風險 3：瓜分下的烏克蘭 Eurasia 20240108 / Taimocracy翻譯

風險 2：瓜分下的烏克蘭    Eurasia 20240108 / Taimocracy翻譯

Ukraine will be de facto partitioned this year, an unacceptable outcome for Ukraine and the West that will nevertheless become reality. At a minimum, Russia will keep control of the territory it now occupies on the Crimean peninsula and in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts—about 18% of Ukraine's territory—as the war settles into a defensive struggle with a fairly static line of control. But Russia now has the battlefield initiative and a material advantage, and it could take more land in 2024. This year is an inflection point in the war: If Ukraine doesn't solve its manpower problems, increase weapons production, and set a realistic military strategy soon, it could “lose” the war as early as next year.	烏克蘭今年將事實上被瓜分，這對烏克蘭和西方來說是一個不可接受的結果，但將成為現實。至少，俄羅斯將保持對克里米亞半島以及頓涅茨克、盧甘斯克、扎波羅熱和赫爾松州（約佔烏克蘭領土18%）的領土的控制權，因為戰爭將進入防禦性戰鬥，控制線相當靜止不動。但俄羅斯現在擁有戰場主動權和物質優勢，它可能會在2024年佔領更多土地。今年是戰爭的轉捩點：如果烏克蘭不儘快解決人力問題，增加武器生產，制定現實的軍事戰略，最早可能在明年「輸掉」戰爭。
Kyiv has taken a body blow from ebbing US political and material support for Ukraine. Americans are increasingly split on the war, and many Republican lawmakers actively oppose more aid. Even if Congress approves additional military assistance for 2024, this will probably be the last significant appropriation Kyiv will get from Washington. If Donald Trump wins, he will drastically cut aid. If President Joe Biden wins, another large package is a long shot unless Democrats improbably win both the House and the Senate. The outlook for European assistance is only slightly better. German budgetary challenges on one side, growing Hungarian opposition on the other, and a lack of leadership from most everyone else will make it hard for the Europeans to fill the gap in military aid the Americans will leave over the medium term. While Europe is ramping up production capacity, it doesn't have the infrastructure to provide the high volume of ammunition (including all-important artillery shells), heavy tanks, howitzers, and infantry fighting vehicles that Ukraine needs.	基輔因美國對烏克蘭的政治和物質支援減弱而受到沉重打擊。美國人在戰爭問題上的分歧越來越大，許多共和黨議員積極反對更多的援助。即使國會批准2024年的額外軍事援助，這也可能是基輔從華盛頓獲得的最後一次重大撥款。如果唐納德·川普獲勝，他將大幅削減援助。另一個包裹式計劃將遙遙無期，除非拜登總統獲勝，以及民主黨人同時贏得眾議院和參議院。歐洲援助的前景僅略有好轉。一方面是德國的預算挑戰，另一方面是匈牙利日益增強的反對，以及大多數國家缺乏領導層，這將使歐洲人難以填補美國人在中期留下的軍事援助缺口。雖然歐洲正在提高產能，但它沒有基礎設施來提供烏克蘭所需的大量彈藥（包括最重要的炮彈）、重型坦克、榴彈炮和步兵戰車。
The material balance has also shifted in Russia's favor. On manpower, Russia is attracting significant numbers of men to new contracts, so a politically fraught second mobilization this year is unnecessary for now. President Vladimir Putin has also successfully converted his economy into a war operation. Roughly one-third of government spending and 6% of GDP will be devoted to the war in 2024, and Russian domestic production of missiles and artillery shells is now greater than before the war. North Korea is providing a large volume of additional ammunition, and Iran continues to provide (and now produce in Russia) drones (please see Top Risk #5).	物質平衡也朝著有利於俄羅斯的方向轉變。在人力方面，俄羅斯正在吸引大量男性簽訂新契約，因此今年沒有必要進行政治上令人擔憂的第二次動員。普丁總統也成功地將他的經濟轉變為戰爭行動。到2024年，大約三分之一的政府支出和6%的GDP將用於戰爭，俄羅斯國內的導彈和炮彈產量現在比戰前還要多。朝鮮正在提供大量額外彈藥，伊朗繼續提供（現在在俄羅斯生產）無人機（請參閱最高風險#5）。
Ukraine is in a more troubled position. On manpower, it must mobilize and train new recruits to improve force quality. Kyiv is considering mobilizing 500,000 additional troops, which is probably impossible but shows the quandary Ukraine is in as it confronts the army of a much larger country. Kyiv also needs to scale up its domestic defense production, especially of drones for the battlefield and to hit targets inside Russia.	烏克蘭的處境更加困難。在人力方面，必須動員和培訓新入職人員，以提高部隊素質。基輔正在考慮再動員500,000名士兵，這可能緣木求魚，但表明烏克蘭在面對一個大得多國家的軍隊時所處的困境。基輔還需要擴大其國內國防生產，特別是用於戰場和打擊俄羅斯境內目標的無人機。
Russia's material advantage will be reflected on the battlefield, where Moscow has seized the initiative and is now attacking in Donetsk Oblast, showing limited but effective offensive capability for the first time in over a year. Russia will form additional armies with fresh recruits and continue to develop offensive capability, ratcheting up the pressure on Ukraine.	俄羅斯的物質優勢將體現在戰場上，莫斯科已經掌握了主動權，現在正在頓涅茨克州發動進攻，一年多來首次顯示出有限但有效的進攻能力。俄羅斯將組建更多新兵軍隊，並繼續發展進攻能力，加大對烏克蘭的壓力。
For their part, Ukrainians will be forced to entrench and defend during 2024, and in a predominantly artillery-based war, defense is much easier than offense. This means that Kyiv probably won't lose much land this year. But Ukraine will need to develop its military forces and come up with effective military strategies for both 2024 and 2025 by early in the year. Ukraine will also need to end the growing domestic infighting between the presidential administration and both the military leadership—which contributed to the failure of last year's counteroffensive—and other political leaders like Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko.	就烏克蘭人而言，他們將被迫在2024年採取鞏固和防禦，在一場以炮兵為主的戰爭中，防禦比進攻容易得多。這意味著基輔今年可能不會失去太多土地。但烏克蘭需要發展其軍事力量，並在今年年初之前為2024年和2025年制定有效的軍事戰略。烏克蘭還需要結束總統府與軍方領導層（導致去年反攻失敗）以及基輔市長維塔利·克里琴科等其他政治領導人之間日益加劇的國內內訌。
The upshot is that Ukraine must make progress on mobilization, training, defense production, strategizing, and political infighting. If it succeeds in most of these tasks, Kyiv will be in a strong position to defend its existing territory in coming years, with a future that could include hard security guarantees from the West, eventual NATO membership, reconstruction aid, and EU integration—a better geopolitical trajectory than could have plausibly been expected before the Russian invasion two years ago. But if it fails, Ukraine is likely to lose the war in the near future, where losing means giving up more territory in Donetsk and possibly Kharkiv oblasts, and then being forced to accept a much more unfavorable ceasefire or settlement.	結果是，烏克蘭必須在動員、訓練、國防生產、戰略制定和政治內訌方面取得進展。如果基輔成功完成其中的大部分任務，它將在未來幾年內處於保衛其現有領土的有利地位，未來可能包括來自西方的實質安全保證、最終加入北約、重建援助和歐盟一體化——這比兩年前俄羅斯入侵之前的預期要好。但如果失敗，烏克蘭很可能在不久的將來輸掉這場戰爭，輸掉意味著放棄頓涅茨克和哈爾科夫州的更多領土，然後被迫接受更不利的停火或解決方案。
Ukraine is at risk of losing, but Russia has no way to “win.” Whatever longer-term gains its forces can make on the ground in Ukraine, NATO is now strengthened by new members Finland and (soon) Sweden. This month, the EU will open a membership process for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, an outcome that wasn't on the table before Putin ordered his invasion. Russia has faced 11 rounds of sanctions, with more on the way. Half of its sovereign assets have been frozen, at least some of which are likely to be seized to finance Ukrainian reconstruction. Europe will no longer buy Russia's commodity exports, which instead must be sold to China, India, and others on the cheap. Moscow has been rendered permanently dependent on Beijing. All of this, just to get pieces of eastern and southern Ukraine that will take years and years to consolidate.	烏克蘭有失敗的風險，但俄羅斯沒有辦法「贏」。無論其部隊在烏克蘭的地面上能取得什麼長期收益，北約現在都得到了新成員芬蘭和（很快）瑞典的加強。本月，歐盟將為烏克蘭、喬治亞和摩爾多瓦開啟成員資格程序，這一結果在普丁下令入侵之前並未擺在桌面上。俄羅斯已經面臨11輪制裁，還有更多制裁即將到來。其一半的主權資產已被凍結，其中至少有一部分可能被沒收以資助烏克蘭的重建。歐洲將不再購買俄羅斯的商品出口，而是必須以低價出售給中國、印度和其他國家。莫斯科已經永久依賴北京。所有這一切，只是為了獲得烏克蘭東部和南部的部分，這將需要多年的時間才能鞏固。
Still, a partitioned Ukraine will pose real risks. The first pertains to the Black Sea, where Ukraine has developed a new export route through the littoral waters of NATO members to the Bosphorus. Russia is currently deploying mines in the area and could start to sink ships this year. Should Moscow mistakenly strike a NATO or Western vessel, naval warfare between the alliance and Russia could ensue.	儘管如此，一個被瓜分的烏克蘭將帶來真正的風險。第一個與黑海有關，烏克蘭在那裡開發了一條新的出口路線，通過北約成員國的沿海水域到博斯普魯斯海峽。俄羅斯目前正在該地區部署水雷，並可能在今年開始擊沉船隻。如果莫斯科錯誤地襲擊了北約或西方船隻，聯盟與俄羅斯之間的海戰可能會隨之而來。
Diminishing Western support and growing political infighting will leave Ukraine feeling increasingly desperate, which will cause President Volodymyr Zelensky to become more risk-acceptant (please see box in Top Risk #5). He will turn to asymmetric warfare away from the frontlines in an attempt to degrade the Russian military, keep Ukraine in the headlines, and potentially bring NATO into the conflict. More targeted killings are likely, focusing on individuals connected to the war and occupation. The Ukrainians will also launch deep strikes with drones and missiles in Crimea and Russia targeting military and economic infrastructure—possibly including Russian oil and grain facilities on the Black Sea, which would lead to global oil and food market disruptions. Attacks are also likely on the Kerch Strait Bridge, Russian railroads, and Russian cities, which would provoke stepped-up Russian attacks against Ukrainian cities. The risk of a miscalculation or accident that results in NATO casualties and draws the United States more directly into the war will be heightened accordingly.	西方支持減少和日益加劇的政治內訌將使烏克蘭感到越來越絕望，這將導致總統澤倫斯基變得更願意接受風險（請參閱最高風險#5中的框）。他將轉向遠離前線的不對稱戰爭，試圖削弱俄羅斯軍隊，讓烏克蘭成為頭條新聞，並可能將北約捲入衝突。可能會有更多有針對性的殺戮，重點是與戰爭和佔領有關的個人。烏克蘭人還將在克里米亞和俄羅斯使用無人機和導彈對軍事和經濟基礎設施發動深度打擊，可能包括俄羅斯在黑海的石油和糧食設施，這將導致全球石油和糧食市場中斷。刻赤海峽大橋、俄羅斯鐵路和俄羅斯城市也可能遭到襲擊，這將引發俄羅斯加強對烏克蘭城市的襲擊。導致北約傷亡並使美國更直接地捲入戰爭的誤判或事故的風險將相應增加。
Tapering US political and material support will deepen a rift in the transatlantic alliance, which is the cornerstone of the international system. Europeans view current and likely future cuts in US assistance to Ukraine as an Afghanistan 2.0 policy lurch, but with much higher stakes for European security. Their concern is magnified by the risk that Trump will try to take the US out of NATO if he wins in November. Russia's upper hand will make the Kremlin feel like it successfully stared down the West on an existential issue, emboldening Putin to lean on unsupportive countries in the EU and NATO (such as Hungary and Slovakia) and driving further division.	美國逐漸減少政治和物質支援將加深作為國際體系基石的跨大西洋聯盟的裂痕。歐洲人認為，美國目前和未來可能削減對烏克蘭的援助是阿富汗2.0政策的蹣跚，但對歐洲安全的影響要大得多。如果川普在11月獲勝，他將試圖將美國帶出北約的風險加劇了他們的擔憂。俄羅斯的佔上風將使克里姆林宮自覺它成功地在生存問題上盯著西方，使普丁更加大膽地依靠歐盟和北約中不支援的國家（如匈牙利和斯洛伐克），並進一步推動分裂。
A partitioned Ukraine will also undermine US credibility on the global stage. The United States made a major security commitment to help Ukraine protect itself and regain its land for “as long as it takes.” Domestic politics is leading the US to renege on this commitment, worsening the image of the US as an unreliable partner (please see Top Risk #1). Rogue and revisionist states will be emboldened accordingly (please see Top Risk #5). What's more, the war's trendline will make Ukraine a political loser for Biden during an election year, giving Trump a boost. A Trump win would accelerate this decline in US credibility.	一個被瓜分的烏克蘭也將破壞美國在全球舞臺上的信譽。美國做出了一項重大的安全承諾，即幫助烏克蘭保護自己並「只要需要」就收復其土地。美國國內政治正在導致美國背棄這一承諾，惡化了美國作為不可靠夥伴的形象（請參閱最高風險#1）。流氓和修正主義國家將相應地受到鼓勵（請參閱最高風險#5）。更重要的是，戰爭的趨勢線將使烏克蘭在選舉年成為拜登的政治輸家，從而提振川普。川普的勝利將加速美國信譽的下降。