風險 6：中國經濟無法復甦 Eurasia 20240108 / Taimocracy翻譯

風險 6：中國經濟無法復甦   Eurasia 20240108 / Taimocracy翻譯

Any green shoots in the Chinese economy will only raise false hopes of a recovery as economic constraints and political dynamics prevent a durable growth rebound. Consolidation of power at the top (Eurasia Group's Top Risk #2 for 2023) has snuffed out policy debate and animal spirits just as China's past growth engines have been exhausted, and there is little the government will do to reverse either trend. Beijing's failure to address the country's sputtering growth model, financial fragilities, insufficient demand, and crisis of confidence will expose gaps in the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CPP) and increase the risk of social instability.	中國經濟的任何萌芽都只會帶來虛假的復甦希望，因為經濟制約和政治動態阻礙了持久的成長反彈。高層權力整合（歐亞集團 2023 年最大風險#2）已經消除了政策辯論和動物精神，就像中國過去的成長引擎已經耗盡一樣，政府幾乎無能為力扭轉任一趨勢。北京未能解決該國糟糕的成長模式、金融脆弱性、需求不足和信任危機，將暴露中國共產黨合法性的缺陷，並增加社會不穩定的風險。
We've already seen warning signs of deepening malaise emerge in 2023, from the exit of foreign investors and Moody's outlook downgrades to stalled property purchases and a stock market slump. This year, appetite to re-invest in the country will continue to be dampened by vague and conflicting policy signals, growing concerns about geopolitical risk, and the CCP's ongoing regulatory crackdowns.	我們已經看到2023年出現了惡化的警告信號，從外國投資者退出、穆迪展望下調到房地產購買停滯和股市暴跌。今年，模糊且相互矛盾的政策信號、對地緣政治風險日益增長的擔憂以及中共持續的監管打壓將繼續抑制對該國再投資的興趣。
The persistence of constraints such as unfavorable demographics, eroding labor cost advantages, high indebtedness (particularly at the local level), Western “de-risking” efforts, and continued reliance on state investment for growth will further diminish hopes of a resurgent Chinese economy. While Beijing will try to restore confidence and prop up demand by throwing more money at the problem—building yet more infrastructure to meet its likely 5% growth target (again) for 2024—its efforts will have limited impact in the absence of a true shift toward bold reform.	不利的人口結構、勞動成本優勢削弱、高負債（尤其是地方層級）、西方「去風險」努力以及繼續依賴國家投資促進成長等限制因素的持續存在，將進一步削弱中國經濟復甦的希望。儘管北京方面將透過投入更多資金來解決問題（建造更多基礎設施以實現2024年可能的5%增長目標）來嘗試恢復信心並提振需求，但如果沒有真正的轉變，其努力將產生有限的影響力邁向大膽改革。
Four additional economic factors will impede a recovery in 2024:	另外四個經濟因素將阻礙2024 年的復甦：
1) Fading zero-Covid rebound. The tailwind from last year's reopening will disappear as slowing income growth, higher unemployment, local government fiscal consolidation, falling property prices, and cascading defaults weigh on confidence and consumption.	1) 零新冠疫情反彈逐漸減弱。去年的順風車由於收入成長放緩、失業率上升、地方政府財政整頓、房價下跌以及連鎖違約對信心和消費造成壓力，今年的重新開放將會消失。
2) Real estate weakness. Previously a pillar of China's economy, the real estate sector won't provide a much hoped-for boost despite recent stabilization efforts, with new construction remaining anemic owing to weak homebuyer demand and slumping land purchases by cash-strapped property developers over the past two years.	2) 房地產疲軟。房地產行業曾是中國經濟的支柱，儘管最近採取了穩定措施，但它不會提供人們所希望的提振。由於過去兩年購屋者需求疲軟以及資金短缺的房地產開發商土地購買量下降，新建築仍然疲軟。
3) Low external demand. International demand for Chinese exports, especially from the US and Europe, will prove less resilient than in 2023, constrained by high interest rates and slow global growth (please see Top Risk #8).	3) 外部需求低迷。受高利率和全球增長放緩的制約，國際對中國出口的需求，尤其是來自美國和歐洲的出口需求，將比2023年更具彈性（請參閱最高風險#8）。
4) Government economic response. Beijing's whack-a-mole approach to emerging episodes of financial stress such as developer defaults and bank collapses (as opposed to larger-scale, more preemptive reform) will sap confidence and test the government's already-stretched administrative capacity.	4) 政府的經濟反應。北京對開發商違約和銀行倒閉等新出現的金融壓力採取打地鼠的做法（而不是更大規模、更先發制人的改革）將削弱信心，並考驗政府本已捉襟見肘的行政能力。
Then there's politics. President Xi Jinping's concentration of power and prioritization of security over growth will not only weigh on consumer, business, and investor confidence, but it will also make the regime slower to respond to rising economic and financial vulnerabilities. This doesn't mean that China faces an imminent crisis. Rather, these conditions will entrench the country's economic malaise and expose cracks in the CCP's veneer of competence and legitimacy.	然後是政治。中國國家主席習近平的集權中和將安全置於增長之上，不僅會打擊消費者、企業和投資者的信心，而且還會使該政權對日益加劇的經濟和金融脆弱性做出反應的速度變慢。這並不意味著中國正視迫在眉睫的危機。相反，這些條件將加劇該國的經濟萎靡不振，並暴露出中共能力和正當性外表的裂縫。
Absent an unlikely loosening of Xi's grip or a radical pivot toward large-scale consumer stimulus and structural reform that restore confidence and reignite growth, China's economy will underperform throughout 2024. While the CCP's rule is stable, there remains a longer-term risk that Beijing will react too slowly to warning signs of financial contagion and social unrest, increasing the chances that the government could one day lose control of both.	在無以下不太可能的情況，即習近平的放鬆權力或出現大規模的消費者刺激和結構性改革，以恢復信心並重新點燃增長，中國經濟在整個2024年將表現不佳。雖然中共的統治穩固，但存在一種更長期的風險，即北京在金融傳染和社會動盪的警告信號上反應過於緩慢，增加政府有一天可能失去對兩者的控制的可能性。