烏克蘭該改變戰術嗎？ Should Ukraine change its strategy and statics?

【雙魚之論】英文拷到 G / D 找中文翻譯
Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, submitted an op-ed titled “The Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces on How to Win the War” to The Economist on November 1st. It is unusual for a military leader of such rank to take such action. Unfortunately, we cannot access the article for free from The Economist. As an alternative, we have referenced a similar report “War Is Entering a New Stage, Ukraine Needs Technology – Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief” from Ukrainska Pravada.
A growing discord between political and military circles is evident. President Zelensky strongly believes that the current strategy and tactics are correct, advocating for the defense of every inch of Ukrainian territory and the reclaiming of areas occupied by Russia. In contrast, Zaluzhnyi believes that the trench warfare and static warfare currently employed by Ukraine will not lead to victory and will only provide Russia with precious time to strengthen its position. Therefore, Zaluzhnyi suggests a change in tactics, concentrating Ukrainian military efforts to cut into the central part of the Russian occupation zone, as analyzed by NHK on November 29th by Ishigawa Youichi.
What do these divergent opinions refer to?
As the war prolongs, significant changes may occur, ranging from positive to negative, including morale, weapons and munitions, conscription quantity and quality, international support, training, corruption, and constitutional practices. For instance, facing the prospect of sudden death, people may become unusually greedy. President Zelensky is now confronted with a challenging situation, especially after the October 27th attack by Hamas on Israel, leading to Israel's invasion of the Gaza Strip for retaliation. Consequently, the focus shifts to Israel.
In the context of the constitution: Putin was initially set to complete his term on May 7th, 2024 but chose to extend it for two additional six-year terms, allowing him to be eligible for re-election until 2036. On the other hand, Zelensky’s term will also come to an end on May 20, 2024. However, holding a nationwide election on March 31, 2024, could prove impossible, as approximately 20% of the territories have been controlled by Russia, and considering that Ukraine has been under an emergency system responding to Russia’s invasion since February 25, 2022.
The war in Ukraine teaches us a lesson: engaging in war is not an easy task, particularly when it is challenging to anticipate its duration and evolving circumstances. We must work towards preventing war while preparing for its occurrence.

烏克蘭武裝部隊總司令Valerii Zaluzhnyi，於11月1日投書《經濟學人》一篇名為《烏克蘭武裝部隊總司令談如何取得戰爭勝利》的署名文章。這對於一位如此高階的軍事領袖來說是不尋常的舉動。不幸的是，我們無法免費查閱《經濟學人》的文章。作為替代方案，我們參考了《烏克蘭真理報》的類似報導《戰爭進入新階段，烏克蘭需要技術-烏克蘭武裝部隊總司令》。
政治和軍事圈子之間的分歧日益明顯。澤倫斯基總統堅信當前的戰略和戰術是正確的，主張捍衛烏克蘭每一吋領土，並收復被俄羅斯佔領的地區。相反，Zaluzhnyi認為烏克蘭目前所使用的戰壕戰和靜態戰將無法取得勝利，只會讓俄羅斯有寶貴時間強化其立場。因此，Zaluzhnyi建議改變戰術，集中烏克蘭軍事力量切入俄羅斯佔領區的中心部分，由NHK的石川洋一於11月29日進行分析。
這些不同的意見指的是什麼呢？ 隨著戰爭的延長，將會發生重大變化，從積極到消極，包括士氣、武器彈藥、兵役數量和質量、國際支持、訓練、腐敗和憲法實踐等。例如，面臨突如其來的死亡可能會使人變得非常貪婪。特別是在哈馬斯於10月27日對以色列發動襲擊，導致以色列入侵加薩地帶進行報復之後，澤倫斯基總統現在面臨著一個艱難的情況。因此，焦點轉向以色列。
在憲法的背景下：普丁原本預定於2024年5月7日結束他的任期，但他決定延長兩個六年的任期，使他有資格參選至2036年。另一方面，澤倫斯基的任期也將於2024年5月20日結束。然而，由於大約20%的領土已被俄羅斯控制，且烏克蘭自2022年2月25日以來一直處於應對俄羅斯入侵的緊急體制之下，可能無法在2024年3月31日舉行全國選舉。
烏克蘭的戰爭給我們一個教訓：參與戰爭不是一件容易的事，尤其是當難以預料其持續時間和發展狀況時更是如此。我們必須努力做好準備，並防止戰爭發生。

戰爭進入新階段，烏克蘭需要科技—烏克蘭總司令 War is entering new stage, Ukraine needs technology – Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief    Ukrainska Pravada / Taimocracy 20231101  

Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, believes that the war with Russia is moving to a new stage: "positional" warfare with static and attritional fighting. To win it, Ukraine needs high technologies.  烏克蘭武裝部隊總司令瓦萊裡·扎盧日尼認為，與俄羅斯的戰爭正在進入一個新階段：「陣地」戰爭、靜態戰和消耗戰。烏克蘭需要高科技來贏得勝利。

Source: Zaluzhnyi, in his column for The Economist  來源：Zaluzhnyi，在他為《經濟學人》撰寫的專欄

Details: The Commander-in-Chief warns that such a war is beneficial to Russia because it gives it the opportunity to regain strength.  詳細資料：總司令警告說，這樣的戰爭對俄羅斯有利，因為它給了俄羅斯恢復實力的機會。

In such a situation, the Armed Forces need key military capabilities and technologies. The most important of them is air power. Control of the skies is essential for large-scale ground operations. This includes both manned aircraft and drones.  在這種情況下，武裝部隊需要關鍵的軍事能力和技術。其中最重要的是空軍力量。空優對於大規模地面作戰至關重要。這包括有人駕駛飛機和無人機。

Zaluzhnyi noted that Russia currently maintains a significant advantage over Ukraine in the sky, and this makes it difficult for Ukrainian troops to advance. 扎盧日尼指出，俄羅斯目前在空中對烏克蘭保持顯著優勢，這使得烏克蘭軍隊難以推進。

Ukraine's second priority: means of radio-electronic warfare. "EW is the key to victory in the drone war," the general emphasises.  烏克蘭的第二優先：無線電電子戰手段。「電子戰是無人機戰爭勝利的關鍵，」這位將軍強調。

As he said, over the last decade, Russia has modernised its electronic warfare forces, creating a new type of military and developing 60 new types of such equipment. And the Russian Federation is now stronger in this regard than Ukraine.  正如他所說，過去十年來，俄羅斯實現了電子戰部隊現代化，打造了新型軍隊，並開發了60種新型裝備。而俄羅斯聯邦目前在這方面比烏克蘭更強大。

Zaluzhnyi says that while Ukraine has built many of its own electronic defence systems, it also needs greater access to electronic intelligence from allies.  札盧日尼表示，雖然烏克蘭已經建立了許多自己的電子防禦系統，但它也需要盟友的更多電子情報。

The third task is counter-battery fire, that is, the destruction of enemy artillery. In this war, artillery, missile and rocket fire make up 60-80% of all military tasks. When Ukraine first received Western weapons last year, the Ukrainian military was quite successful in detecting and engaging Russian artillery. However, the effectiveness of such weapons has sharply decreased due to the improvement of Russian electronic warfare equipment.  第三個任務是反砲兵火力，即摧毀敵方火砲。在這場戰爭中，火砲、飛彈和火箭彈佔全部軍事任務的60-80%。去年烏克蘭首次接收西方武器時，烏克蘭軍方相當成功地發現並交戰俄羅斯火砲。但由於俄羅斯電子戰裝備的改進，此類武器的效能急劇下降。

Russia's counter-battery fire has also improved, Zaluzhnyi adds. This is largely due to the use of Lancet loitering munitions, which work in conjunction with reconnaissance drones, and the increase in the production of high-precision projectiles that can be guided by ground correctors.  札盧日尼補充說，俄羅斯的反砲兵火力也有所改善。這主要是由於與偵察無人機配合使用的「柳葉刀」遊蕩彈藥，以及可由地面校正器引導的高精度彈體產量的增加。

As he said, so far, Ukraine has managed to achieve parity with Russia thanks to more accurate firearms, albeit in smaller quantities. But it cannot last long. "And we need our partners to send us better artillery-reconnaissance equipment that can locate Russian guns," the Commander-in-Chief says.  正如他所說，到目前為止，烏克蘭憑藉著更精確的槍支，儘管數量較少，但已成功與俄羅斯持平。但它不能持續太久。「我們需要我們的合作夥伴向我們提供更好的火砲偵察設備，可以定位俄羅斯的槍支，」他說。總司令說。

Technology for mine-breaching is the fourth task. Given the extent of Russian minefields, which extend as far back as 20 kilometres in some places, even Western supplies have proven inadequate. Russia quickly restocks minefields when Ukrainian forces breach them by firing new mines from a distance.  除雷技術是第四項任務。考慮到俄羅斯雷區的範圍（有些地方甚至可以延伸到20公里），事實證明即使是西方的補給也不夠。當烏克蘭軍隊從遠處發射新地雷突破雷場時，俄羅斯迅速補充雷場。

Ukraine needs smoke-projection systems to hide the actions of its demining units and radar-like sensors that use invisible light pulses to detect mines in the ground. Ukrainian forces would also find useful water cannons, cluster munitions, or jet engines from retired aircraft to get past mine barriers without going underground. Additionally helpful are novel forms of tunnel excavators.  烏克蘭需要煙霧投射系統來隱藏其除雷部隊的行動，也需要類似雷達的感測器使用不可見光脈衝來偵測地下的地雷。烏克蘭軍隊也會從退役飛機上找到有用的水砲、集束炸彈或噴射發動機，以便在不進入地下的情況下越過地雷屏障。另外有用的是新型隧道挖土機。

The fifth and last priority is building up Ukrainian reserves. Ukraine has a limited ability to train reserves within its own borders. The soldiers that are positioned at the front are difficult to spare. Russia can also attack training facilities. Furthermore, there are legal loopholes that let people avoid their obligations.  第五個也是最後一個優先事項是建立烏克蘭儲備。烏克蘭在其境內訓練後備力量的能力有限。位於前線的士兵很難有閒暇。俄羅斯還可以攻擊訓練設施。此外，還存在法律漏洞，使人們逃避義務。

According to Zaluzhnyi, Ukraine is trying to solve these problems. A single register of those liable for military service is being implemented, and it is also planned to expand the category of citizens who can be called up. In addition, a "combat internship" is being introduced, which involves sending recently mobilised and trained military personnel to experienced frontline units for training.  扎盧日尼表示，烏克蘭正在努力解決這些問題。正在實施服兵役者單一登記冊，並計劃擴大可應徵入伍的公民類別。此外，也實施了「戰鬥實習」，包括將最近動員和訓練的軍事人員派遣到經驗豐富的前線部隊進行訓練。

Quote: "Russia should not be underestimated. It has suffered heavy losses and expended a lot of ammunition. But it will have superiority in weapons, equipment, missiles and ammunition for a considerable time. Its defence industry is increasing its output, despite unprecedented sanctions. Our NATO partners are dramatically increasing their production capacity, too. But it takes at least a year to do this and, in some cases, such as aircraft and command-and-control systems, two years.  引用：「俄羅斯不應被低估。它損失慘重，消耗了大量彈藥。但它在武器裝備、飛彈彈藥方面將在相當長的時間內擁有優勢。儘管受到前所未有的制裁，其國防工業仍在增加產量。我們的北約合作夥伴也大幅提高其生產能力。但做到這一點至少需要一年的時間，在某些情況下，例如飛機和指揮控制系統，需要兩年的時間。

A positional war is a prolonged one that carries enormous risks to Ukraine’s armed forces and to its state. If Ukraine is to escape from that trap, we will need all these things: air superiority, much-improved electronic-warfare and counter-battery capabilities, new mine-breaching technology and the ability to mobilise and train more reserves. We also need to focus on modern command and control—so we can visualise the battlefield more effectively than Russia and make decisions more quickly — and on rationalising our logistics while disrupting Russia’s with longer-range missiles. New, innovative approaches can turn this war of position back into one of manoeuvre."  陣地戰是一場曠日持久的戰爭，為烏克蘭武裝部隊及其國家帶來巨大風險。如果烏克蘭要擺脫這個陷阱，我們將需要所有這些：空中優勢、大大改進的電子戰和反砲火能力、新的除雷技術以及動員和訓練更多後備力量的能力。我們還需要關注現代指揮和控制——這樣我們就能比俄羅斯更有效地了解戰場情況並更快地做出決策——以及合理化我們的後勤，同時用遠程導彈干擾俄羅斯的後勤。新穎而創新的方法可以將這場陣地戰重新轉變為機動戰。」