19500112〈亞洲危機—美國政策檢視〉Crisis in
Asia - An Examination of U.
【雙魚之論】英文拷到 G / D 找中文翻譯
這是在杜魯門19500105發表聲明（放棄中國）之後的國務卿艾奇遜的補充演說。（原先杜魯門說是19500105下午，卻只有0112的相關文件）。
此講演養與17年後尼克森的文章19671001〈越戰後的亞洲〉 尼克森撰/2020727 Taimocracy翻譯，觀點與架構幾乎一樣。
國務卿艾奇遜演講〈亞洲危機—美國政策檢視〉 DoS 19500112
/ Taimocracy翻譯
國務院公報，二十二號，第551號（1950年1月23日），第111-118頁。
|
Secretary
of State Dean G. Acheson's speech, Crisis in Asia - An Examination of U.S.
Policy |
國務卿艾奇遜演講〈亞洲危機—美國政策檢視〉Taimocracy翻譯 |
|
Foundations
of Policy This afternoon I should
like to discuss with you the relations between the peoples of the United
States and the peoples of Asia, and I used the words "relations of the
peoples of the United States and the peoples of Asia" advisedly. I am
not talking about governments or nations because it seems to me what I want
to discuss with you is this feeling of mine that the relations depend upon
the attitudes of the people; that there are fundamental attitudes,
fundamental interests, fundamental purposes of the people of the United
States, 150 million of them, and of the peoples of Asia, unnumbered millions,
which determine and out of which from their relations of our countries and
the policies of our governments. Out of these attitudes and interests and purposes
grow what we do from day to day. Now let's dispose of one
idea right at the start and not bother with it any more. That is that the
policies of the United States are determined out of abstract principles in
the Department of State or in the White house or in the Congress. That is not
the case. If these polices are going to be good, they must grow out of the
fundamental attitudes of our people on both sides. If they are to be
effective, they must become articulate through all the institutions of our national
life, of which this is one of the greatest--through the press, through the
radio, through the churches, through the labour unions, through the business
organizations, through all the groupings of our national life, there must
become articulate the attitudes of our people and the policies which we
propose to follow. It seems to me that understanding is the beginning of
wisdom and therefore, we shall begin by trying to understand before we
announce what we are going to do, and that is a proposition so heretical in
this town that I advance it with some hesitation. Now, let's consider some
of the basic factors which go into the making of the attitudes of the peoples
on both sides. I am frequently asked: Has the State Department got an Asian
policy? And it seems to me that that discloses such a depth of ignorance that
it is very hard to begin to deal with it. The peoples of Asia are so
incredibly diverse and their problems are so incredibly diverse that how
could anyone, even the most utter charlatan believe that he had a uniform
policy which would deal with all of them. On the other hand, there are very
important similarities in ideas and in problems among the peoples of Asia and
so what we come to, after we understand these diversities and these common attitudes
of mind, is the fact that there must be certain similarities of approach, and
there must be very great dissimilarities in action. To illustrate this only a
moment: If you will consider as an example of the differences in Asia the
subcontinent of India and Pakistan, you will find there an area which is
roughly comparable in size and population to Europe. You will find that the
different states and provinces of that subcontinent are roughly comparable in
size to the nations of Europe and yet you will find such differences in race,
in ideas, in languages, and religion, and culture, that compared to that
subcontinent, Europe is almost one homogeneous people. Or take the difference,
for instance, between the people and problems of Japan and Indonesia, both in
the same Asian area. In Japan, you have a people far advanced in the
complexities of industrial civilization, a people whose problems grow out of
overpopulation on small islands and the necessity of finding raw materials to
bring in and finding markets for the finished goods which they produce. In
Indonesia, you find something wholly different--a people' on the very
threshold of their experience with these complexities and a people who live
in an area which possesses vast resources which are awaiting development.
Now, those are illustrations of complexities. Emerging
Independence Let's come now to the
matters which Asia has in common. There is in this vast area what we might
call a developing Asian consciousness, and a developing pattern, and this, I
think, is based upon two factors which are pretty nearly common to the entire
experience of all these Asian people. One of these factors is a
revulsion against the acceptance of misery and poverty as the normal
condition of life. Throughout all of this vast area, you have that
fundamental revolutionary aspect in mind and belief. The other common aspect
that they have is the revulsion against foreign domination. Whether that
foreign domination takes the form of colonialism or whether it takes the form
of imperialism, they are through with it. They have had enough of it, and
they want no more. These two basic ideas
which are held so broadly and commonly in Asia tend to fuse in the minds of
many Asian peoples and many of them tend to believe that if you could get rid
of foreign domination, if you could gain independence, then the relief from
poverty and misery would follow almost in course. It is easy to point out
that that is not true, and of course, they are discovering that it is not
true. But underneath that belief, there was a very profound understanding of
a basic truth and it is the basic truth which underlies all our democratic
belief and all our democratic concept. That truth is that just as no man and
no government is wise enough and disinterested enough to direct the thinking
and the action of another individual, so no nation and no people are wise
enough and disinterested enough very long to assume the responsibility for
another people or to control another people's opportunities. That great truth they
have sensed, and on that great truth they are acting. They say and they
believe that from now on they are on their own. They will make their own decisions.
They will attempt to better their own lot, and on occasion they will make
their own mistakes. But it will not be their mistakes, and they are not going
to have their mistakes dictated to them by anybody else. The symbol of these
concepts has become nationalism. National independence has become the symbol
both of freedom from foreign domination and freedom from the tyranny of
poverty and misery. Since the end of the war
in Asia, we have seen over 500 million people gain their independence and
over seven new nations come into existence in this area. We have the Philippines
with 20 million citizens. We have Pakistan, India, Ceylon, and Burma with 400
million citizens, southern Korea with 20 million, and within the last few
weeks, the United States of Indonesia with 75 million. This is the outward and
visible sign of the internal ferment of Asia. But this ferment change is not
restricted to these countries which are just gaining their independence. It
is common idea and the common pattern of Asia
and as I tried to suggest a moment ago, it is not based on purely politica1
conceptions. It is not based purely on ideological conceptions. It based on a
fundamental and an earthy and a deeply individual realization of the problems
of their own daily lives. This new sense of nationalism means that they are
going to deal with those daily problems--the problems of the relation of man
to the soil, the problem of how much can be exacted from them by the tax
collectors of the state. It is rooted in those ideas. With those ideas they
are going forward. Resignation is no longer the typical emotion of Asia. It
has given way to hope, a sense of effort, and in many cases, to a real sense
of anger. Recent
Developments in China Now, may I suggest to you
that much of the bewilderment which has seized the minds of many of us about
recent developments in China comes from a failure to understand this basic
revolutionary force which is loose in Asia. The reasons for the fall of the
Nationalist Government in China are preoccupying many people. All sorts of
reasons have been attributed to it. Most commonly, it is said in various
speeches and publications that it is the result of American bungling, that we
are incompetent, that we did not understand, that American aid was too little,
that we did the wrong things at the wrong time. Other people go on and say:
"No, it is not quite that, but that an American general did not like Nobody, I think, says
that the Nationalist Government fell because it was confronted by
overwhelming military force which it could not resist. Certainly no one in
his right mind suggests that. Now, what I ask you to do is to stop looking
for a moment under the bed and under the chair and under the rug to find out
these reasons, but rather to look at the broad
picture and see whether something doesn't suggest itself. The broad picture is that
after the war, As I said, no one says
that vast armies moved out of the hills and defeated him. To attribute to the
inadequacy of American aid is only to point out the depth and power of the
forces which miscalculated or ignored. What has happened in my judgment is
that the almost inhaustible patience of the Chinese people in their misery
ended. They did not bother to overthrow this government. There was really
nothing to overthrow. They simply ignored it throughout the country. They
took the solution of their immediate village problems into their own hands.
If there was any trouble or interference with the representatives of the
government, they simply brushed them aside. They completely withdraw their
support from this government, and when that support was withdrawn, the whole
military establishment disintegrated. Added to the grossest incompetence ever
experienced by any military command was this total lack of support both in
the armies and in the country, and so the whole matter just simply
disintegrated. The Communists did not
create this. The Communists did not create this condition. They did not
create this revolutionary spirit. They did not create a great force which
moved out from under U.S.
Attitude Toward Asia Let's consider for a
moment another important factor in this relationship. That is the attitude of
our own people to Asia. What is that fundamental attitude out of which our
policy has grown? What is the history of it? Because history is very
important, and history furnishes the belief on the one side in the reality
and truth of the attitude. What has our attitude
been toward the peoples of Asia? It has been, I submit to you, that we are
interested--that Americans as individuals are interested in the peoples of
Asia. We are not interested in them as pawns or as subjects for exploitation
but just as people. For 100 years some
Americans have gone to Asia to bring in what they thought was the most
valuable thing they had--their fait. They wanted to tell them what they
thought about the nature and relationship of man to God. Others, went to them
to bring to them what they knew of learning. Others went to them to bring
them healing for their bodies. Others and perhaps fewer went to them to learn
the depth and beauty of their own cultures, and some went to them to trade
and they traded with them. But this trade was a very small part of American
interest in the Far East, and it was a very small part of American interest
in trade. It was a valid interest; it was a good interest. There was nothing
wrong about it, but out of the total sum of the interests of the American people
in Asia, it was a comparatively small part. Through all this period
of time also, we had, and still have great interests in Asia. But let me
point out to you one very important factor about our interests in Asia. That
is that our interests have been parallel to the
interests of the people of Asia. For 50 years, it has been the
fundamental belief of the American people--and I am not talking about
announcements of government but I mean a belief of people in little towns and
villages and churches and missionary forces and labor unions throughout the
United States--it has been their profound belief that
the control of China by a foreign power was contrary to American interests.
The interesting part about that is it was not contrary to the interests of
the people of China. There was not conflict but parallelism in that
interest. And so from the time of the announcement of the open door policy
through the 9-power treaty to the very latest resolution of the General
Assembly of the United Nations, we have stated that principle and we believe
it. And similarly in all the rest of Asia--in the Philippines, in India, in
Pakistan and Indonesia, and in Korea for years and years and years, the interests of Americans throughout this country have
been in favor of their independence. This is where their independence,
societies and their patriotic groups have come for funds and sympathy. The
whole policy of our government insofar as we have responsibility in the
Philippines was to bring about the accomplishment of this independence and
our sympathy and help. The very real help which we have given other nations
in Asia has been in that direction, and it is still in that direction. The
Factor of Communism Now, I stress this, which
you may think is a platitude, because of a very important fact: I hear almost
every day someone say that the real interest of the United States is to stop
the spread of communism. Nothing seems to me to put the cart before the horse
more completely than that. Of course we are interested in stopping the spread
of communism. But we are interested for a far deeper reason than any conflict
between the Soviet Union and the United States. We are interested in stopping
the spread of communism because communism is a doctrine that we don't happen
to like. Communism is the most
subtle instrument of Soviet foreign policy that has ever been devised, and it
is really the spearhead of Russian imperialism which would, if it could, take
from these people what they have won, what we want them to keep and develop,
which is their own national independence, their own individual independence,
their own development of their own resources for their own good and not as
mere tributary states to this great Soviet Union. Now, it is fortunate that
this point that I made does not represent any real conflict. It is an
important point because people will do more damage and create more
misrepresentation in the Far East by saying our interest is merely to stop
the spread of communism than any other way. Our
real interest is in those people as people. It is because communism is
hostile to that interest that we want to stop it. But it happens that the
best way of doing both things is to do just exactly what the peoples of Asia
want to do and what we want to help them to do, which is to develop a
soundness of administration of these new government and to develop their
resources and their technical skills so that they are not subject to
penetration either through ignorance, or because they believe these false
promises, or because there is real distress in their areas. If we can help
that development, if we can go forward with it, then we have brought about
the best way that anyone knows of stopping this spread of communism. It is important to take
this attitude not as a mere negative. Reaction to communism but as the most
positive affirmation of the most affirmative truth that we hold, which is in
the dignity and right of every nation, of every people, and of every
individual to develop in their own way, making their own mistakes, reaching
their own triumphs but acting under their own responsibility. That is what we
are pressing for in the Far East, that is what we must affirm and not get
mixed up with purely negative and inconsequential statements. Soviet
Attitude Now, let me come to
another underlying and important factor which determines our relations and,
in turn, our policy with the peoples of Asia. That is the attitude of the
Soviet Union toward Asia, and particularly towards those parts of Asia which
are contiguous to the Soviet Union, and with great particularity this
afternoon, to north China. The attitude and interest
of the Russians in north China, and in these other areas as well, long
antedates communism. This is not something that has come out of communism at
all. It long antedates it. But the Communist regime has added new methods,
new skills, and new concepts to the thrust of Russian imperialism. This
Communistic concept and techniques have armed Russian imperialism with a new
and most insidious weapon of penetration. Armed with these new powers, what
is happening in China is that the Soviet Union is detaching the northern
provinces [areas] of China from China and is attaching them to the Soviet
Union. This process is complete in Outer Mongolia. It is nearly complete in
Manchuria, and I am sure that in inner Mongolia and in Sinkiang there are
very happy reports coming from Soviet agents to Moscow. This is what is going
on. It is the detachment of these whole areas, vast area -- populated by
Chinese -- the detachment of these areas from China and their attachment to
the Soviet Union. I wish to state this and
perhaps sin against my doctrine of nondogmatism, but I should like to suggest
at any rate that this fact that the Soviet Union is taking the four northern
provinces of China is the single most significant, most important fact, in
the relation of any foreign power with Asia. Two
Rules of U.S. Policy What does that mean for
us? It means something very, very significant. It means that nothing that we
do and nothing that we say must be allowed to obscure the reality of this
fact. All the efforts of propaganda will not be able to obscure it. The only
thing that can obscure it is the folly of ill-conceived adventures on our
part which easily could do so, and I urge all who are thinking about these
foolish adventures to remember that we must not seize the unenviable position
which the Russians have carved out for themselves. We must not undertake to
deflect from the Russians to ourselves the righteous anger, and the wrath,
and the hatred of the Chinese people which must develop. It would be folly to
deflect it to ourselves. We must take the position we have always taken--that
anyone who violates the integrity of China is the
enemy of China and is acting contrary to our own interest. That, I suggest
to you this afternoon, is the first and the greatest rule in regard to the
formulation of American policy toward Asia. I suggest that the second
rule is very like the first. That is to keep our own purposes perfectly
straight, perfectly pure, and perfectly aboveboard and do not get them
mixed-up with legal quibbles or the attempt to do one thing and really
achieve another. The consequences of this
Russian attitude and this Russian action in China are perfectly enormous.
They are saddling all those in China who are proclaiming their loyalty to
Moscow, and who are allowing themselves to be used as puppets of Moscow, with
the most awful responsibility which they must pay for. Furthermore, these
actions of the Russians are making plainer than any speech, or any utterance,
or any legislation can make throughout all of Asia, what the true purposes of
the Soviet Union are and what the true function of communism as an agent of
Russian imperialism is. These I suggest to you are the fundamental factors,
fundamental realities of attitude out of which our relations and policies
must grow. Military
Security in the Pacific Now, let's in the light
of that consider some of thee policies. First of all, let's deal with the
question of military security. I deal with it first because it is important
and because, having stated our policy in that regard, we must clearly
understand that the military menace is not the most immediate. What is the situation in
regard to the military security of the Pacific area, and what is our policy
in regard to it? In the first place, the
defeat and the disarmament of Japan has placed upon the United States the
necessity of assuming the military defense of Japan so long as that is
required, both in the interest of our security and in the interests of the
security of the entire Pacific area and, in all honor, in the interest of
Japanese security. We have American -- and there are Australian -- troops in
Japan. I am not in a position to speak for the Australians, but I can assure
you that there is no intention of any sort of abandoning or weakening the
defenses of Japan and that whatever arrangements are to be made either
through permanent settlement or otherwise, that defense must and shall be
maintained. This
defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the
Ryukyus. We
hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and those we will
continue to hold. In the interest of the population of the Ryukyu Islands, we
will at an appropriate time offer to hold these islands under trusteeship of
the United Nations. But they are essential parts of the defensive perimeter
of the Pacific, and they must and will be held. The
defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands. Our relations, our
defensive relations with the Philippines are contained in agreements between
us. Those agreements are being loyally carried out and will be loyally
carried out. Both peoples have learned by bitter experience the vital
connections between our mutual defense requirements. We are in no doubt about
that, and it is hardly necessary for me to say an attack on the Philippines
could not and would not be tolerated by the United States. But I hasten to
add that no one perceives the imminence of any such attack. So far as the military
security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no
person can guarantee these areas against military attack. But it must also be
clear that such a guarantee is hardly sensible or necessary within the realm
of practical relationship. Should such an attack
occur -- one hesitates to say where such an armed attack could come from --
the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then
upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the
United Nations which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any
people who are determined to protect their independence against outside
aggression. But it is a mistake, I think, in considering Pacific and Far
Eastern problems to become obsessed with military considerations. Important
as they are, there are other problems that press, and these other problems
are not capable of solution through military means. These other problems
arise out of the susceptibility of many areas, and many countries in the
Pacific area, to subversion and penetration. That cannot be stopped by
military means. Susceptibility
to Penetration The susceptibility to
penetration arises because in many areas there are new governments which have
little experience in governmental administration and have not become firmly
established or perhaps firmly accepted in their countries. They grow, in
part, from very serious economic problems, some of them growing out directly
from the last war, others growing indirectly out of the last war because of
the disruptions of trade with other parts of the world, with the disruption
of arrangements which furnished credit and management to these areas for many
years. That has resulted in dislocation of economic effort and in a good deal
of suffering among the peoples concerned. In part this susceptibility to
penetration comes from the great social upheaval about which I have been
speaking, an upheaval which was carried on and confused a great deal by the
Japanese occupation and by the propaganda which has gone on from Soviet
sources since the war. Here, then, are the
problems in these other areas which require some policy on our part, and I
should like to point out two facts to you and then discuss in more detail
some of these areas. The first fact is the
great difference between our responsibility and our opportunities in the
northern part of the Pacific area and in the southern part of the Pacific
area In the north, we have direct responsibility in Japan and we have direct
opportunity to act. The same thing to a lesser degree is true in Korea. There
we had direct responsibility. And there we did act, and there we have a
greater opportunity to be effective than we have in the more southerly part. In the southerly part of
the area, we are one of many nations who can do no more than help. The direct
responsibility lies with the peoples concerned. They are proud of their new
national responsibility. You cannot sit around in Washington, or London, or
Paris, or The Hague and determine what the policies are going to those areas.
You can be willing to help, and can help only when the conditions are right
for help to be effective. Limitations of U.S.
Assistance That leads me to the
other thing that I wanted to point out, and that is the limitation of
effective American assistance. American assistance can be effective when it
is the missing component in a situation which might otherwise be solved. The
United States cannot furnish all these components to solve the question. It
cannot furnish determination, it cannot furnish the will, and it cannot
furnish the loyalty of a people to its government. But if the will and if the
determination exists and if the people are behind their government, then, and
not always then, is there a very good chance. In that situation, American
help can be effective and it can lead to an accomplishment which could not
otherwise be achieved. Japan.-- Now, with that statement, let's
deal very briefly - because the time is going on and I am almost equaling my
performance in the Senate and House -- let's deal very briefly with some of
the problems. Let's take the situation in Japan for a moment. There are three
great factors to be faced. The security matter I have dealt with. Aside from
that, there are the economic questions and the political questions. In the
political field, In the economic field, we
have not been so successful. That is in very large part due to the inherent
difficulty of the problem. The problem arises with the necessity of Japan
being able to buy raw materials and sell goods. The former connections of
Japan with the mainland and with some of the islands have been disrupted.
That has produced difficulties. The willingness of other countries to receive
Japanese goods has very much contracted since the war. Difficulties of currency
have added to those problems. But those matters have got to be faced and have
got to be solved. Whether they are solved under a treaty or if the procedural
difficulties of that are too great under some other mechanism, they must be
solved along lines which permit the Japanese greater freedom -- complete
freedom if possible -- to buy what they need in the world and to sell what
they have to offer on the mainland of Asia, in southeast Asia, and in other
parts of the world. That is the nature of the problem and it is a very tough
one. It is one on which the occupation authorities, the Japanese government,
ourselves, and others are working. There can be no magic solution to it. Korea.--In Korea, we have taken great
steps which have ended our military occupation,
and in cooperation with the United Nations, have established an independent
and sovereign country recognized by nearly all the rest of the world. We have given that nation
great help in getting itself established. We are asking the Congress to
continue that help until it is firmly established, and that legislation is
now pending before the Congress. The idea that we should scrap all of that,
that we should stop half way through the achievement of the establishment of
this country, seems to me to be the most utter defeatism and utter madness in
our interests in Asia. But there our responsibilities are more direct and our
opportunities more clear. When you move to the south, you find that our
opportunity is much slighter and that our responsibilities, except in the
Philippines and there indirectly, are very small. Those problems are very
confusing. Philippines.--In the Philippines, we
acted with vigor and speed to set up an independent sovereign nation which we
have done. We have given the Philippines a billion dollars of direct economic
aid since the war. We have spent another billion dollars in such matters as
veterans' benefits and other payments in the Philippines. Much of that money
has not been used as wisely as we wish it had been used, but here again, we
come up against the matter of responsibility. It is the Philippine Government
which is responsible. It is the Philippine Government which must make its own
mistakes. What we can do is advise and urge, and if help continues to be
misused, to stop giving the help. We cannot direct, we should not direct, we
have not the slightest desire to direct. I believe that there are indications
that the Philippines may be facing serious economic difficulties. With
energetic, determined action, they can perhaps be avoided or certainly
minimized. Whether that will be true or not, I can not say, but it does not
rest within the power of the American Government to determine that. We are
always ready to help and to advise. That is all we can and all we should do. Asia.-- Elsewhere in southeast Asia, the
limits of what we can do are to help where we are wanted. We are organizing
the machinery through which we can make effective help possible. The western
powers are all interested. We all know the techniques. We have all had
experiences which can be useful to those governments which are newly starting
out if they want it. It cannot be useful if they don't want it. We know
techniques of administration. We know techniques of organizing school
districts, and road districts, and taxation districts. We know agricultural
and industrial techniques, all of which can be helpful, and those we are
preparing to make available if they are wanted, where they are wanted, and
under circumstances where they have a fighting chance to be successful. We
will not do these things for the mere purpose of being active. They will not
be done for the mere purpose of running around and doing good, but for the
purpose of moving in where we are wanted to a situation where we have the
missing component which, if put into the rest of the picture, will spell
success. The situation in the different countries of Southeast Asia is
difficult. It is highly confused in Burma where five different factions have
utterly disrupted the immediate government of the country. Progress is being
made in Indochina where the French, although moving slowly, are moving. There
are noticeable signs of progress in transferring responsibility to a local
administration and getting the adherence of the population to this local
administration. We hope that the situation will be such that the French can
make further progress and make it quickly, but I know full well the
difficulties which are faced by the Foreign Minister of France and my
admiration and respect for him are so great that I would not want one word I
say to add a feather to the burden that he carries. In Malaya, the British have and are discharging their responsibility
harmoniously with the people of Malaya and are making progress. Indonesia.--In Indonesia, a great success has
been achieved within the last few weeks and over a period of months. The
round table conferences at The Hague in which great statesmanship and
restraint were displayed, both on the Dutch and the Indonesian side, have
resulted in this new government being formed. Relations of this government
with the Dutch will be very good, and the Dutch can furnish them great help
and advice, and we will be willing to stand by to give whatever help we can
rightly and profitably give. That situation is one which is full of
encouragement although it is full of difficulty also. India and Pakistan.--As one goes to the end of this semicircle
and bomes to lndia and Pakistan, we find really grave troubles facing the
world and facing these two countries there, both with respect to Kashmir, and
to the utter difficulties--economic difficulties growing out of the
differences in devaluation, settlement of monetary plans back and forth, et
cetera. We know that they have assured one another, and they have assured the
world, that as stubborn as these difficulties may be and difficult as they
may be of solution, they are not going to resort to war to solve them. We are
glad to hear those assurances and the whole world is glad to hear it, but we
know also that the problems are in such a situation and in such an area that
they are most inflammable, and we believe that in addition to these most desirable
assurances there should be some accommodation of wills to bring about a
result as soon as possible. In India and in Pakistan
we are willing to be of such help as we can be. Again, the responsibility is
not ours. Again we can only be helpful friends. Again the responsibility lies
with people who have won their freedom and who are very proud of it. The
New Day for Asia So after this survey,
what we conclude, I believe, is that there is a new day which has dawned in
Asia. It is a day in which the Asian peoples are on their own, and know it,
and intend to continue on their own. It is a day in which the old
relationships between east and west are gone, relationships which at their
worst were exploitation and which at their best were paternalism. That relationship
is over, and the relationship of east and west must now be in the Far East
one of mutual respect and mutual helpfulness. We are their friends. Others
are their friends. We and those others are willing to help, but we can only
where we are wanted and only where the conditions of help are really sensible
and possible. So what we can see is that this new day in Asia, this new day
which is dawning, may go on to a glorious noon or it may darken and it may
drizzle out. But that decision lies within the countries of Asia and within
the power of the Asian people. It is not a decision which a friend or even an
enemy from the outside can decide for them.
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政策基礎 今天下午我想和大家討論美國人民和亞洲人民的關係，我特意使用了「美國人民和亞洲人民的關係」這個詞。我不是說政府或國家，因為在我看來，我想與你們討論的是我的這種感覺，即關係取決於人民的態度；一億五千萬美國人民和無數亞洲人民的基本態度、根本利益和根本目的，決定了我們各國之間的關係和亞洲各國的政策。我們每天所做的事情都源自於這些態度、興趣和目的。
現在，讓我們從一開始就放棄一個想法，不再為它煩惱。也就是說，美國的政策是根據國務院、白宮或國會的抽象原則來決定的。事實並非如此。如果這些政策想要發揮作用，它們就必須源自於我們雙方人民的基本態度。如果它們要有效，就必須透過我們國家生活的所有機構來表達，其中這是最偉大的機構之一——透過媒體、透過廣播、透過教會、透過工會、透過企業組織，透過我們國家生活的所有群體，必須明確表達我們人民的態度和我們建議遵循的政策。在我看來，理解是智慧的開始，因此，我們應該先試圖理解，然後再宣布我們的行動計劃。而這在這個城鎮中是一個如此異端的主張，以至於我提出時有些猶豫。
現在，讓我們考慮一下影響雙方人民態度的一些基本因素。我常被問到：國務院有亞洲政策嗎？在我看來，這暴露了無知的深度，以至於很難開始處理它。亞洲人民是如此的多樣化，他們的問題也如此多樣化，以至於任何人，甚至是最徹頭徹尾的江湖騙子，怎麼可能相信他有一個統一的政策來解決所有亞洲人的問題。另一方面，亞洲各國人民在思想和問題上有非常重要的相似之處，因此，在我們了解這些差異和共同的心態之後，我們得出的事實是，在方法上必定存在某些相似之處，而且行動上一定有很大的不同。
為了說明這一點：如果你將印度和巴基斯坦次大陸作為亞洲差異的一個例子，你會發現那裡的面積和人口與歐洲大致相當。你會發現該次大陸的不同州和省份的面積與歐洲國家大致相當，但你會發現種族、思想、語言、宗教和文化方面的差異與該次大陸相比，歐洲幾乎是一個同質的民族。
或我們以位於同一亞洲地區的日本和印尼的人民和問題之間的差異為例。日本的人民在工業文明的複雜性方面遠遠領先，他們的問題源於小島嶼上的人口過剩，以及需要尋找原材料進口並為他們生產的製成品尋找市場。在印度尼西亞，你會發現一些完全不同的東西——人們剛開始經歷這些複雜性，而人們生活在擁有大量等待開發的資源的地區。現在，這些都是複雜性的例證。
新興獨立 現在讓我們來談談亞洲的共同點。在這個廣闊的領域，我們可以稱之為發展中的亞洲意識和發展模式，我認為，這是基於兩個因素，這兩個因素幾乎是所有這些亞洲人的整個經歷所共有的。
這些因素之一是厭惡接受痛苦和貧窮作為生活的正常狀況。在整個這片廣闊的地區，你的頭腦和信念中都具有基本的革命性面向。他們的另一個共同點是厭惡外國統治。無論這種外國統治是以殖民主義的形式還是以帝國主義的形式，他們都已經結束了。他們已經受夠了，不再想要了。
這兩個在亞洲廣泛普遍持有的基本觀念往往會在許多亞洲人民的心中融合，他們中的許多人傾向於相信，如果你能夠擺脫外國統治，如果你能夠獲得獨立，那麼就可以擺脫外國統治。很容易指出這不是真的，當然，他們也發現這不是真的。但在這種信念之下，有一個對基本真理的非常深刻的理解，這個基本真理是我們所有民主信仰和民主概念的基礎。事實是，正如沒有人和任何政府足夠明智和無私地指導另一個人的思想和行動一樣，沒有任何國家和人民足夠明智和無私地長期承擔對另一個人或其他人的責任。 。
他們已經感受到了這個偉大的真理，並且正在根據這個偉大的真理採取行動。他們說並且相信從現在開始就要靠自己了。他們會做出自己的決定。他們會嘗試改善自己的命運，但有時他們也會犯錯。但這不會是他們的錯誤，他們的錯誤也不會由其他人強加給他們。這些觀念的象徵已成為民族主義。民族獨立已成為擺脫外國統治和擺脫貧窮和苦難暴政的象徵。
自亞洲的戰爭結束以來，我們已經看到超過5億人獲得了獨立，並且該地區出現了7個以上的新國家。
我們有擁有 2000 萬公民的菲律賓。巴基斯坦、印度、錫蘭和緬甸擁有 4 億公民，韓國南部擁有 2,000 萬公民，以及在過去幾週剛成立的印度尼西亞合眾國，其人口為7500萬。
這是亞洲內部騷亂的外在和可見的跡象。但這種發酵的變化並不僅限於這些剛獨立的國家。這是亞洲的共同理念和共同模式，正如我剛才試圖指出的，它並不是基於純粹的政治概念。它並非純粹基於意識形態觀念。它是基於對自己日常生活問題的基本、樸實和深刻的個人認知。這種新的民族主義意識意味著他們將處理那些日常問題——人與土地的關係問題，國家稅收人員可以從他們身上收取多少錢的問題。它植根於這些想法。帶著這些想法，他們正在前進。順從不再是亞洲的典型情感。取而代之的是希望、一種努力的意識，而且在許多情況下，還包括真正的憤怒感。
中國的最新發展 現在，我可以向你們指出，我們許多人對中國最近的事態發展感到困惑，很大程度上是由於未能理解這種在亞洲鬆散的基本革命力量。中國國民政府垮台的原因引起了許多人的關注。種種原因都被歸咎於此。最常見的是，在各種演講和出版物中，人們說這是美國搞砸的結果，我們無能，我們不理解，美國的援助太少，我們在錯誤的時間做了錯誤的事情。其他人繼續說：「不，不完全是這樣，而是一位美國將軍不喜歡蔣介石，而真正的麻煩就來自於這種關係。」她們說：「嗯，你還得補充一點，中國有很多女人在政治上胡作非為。」
我想，沒有人說國民政府的垮台是因為它無法抵抗壓倒性的軍事力量。當然，頭腦清醒的人不會這麼認為。現在，我要求你們不要再在床下、椅子下和地毯下尋找這些原因，而是要放眼全局，看看是否有會冒出什麼想法來。
整體情況是，戰後，蔣介石成為中國人民無可爭議的領袖。只有一個派別，即位於山上的共產黨，裝備簡陋，衣衫襤褸，軍隊規模很小，堅決反對蔣的立場。蔣擁有壓倒性的軍事力量，比整個中國歷史上任何統治者的軍事力量都要強大。他得到了美國巨大的經濟和軍事支持和支持。他得到了所有其他外國的接受，無論是真心假意，對蘇聯來說，這件事並不重要。他現在處於這個位置，四年後我們發現了什麼？我們發現他的軍隊已經消失了。他在國內的支持已經消失。他在國外的支持基本上消失了，他和他的殘餘部隊一起成為中國外海一個小島上的難民。
正如我所說，沒有人說大軍出山打敗了他。將問題歸咎於美國援助的不足，只是指出了那些誤判或忽視的力量的深度和力量。在我看來，發生的事情是中國人民在苦難中的幾乎無盡的耐心終於耗盡了。他們懶得推翻這個政府。確實沒有什麼好推翻的。他們只是在全國範圍內忽視了這一點。他們把解決村莊當前問題的辦法掌握在自己手中。如果政府代表有任何麻煩或干擾，他們只是置之不理。人民完全撤回了對這個政府的支持，而當這種支持消失時，整個軍事體系隨之瓦解。再加上前所未有的極端無能，不僅在軍隊內部，甚至在整個國家中都缺乏支持，因此整個局勢就徹底崩潰了。
這不是共產黨人創造的。共產黨並沒有創造這個條件。這種革命精神不是他們創造的。他們並沒有創造出一支從蔣介石統治下崛起的強大力量。但共產黨精明狡猾地利用它，駕馭這東西取得勝利並掌握權力。我向您建議的解釋具有一定的現實主義根源，並且不需要對複雜且可能不相關的細節進行所有這些檢查。亞洲人民的態度就這麼多。
美國對亞洲的態度 讓我們考慮一下這種關係中的另一個重要因素。這就是我們自己的人民對亞洲的態度。我們的政策源自於什麼基本態度？它的歷史是怎麼樣的？因為歷史是非常重要的，而歷史一方面提供了對現實和真理的信念態度。 我們對亞洲人民的態度是什麼？我向你們表示，我們感興趣的是美國人對作為個人的亞洲人民感興趣。我們對只將他們視為棋子或剝削對象一事不感興趣，我們只是將亞洲人民視為人。 一百年來，有些美國人前往亞洲，帶來了他們認為最有價值的東西──他們的財富。他們想告訴他們對人與神的本質和關係的看法。其他人則去找他們，將他們所知道的學習知識傳授給他們。其他人去找他們，為他們的身體帶來治癒。其他人（也許更少）去他們那裡學習他們自己文化的深度和美麗，還有一些人去他們那裡進行貿易，他們也與他們進行貿易。但這種貿易只是美國在遠東的利益的一小部分，也是美國貿易利益的一小部分。這是一個有效的利益；這是一個很好的利益。這並沒有什麼錯，但在美國人民在亞洲的利益總和中，那只是相對較小的一部分。
在這段時間裡，我們曾經並且仍然對亞洲有著極大的興趣。但讓我向你們指出關於我們在亞洲的利益的一個非常重要的因素。也就是說，我們的利益與亞洲人民的利益是並行共存的。 50年來，它一直是美國人民的基本信仰——我說的不是政府的公告，而是全美國各地小鎮、村莊、教堂、傳教士部隊和工會的人們的信仰——他們堅信外國勢力對中國的控制與美國的利益背道而馳。有趣的是，它並沒有違背中國人民的利益。這種利益並不衝突，而是平行的。因此，從透過九國條約宣布門戶開放政策到聯合國大會最新決議，我們都闡明了這項原則，我們也相信這一點。同樣，在亞洲其他地區——菲律賓、印度、巴基斯坦和印尼以及韓國，多年來，整個國家的美國人一直支持他們的獨立。這是他們的獨立、社會和愛國團體來到這裡美國尋求資金和同情的點。就我們在菲律賓負有的責任而言，我國政府的全部政策就是實現這種獨立以及我們的同情和幫助。我們向亞洲其他國家提供的真正幫助一直是這個方向，現在仍然是這個方向。
共產主義因素 現在，我強調這一點，你可能認為這是陳腔濫調，因為一個非常重要的事實：我幾乎每天都聽到有人說，美國的真正利益是阻止共產主義的蔓延。在我看來，沒有什麼比這更徹底地本末倒置了。當然，我們有興趣阻止共產主義的蔓延。但我們感興趣的原因比蘇聯和美國之間的任何衝突都要深得多。我們有興趣阻止共產主義的傳播，因為共產主義是我們不喜歡的理論。 共產主義是蘇聯外交政策有史以來最微妙的工具，它實際上是俄羅斯帝國主義的先鋒，如果可以的話，它會從這些人民那裡奪走他們所贏得的東西，我們希望他們保留和發展的東西，這是他們自己的民族獨立，他們自己的個人獨立，他們自己為了自己的利益而開發自己的資源，而不僅僅是這個偉大的蘇聯的附屬國。 現在，幸運的是，我提出的這一點並不代表任何真正的衝突。這一點很重要，因為人們如果說我們的利益只是為了阻止共產主義的蔓延，而不是其他任何方式，就會在遠東造成更大的損害並製造更多的誤傳。我們真正感興趣的是那些人。正是因為共產主義敵視這種利益，我們才想阻止它。但碰巧的是，做這兩件事的最好方法就是做亞洲人民想做的事，也做我們想幫助他們做的事，那就是建立這些新政府的健全管理，發展他們的資源和技術技能，使他們不會因無知而受到滲透。或者因為他們相信這些虛假的承諾，或者因為他們所在的地區存在著真正的苦難。如果我們能夠幫助這種發展，如果我們能夠繼續前進，那麼我們就帶來了任何人都知道的阻止共產主義蔓延的最佳方法。 重要的是不要將這種態度僅僅視為消極態度。對共產主義的反應，而是對我們所持有的最肯定真理的最積極肯定，即每個國家、每個民族、每個個人的尊嚴和權利，以自己的方式發展，犯自己的錯誤，達到他們自己的勝利，但在自己的責任下行事。這就是我們在遠東所迫切要求的，這就是我們必須肯定的，而不是與純粹消極和無關緊要的言論混在一起。
蘇聯的態度 現在，讓我談談決定我們與亞洲人民的關係以及我們的政策的另一個根本和重要因素。這就是蘇聯對亞洲的態度，特別是對那些與蘇聯毗鄰的亞洲地區的態度，特別是今天下午對中國北方的態度。 俄羅斯人對華北以及其他地區的態度和興趣早在共產主義出現之前就已經存在。這根本不是共產主義產生的東西。它早於它。但共產黨政權卻為俄羅斯帝國主義的主旨增添了新方法、新技巧、新觀念。這種共產主義的理念和技術為俄羅斯帝國主義武裝了一種新的、最陰險的滲透武器。有了這些新的力量，中國正在發生的事情是，蘇聯正在將中國北方省份（地區）從中國分離出來，並將它們併入蘇聯。這個過程在外蒙古完成。滿洲的工作已接近完成，我確信在內蒙古和新疆，蘇聯特工向莫斯科傳來了非常令人高興的報告。這就是正在發生的事情。這是這些整個地區、廣大地區——居住著中國人——的脫離，這些地區與中國的脫離以及他們對蘇聯的依附。 我想說明這一點，也許是對我的非教條主義學說的冒犯，但無論如何，我想指出，蘇聯正在佔領中國北方四個省份這一事實是任何外國與亞洲關係中最重要、最重要的事實。
美國政策的兩條規則 這對我們意味著什麼？這意味著非常非常重要的事情。這意味著我們所做的一切和所說的一切都不能掩蓋這一事實。所有的宣傳努力都無法掩蓋這一點。唯一能掩蓋這一點的是我們考慮不周的冒險行為是愚蠢的，而且很容易做到這一點，我敦促所有思考這些愚蠢冒險行為的人記住，我們決不能抓住俄羅斯人為自己開闢的令人羨慕的地位。我們絕不能把中國人民的正義憤怒、憤怒和仇恨從俄羅斯人身上轉移到我們自己身上。如果把它轉移到我們自己身上，那就太愚蠢了。我們必須採取我們一貫的立場：任何違背中國誠信的人都是中國的敵人，都是違背我們自身利益的行為。我今天下午向你們提出的建議是，這是制訂美國對亞洲政策的第一條也是最重要的規則。 我認為第二條規則與第一條非常相似。也就是說，要保持我們自己的目的完全正直、完全純潔、完全光明正大，不要將它們與法律上的狡辯或試圖做一件事並真正實現另一件事混在一起。 俄羅斯的這種態度和俄羅斯在中國的行動的後果是巨大的。他們讓中國所有宣稱效忠莫斯科、讓自己成為莫斯科傀儡的人背負著必須付出的最可怕的責任。此外，俄羅斯人的這些行動比整個亞洲的任何言論、言論或立法都更清楚地表明了蘇聯的真正目的是什麼以及共產主義作為俄羅斯帝國主義代理人的真正作用是什麼。我向你們建議的這些是我們的關係和政策必須發展的基本因素和態度的基本現實。
太平洋軍事安全 現在，讓我們考慮一下其中的一些政策。首先，我們來談談軍事安全問題。我首先處理這個問題是因為它很重要，而且因為在闡述了我們在這方面的政策後，我們必須清楚地認識到軍事威脅並不是最直接的。 太平洋地區軍事安全情勢如何？ 首先，日本的戰敗和裁軍使美國有必要在必要時對日本進行軍事防禦，這既是為了我們的安全，也是為了日本的安全。我們在日本有美國軍隊和澳洲軍隊。我不能代表澳洲人發言，但我可以向你們保證，無意放棄或削弱日本的防禦，並且無論透過永久駐軍或其他方式做出安排，該防禦必須且應予以維護。 這條防禦線沿著阿留申群島延伸到日本，然後延伸到琉球群島。我們在琉球群島擁有重要的防禦陣地，並且我們將繼續佔領這些陣地。為了琉球群島人民的利益，我們將在適當的時候提出將這些島嶼置於聯合國的託管之下。但它們是太平洋防禦線的重要組成部分，必須而且將會被守住。 防禦範圍從琉球群島一直延伸到菲律賓群島。我們與菲律賓的關係、我們的防禦關係都包含在我們之間的協議中。這些協議正在忠實地履行，也將忠實地履行。兩國人民從痛苦的經驗中認識到了我們共同防禦要求之間的重要連結。我們對此毫不懷疑，而且我幾乎沒有必要說美國不能也不會容忍對菲律賓的攻擊。但我必須補充一點，沒有人意識到任何此類攻擊的迫在眉睫。 就太平洋其他地區的軍事安全而言，必須清楚的是，沒有人能夠保證這些地區免受軍事攻擊。但也必須清楚的是，在實際關係範圍內，這種保證幾乎是不明智或不必要的。 如果發生這樣的襲擊——人們不願透露這種武裝襲擊可能來自何處——首先必須依靠受襲擊的人民進行抵抗，然後依靠迄今為止整個文明世界根據〈聯合國憲章〉做出的承諾，事實證明，對於任何決心保護自己的獨立免受外來侵略的人民來說，這並不是一根可以依靠的軟弱的蘆葦。但我認為，在考慮太平洋和遠東問題時過於注重軍事考量是錯誤的。儘管這些問題很重要，但還有其他緊迫的問題，而這些其他問題無法透過軍事手段解決。這些其他問題的產生是由於許多地區和太平洋地區的許多國家容易受到顛覆和滲透。這是軍事手段無法阻止的。
滲透敏感性 滲透的敏感性之所以產生，是因為許多地區的新政府缺乏政府管理經驗，而且還沒有在本國牢固確立或可能被牢固接受。它們的成長部分源於非常嚴重的經濟問題，其中一些直接源於上次戰爭，另一些則間接源於上次戰爭，因為與世界其他地區的貿易中斷，以及與世界其他地區的貿易安排的中斷。這導致了經濟努力的混亂，並給有關人民帶來了巨大的痛苦。這種對滲透的敏感性部分來自於我一直在談論的巨大的社會動亂，這種動亂是由日本的佔領和戰後來自蘇聯的宣傳所持續並造成很大的混亂的。 那麼，這些其他領域的問題需要我們採取一些政策，我想向你們指出兩個事實，然後更詳細地討論其中一些領域。 第一個事實是，我們在太平洋北部地區和太平洋南部地區的責任和機會之間存在很大差異。韓國也存在同樣的情況，但程度較輕。在那裡我們負有直接責任。我們在那裡確實採取了行動，而且我們在那裡比在更南邊的地區有更大的機會發揮作用。 在該地區的南部，我們是許多只能提供幫助的國家之一。直接責任在於有關人民。他們為自己新的國家責任感到自豪。你不能坐在華盛頓、倫敦、巴黎或海牙決定針對這些地區的政策。你可以願意提供協助，並且只有在條件合適、幫助有效的情況下才能提供協助。
美國援助的局限性 這引出了我想指出的另一件事，那就是美國有效援助的限制。當美國的援助是本來可以解決的局勢中所缺乏的組成部分時，它就會發揮作用。美國無法提供所有這些要素來解決這個問題。它不能提供決心，不能提供意志，也不能提供人民對其政府的忠誠。但如果有意願、有決心，如果人民支持政府，那麼（並非總是如此）就有很好的機會。在這種情況下，美國的幫助可以是有效的，並且可以取得其他方式無法實現的成就。
日本——現在，通過這一聲明，讓我們非常簡短地討論一下 - 因為時間正在流逝，我幾乎等於我在參議院和眾議院的表現 - 讓我們非常簡單地討論一些問題。我們先來看看日本的情況。需要面對三個重要因素。我處理過的安全問題。除此之外，還有經濟問題和政治問題。在政治領域，麥克阿瑟將軍非常成功，日本人正在努力打造一個以非軍國主義制度為基礎的政治體系，但也有一些倒退，重新獲得進步並再次倒退。 在經濟領域，我們還沒有那麼成功。這在很大程度上是由於該問題固有的難度。問題的出現是因為日本需要能夠購買原料和銷售商品。日本與大陸和一些島嶼以前的聯繫已經中斷。這造成了困難。戰後，其他國家接受日本商品的意願大幅下降。 貨幣問題加劇了這些問題。但這些問題必須面對，必須解決。無論這些問題是根據條約解決的，還是透過其他機制解決的程序困難太大，都必須按照允許日本有更大自由（如果可能的話，完全自由）的方針來解決，以便在世界上購買他們需要的東西並將他們提供的產品銷往亞洲大陸、東南亞和世界其他地區。這就是問題的本質，而且是一個非常棘手的問題。佔領當局、日本政府、我們自己和其他人正在為此努力。沒有什麼神奇的解決方法。
韓國——在朝鮮，我們採取了重大步驟，結束了我們的軍事佔領，並與聯合國合作，建立了一個幾乎得到世界其他國家承認的獨立主權國家。 我們為這個國家的站穩腳步提供了很大的幫助。我們要求國會繼續提供這種幫助，直至其牢固確立，該立法目前正在等待國會審議。在我看來，我們應該廢除所有這些，我們應該在建立這個國家的過程中中途停止，這似乎是對我們亞洲利益最徹底的失敗主義和徹底的瘋狂。但在那裡我們的責任更加直接，我們的機會也更加明確。當你看到南方時，你會發現我們的機會要小得多，我們的責任（除了菲律賓和那裡的間接責任）很小。這些問題非常令人困惑。
菲律賓—在菲律賓，我們以有力和迅速的行動建立了一個獨立的主權國家，我們做到了。戰後，我們向菲律賓提供了10億美元的直接經濟援助。我們在菲律賓的退伍軍人福利和其他付款等問題上又花了十億美元。大部分資金並沒有像我們希望的那樣明智地使用，但在這裡，我們再次遇到了責任問題。這是菲律賓政府的責任。菲律賓政府必須犯自己的錯。我們能做的就是建議和敦促，如果幫助繼續被濫用，就停止提供幫助。我們不能指揮，我們不應該指揮，我們沒有絲毫指揮的慾望。我認為，有跡象顯示菲律賓可能面臨嚴重的經濟困難。透過積極、堅決的行動，這些問題或許可以避免，或肯定可以最小化。我不能說這是否屬實，但美國政府無權決定這一點。我們隨時準備提供協助和建議。這是我們所能做的，也是我們應該做的。
亞洲——在東南亞其他地方，我們能做的僅限於為需要我們的地方提供幫助。我們正在組織機制，透過這些機制我們可以提供有效的幫助。西方列強都對此感興趣。我們都知道這些技術。我們都有過經驗，如果新政府願意的話，這些經驗對他們來說是有用的。如果他們不想要它，它就沒有用。我們了解管理技術。我們知道組織學區、路區和稅區的技術。我們了解農業和工業技術，所有這些技術都會有所幫助，我們正在準備在需要時提供這些技術，在需要它們的地方以及在它們有機會成功的情況下提供。我們不會僅僅為了活躍而做這些事情。這樣做的目的不僅是為了四處奔走和做好事，而是為了進入我們需要的地方，達到我們擁有缺失的組成部分的情況，如果將這些組成部分放入全景的其餘部分，將意味著成功。東南亞各國的情況都很困難。緬甸非常混亂，五個不同的派系徹底擾亂了直接管理該國的現任政府。印度支那正在取得進展，法國人雖然行動緩慢，但正在前進。在將責任移交給地方行政部門和讓民眾服從地方行政部門方面，有明顯的進展跡象。我們希望法國能夠進一步取得進展，盡快取得進展，但我深知法國外交部長所面臨的困難，我對他的欽佩和尊重是如此之大，所以我不會希望我說的一句話能夠為他所背負的重擔增添一絲重量。
在馬來亞，英國人已經並且正在與馬來亞人民和諧地履行其責任，並且正在取得進展。
印尼——在印度尼西亞，過去幾週和幾個月內取得了巨大成功。在海牙舉行的圓桌會議上，荷蘭和印尼都展現了偉大的政治家風範和克制，最終促成了新政府的組成。本屆政府與荷蘭人的關係將會非常好，荷蘭人可以為他們提供很大的幫助和建議，我們將願意隨時提供我們能夠正確且有利可圖的幫助。這種情況是充滿鼓勵的，但也充滿困難。
印度和巴基斯坦——當我們走到這個半球的盡頭，到達印度和巴基斯坦時，我們發現世界和這兩個國家面臨著真正嚴重的麻煩，無論是克什米爾問題，還是徹底的困難——經濟困難日益凸顯貶值、貨幣計劃結算等方面的差異。我們知道，他們已經向彼此保證，也向世界保證，儘管這些困難可能很頑固、解決起來也很困難，但他們不會訴諸戰爭來解決這些問題。我們很高興聽到這些保證，全世界也很高興聽到這些保證，但我們也知道，問題是在這樣一種情況和這樣一個領域，它們是最易燃的，我們相信，除了這些最可取的之外，保證應在意願上做出一定的調整，以盡快取得結果。 在印度和巴基斯坦，我們願意提供力所能及的幫助。再說一次，責任不是我們的。再說一遍，我們只能成為有幫助的朋友。同樣，責任在於那些贏得了自由並為此感到非常自豪的人們。
亞洲的新時代 因此，在這次調查之後，我相信我們得出的結論是，亞洲新的一天已經來臨。在這一天，亞洲人民要靠自己，並且知道這一點，並打算繼續靠自己。在這一天，東西方之間舊有的關係消失了，這種關係在最壞的情況下是剝削，在最好的情況下是家長式作風。這種關係已經結束，在遠東，東西方的關係現在必須是相互尊重和互助的關係。我們是他們的朋友。其他人是他們的朋友。我們和其他人願意提供幫助，但我們只能在需要我們的地方提供幫助，並且只有在幫助的條件確實合理和可能的情況下才能提供幫助。所以我們可以看到的是，亞洲的新的一天，即將到來的新的一天，可能會持續到一個燦爛的中午，也可能會變暗，可能會下毛毛雨。但這是亞洲國家的決定，是亞洲人民的決定。這不是一個朋友甚至外部敵人可以為他們做出的決定。
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