風險 5：流氓軸心 Eurasia 20240108 / Taimocracy翻譯

風險 5：流氓軸心   Eurasia 20240108 / Taimocracy翻譯

Russia, North Korea, and Iran are the world's most powerful rogue states. And they have been working to strengthen their cooperation since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, united by the draconian sanctions levied against them, their shared hatred of the US, and their willingness to violate international law to disrupt a global status quo they believe serves Western interests at their expense. They are agents of chaos in today's geopolitical order, bent on undermining existing institutions and the governments and principles that uphold them.	俄羅斯、朝鮮和伊朗是世界上最強大的流氓國家。自俄羅斯在2022年2月入侵烏克蘭以來，它們一直在努力加強彼此的合作，受到對它們實施的嚴厲制裁的共同影響，以及對美國的共同厭惡，以及它們願意違反國際法來破壞它們認為是以犧牲他們為代價來服務西方利益的全球現狀。他們是當今地緣政治秩序混亂的推動者，一心想要破壞現有的機構、政府以及支撐它們的原則。
Once seen by Russia as a nuisance at best and a liability at worst, North Korea has become an essential resource for Vladimir Putin's war effort in Ukraine thanks to its pariah status, militarized economy, and large stocks of Soviet-standard artillery ammunition. Meeting in Russia's Far East in September 2023, Kim Jong-un and Putin struck a deal that sends North Korean artillery shells, rockets, and ballistic missiles to Russia in exchange for Russian food, energy, and—most importantly— technological assistance, especially on satellite development and deployment.	朝鮮曾在俄羅斯眼中被視為是一個困擾，最糟糕時甚至是一個負債，如今卻因其被視為國際社會的局外人地位、實行軍事經濟體制，以及擁有大量蘇聯標準的火砲彈藥，已經成為弗拉基米爾·普丁在烏克蘭戰爭中不可或缺的資源。2023年9月，金正恩和普丁在俄羅斯遠東地區會面，達成協議，向俄羅斯發送朝鮮砲彈、火箭和彈道飛彈，以換取俄羅斯的糧食、能源，以及最重要的技術援助，特別是衛星開發和部署方面的援助。
Russia and Iran, longtime partners in a bid to protect Bashar Assad's regime in Syria, have also upgraded their relationship from a limited tactical alliance to a more comprehensive and strategic military and economic partnership. Tehran has supplied Moscow with kamikaze drones to terrorize Ukrainian cities—now also being built in Russia—and drawn on its decades of experience to help Moscow evade Western sanctions. For its part, Russia has become Iran's chief external weapons supplier, its top source of foreign investment, and a key trading partner. Moscow also provides diplomatic cover for Tehran's nuclear program at the UN Security Council and has developed warm relations with Iranian proxies at war with the US and Israel in the Middle East.	俄羅斯和伊朗是保護敘利亞巴沙爾·阿薩德政權的長期合作夥伴，兩國關係也從有限的戰術聯盟升級為更全面的戰略軍事和經濟夥伴關係。德黑蘭向莫斯科提供了自殺無人機，用於恐嚇烏克蘭城市（目前俄羅斯也在建造這些無人機），並利用其數十年的經驗幫助莫斯科逃避西方制裁。俄羅斯已成為伊朗的主要外部武器供應國、最大的外國投資來源國和重要的貿易夥伴。莫斯科也在聯合國安理會為德黑蘭的核子計畫提供外交掩護，並與在中東與美國和以色列交戰的伊朗代理人建立了友好關係。
While less prominent than Russia's bilateral ties within the axis, North Korea and Iran have a decades-long history of cooperation on nuclear and ballistic missile development. This cooperation has reportedly extended to North Korea supplying weapons and missile designs to Hamas, the Houthis, and other Iranian-backed militant groups.	儘管在軸心內的雙邊關係不如俄羅斯那麼突出，但朝鮮和伊朗在核武和彈道飛彈開發方面有著長達數十年的合作歷史。據報導，這種合作已擴展到朝鮮，向哈馬斯、胡塞武裝和其他伊朗支持的激進組織提供武器和導彈設計。
In 2024, deeper alignment and mutual support among these rogue states will pose a growing threat to global stability as they boost one another's capabilities and act in increasingly coordinated and disruptive ways on the global stage.	到2024年，這些流氓國家間更深層的結盟和相互支持將對全球穩定構成越來越大的威脅，因為它們會增強彼此的能力，並在全球舞台上以日益協調和破壞性的方式行事。
Russia will be the primary driver of risk as it seeks to bolster its warfighting capabilities in Ukraine while working to deflect Western attention elsewhere. In exchange for North Korean artillery shells and rockets to sustain its war of attrition, Moscow will provide Pyongyang with technologies and know-how to advance its missile, submarine, and satellite programs, with major repercussions for Northeast Asian security. And in exchange for stepped-up provision of Iranian drones, munitions, sanctions relief, and ballistic missiles with which to strike Ukrainian cities, Moscow is poised to supply Tehran with fighter jets and advanced weapons technology. Along with growing Russian support for Iran's proxies, this will alter the regional balance of power in Iran's favor at a time when Tehran and its proxies represent a much more direct security challenge to the West (please see Top Risk #2). Both bilateral deals would strengthen Russia's hand in Ukraine and increase the war's damage and costs (please see Top Risk #3).	俄羅斯將成為風險的主要驅動因素，因為它尋求加強其在烏克蘭的作戰能力，同時努力將西方的注意力轉移到其他地方。為了換取朝鮮的炮彈和火箭彈來維持其消耗戰，莫斯科將向平壤提供技術和專業知識，以推進其導彈、潛艇和衛星計劃，對東北亞安全產生重大影響。為了換取伊朗加強提供無人機、彈藥、制裁減免和彈道導彈來打擊烏克蘭城市，莫斯科準備向德黑蘭提供戰鬥機和先進武器技術。隨著俄羅斯對伊朗代理人的支援日益增加，將改變對伊朗有利的地區力量平衡，因為德黑蘭及其代理人對西方構成了更直接的安全挑戰（請參閱最高風險#2）。這兩項雙邊協定都將加強俄羅斯在烏克蘭的影響力，並增加戰爭的損害和成本（請參閱最高風險#3）。
The severity of existing Western sanctions against all three rogue states and the close cooperation among them means they will not be deterred by fear of further sanctions and isolation. This will unleash them to wage asymmetric warfare short of direct military attacks on the US and Europe, including via cyberattacks, support for terrorism, and disinformation campaigns designed to disrupt elections and sow chaos. More generally, the axis's coordinated sanctions-busting and rule-breaking will undermine the compellent and deterrent power of Western sanctions, emboldening other would-be rogues.	西方對這三個流氓國家實施的嚴厲制裁以及它們之間的密切合作意味著它們不會因擔心進一步制裁和孤立而退縮。這將使他們發動不對稱戰爭，而不是對美國和歐洲進行直接軍事攻擊，包括通過網路攻擊、支持恐怖主義以及旨在破壞選舉和播下混亂的假訊息活動。更一般地說，軸心國協調一致地破壞制裁和違反規則將削弱西方制裁的強制力和威懾力，使其他潛在的流氓更加膽大妄為。
It bears noting that China is not a member of the axis of rogues. Beijing did not openly condemn Russian aggression in Ukraine, but neither did it endorse the invasion or do much to help Putin's war effort beyond purchasing discounted oil and allowing flows of dual-use goods to continue. (If India and the UAE were less friendly to the United States, analysts would be likening their Russia policies to China's.) Beijing has looked on warily at the deepening security cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang—indeed, Chinese officials didn't know Kim was going to Russia until after it was publicly announced … and they were piqued by it. And while it has ramped up oil imports from and diplomatic support for Tehran, Beijing has no desire to jeopardize its more strategically important interests in the Gulf (particularly its ties with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) by helping Iran make regional trouble.	值得注意的是，中國不是流氓軸心成員。北京沒有公開譴責俄羅斯對烏克蘭的侵略，但也沒有支持入侵，也沒有為普丁的戰爭努力提供太多幫助，除了購買打折的石油和允許軍民兩用商品繼續流通之外。（如果印度和阿聯酋對美國不那麼友好，分析師就會將他們的俄羅斯政策與中國的政策相提並論。）北京對莫斯科和平壤之間不斷加深的安全合作感到警惕 — 實際上，中國官員直到公開宣布之後才得知金正恩將訪俄的消息…而且他們對此感到惱怒。雖然北京方面已經增加了從德黑蘭進口石油和提供外交支持，但中國不希望因幫助伊朗製造地區麻煩而危及其在海灣地區更具戰略重要性的利益（尤其是與沙烏地阿拉伯和阿拉伯聯合大公國的聯繫）。
That said, China is often well-served by the three rogues' anti-Western operations and maintains a de facto policy of pro-axis neutrality. Indeed, without active acquiescence from China, the axis's rogue activities would be less impactful. Short of violating international sanctions or jeopardizing its own interests, expect Beijing to continue to do business with and legitimize the axis as it undermines the US and its allies this year.	儘管如此，中國往往因這三個流氓的反西方行動而受益，並在政策上保持事實上對親流氓軸國家的中立。事實上，如果沒有中國的積極默許，軸心國的流氓活動將影響不大。在不違反國際制裁或損害自身利益的情況下，預計北京將繼續與軸心國做生意並使其合法化，因為它們今年會破壞美國及其盟國。
Still, the disruptive potential of their growing cooperation—especially with a boost or at the very least a blind eye from Beijing—should not be underestimated.	儘管如此，不應低估雙方日益增長的合作的顛覆性潛力——尤其是在北京的推動下，或者至少是視而不見。
Three caveats are in order. First, Russia, Iran, and North Korea leaning on each other is a sign of their desperation and weakness on the global stage. When your best (and near only) friends are two rogue states, you're in trouble. Second, all of them seek to avoid an active shooting war with the West, which means continued caution when escalating direct attacks on the United States or its core allies. And third, despite their common interest in sowing chaos, dictators have trouble trusting each other, making the entente a fragile one. This axis is a marriage of convenience and opportunity; its members are neither strategic nor ideological bedfellows—they are focused primarily on regime survival and geopolitical gain. As such, their relationships will remain largely transactional.	需要注意三點： 首先，俄羅斯、伊朗和朝鮮相互依賴是它們在全球舞台上絕望和軟弱的表現。當你最好的（也是唯一的）朋友是兩個流氓國家時，你就會有麻煩了。 其次，它們都試圖避免與西方發生激烈的戰爭，這意味著在升級對美國或其核心盟友的直接攻擊時要繼續保持謹慎。 第三，儘管獨裁者們都有製造混亂的共同利益，但獨裁者間卻很難互相信任，這使得親近關係變得脆弱。這條軸線是權宜之計；其成員既不是戰略上的夥伴，也不是意識形態上的夥伴──他們主要關注的是政權的生存和地緣政治利益。因此，他們的關係在很大程度上仍將是交易性的。
AMERICA'S DANGEROUS FRIENDS America's enemies are becoming more dangerous, but even its friends could drag it into expanded conflicts this year.	美國危險的朋友 美國的敵人正變得越來越危險，但即使是它的朋友也可能在今年將其拖入擴大的衝突。
Volodymyr Zelensky. President Joe Biden has been Ukraine's staunchest supporter since Russia's invasion in February 2022. Having pledged to stay by Kyiv's side “as long as it takes,” he has shepherded $113 billion in military and other aid that has proven vital to Ukrainians' ability to defend themselves. Biden has done this even though he neither likes nor trusts President Zelensky. However, political support for Ukraine within the US has wavered as the war has dragged on, seriously undermining Biden's ability to keep the aid coming past this year. And if Donald Trump—who considers Zelensky a personal adversary—wins in November, Ukrainians can wave goodbye to their biggest backer (please see Top Risk #1). Cracks have also emerged within Ukraine, where infighting between Zelensky and Chief of the Armed Forces Valery Zaluzhny (over military strategy) as well as Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko (over Zelensky's allegedly authoritarian leadership) has spilled into the open, threatening Ukrainian political unity and fueling more skepticism among Kyiv's friends.	弗拉基米爾·澤倫斯基　自2022年2月俄羅斯入侵以來，喬·拜登總統一直是烏克蘭最堅定的支援者。他承諾「只要需要」就留在基輔身邊，他已經提供了1130億美元的軍事和其他援助，這些援助已被證明對烏克蘭人的自衛能力至關重要。拜登這樣做了，儘管他既不喜歡也不信任澤倫斯基總統。然而，隨著戰爭的拖延，美國國內對烏克蘭的政治支持已經動搖，嚴重削弱了拜登今年保持援助的能力。如果唐納德·川普——他認為澤倫斯基是其個人對手——在11月獲勝，烏克蘭人可以向他們最大的支援者揮手告別（請參閱最高風險 #1）。烏克蘭內部也出現了裂痕，澤倫斯基與武裝部隊總司令瓦列里·扎盧日尼（關於軍事戰略）以及基輔市長維塔利·克里琴科（關於澤倫斯基所謂的獨裁領導）之間的內訌已經公開化，威脅到烏克蘭的政治團結，並加劇了基輔朋友之間的更多懷疑。
Under pressure domestically and frustrated with both diminishing US support and increasing difficulties on the battlefield, a desperate Zelensky will be willing to take bigger risks to turn the war around and maintain his political standing before Trump potentially takes office (please see Top Risk #3). This includes more aggressive attacks against targets in Russia, Crimea, and the Black Sea, threatening a response from Russia and potentially forcing the United States to become more directly involved in the war.	在國內的壓力下，對美國支援減少和戰場困難增加感到沮喪，絕望的澤倫斯基將願意承擔更大的風險來扭轉戰爭，並在川普可能上任之前保持他的政治地位（請參閱最高風險#3）。這包括對俄羅斯、克里米亞和黑海的目標進行更積極的攻擊，威脅到俄羅斯的回應，並可能迫使美國更直接地捲入戰爭。
Benjamin Netanyahu. Israel is America's closest ally in the Middle East, the only democracy in the region, and the largest cumulative recipient of US foreign aid. It is no surprise that Biden—a self-described Zionist and longtime Israel supporter—strongly backed Israel's initial response to Hamas's 7 October attacks, despite his complicated relationship with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Since then, however, a public rift has opened between the two over the conduct and endgame of the war in Gaza. They are also at odds about the role the Palestinian Authority should play in Gaza's postwar governance as well as the viability of a two-state solution. Fundamentally, Biden wants to see the war end, while Netanyahu has political and personal reasons to keep it going or even escalate it.	班傑明·納坦雅胡　以色列是美國在中東最親密的盟友，是該地區唯一的民主國家，也是美國對外援助的最大累計接受國。毫不奇怪，拜登——自稱是猶太復國主義者和以色列的長期支援者——強烈支援以色列對哈馬斯10月7日襲擊的最初反應，儘管他與總理班傑明·納坦雅胡關係複雜。然而，從那時起，兩人之間就加薩戰爭的進行和結局產生了公開裂痕。他們對巴勒斯坦權力機構在加薩戰後治理中應發揮的作用以及兩國解決方案的可行性也存在分歧。從根本上說，拜登希望看到戰爭結束，而納坦雅胡有政治和個人原因讓它繼續下去，甚至升級戰爭。
Determined to stay in power and out of jail and emboldened by the possibility that his friend Trump returns to power in January 2025, Netanyahu will push back against pressure from Biden to end the war. He will ignore calls for restraint in Gaza while eyeing more conflict with Hezbollah in the north (please see Top Risk #2). He will also continue to inflame tensions in the West Bank and thwart any efforts to create a Palestinian state in the future. As a result, the United States will be inextricably tied to an intensifying conflict over which it has limited influence—one that will further strain US relations with the Arab world, the Global South, and even some allies, as well as create political challenges for Biden at home. Should Netanyahu decide to preemptively strike Hezbollah or even Iran itself, the US would find itself drawn into a much broader Middle East war.	納坦雅胡決心繼續掌權並出獄，並受到他的朋友川普在2025年1月重新掌權的可能性的鼓舞，他將抵制拜登要求結束戰爭的壓力。他將無視加薩要求克制的呼籲，同時著眼於與北部真主黨的更多衝突（請參閱最高風險#2）。他還將繼續加劇約旦河西岸的緊張局勢，並挫敗未來建立巴勒斯坦國的任何努力。因此，美國將與一場日益加劇的衝突密不可分，而這場衝突的影響力有限——這場衝突將進一步加劇美國與阿拉伯世界、全球南方甚至一些盟國的關係，並在國內給拜登帶來政治挑戰。如果納坦雅胡決定先發制人地打擊真主黨甚至伊朗本身，美國將發現自己被捲入了一場更廣泛的中東戰爭。
William Lai. Washington's long-standing “one China” policy and its security cooperation with Taiwan have been critical to deterring both a Chinese invasion and a declaration of independence from Taipei. Although Biden has repeatedly said the US would defend Taiwan against a Chinese attack, “strategic ambiguity” remains the official stance, and the president has no desire to risk a crisis with Beijing over the island. But the uneasy status quo in the Taiwan Strait will soon be tested if Taiwan elects Vice President William Lai, the ruling party candidate whom China views as the most pro-independence Taiwanese leader in a generation, as president (and his running mate Hsiao Bi-khim, Taiwan's former representative to the US, as vice president).	賴清德　華盛頓長期以來的「一個中國」政策以及與台灣的安全合作一直對阻止中國入侵和阻止台北宣布獨立至關重要。儘管拜登一再表示，美國將保衛台灣免受中國的攻擊，但「戰略模糊」仍然是官方立場，總統不想冒著與北京在台灣發生危機的風險。但是，如果台灣選舉執政黨候選人賴清德（中國認為是一代人以來最支援獨立的台灣領導人）擔任總統（以及他的競選搭檔、台灣前駐美國代表蕭美琴擔任副總統），台灣海峽的不安現狀將很快受到考驗。
While Biden will oppose any de jure independence moves from Lai, the domestic politics of the Taiwan issue will prevent the US president from objecting to the smaller, symbolic steps toward de facto autonomy Lai is likely to take. Yet even these will be enough to provoke a beyond-precedent military response from Beijing, such as violating Taiwan's airspace or waters or conducting ship inspections. Biden will be forced to respond to Chinese aggression with a show of resolve in support for Taipei that could jeopardize the US-China thaw and risk a dangerous cycle of escalation.	雖然拜登將反對賴的任何法理的獨立行動，但台灣的國內政治將阻止美國總統的反對，並將使賴採取更小、象徵性的步驟，走向事實上的自治。然而，即便如此，也足以激起北京前所未有的軍事反應，例如侵犯台灣領空或水域或進行船舶檢查。拜登將被迫以支援台北的決心來回應中國的侵略，這可能會危及美中解凍，並冒著危險的升級迴圈。
Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan will all continue to be major US allies. But their leaders' pursuit of their national—and, occasionally, personal—interests will further entangle Washington in growing conflicts.	烏克蘭、以色列和台灣都將繼續是美國的主要盟友。但是，他們的領導人對國家利益（有時是個人利益）的追求將進一步使華盛頓捲入日益加劇的衝突。