紅鯡魚（混淆議題） Eurasia 20240108 / Taimocracy翻譯

紅鯡魚（混淆議題）   Eurasia 20240108 / Taimocracy翻譯

US-CHINA CRISIS This year will prove another turbulent one for US-China relations, with several irritants that will threaten to derail the thaw the two sides established over the course of 2023.	美中危機 今年將是中美關係又一個動蕩的一年，有幾個刺激因素可能會破壞雙方在2023年建立的解凍。
First, if Vice President William Lai wins Taiwan's presidential election, Beijing will take aggressive military and economic steps to discourage his pro-independence ambitions. Policymakers in Washington will respond with a show of support for Taiwan (please see box in Top Risk #5). Second, China's drive to assert its regional interests will continue to produce close encounters with US military assets in or above the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Third, tech competition between the US and China will continue apace as Washington expands restrictions on China's semiconductor and artificial intelligence industries while Beijing retaliates with further export controls on critical minerals and green technologies (please see Top Risk #7).	首先，如果副總統賴清德贏得台灣總統選舉，北京將採取積極的軍事和經濟措施來阻止他的台獨野心。華盛頓的政策制定者將以對台灣的支持表示回應（請參閱「最大風險#5」中的方框）。 其次，中國維護其區域利益的努力將繼續在台灣海峽和南海及其上空與美國軍事資產密切接觸。 第三，隨著華盛頓擴大對中國半導體和人工智慧產業的限制，而北京則透過對關鍵礦產和綠色技術進一步出口管制進行報復，中美之間的技術競爭將繼續加速（請參閱最大風險#7 ）。
Yet we expect the US and China to maintain comparatively stable ties in 2024. There are several reasons why.	然而，我們預計美國和中國將在2024年保持相對穩定的關係。有幾個原因。
While committed to "systemic competition,” President Joe Biden's administration is more immediately determined to put a floor beneath the relationship and preserve the guardrails established by Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Woodside Summit. Election-year politics in the US will limit cooperation and occasionally dial up hostile rhetoric and actions (please see Top Risk #1). But new diplomatic and military-to-military channels will help manage tensions with Beijing.	在致力於「系統性競爭」的同時，喬·拜登總統的政府更立即地決心為鋪陳這種關係，並維護拜登和中國國家主席習近平在伍德賽德高峰會上建立的準則。美國的選舉年政治將限制合作，偶爾會引發敵對言論和行動（請參閱最高風險#1）。但新的外交和軍方管道將有助於緩解與北京的緊張關係。
Beijing's recent charm offensive—a far cry from the “wolf warrior” diplomacy of Xi's first two terms—will continue, as China's domestic economic challenges and the structural issues underpinning them (please see Top Risk #6) remain defining priorities in 2024 and beyond. The importance of social and economic stability at home and the need to ease the fears of foreign investors and trading partners will continue to override inclinations for a more pugnacious foreign-policy approach. Moreover, given the significant uncertainty—and growing concern—about how Donald Trump might approach US-China relations in a second term, China's leadership has incentives to reinforce engagement while the option is still on the table.	隨著中國國內經濟挑戰及其背後的結構性問題的解決，北京最近的「友好攻勢」將會繼續下去——這與習近平前兩屆任期的「戰狼」外交相去甚遠——（請參閱首要風險# 6）仍將確定會是2024年及以後的優先事項。國內社會和經濟穩定的重要性，以及緩解外國投資者和貿易夥伴擔憂的必要性，將繼續壓倒更好鬥的外交政策方針的傾向。此外，考慮到唐納德·川普在第二任期內可能如何處理美中關係存在巨大的不確定性和日益增長的擔憂，中國領導層有動力在這一選擇仍在桌面上時加強接觸。
The most important geopolitical relationship in the world is still fundamentally adversarial and marked by mistrust; several flashpoints will exacerbate bilateral tension throughout 2024. But preserving stability is better for both sides this year, neither of which wants to risk major decoupling or conflict. The two countries will carefully manage the relationship's decline as they weather any expected turbulence.	世界上最重要的地緣政治關係從根本上仍然是敵對的，並以不信任為標誌；2024年全年，幾個爆發點將加劇雙邊緊張局勢。但今年保持穩定對雙方來說都更好，雙方都不想冒著重大脫鉤或衝突的風險。兩國將小心翼翼地管理兩國關係的衰落，以應對任何預期的動蕩。
POPULIST TAKEOVER OF EUROPEAN POLITICS A surge in support for far-right and populist parties within many European countries is fueling concern that the centrist consensus that has defined Europe's postwar order could break down in 2024.	民粹主義接管歐洲政治 許多歐洲國家對極右翼和民粹主義政黨的支援激增，加劇了人們的擔憂，即定義歐洲戰後秩序的中間派共識可能會在2024年崩潰。
In 2023, Geert Wilders and his Freedom Party secured mainstream support for the first time to win the Dutch elections. Robert Fico's left-wing nationalist Smer came back to power in Slovakia. Support for the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) surged to record highs. Far-right and far-left parties in France currently have over 50% support combined. Economic headwinds, migratory pressures, some Ukraine war fatigue, and intra-EU discord are kindling fears of a populist sweep at the European Parliament elections in June.	2023年，吉爾特·懷爾德斯（Geert Wilders）和他的自由黨（Freedom Party）首次獲得主流支持，贏得荷蘭大選。羅伯特·菲科（Robert Fico）的左翼民族主義者斯梅爾（Smer）在斯洛伐克重新掌權。對極右翼德國另類選擇黨（AfD）的支援率飆升至歷史新高。法國的極右翼和極左翼政黨目前總共有超過50%的支持率。經濟逆風、移民壓力、烏克蘭戰爭疲勞以及歐盟內部的不和，都引發了人們對民粹主義在6月歐洲議會選舉中橫掃的擔憂。
But Europe's center will hold in 2024. Euroskeptic and populist parties should capture around a quarter of European Parliament seats. An alliance of Europe's center-right parties with far-right and populist parties is politically unlikely. Even if their politics align, they will not account for a sizable majority in the European Parliament. Therefore, the traditional European coalition—comprising the center-right, social democrats, liberals, and Greens—will maintain power in the EU's legislature, and the European Commission (the bloc's executive) will be chosen by consensus among centrist candidates.	但歐洲的中心將在2024年舉行。 歐洲懷疑論者和民粹主義政黨應該佔據歐洲議會約四分之一席次。歐洲中右翼政黨與極右翼和民粹主義政黨結盟在政治上不太可能。即使他們的政治立場一致，他們也不會在歐洲議會中佔有相當大的多數席次。因此，由中右翼、社會民主黨、自由派和綠黨組成的傳統歐洲聯盟將在歐盟立法機構中保持權力，而歐盟委員會（歐盟的執行機構）將由中間派候選人協商一致選出。
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban will continue obstructing EU decision-making, but centrist governments in the majority of member states will manage to find workarounds. Moreover, Orban will no longer have the support of his crucial former allies in Warsaw after Polish voters replaced a xenophobic right-wing government with an EU-friendly centrist one in 2023. Despite pushback from Hungary and other headwinds, financial support for Ukraine is likely to be maintained near current levels this year. Even in countries led by antiestablishment parties, such as Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni's Brothers of Italy, decision-making will remain overwhelmingly pragmatic—even centrist.	匈牙利總理歐爾班（Viktor Orban）將繼續阻撓歐盟的決策，但大多數成員國的中間派政府將設法找到變通辦法。此外，在波蘭選民在2023年用對歐盟友好的中間派政府取代了仇外的右翼政府後，歐爾班將不再得到他在華沙的重要前盟友的支援。儘管受到匈牙利和其他不利因素的抵制，但今年對烏克蘭的財政支援可能會保持在當前水準附近。即使在義大利總理喬治亞·梅洛尼（Giorgia Meloni）領導的義大利兄弟黨（Brothers of Italy）等反建制政黨領導的國家，決策仍將是壓倒性的務實主義，甚至是中間派。
Populists and right-wingers will continue to make gains and strike fear into the European political establishment. But limited setbacks for mainstream parties in European Parliament, national, and local elections will neither upend the European political order nor fundamentally derail revamped EU ambitions following the twin crises of the Covid-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war.	民粹主義者和右翼分子將繼續取得進展，並給歐洲政治機構帶來恐懼。但是，主流政黨在歐洲議會、國家和地方選舉中遭受的有限挫折既不會顛覆歐洲政治秩序，也不會從根本上破壞 Covid-19 大流行和烏克蘭戰爭雙重危機之後歐盟的雄心壯志。
BRICS VS. G7	金磚國家與G7七大工業國集團
On 1 January, the BRICS welcomed new members Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Ethiopia. Some have argued that this expanded BRICS will become an anti-US counterweight to the G7 and the West. This view also holds that China will co-opt the organization, and through it, expand its influence over the Global South.	1月1日，金磚國家加入了沙烏地阿拉伯、伊朗、埃及、阿拉伯聯合大公國和衣索比亞的新成員。一些人認為，這個擴大的金磚國家將成為對七國集團和西方的反美制衡。這種觀點還認為，中國將拉攏該組織，並通過它擴大其對全球南方的影響力。
We disagree. The expanded BRICS, like the original organization, will be a weak group, with much less institutional coherence than the G7. The group's original members—China, India, Russia, South Africa, and Brazil—have little in common beyond a shared desire to boost their status on the global stage. They also have dramatically different political and economic systems. The addition of new members will make consensus—a requirement for the group to take any action—even harder to reach than it already is. The expanded BRICS now includes two pairs of countries that are longtime rivals: China and India plus Saudi Arabia and Iran.	我們不同意。 與原先的組織一樣，擴大後的金磚國家將是一個弱小的集團，其制度一致性遠不如七大工業國集團。該組織的原始成員——中國、印度、俄羅斯、南非和巴西——除了共同的願望之外，幾乎沒有共同點，希望提高他們在國際舞臺上的地位。它們的政治和經濟制度也截然不同。新成員的加入將使共識——這是該集團採取任何行動的要求——比現在更難達成。擴大後的金磚國家現在包括兩對長期競爭對手：中國和印度，以及沙烏地阿拉伯和伊朗。
China will have important influence in the BRICS, to be sure, but its attempt to co-opt the group won't work. India is a critical member—especially and increasingly as a leader of the Global South—and will oppose most initiatives that strengthen Chinese clout. Also, most BRICS countries seek good relations with both the US and China and don't want to jeopardize their existing (and in some cases growing) diplomatic and commercial ties with the G7. Therefore, they will place limits on Chinese sway.	可以肯定的是，中國將在金磚國家中發揮重要影響力，但其拉攏金磚國家的企圖是行不通的。印度是一個關鍵成員——尤其是作為全球南方的領導者——並將反對大多數加強中國影響力的舉措。此外，大多數金磚國家都尋求同時與美國和中國保持良好關係，不想危及他們與七大工業國家集團現有的（在某些情況下正在增長的）外交和商業關係。因此，他們將限制中國人的影響力。
The BRICS will not emerge as a China-led rival to the G7 this year—or anytime soon.	金磚國家今年不會成為中國領導下與七大工業國家集團（G7）競爭的對手，即使會也不至於很快。