the head, not of the heart.  Internal evolution played a role, to be sure, but the key factor was that the West was able to create conditions—notably in the shoring up of European defenses, the rapid restoration of European economies and the cementing of the Atlantic Alliance—that forced Moscow to look to the wisdom of reaching some measure of accommodation with the West.  We are still far from reaching a full détente, but at least substantial progress has been made. 如果與蘇聯在二次大戰後所帶來的挑戰並不完全一致，那蘇聯的挑戰也仍足以提供前車之鑑和寶貴教訓。當莫斯科發現需要改變時，它也一樣會改變。蘇聯的改變本質上是改變腦袋，而不是改變內心。可以肯定的是，蘇聯內部的演變發揮了角色，但關鍵因素是西方能創造條件，尤其是在加強歐洲防禦，歐洲經濟的快速復興，及鞏固大西洋聯盟等，迫使莫斯科尋求智慧而與西方達成某種和解。我們仍未達成充分的和解，但至少已取得實質性進展。 

During the next decade the West faces two prospects which, together, could create a crisis of the first order: (1) that the Soviets may reach nuclear parity with the United States; and (2) that China, within three to five years, will have a significant deliverable nuclear capability—and that this same China will be outside any nonproliferation treaty that might be signed, free, if it chooses, to scatter its weapons among "liberation" forces anywhere in the world. 在接下來的十年中，西方面臨著兩個前景，它們綜合起來可能造成即刻危機：（1）蘇聯的核武可能達到與美國平起平坐的地位；（2）中國若在三到五年內擁有可實戰的核武，如果中國願意的話，它將自外於任何禁止核武擴散條約之約束，而將核武擴散到世界各地的共產解放軍隊去。 

This heightens the urgency of building buffers that can keep the major nuclear powers apart in the case of "wars of national liberation," supported by Moscow or Peking but fought by proxy.  It also requires that we now assign to the strengthening of non- communist Asia a priority comparable to that which we gave to the strengthening of Western Europe after World War II. 由莫斯科或北京所支持，但由代理人進行的「民族解放戰爭」，增加了建立緩衝區的緊迫性，這些緩衝區可隔離主要核大國。它還需要我們現在將加強「非共的亞洲」之優先地位，以與二次大戰後的西歐相當。 

Some counsel conceding to China a "sphere of influence" embracing much of the Asian mainland and extending even to the island nations beyond; others urge that we eliminate the threat by preemptive war.  Clearly, neither of these courses would be acceptable to the United States or to its Asian allies.  Others argue that we should seek an anti-Chinese alliance with European powers, even including the Soviet Union.  Quite apart from the obvious problems involved in Soviet participation, such a course would inevitably carry connotations of Europe vs. Asia, white vs. non-white, which could have catastrophic repercussions through-out the rest of the non-white world in general and Asia in particular.  If our long-range aim is to pull China back into the family of nations, we must avoid the impression that the great powers or the European powers are "ganging up;" the response should clearly be one of active defense rather than potential offense, and must be untainted with any suspicion of racism. 我們一些法律顧問建議承認中國「勢力範圍」，該勢力範圍涵蓋了亞洲大陸的大部分地區，甚至延伸至其他島嶼國家；其他人則敦促我們通過先發制人的戰爭消除威脅。顯然，這些方案都不是美國或其亞洲盟友可接受的。另外一些人則認為，我們應該尋求與歐洲大國，甚至包括蘇聯在內的反中同盟。除了與蘇聯參與有關的明顯問題外，這樣的方案不可避免地帶有歐洲與亞洲，白人與非白人的涵義，這可能會在整個非白人世界以及其他地區造成災難性的影響，特別是亞洲。如果我們的長期目標是使中國重返國際大家庭，則我們必須避免給人留下這樣的印象，即大國或歐洲大國正在「聯合起來」；應對措施顯然應該是「積極防禦」，而非「潛在攻擊」，並且必須毫無種族主義的色彩。 

For the United States to go it alone in containing China would not only place an unconscionable burden on our own country, but also would heighten the chances of nuclear war while undercutting the independent development of the nations of Asia.  The primary restraint on China's Asian ambitions should be exercised by the Asian nations in the path of those ambitions, backed by the ultimate power of the United States.  This is sound strategically, sound psychologically and sound in terms of the dynamics of Asian development.  Only as the nations of non-communist Asia become so strong—economically, politically and they no longer furnish tempting targets for Chinese aggression, will the leaders in Peking be persuaded to turn their energies inward rather than outward.  And that will be the time when the dialogue with mainland China can begin. 如果美國獨自控制中國，不僅會給我國造成不合理的負擔，而且會在減少亞洲國家的獨立發展的同時，增加發生核戰的機會。遏止中國對亞洲的野心，必須由亞洲國家扮演主要角色，加上美國的終極力量支持，在中國侵略路徑上逐一突破。就亞洲發展的動力而言，這在戰略上，心理上和聲音上都是合理的。只有當「非共的亞洲」國家在經濟，政治上變得強大，並且不再為中國的侵略提供誘人的目標時，北京的領導人才能被說服向內而不是向外轉移自己的精力。那將是與中國大陸開始對話的時候。 

For the short run, then, this means a policy of firm restraint, of no reward, of a creative counterpressure designed to persuade Peking that its interests can be served only by accepting the basic rules of international civility.  For the long run, it means pulling China back into the world community—but as a great and pressing nation, not as the epicenter of world revolution. 因此，就短期而言，這意味著要採取堅定的遏制政策，絕不給予任何獎勵。這種創造性的反壓力旨在說服北京，只有接受國際文明的基本規則才能維護其利益。從長遠來看，這意味著將中國拉回國際社會，但要成為一個偉大而進步的國家，而不是成為世界革命的中心。 

"Containment without isolation" is a good phrase and a sound concept, as far as it goes.  But it covers only half the problem.  Along with it, we need a positive policy of pressure and persuasion, of dynamic detoxification, a marshaling of Asian forces both to keep the peace and to help draw off the poison from the Thoughts of Mao. 就目前而言，「圍堵而非孤立」是好口號，也是合理的概念。但這僅講到問題的一半。此時，我們需要採取積極的壓力和說服政策，動態除毒，集結亞洲部隊，以維持和平並幫助中國從毛澤東思想中排除毒素。 

Dealing with Red China is something like trying to cope with the more explosive ghetto elements in our own country.  In each case a potentially destructive force has to be curbed; in each case an outlaw element has to be brought within the law; in each case dialogues have to be opened; in each case aggression has to be restrained while education proceeds; and, not least, in neither case can we afford to let those now self-exiled from society Stay exiled forever.  We have to proceed with both an urgency born of necessity and a patience born of realism, moving step by calculated step toward the final goal. 與紅色中國打交道，就像是試圖應對我們國家中更具爆炸性的隔離區。無論如何，都必須遏制潛在的破壞力量；都必須將違法成分納入法律範圍；都必須進行對話；在進行教育的過程中都必須限制侵略性；而且，同樣重要的是，無論如何，我們都無法讓那些自我流放的人永遠流放。我們必須既要從必然產生的緊迫感，又要從現實主義產生的耐心，著手一步一步地朝著最終目標邁進。 

V 

And finally, the role of the United States. 最後，美國的角色。 

Weary with war, disheartened with allies, disillusioned with aid, dismayed at domestic crises, many Americans are heeding the call of the new isolationism.  And they are not alone; there is a tendency in the whole Western world to turn inward, to become parochial and isolationist—dangerously so.  But there can be neither peace nor security a generation hence unless we recognize now the massiveness of the forces at work in Asia, where more than half the world's people live and where the greatest explosive potential is lodged. 許多美國人對戰爭感到厭倦，對盟友感到沮喪，對援助感到失望，對國內危機感到沮喪，許多美國人正在關注新的孤立主義。他們並非特例，整個西方世界都有向內轉向，成為眼光狹隘和孤立主義者，這很危險。但除非我們現在意識到亞洲的龐大勞動人口，佔世界一半以上人口，且爆發力最大，不會有和平與安全。  

Out of the wreckage of two world wars we forged a concept of an Atlantic community, within which a ravaged Europe was rebuilt and the westward advance of the Soviets contained.  If tensions now strain that community, these are themselves a by-product of success.  But history has its rhythms, and now the focus of both crisis and change is shifting.  Without turning our backs on Europe, we have now to reach out westward to the East, and to fashion the sinews of a Pacific community. 在兩次世界大戰的殘骸中，我們構築了一個大西洋共同體的概念。在這個共同體中，遭受重創的歐洲得以被重建，而蘇聯人則向西推進。如果目前的緊張局勢損及該共同體，那麼這些事件本身就是成功的必然之惡（？）。但歷史自有其節奏，現在危機與變化的焦點都在轉移。在不背棄歐洲的情況下，我們現在必須從西向東延伸，並塑造太平洋共同體架構。 

This has to be a community in the fullest sense: a community of purpose, of understanding and of mutual assistance, in which military defenses are coordinated while economies are strengthened; a community embracing a concert of Asian strengths as a counterforce to the designs of China; one in which Japan will play an increasing role, as befits its commanding position as a world economic power; and one in which U.S. leadership is exercised with restraint, with respect for our partners and with a sophisticated discretion that ensures a genuinely Asian idiom and Asian origin for whatever new Asian institutions are developed. 這必須是個具有廣泛意義的共同體：一個有目的，體諒和互助的共同體，能同時協調增強經濟與軍事防禦；一個擁護亞洲實力的群體，以對抗中國的圖謀；一個讓世界經濟大國日本，能扮演主導地位，與越來越重要角色的共同體；一個有克制的美國領導地位，尊重我們的合作夥伴，並且有周全的判斷力的共同體，以確保無論發展出怎樣的新亞洲機構，都是真正的亞洲模式並且是源自於亞洲傳統。 

In a design for Asia's future, there is no room for heavy-handed American pressures; there is need for subtle encouragement of the kind of Asian initiatives that help bring the design to reality. 在為亞洲未來設計的過程中，美國不應施加重手。有必要進行微妙的鼓勵使亞洲自發的倡議付諸實現。 

The distinction may seem superficial, but in fact it is central both to the kind of Asia we want and to the effectiveness of the means of achieving it.  The central pattern of the future in U.S.-Asian relations must be American support for Asian initiatives. 這種區別看似膚淺，但實際上對我們想要的那種亞洲，和有效實現的手段都至關重要。美亞關係未來的中心模式必須是：美國支持下，亞洲自發的倡議。 

The industrial revolution has shown that mass abundance is possible, and as the United States moves into the post-industrial world-the age of computers and cybernetics-we have to find ways to engineer an escape from privation for those now living in mass poverty.  There can be no security, whatever our nuclear stockpiles, in a world of boiling resentment and magnified envy.  The oceans provide no sanctuary for the rich, no barrier behind which we can hide our abundance. 工業革命表明，大規模富裕有可能實現，隨著美國進入後工業化時代（計算機和控制論的時代），我們必須找到方法，使處於大規模貧困中的人們能擺脫貧困。在充滿怨恨和嫉妒的世界裡，無論我們的核彈庫如何充分，都無法保障安全。海洋不會保護富人，但也沒有任何障礙可限制我們的富裕（？）。 

The struggle for influence in the Third World is a three-way race among Moscow, Peking and the West.  The West has offered both idealism and example, but the idealism has often been unconvincing and the example non-idiomatic.  However, an industrialized Japan demonstrates the economically possible in Asian terms, while an advancing Asia tied into a Pacific community offers a bridge to the underdeveloped elsewhere.  During this final third of the twentieth century, the great race will be between man and change: the race to control change, rather than be controlled by it.  In this race we cannot afford to wait for others to act, and then merely react.  And the race in Asia is already under way. 莫斯科，北京和西方三方在第三世界爭取影響力。西方既提供了理想主義又提供了範例。理想主義常難說服別人，而範例卻無須多言。然而，工業化的日本展示了經濟上亞洲模式的可能性，而與太平洋共同體緊密相連的發達亞洲，則可架起與其他地方落後國家的橋樑。在二十世紀的最後三分之一，大競賽出現在人與變革之間：由人來控制變革，而不是人被變革所控制。在這場競賽中，我們不能等待他人採取行動然後作出反應。亞洲的競賽已在進行中了。

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[1]  https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/07/08/rudyard-kipling-in-america