附加—日本的風險 Eurasia 20240108 / Taimocracy翻譯

附加—日本的風險   Eurasia 20240108 / Taimocracy翻譯 https://www.eurasiagroup.net/issues/Top-Risks-2024-Implications-for-Japan

Implications for Japan Eurasia Group's Top Risks 2024 report provides insight into what to expect from major global players (such as the US, China, and Russia) as well as from big trends (such as inflation, AI, and critical minerals).	日本的風險 歐亞集團的《2024年主要風險》報告提供了對全球主要參與者（如美國、中國和俄羅斯）以及大趨勢（如通貨膨脹、人工智慧和關鍵礦產）的預期的洞察。
Some of these risks will affect Japan more than others. In particular, risks #1 (The United States vs. itself) and #10 (Risky business) stand out for Japan, given its close economic and security relationship with the United States. But so too does risk #6 (No China recovery), because China is Japan's top trading partner. Other risks related to inflation and Taiwan could likewise have significant implications for Japan as it begins the Year of the Dragon—often considered the most auspicious year on the zodiac calendar.	其中一些風險對日本的影響將大於其他風險。特別是，鑒於日本與美國的密切經濟和安全關係，風險#1（美國自身）和#10（風險業務）對日本來說尤為突出。但風險#6（沒有中國復甦）也是如此，因為中國是日本最大的貿易夥伴。與通貨膨脹和台灣有關的其他風險也可能對日本產生重大影響，因為它開始了龍年——通常被認為是十二生肖日曆上最吉祥的一年。
Here are some of the key takeaways from Eurasia Group's Top Risks 2024 report for Japan. For the full list of top ten global risks, please see the report here.	以下是歐亞集團《2024年日本主要風險報告》中的一些關鍵要點。有關全球十大風險的完整清單，請參閱此處的報告。
Risk #1 (The United States vs. itself) is also Japan's top risk. Ever since Commodore Matthew Perry arrived at Tokyo Bay in 1853, the US has loomed large in the minds of the Japanese. And in the postwar era, no country wields as much influence over Japan's economy, politics, national security, and pop culture as the US does. That said, along with such influence comes enhanced risk for Japan when the US political system goes haywire.	風險#1（美國自身）也是日本面臨的最大風險。自從馬修·培里準將於1853年抵達東京灣以來，美國在日本人的心目中佔有重要地位。在戰後時代，沒有哪個國家能像美國那樣對日本的經濟、政治、國家安全和流行文化產生如此大的影響力。也就是說，隨著這種影響，當美國政治制度失控時，日本面臨的風險也會增加。
Tokyo's political and government centers of Nagata-cho and Kasumigaseki are already abuzz over the 2024 US presidential election. That chatter is about whether there will be a sequel to Donald Trump's presidency. Former prime minister Abe Shinzo was masterful at flattering Trump—with gifts of golden golf clubs and a nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize. But of course, Abe is gone, so the burning question in Tokyo is whether Prime Minister Kishida Fumio (or a future leader) could manage Trump as well as Abe did. There is today a consensus that Japan lacks a “Trump whisperer” to rival Abe. And that makes Tokyo very, very antsy.	東京的永田町和霞關的政治和政府中心已經在為2024年美國總統大選而嗡嗡作響。這種喋喋不休是關於唐納德·川普的總統是否會有續集。前首相安倍晉三（Abe Shinzo）善於奉承川普，贈送了金色高爾夫球桿和諾貝爾和平獎提名。但當然，安倍晉三已經走了，所以東京的緊迫問題是首相岸田文雄（或未來的領導人）能否像安倍晉三那樣管理川普。如今，人們一致認為，日本缺乏與類似安倍的「川普直通者」。這讓東京非常非常緊張。
It is notable that even Abe could not stop Trump from slapping tariffs on Japanese steel and aluminum imports. The US still has a wide goods trade deficit with Japan ($68 billion in 2022) and that would draw Trump's ire in a second administration because he abhors trade deficits. Japan could be the target of tariffs again, along with other countries. And whereas Japan is now moving toward increasing its defense spending to 2% of GDP by 2027, Tokyo's steps would probably not be enough to satisfy Trump, who would pressure Japan to spend even more. Conversely, however, Japan might have some avenues to influence Trump. He would likely take a very hard line on China and could find useful a critical ally such as Japan to successfully implement his hardline policy.	值得注意的是，即使是安倍晉三也無法阻止川普對日本鋼鐵和鋁進口徵收關稅。美國對日本的商品貿易逆差仍然很大（2022年為680億美元），這將引起川普在第二屆政府中的憤怒，因為他憎惡貿易逆差。日本可能再次成為關稅的目標，與其他國家一樣。雖然日本現在正朝著到2027年將其國防開支增加到GDP的2%邁進，但東京的措施可能不足以讓川普滿意，川普將迫使日本增加開支。然而，相反，日本可能有一些途徑來影響川普。意即川普可能會對中國採取非常強硬的立場，並可能找到一個有用的關鍵盟友，如日本，以成功實施他的強硬政策。
Japan is the largest source of FDI in the US (more than $700 billion in 2022). Also, US-based Japanese manufacturing firms employ the highest number of US workers, at more than half a million. As a result, this puts the #10 risk for 2024 (Risky business) near the top for Japan. Japanese corporations, which operate all over the US, will confront policies and regulations that vastly differ from state to state (such as in California and Texas). That will be difficult to navigate this year because of political polarization. After the US-Japan trade wars of the 1980s and 1990s, Japanese firms—with support from their government—rapidly ramped up their investments into the US to avoid becoming a target of tariffs. That was a wise move at the time. But one downside now is that it risks putting Japanese firms more squarely in the crossfire of US domestic politics.	日本是美國最大的外國直接投資來源國（2022年超過7000億美元）。此外，總部位於美國的日本製造企業僱用的美國工人人數最多，超過五十萬。因此，這使得2024年的 #10 風險（風險業務）接近日本的頂部。在美國各地開展業務的日本公司將面臨各州（例如加利福尼亞州和德克薩斯州）差異很大的政策和法規。由於政治兩極分化，今年將很難駕馭這種情況。在1980年代和1990年代的美日貿易戰之後，日本企業在政府的支援下迅速增加了對美國的投資，以避免成為關稅的目標。這在當時是一個明智的舉動。但現在的一個缺點是，它有可能使日本企業更直接地陷入美國國內政治的交火之中。
After the US, China is the country with the biggest influence over Japan's economy and national security. As mentioned, the vim of the Japanese economy depends on the Chinese economy. So risk #6 (No China recovery) has large implications for Japan. A corollary of China no longer being a major driver of world economic growth is that Chinese demand for Japanese exports will remain weak in 2024. Although decoupling from the Chinese economy is not an option for Japan, Japanese firms and investors will increasingly be forced this year to move investments from China to more appealing emerging markets.	繼美國之後，中國是對日本經濟和國家安全影響最大的國家。如前所述，日本經濟的活力取決於中國經濟。因此，風險#6（沒有中國復甦）對日本有很大影響。中國不再是世界經濟增長的主要驅動力的一個必然結果是，到2024年，中國對日本出口的需求將保持疲軟。儘管與中國經濟脫鉤對日本來說不是一種選擇，但日本企業和投資者今年將越來越多地被迫將投資從中國轉移到更具吸引力的新興市場。
One piece of good news for Japan is that a US-China crisis is unlikely in 2024—Top Risks identifies this as a red herring. As for Japan's relations with China, Kishida's meeting in November with President Xi Jinping yielded results that should help stabilize the relationship into 2024. That said, the year could start off with a bang if pro-independence candidate William Lai is elected Taiwan's president on 13 January. This is the other election of most intense interest to Japan, after the US election. As the Top Risks report notes, Lai is one of “America's dangerous friends” (along with Volodymyr Zelensky and Benjamin Netanyahu) who could drag the country into expanded conflicts in 2024. A Lai victory would undeniably raise the level of economic coercion and military fireworks from China against Taiwan. But even if Lai wins and other challenges arise (such as close military encounters between the US and China in the region), US-China ties are likely to remain relatively stable. The two sides will carefully manage their relationship, even as it slowly deteriorates.	對日本來說，一個好消息是，2024年不太可能發生美中危機——Top Risks認為這是「誤導」（一條紅鯡魚）。至於日本與中國的關係，岸田文雄11月與習近平主席的會晤產生了有助於將關係穩定到2024年的結果。也就是說，如果傾向獨立的候選人賴清德在1月13日當選台灣總統，今年可能會大放異彩。這是繼美國大選外，日本最感興趣的另一次選舉。正如《最高風險報告》所指出的那樣，賴清德是「美國的危險朋友」之一（與澤倫斯基和納坦雅胡一起），他可能會在2024年將美國拖入擴大的衝突。不可否認，賴清德的勝利將提高中國對台灣的經濟脅迫和軍事煙火的程度。但即使賴清德獲勝並出現其他挑戰（例如美國和中國在該地區的近距離軍事交鋒），美中關係也可能保持相對穩定。美中雙方將小心翼翼地管理他們的關係，即使它正在慢慢惡化。
Top Risks 2024 identifies the ongoing global inflation shock as a major factor that will remain a political and economic drag on many countries. Because Chinese growth—once a safety net against global economic downturns—will remain weak, the world will experience low growth. That risk has big implications for the Japanese economy, which already struggles to reach solid growth because of its declining population. Although inflation has been relatively low compared to other countries, Japanese residents are for the first time in decades seeing price levels rise, particularly because of the high cost of food and energy imports.	《2024年主要風險》指出，持續的全球通脹衝擊是一個主要因素，仍將拖累許多國家的政治和經濟。由於中國經濟增長——曾經是抵禦全球經濟衰退的安全網——將仍然疲軟，世界將經歷低增長。這種風險對日本經濟產生了重大影響，由於人口減少，日本經濟已經難以實現穩定增長。儘管與其他國家相比，通貨膨脹率相對較低，但日本居民幾十年來首次看到物價水平上漲，特別是因為食品和能源進口成本高昂。
Worsening inflation contributed to Kishida's low approval ratings in the second half of 2023, making the Japanese public grumpy over his handling of the economy. The Bank of Japan is poised to raise interest rates, already taking baby steps in that direction last year. But such a move would also have a substantial political impact because it could reduce economic growth and make it harder for Japan to service its gargantuan debt pile. Financing that debt with higher interest rates might crowd out Kishida's other spending priorities such as increasing defense spending. The prospect of weak global growth makes the title of risk #8 (No room for error) a particularly apt description of the challenge for Japan's economic policymakers in 2024.	不斷惡化的通貨膨脹導致岸田文雄在2023年下半年的支援率較低，使日本公眾對他處理經濟的處理方式感到不滿。日本央行準備加息，去年已經朝著這個方向邁出了小步。但此舉也將產生重大的政治影響，因為它可能會降低經濟增長，並使日本更難償還其巨額債務。以更高的利率為債務融資可能會擠佔岸田文雄的其他支出優先事項，例如增加國防開支。全球增長疲軟的前景使得風險#8（沒有犯錯的餘地）的標題特別貼切地描述了日本經濟政策制定者在2024年面臨的挑戰。
Lastly, North Korea's emerging security partnership with Russia and other rogue states has important implications for Japan. North Korea's missile testing in 2023, after a record-setting pace of launches in 2022, was subdued. However, North Korea's cozying up to Russia—outlined in risk #5 (Axis of rogues)—will concern Japan. Russia is also a neighbor that has become more of a threat to Japan, after Tokyo stood with the West in applying tough economic sanctions against Moscow. In response, Russia has ratcheted up its military exercises around Japan. The prospect of Russia boosting North Korea's military and reconnaissance capabilities is not one that Japan will welcome in 2024.	最後，朝鮮與俄羅斯和其他流氓國家正在形成的安全夥伴關係對日本具有重要影響。朝鮮在2022年創紀錄的發射速度之後，2023年的導彈試驗受到抑制。然而，朝鮮對俄羅斯的討好——在風險#5（流氓軸心國）中概述——將讓日本感到擔憂。在東京與西方站在一起對莫斯科實施嚴厲的經濟制裁之後，俄羅斯也是一個對日本構成更大威脅的鄰國。作為回應，俄羅斯加強了在日本周邊的軍事演習。俄羅斯增強北韓軍事和偵察能力的前景不是日本在2024年會歡迎的。