風險 2：戰爭邊緣的中東 Eurasia 20240108 / Taimocracy翻譯

風險 2：戰爭邊緣的中東    Eurasia 20240108 / Taimocracy翻譯

On 30 September 2023, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said that “the Middle East is quieter today than it has been in two decades.” He jinxed it. Just eight days later, Hamas's terrorist attacks shook the region to its core, jolting the world out of its complacency on the Palestinian issue, shattering Israel's sense of security, and turning the Middle East into a powder keg.	2023年9月30日，美國國家安全顧問傑克·蘇利文（Jake Sullivan）表示，「今天的中東比二十年來更平靜。」他錯了。僅僅八天後，哈馬斯的恐怖襲擊就徹底震撼了該地區，使世界擺脫了對巴勒斯坦問題的自滿情緒，粉碎了以色列的安全感，將中東變成了一個火藥桶。
To be sure, there's still a lot of truth to Sullivan's claim: Iran and the Gulf states are the closest they've been in years thanks to the China-brokered breakthrough between Riyadh and Tehran. Qatar and the Gulf Cooperation Council fixed their problems. The ceasefire in Yemen holds. Syria is back in the diplomatic loop. The Abraham Accords remain up and running. And yet … everybody forgot about the Palestinians. Now, one thing is certain: The region is no longer quiet, and it won't be for ages. There is a network of deterrence relationships—Israel and the US on the one hand, Iran and its proxies on the other, and the Gulf states in between—that has so far contained the war to Gaza … just. No country wants a regional war to erupt. But the powder is dry, and the number of players carrying matches makes the risk of escalation high. The current fighting in Gaza is accordingly likely to be only the first phase in an expanding conflict in 2024.	可以肯定的是，蘇利文的說法仍然有很多道理：由於中國斡旋的利雅德和德黑蘭之間的突破，伊朗和海灣國家是多年來最接近的。卡達和「海灣合作委員會」解決了他們的問題。葉門的停火得以維持。敘利亞又回到了外交迴圈中。《亞伯拉罕協定》仍在運行。而…，每個人都忘記了巴勒斯坦人。現在，有一件事是肯定的：該地區不再平靜，而將來也不會長期保持安寧。此區有一個威懾關係網路——一方面是以色列和美國，另一方面是伊朗及其代理人，以及介於兩者之間的海灣國家——迄今為止已經遏制了對加薩的戰爭，僅僅如此而已。沒有一個國家希望爆發地區戰爭。但情勢一觸即發，攜帶火柴的玩家數量使升級的風險很高。因此，加薩目前的戰鬥可能只是2024年衝突擴大的第一階段。
One path to escalation would be a decision by Israel to strike Hezbollah. Israel's post-7 October security posture is defined by a commitment to restore regional deterrence and address long-standing security risks, with a bias toward preempting threats before they materialize. Top Israeli leaders have pledged to “remove” the threat from Hezbollah on their northern border, and the war cabinet is debating an operation to push the militant group beyond the Litani river in southern Lebanon as called for by UN Security Council Resolution 1701. That would lead to a showdown with Hezbollah. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has his own reasons to keep the Gaza campaign going or start another one in the north: avoiding ouster and possible jail time (please see box in Top Risk #5).	升級途徑之一是以色列決定打擊真主黨。以色列在10月7日之後的安全態勢是承諾恢復地區威懾和應對長期存在的安全風險，傾向於在威脅成為現實之前先發制人。以色列最高領導人已承諾「消除」真主黨在其北部邊境的威脅，戰爭內閣正在辯論一項行動，以按照〈聯合國安理會第1701號決議〉的要求，將激進組織推到黎巴嫩南部的利塔尼河之外。此舉將導致與真主黨攤牌。以色列總理班傑明·納坦雅胡有利己的動機讓加薩行動繼續進行，或者在北部開始另一場行動：避免自己下臺和可能的監禁時間（請參閱最高風險#5中的方框內容）。
If Israel were to attack preemptively, it would probably wait to do so until after the fighting ebbed in Gaza to avoid a full-fledged, two-front war (initial withdrawals of some Israeli troops from Gaza should be assessed accordingly). The US military would almost certainly provide support to the Israeli effort. Iran, in turn, would assist Hezbollah, the most important link in Tehran's power projection strategy in the Levant. A spiral of escalation could turn the shadow war between the US/Israel and Iran into a kinetic one.	如果以色列要先發制人發動進攻，它可能會等到加薩的戰鬥平息之後才發動進攻，以避免一場全面的兩線戰爭（應相應地評估一些以色列軍隊最初從加薩撤出的情況）。美軍幾乎肯定會為以色列的努力提供支援。反過來，伊朗將協助真主黨，這是德黑蘭在黎凡特（Levant）的權力投射戰略中最重要的一環。螺旋式的升級可能會將美國/以色列和伊朗之間的隱密的戰爭變成一場動態的戰爭。
A similar spiral could be initiated by Hezbollah with the backing of Iran if its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, thought the level of Palestinian casualties in Gaza—or the West Bank—had become intolerably high. And if Iran believed that Hezbollah was at risk of being existentially degraded, its level of support for the group would increase.	如果真主黨領導人哈桑·納斯魯拉（Hassan Nasrallah）認為加薩或約旦河西岸的巴勒斯坦人傷亡人數已經高到無法忍受，那麼真主黨在伊朗的支援下可能會發起類似的螺旋式上升。如果伊朗認為真主黨有生存風險，它對該組織的支援程度就會增加。
Houthi militants are also pursuing an escalatory path. The Yemen-based former rebels have a formidable arsenal of weapons supplied by Iran and are keen to boost their standing at home and within the Tehran-backed “Resistance Front.” They have a longer leash—but also less protection—from Tehran than Iran's other regional proxies, and they are more risk acceptant. The Houthis have been launching missile and drone attacks on Israel, US warships, and commercial shipping vessels since November, threatening safe passage through the Strait of Bab al Mandab and the Gulf of Aden—key transit waterways for oil and goods to Europe, North America, and Asia. In response, the US has formed a multinational naval task force to protect shipping and deter the Houthis. But the Yemeni group will remain undeterred and continue to shoot. In doing so, it could inadvertently kill US citizens, which would demand a stronger response from Washington. If the Houthis stay on this path, strikes on their bases in Yemen are increasingly likely, bringing the United States and its allies more directly into the war.	胡塞民兵組織也在尋求升級的道路。總部設在葉門的前叛亂分子擁有伊朗提供的強大武器庫，並熱衷於提高他們在國內和德黑蘭支援的「抵抗陣線」中的地位。與伊朗其他地區代理人相比，胡塞組織民兵與德黑蘭的束縛時間更長，但保護也更少，而且他們更容易接受風險。自11月以來，胡塞組織一直在對以色列、美國軍艦和商業運輸船發動導彈和無人機襲擊，威脅到通過曼達海峽和亞丁灣的安全通道——這是石油和貨物通往歐洲、北美和亞洲的關鍵過境水道。作為回應，美國組建一支多國海軍特遣部隊，以保護航運並威懾胡塞組織。但這葉門的集團將毫不氣餒，繼續射擊。這樣做可能會無意中殺死美國公民，這將要求華盛頓做出更強有力的回應。如果胡塞組織繼續走這條路，那麼對他們在葉門的基地發動襲擊的可能性越來越大，使美國及其盟國更直接地捲入戰爭。
Finally, Shia militias operating in Iraq and Syria have systematically increased their attacks on US bases, with Tehran's blessing but at least partially driven by local political dynamics. These attacks are difficult to deter, and the possibility of unintended consequences is rising accordingly. Risks associated with US casualties are particularly stark. Washington has made clear that any US deaths will lead to large-scale retaliation, and that Iran will be held directly accountable.	最後，在伊拉克和敘利亞活動的什葉派民兵在德黑蘭的支援下，系統地增加了對美國基地的襲擊，但至少部分是由當地政治動態驅動的。這些攻擊很難阻止，發生意外後果的可能性也相應增加。與美軍傷亡相關的風險尤為明顯。華盛頓已經明確表示，美國的任何死亡都將導致大規模報復，伊朗將被追究直接責任。
All these pathways pose risks to the global economy. Most of the world's largest shipping companies have already suspended transit through the Red Sea in response to the Houthi strikes, paralyzing a critical waterway that sees 12% of global trade pass through it. Ongoing Houthi attacks will keep freight insurance rates elevated, disrupt global supply chains, and create inflationary pressure. In addition, the closer the conflict comes to Iran, the greater the risk of disruptions to oil flows in both the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, pushing crude prices higher. Any moves by Israel, the US, or others to block Iran's 1.4 million barrels per day of oil exports via sanctions or military strikes would provoke retaliation by Tehran that puts larger volumes of oil and LNG exports from the region at risk (though the worst-case scenario, a closure of the Strait of Hormuz, remains a very low probability).	所有這些途徑都對全球經濟構成風險。為了應對胡塞組織的襲擊，世界上大多數最大的航運公司已經暫停通過紅海，胡塞組織癱瘓一條關鍵的水道，這條全球貿易的12%通過紅海。持續的胡塞組織襲擊將使貨運保險費率居高不下，擾亂全球供應鏈，並造成通脹壓力。此外，衝突越接近伊朗，紅海和波斯灣石油流動中斷的風險就越大，從而推高原油價格。以色列、美國或其他國家以制裁或軍事打擊來阻止伊朗每天140萬桶石油出口的任何舉動都將引發德黑蘭的報復，使該地區更多的石油和液化天然氣出口面臨風險（儘管最壞的情況，即關閉荷穆茲海峽，仍然非常低的可能性）。
The conflict will also widen existing global divisions and disrupt politics. Anti-Israel sentiment is inflamed across the Middle East, among Muslim populations around the world, and— increasingly—within the Global South. The United States is currently as isolated globally in its support for Israel as Russia was over its invasion of Ukraine. As the war in Gaza drags on, the schism between Washington and the rest of the world will grow.	這場衝突還將擴大現有的全球分歧並擾亂政治。反以色列情緒在整個中東地區、世界各地的穆斯林人口中以及全球南方內部日益激化。美國目前在支援以色列方面與俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭一樣在全球範圍內處於孤立狀態。隨著加薩戰爭的持續，華盛頓與世界其他地區之間的分裂將加劇。
Divisions will deepen within the US as well, where public opinion on Israel-Palestine is shifting with the nation's demographics. A majority of Gen Zers now view the 7 October attacks—the worst violence against Jews since the Holocaust—as justified. Discontent among young Americans, minorities, and progressives with President Joe Biden's steadfast backing of Israel will hurt Democrats in the 2024 election.	美國內部的分歧也將加深，公眾對以色列-巴勒斯坦的看法正在隨著國家人口結構的變化而變化。大多數Z世代現在認為10月7日的襲擊是合理的，這是自大屠殺以來針對猶太人的最嚴重暴力行為。美國年輕人、少數族裔和進步人士對拜登總統堅定支援以色列的不滿將在2024年大選中傷害民主黨人。
The most dangerous schism, though, remains between Israelis and Palestinians. Israelis across the political spectrum overwhelmingly support the complete destruction of Hamas, whatever that means and however improbable it may be. A growing majority of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, meanwhile, support Hamas. More temporary ceasefires to the current fighting in Gaza remain possible, especially given the strong international pressure behind them … but they're extremely unlikely to prove sustained. The longer the war goes on, the more both populations will radicalize. This will increase the risk of insurgency in Gaza, deadly clashes in the West Bank and Jerusalem, and terrorist attacks in Israel that provoke a further military response. It goes without saying that the expansion of Israeli-Palestinian violence makes the prospects for an eventual two-state solution increasingly dim.	然而，最危險的分裂仍然存在於以色列人和巴勒斯坦人之間。以色列各政治派別都壓倒性地支持徹底摧毀哈馬斯，無論這意味著什麼，無論它多麼不可能。與此同時，約旦河西岸和加薩地帶越來越多的巴勒斯坦人支援哈馬斯。目前加薩的戰鬥仍有可能實現更多的臨時停火，特別是考慮到其背後的強大國際壓力......但它們極可能是不可持續的。戰爭持續的時間越長，雙方的激進化程度就越高。這將增加加薩叛亂、約旦河西岸和耶路撒冷發生致命衝突以及以色列恐怖攻擊的風險，從而引發進一步的軍事反應。不言而喻，以巴暴力的擴大使最終兩國解決方案的前景越來越黯淡。
Finally, and perhaps most troublingly, this conflict will stoke political and religious extremism across the Middle East and elsewhere. Demonstrations could erupt in Arab and Muslim countries as Israeli forces kill or displace larger numbers of Palestinian civilians in Gaza, or in response to settler violence and repression in the West Bank and Jerusalem. These upheavals could destabilize countries with large populations of Palestinian refugees such as Egypt and Jordan and—in the extreme—force their governments to cut ties with Israel. All along, Islamic terrorist groups will use images and casualty figures from Gaza as propaganda and recruitment tools, and violence against Jews will spike in many countries. Fatal violence linked to the war has already hit Europe, and the United States is also vulnerable.	最後，也許最令人不安的是，這場衝突將在整個中東和其他地方煽動政治和宗教極端主義。隨著以色列軍隊在加薩殺害或流離失所的大量巴勒斯坦平民，或者為了回應約旦河西岸和耶路撒冷定居者的暴力和鎮壓，阿拉伯和穆斯林國家可能會爆發示威活動。這些動盪可能會破壞埃及和約旦等擁有大量巴勒斯坦難民的國家的穩定，並在極端情況下迫使其政府切斷與以色列的關係。一直以來，伊斯蘭恐怖組織將利用加薩的圖像和傷亡數位作為宣傳和招募工具，許多國家針對猶太人的暴力行為將激增。與戰爭有關的致命暴力事件已經襲擊了歐洲，美國也很脆弱。