風險 1：美國自己 Eurasia 20240108 / Taimocracy翻譯

風險 1：美國自己   Eurasia 20240108 / Taimocracy翻譯

While America's military and economy remain exceptionally strong, its political system is more dysfunctional than that of any other advanced industrial democracy … and in 2024 faces further weakening. The US presidential election will worsen the country's political division, testing American democracy to a degree the nation hasn't experienced in 150 years and undermining US credibility on the global stage.	雖然美國的軍事和經濟仍然異常強大，但其政治體系比任何其他先進工業民主國家的政治體系都更加功能失調……並且在2024年將面臨進一步的削弱。美國總統選舉將加劇該國的政治分裂，將美國的民主制度考驗到美國150年來從未經歷過的程度，並損害美國在全球舞台上的信譽。
The US political system is remarkably divided, and its legitimacy and functionality have eroded accordingly. Public trust in core institutions—such as Congress, the judiciary, and the media—is at historic lows; polarization and partisanship are at historic highs. Add algorithmically amplified disinformation to the mix, and Americans no longer believe in a common set of settled facts about the nation and the world.	美國政治體系嚴重分裂，其正當性和功能性也相應的受到侵蝕。公眾對國會、司法機構和媒體等核心機構的信任度處於歷史低點；兩極化和黨派之爭正處於歷史最高點。再加上經過演算法放大的假訊息，美國人將不再相信關於國家和世界的一套共同的既定事實。
The two major parties' likely presidential candidates are uniquely unfit for office. Former President Donald Trump faces dozens of felony criminal charges, many directly related to actions taken during his term in office, most critically including his efforts to overturn the results of a free and fair election. In any stable, well-functioning democracy, the 2024 contest would be principally about those. The United States is presently far from that. On the other side of the aisle, President Joe Biden would be 86 years old at the end of his second term. The vast majority of Americans want neither to lead the nation.	兩大黨的可能的總統候選人是獨一無二的不適合擔任公職的人。前總統唐納德·川普面臨數十項重罪刑事指控，其中許多與他在任期間採取的行動直接相關，最關鍵的是他試圖推翻自由公正的選舉結果。在任何穩定、運作良好的民主國家，2024年的競選將主要圍繞在這些。美國目前還遠遠未達到這個目標。而另一邊，總統拜登在第二任期結束時將年滿86歲。絕大多數美國人都不想讓這兩位人物領導國家。
This division will worsen in the run-up to the election. From the moment he secures the nomination (not guaranteed, but overwhelmingly likely), Trump will hijack Republican and American politics, as even the most reluctant of Republicans in Congress—and most conservative media, activist groups, and monied interests—will fall in line with him. His policy pronouncements—however outlandish—will shift the national narrative and shape the policy direction on Capitol Hill and in statehouses across the country before a vote is cast. The result will be even more policy extremism, division, and gridlock.	這種分歧將在選舉前夕進一步惡化。從川普獲得提名的那一刻起（不能保證，但極有可能），他將劫持共和黨和美國政治，因為即使是國會中最不情願的共和黨人——以及大多數保守派媒體、激進團體和金錢利益團體——也會屈服和他一起。他的政策聲明——無論多麼古怪——將改變國家建構敘事，並在投票前塑造國會山莊和全國各州議會的政策方向。其結果將是更多的政策極端主義、分裂和僵局。
Knowing he faces prison time if he loses in November, Trump will use his online pulpit, control of the Republican Party, and friendly media to delegitimize both the system that is prosecuting him and the integrity of the election. His victim narrative and preemptive claims of fraud will find a receptive audience of Americans who agree, putting implicit pressure on Republican state governments and election officials to manage the election in ways that would benefit him (such as by purging voter rolls more liberally or tightening voting restrictions). While these efforts are unlikely to overturn the electoral process, they may well disrupt it.	川普知道，如果他在11月落敗，他將面臨牢獄之災，因此他將利用他的網路講壇、對共和黨的控制以及友好的媒體來破壞起訴他的體制和選舉的公正性。他的受害者訴求和先發制人的欺詐指控，將找到一群願意接受的美國人，這對共和黨州政府和選舉官員施加隱性壓力，要求他們以有利於他的方式管理選舉（例如更自由地清除選民名冊或收緊投票限制）。雖然這些努力不太可能推翻選舉進程，但很可能會擾亂它。
And they are sure to persuade many of Trump's supporters to doubt the election outcome's legitimacy—a problem that will be exacerbated by AI-fueled disinformation and social media echo chambers (please see Top Risk #4).	他們肯定會說服川普的許多支援者懷疑選舉結果的合法性——人工智慧引發的假資訊和同溫層社交媒體將加劇這個問題（請參閱最高風險#4）。
In a world beset by crises, the prospect of a Trump victory will weaken America's position on the global stage as Republican lawmakers take up his foreign policy positions and US allies and adversaries hedge against his likely policies. US support for Ukraine will face stronger headwinds on Capitol Hill, straining the transatlantic alliance and leaving Ukrainians and their frontline European supporters in the lurch. Kyiv will take increasingly reckless actions to make what gains it can before the next president takes office, while hopes for a definitive end to US aid in 2025 will stiffen Russia's resolve to keep fighting (please see Top Risk #3). In the Middle East, Trump's prominent support for Israel and willingness to bomb Iran for transgressions will embolden Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and limit Biden's political space for policy maneuver. Pressure from congressional Republicans, meanwhile, will make it politically harder—albeit not impossible (please see Red Herrings)—for Biden to preserve the “thaw” with China this year. The shadow of Trump will lead US allies and adversaries to brace for his return to office, with destabilizing consequences long before Inauguration Day.	在一個危機四伏的世界裡，川普獲勝的前景將削弱美國在全球舞台上的地位，因為共和黨議員將採取他的外交政策立場，而美國的盟友和對手也會對他可能採取的政策進行對沖。美國對烏克蘭的支持將在國會山莊面臨更強勁的阻力，使跨大西洋聯盟變得緊張，並使烏克蘭人和他們的前線歐洲支持者陷入困境。基輔將採取越來越魯莽的行動，以在下一任總統就職之前獲得盡可能多的利益，而美國在2025年徹底終止援助的希望將讓俄羅斯堅定繼續戰鬥的決心（請參閱最高風險＃3）。在中東，川普對以色列的突出支持以及因伊朗的違法行為而轟炸伊朗的意願，將使以色列總理班傑明·納坦雅胡更加大膽，並限制拜登的政策迴旋政治空間。與此同時，來自國會共和黨人的壓力將使拜登在政治上更難保持與中國的「解凍」，儘管這並非不可能（請參閱「紅鯡魚」）。川普的陰影將導致美國的盟友和對手為他重返職務做好準備，並在就職日之前很久就帶來不穩定的後果。
If Trump wins the election, Biden will concede. But while Democratic leaders may be less likely to claim the election was “rigged” than the former president, they will still treat Trump as illegitimate, believing he should be in jail and is unfit for office. Some congressional Democrats will likely vote against certifying his election on the grounds that he is not qualified to serve under the 14th Amendment, undermining trust in American electoral institutions. The response in major cities would be a repeat of the massive street protests during the 2016 presidential transition, but in a country even more bitterly divided and with an opposition coalition more convinced that Trump 2.0 beckons the end of American democracy. Whether driven by extremist elements, clashes with counter-protesters, or opportunistic bad actors, widespread violence is a real (and indeed nearly inevitable) risk. The danger will intensify over the course of a Trump administration as he pardons those arrested for storming the Capitol on 6 January, allowing them to return to their quasi-militias and organize against what they see as elite leftist institutions.	如果川普贏得選舉，拜登就會認輸。但是，儘管民主黨領導人可能不像前總統那樣聲稱選舉被「操縱」，但他們仍然會認為川普是非法的，認為他應該入獄並且不適合擔任公職。一些國會民主黨人可能會投票反對批准他的當選，理由是他沒有資格根據第十四修正案任職，從而損害了對美國選舉機構的信任。主要城市的反應將是2016年總統過渡期間大規模街頭抗議的重演，但在一個分裂更加嚴重的國家，反對派聯盟更加相信川普2.0預示著美國民主的終結。無論是由極端主義者、與反抗議者的衝突或是機會主義的不良行為者驅動，廣泛的暴力都是一個真實的（實際上幾乎不可避免的）風險。在川普執政期間，這種危險將會加劇，因為他赦免了那些因1月6日襲擊國會大廈而被捕的人，允許他們重返準民兵組織，並組織起來反對他們眼中的精英左翼機構。
If Trump loses, he won't accept defeat. Instead, he will do everything in his power—legal or illegal—to contest the outcome and impugn the legitimacy of the process. He has fewer options for challenging the results than he had as president in 2020, owing to the passage of the Electoral Count Reform Act and the fact that he's not the incumbent. But that will not stop him from trying—especially not when he faces the prospect of prison time. He will allege mass fraud once again. He will incite widespread intimidation campaigns against election workers and secretaries of state in both red and blue states, demanding that they “find” extra votes for him. He will lean hard on Republican governors to submit slates of Republican electors in states Democrats won. And he will pressure Republican senators and representatives to object to states' slates of electors to disqualify Democratic electoral college votes. While none of these efforts is likely to succeed, they will inflict damage on already low public confidence in the integrity of America's democratic institutions.	如果川普輸了，他不會接受失敗。相反，他將竭盡全力——無論是合法的還是非法的——來質疑結果並質疑這一過程的合法性。與2020年擔任總統相比，他挑戰選舉結果的選擇更少，因為《選舉計票改革法案》（the Electoral Count Reform Act）的通過以及他不是現任總統的事實。但這並不能阻止他嘗試，尤其是當他面臨入獄的前景時。他將再次指控大規模欺詐。他將煽動針對紅州和藍州選舉工作人員和州務卿的廣泛恐嚇運動，要求他們為他「找到」額外的選票。他將大力依靠共和黨州長在民主黨贏得的州提交共和黨選舉人名單。他將向共和黨參議員和眾議員施壓，要求他們反對各州取消民主黨選舉人團投票資格的選舉人名單。雖然這些努力都不太可能成功，但它們將損害公眾對美國民主制度完整性的信心。
Barring an unlikely Democratic landslide, Republicans are poised to see a Biden win as illegitimate, alleging either that the election was “stolen” or that politically motivated investigations made it more difficult for Trump to campaign. They will see Trump's incarceration during the Biden administration as Democrats jailing the opposition leader for political purposes. This could create an unprecedented political crisis, destroying the remaining trust in federal institutions Republicans still have and leading to calls for Biden to pardon Trump the same way Gerald Ford pardoned Richard Nixon to avoid national disunity. While large-scale violence is less likely in this environment, America's political divide would deepen, and the nation's fragmentation into red vs. blue states, cities, and towns would accelerate.	除非民主黨取得壓倒性勝利，否則共和黨人將認為拜登的勝利是非法的，他們聲稱選舉要不是被「偷走」，要不然就是政治調查才使川普的競選變得更加困難。他們將看到川普在拜登執政期間被監禁，因為民主黨出於政治目的而監禁反對派領袖。這可能引發一場前所未有的政治危機，摧毀共和黨人對聯邦機構僅存的信任，並導致人們呼籲拜登赦免川普，就像傑拉爾德·福特赦免理查德·尼克森以避免國家不團結一樣。雖然在這種環境下發生大規模暴力的可能性較小，但美國的政治分歧將會加深，國家分裂為紅藍各州、城市和城鎮的速度將會加快。
And then there's the tail risk (unlikely but plausible) that you'd rather not think about: What if the world's most powerful country is unable to hold a free and fair election on 5 November? Efforts to subvert the election could come from cyberattacks, deep fakes and disinformation, physical attacks on election process and oversight, and even terrorism to disrupt voting on the day. There's no more geopolitically significant target than the upcoming ballot—a softer and more vulnerable target than most homeland security challenges—with plenty of foreign (and more than a few domestic) adversaries that would love nothing more than to see more chaos in America.	然後是你不敢去想極端風險（不太可能，但似乎合理）：如果世界上最強大的國家無法在11月5日舉行自由公正的選舉怎麼辦？顛覆選舉的努力可能來自網路攻擊、深偽和假訊息、對選舉過程和監督的物理攻擊，甚至是破壞當天投票的恐怖主義。沒有比即將到來的投票更具地緣政治意義的目標了——這是一個比大多數國土安全挑戰更溫和、更脆弱的目標——有很多外國（以及不少國內）對手只希望看到美國出現更多混亂。
The United States is already the world's most divided and dysfunctional advanced industrial democracy. The 2024 election will exacerbate this problem no matter who wins. With the outcome of the vote essentially a coin toss (at least for now), the only certainty is continued damage to America's social fabric, political institutions, and international standing.	美國已經是世界上最分裂、功能失調的先進工業民主國家。無論誰獲勝，2024年的選舉都將加劇這個問題。由於投票結果基本上是拋硬幣（至少目前是這樣），唯一可以肯定的是，美國的社會結構、政治制度和國際地位將繼續受到損害。
TRUMP: THE FINAL SEASON? What if he wins again?	川普：最後一季？ 如果他再獲勝怎麼辦？
Trump's 2016 upset was met with horror from the American left and concern from allied world leaders, but generally positive reactions from American business leaders and optimism from global financial markets, which saw the lower taxes and deregulation of a Trump administration as a net positive for the US economy. The response next time around would be significantly more troubled, as a second Trump administration would have fewer guardrails than the first, reduced fiscal space, and more radical policy divisions among US states following eight additional years of polarizing politics.	川普2016年的失利遭到了美國左派的恐懼和世界盟國領導人的擔憂，但美國商界領袖普遍做出積極反應，全球金融市場也持樂觀態度，認為川普政府的減稅和放鬆監管是一項重大舉措。對美國經濟產生淨正面影響。下一次的反應將明顯更加麻煩，因為在經歷了八年的兩極分化政治之後，第二屆川普政府的準則將比第一屆政府更少，財政空間也會縮小，而且美國各州之間的政策分歧也會更加激進。
A second Trump administration would take steps to consolidate executive power, weaken checks and balances, and undermine the rule of law. Trump would try to capture federal institutions by purging thousands of civil servants he sees as obstacles and replacing them with inexperienced loyalists. Much of a second Trump cabinet would be senior Republicans: Former cabinet members Nikki Haley, Robert Lighthizer, and Mike Pompeo—known as capable within the broader policy community—are all likely to return. Key policy risks from the cabinet would include trade protectionism—with goals of broad-based 10% import tariffs and stripping most favored nation status from China—and unpredictability from the Department of Defense, where appointed leadership will be comprised of political loyalists more like Mike Flynn than Jim Mattis. At the same time, a core of Trump's policy advisers in the White House (including the likes of Steve Bannon, Stephen Miller, and Kash Patel) would have virtually no relationships with elite business leaders or foreign dignitaries—and limited willingness to prioritize an audience with them.	川普第二屆政府將採取措施鞏固行政權力、削弱制衡並破壞法治。川普將試圖透過清除數千名他認為是障礙的公務員並用缺乏經驗的忠誠者取而代之來奪取聯邦機構。川普第二任內閣的大部分成員將是資深共和黨人：前內閣成員妮基·海利(Nikki Haley)、羅伯特·萊特希澤(Robert Lighthizer)和邁克·蓬佩奧(Mike Pompeo)— —在更廣泛的政策界被認為有能力—都有可能回歸。內閣的主要政策風險將包括貿易保護主義（其目標是廣泛徵收10%的進口關稅並剝奪中國的最惠國待遇）以及國防部的不可預測性，國防部任命的領導層將由像麥克這樣的政治忠誠者組成弗林比吉姆馬蒂斯。同時，川普在白宮的核心政策顧問，包括史蒂夫班農（Steve Bannon）、史蒂芬米勒（Stephen Miller）和卡什帕特爾（Kash Patel）等人，與菁英商界領袖或外國政要幾乎沒有關係，而且意願有限優先考慮他們的受眾。
Having gutted the “deep state,” Trump would be less constrained to break the rule of law. His first order of business would be to weaponize the FBI, the Justice Department, and the IRS to block proceedings against himself and his allies and persecute his political enemies. Biden and his family would be in the crosshairs, but how far this revanchist McCarthyism goes—to opposition lawmakers, media figures, donors, critics—is a question of enormous import, especially in its signaling importance to determine behavior across the political spectrum, at best chilling political dissent and at worst squelching it nearly entirely.	摧毀了「深層政府」後，川普破壞法治的行為就會減少。他的首要任務是武裝聯邦調查局、司法部和國稅局，阻止針對他自己和他的盟友的訴訟，並迫害他的政敵。拜登和他的家人將成為眾矢之的，但這種復仇麥卡錫主義對反對派議員、媒體人物、捐助者、批評家來說，能走多遠，是一個非常重要的問題，特別是它對決定整個政治派別行為的重要性。最好的情況是令人不寒而慄的政治異議，最糟的情況是幾乎完全壓制它。
There would be little remedy at the federal level to restrain a second Trump administration if it acts lawlessly. A divided or Republican-controlled Congress would be unable and unwilling to check Trump's executive excesses, with impeachment and removal off the table even under a Democratic Congress. While a conservative Supreme Court, one-third of whose members were appointed by Trump, would remain independent, it would have limited power to enforce its rulings against a renegade president, setting up the potential for a constitutional crisis the likes of which America hasn't seen since the end of the Civil War.	一個分裂或共和黨控制的國會，將無法也不願意遏制川普的行政過度行為，即使在民主黨國會的領導下，彈劾和罷免也被排除在桌面之外。雖然保守派最高法院（其三分之一的成員由川普任命）將保持獨立，但它對叛變總統執行裁決的權力有限，這為美國自內戰結束以來從未見過的憲法危機埋下了伏筆。
The decentralized nature of the US system would remain a counterweight to dysfunction in Washington, as a weaker federal government would devolve power to the states and allow a free market of competing political and economic strategies to flourish. The flipside of this decentralization is that red and blue states would continue to grow polarized, not just on policy but increasingly in terms of who they attract to live, do business, and invest. This would create a fractured business and investment environment that would be difficult for companies to navigate as policies and regulations diverge from state to state and their choice of location becomes an implicit political statement (please see Top Risk #10).	美國體系的分散性質仍將是華盛頓功能失調的制衡因素，因為較弱的聯邦政府會將權力下放給各州，並允許相互競爭的政治和經濟戰略的自由市場蓬勃發展。這種權力下放的另一面是，紅州和藍州將繼續兩極化，不僅在政策上，而且在吸引誰來居住、經商和投資方面也日益兩極化。這將造成一個支離破碎的商業和投資環境，公司將難以應對，因為各州的政策和法規各不相同，而且他們對地點的選擇成為一種隱含的政治聲明（請參閱最大風險#10）。
Foreign companies would have a harder time understanding the political geography of America and spend more time trying to get on the good side of Trump's political apparatus. Relationships across the federal government—and particularly with Republicans who have Trump's ear—would become essential for foreign governments, even more so than they were in the first term. And investors are likely to see massive opportunities in deregulated industries but grow increasingly concerned about the US fiscal picture.	外國公司將更難了解美國的政治地理，並花更多時間試圖站在川普政治機構的有利一邊。對外國政府來說，聯邦政府內部的關係，尤其是與聽取川普意見的共和黨人的關係將變得至關重要，甚至比第一任期更重要。投資者可能會在放鬆管制的行業中看到巨大的機會，但也會越來越擔心美國的財政狀況。
However positively markets may view its concrete policies, a second Trump presidency—with all its personalistic, authoritarian, and mercurial tendencies—would deal grievous harm to US democracy. It would also begin to raise foundational questions about the long-term stability of the US as an investment destination, the trustworthiness of its financial promises, the credibility of its commitments to foreign partners, and the durability of its role as the lynchpin of the global security order.	無論市場如何看待其具體政策，川普的第二次總統任期——及其個人主義、專制主義和反覆無常的傾向——都將對美國民主造成嚴重傷害。它還將開始引發一些基本問題，包括美國作為投資目的地的長期穩定性、其金融承諾的可信度、其對外國合作夥伴的承諾的可信度，以及其作為全球安全秩序關鍵角色的持久性。