人事同意權的武器化：從癱瘓憲政機關到沒收民主選舉 Weaponizing the Confirmation Power: From Paralyzing Constitutional Institutions to Nullifying Democratic Elections

【雙魚之論】
In November 2025, the Blue-White camp—comprising the Kuomintang and the Taiwan People's Party—jointly blocked the confirmation vote for nominees to the National Communications Commission (NCC). As a result, the NCC was left with only three commissioners, rendering it unable to convene formal meetings and effectively paralyzing its operations, a situation that has persisted to this day.

Similarly, the Constitutional Court was incapacitated for more than 400 days due to amendments to the Constitutional Court Procedure Act pushed through under Blue-White leadership, which raised the deliberation threshold required for decisions. Only in December 2025, after a judicial ruling declared portions of the amendments unconstitutional, was the Court able to resume operations on a limited basis.
At present, the Blue-White camp continues to obstruct deliberation of the Central Government General Budget Bill and the Special Act for the Defense Procurement Budget by repeatedly refusing to refer them to committee. This not only disrupts routine government operations, but directly undermines national security and fiscal order. As of February 2026, the general budget has been blocked for more than 150 days, while the defense special bill has been rejected over ten times. The resulting delays in military modernization procurement have drawn international concern regarding Taiwan’s commitment to self-defense.

Against this backdrop, there are substantial grounds to anticipate that the Blue-White camp may once again weaponize the confirmation power for political purposes—this time by deliberately delaying or rejecting appointments to the Central Election Commission (CEC). By law, the CEC is composed of nine to eleven commissioners, and meetings require a majority presence (at least five to six members) to convene and adopt resolutions. However, after November 3, 2025, only four commissioners remained in office—including Acting Chair Wu Jung-hui and You Ching-hsin—leaving the Commission unable to hold formal meetings. Electoral administration has since been maintained only through provisional mechanisms, insufficient for matters requiring formal Commission resolutions, such as the announcement of election schedules or the promulgation of regulations.
On December 22, 2025, the Executive Yuan nominated seven candidates (including You Ying-lung), but legislative review has proceeded slowly. As of February 16, 2026, although caucus consultations, public hearings, and questioning sessions have been conducted, the confirmation vote has not yet been completed. Should delays continue, or should only a portion of nominees be confirmed—resulting in total membership falling below the statutory minimum—the risks to electoral administration would be significantly amplified. In an extreme scenario, the 2026 local elections and the 2028 national elections could fail to take place as scheduled. This is not alarmism, but a reasonable risk projection based on the Blue-White camp’s established pattern of conduct.

Indeed, Chen Yu-jen, a Kuomintang legislator representing Kinmen, publicly stated in May 2025 that “by 2028, we may not even know whether we will still have the opportunity to vote.” Cheng Li-wun echoed similar sentiments and has repeatedly delayed internal party nomination procedures—particularly in municipalities and counties such as Taichung, New Taipei, Hsinchu County, Changhua County, and Yilan County—seemingly undeterred by the potential electoral consequences.
Should these developments crystallize, the consequences would extend far beyond any single agency or budget bill. What would be at stake is the systemic integrity of democratic governance itself. Under the cumulative effect of multiple institutional paralyses, Taiwan’s long-cherished democratic achievements could suffer fundamental damage within a short period of time. Once internal political instability deepens and constitutional order becomes destabilized, Beijing would incur little cost in exploiting the power vacuum and social disorder generated by Taiwan’s own institutional dysfunction to advance its long-term strategic objectives. That is the most alarming prospect of all.

2025年11月，藍白陣營（國民黨與民眾黨）聯手封殺NCC人事同意案，導致NCC僅剩3位委員，無法召開正式會議，持續停擺至今；憲法法庭亦因藍白主導的《憲法訴訟法》修正案，導致評議門檻提高而癱瘓逾400天，直至2025年12月經判決宣告部分條文違憲後，方才勉強恢復運作。

目前，藍白陣營以多次拒絕付委持續阻擋《中央政府總預算案》及《國防採購特別預算條例》的審議。此舉不僅影響政府日常運作，更直接衝擊國家安全與財政秩序。截至2026年2月，總預算案已遭阻擋逾150天，國防特別條例草案亦被封殺10次以上，導致國軍現代化裝備採購延宕，國際社會質疑台灣自衛決心。

在此前提下，我們有充分理由推估藍白陣營可能再次動用人事業同意權作為政治工具，針對中央選舉委員會（中選會）委員任命案刻意延宕或否決。目前，中選會置委員9至11人，委員會會議需半數以上出席（至少5-6人）才能開會決議；但2025年11月3日後，僅剩4位委員在任（吳容輝代理主委、游清鑫等），已無法召開正式會議，選務運作僅靠代理機制維持基本行政，無法處理需委員會決議的事項，如選舉期程公告、規則制定等。行政院於2025年12月22日提名7人（游盈隆等），但立院審議進度緩慢，截至2026年2月16日，雖已進行拜會黨團、公聽會及質詢，但尚未完成同意投票。若延宕持續或同意人數不足（僅部分通過，導致總人數低於法定），將放大選務風險，甚至導致2026年地方選舉及2028年全國性選舉無法如期舉行。此並非危言聳聽，而是依藍白既往行為模式所作的合理風險推論。

實際上，國民黨金門立委陳玉珍曾在2025年5月公開表示，「到2028我們還有沒有投票的機會，我們都不知道」；國民黨主席鄭麗文除附和前述言論外，亦多次延遲黨內提名程序（尤其台中市、新北市、新竹縣、彰化縣、宜蘭縣等縣市，至今仍陷協調或初選爭議），對不利於選舉後果似無所懼。

若上述情勢成形，影響將不僅限於單一機關或單一預算案，而是整體民主運作機制的失序。多重制度性癱瘓交織之下，台灣長年引以為傲的民主成就恐在短時間內遭受根本性破壞。一旦內部政治動盪加劇、憲政秩序失衡，北京無須付出高昂成本，便可藉台灣自身失序製造的權力真空與社會混亂，達成其長期戰略目標。這是最恐怖的事情。