有關三國開羅「戰時文件」的效力 The three leaders in wartime document to determine Taiwan?

【雙魚之論】英文拷到 G / D 找中文翻譯
Regarding the status of Taiwan, we, the Taiwanese people, were educated during the rule of the Kuomintang (KMT) that Taiwan had returned to the Republic of China, as per the "Cairo Press Communiqué," also known as the "Declaration of Cairo," issued on December 1st, 1943, following the meeting of President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (Gimo) from November 22-26.
However, the actual story is far more complicated than the one presented in the KMT's textbooks. Therefore, we must engage in self-education to uncover the truth.
Initially, we observed that it was accurately called the "Cairo Press Communiqué," not the popular acknowledged "Declaration of Cairo."  Additionally, we noted that the document was released on December 1st, five days after the conclusion of the meeting, and lacked the signatures of the three leaders must be on purpose.
Further investigation led us to understand that wartime documents hold less weight than peace treaties, which represent the ultimate and final decisions of war by all participants. If the so-called "Declaration of Cairo" exists, it is a wartime document or, in simpler terms, an expression of interest by some participants—not all allies—addressing specific issues.
One reason why "the Cairo" lacks signatures is because it violated the "non-territorial expansion" clause outlined in the "Atlantic Charter" on August 13, 1941, by Roosevelt and Churchill. This clause became a core component of the "Declaration by the United Nations" on January 1, 1942, and the "UN Charter" after the war.
Now, we comprehend that despite the absence of signatures, "the Cairo" was crafted by the three leaders—Roosevelt, Churchill, and Gimo—and excluded all other allies, which makes it even more limited in scope as a wartime intension.
"The Cairo" asserts that Formosa and some other territories belonged to Japanese Empire should be returned to the Republic of China (ROC). However, there were two ROCs—one under Gimo's rule in Chung King and another under Wang Jingwei's rule in Nanking—during wartime. The question arises: which ROC does "the Cairo" refer to in the context of law?
There are also positions held by the US that we are not aware of: the US argues that the obligation in the UN Charter, evolving into a principle of international law, surpasses the treaty of peace. Furthermore, any major power cannot obstruct the path to peace with Japan alone, including the issue of Taiwan, according to the Atlantic Charter.
對於開鑼：我們先是注意到「新聞公報」，不是「宣言」
後來注意到發表時間是1943.12.01（在會議結束好幾天），也注意到「沒與會者簽字」
後來注意到，即使是「宣言」有簽字，效力也遜於「多邊條約」
後來注意到，開鑼，是「戰時意向書」
後來注意到，開鑼違反「聯合國宣言」（不擴張領土、不單獨媾和等原則）
現在注意到，開鑼只有三國與會，非全數盟國（SFPT和約是由48個同盟國對日本簽署），如何對同盟國產生效力？
現在注意到，雖然是蔣介石與會，但當時有兩個ROC，一個位於重慶傾同盟國、一個位於南京傾軸心國。
現在注意到，美國認為：對〈聯合國憲章〉的義務，高於和約的效力。
現在注意到，美國認為：單一大國，不能阻礙對日和平進程。那是規定在〈大西洋憲章〉上的原則。

Answer to Soviet Questions on Principles for Japanese Treaty  回答蘇聯關於日本條約原則的問題  Taimocracy翻譯

[Released to the press December 28]  1950年12月28日公布於眾

The following aide-mémoire, dated December 27, was delivered to J. A. Malik, Soviet representative to the United Nations, at New York.  以下備忘錄日期為12月27日，已轉交給駐紐約的蘇聯駐聯合國代表J. A.馬利克。

On November 20 of this year, Mr. Malik presented to Mr. Dulles an aide-mémoire expressing the desire of the Soviet Government for clarification of a number of points in a tentative United States statement of principles respecting a Japanese peace treaty given Mr. Malik by Mr. Dulles on October 26.1 After careful study of the Soviet aide-mémoire of November 20, the United States Government has concluded that most of the questions raised by the Soviet Government have, in fact, been answered by the statement of principles given to Mr. Malik on October 26. However, in order to dispel any possible misunderstanding, the points raised by the Soviet Government are further discussed as follows:  今年11月20日，馬利克先生向杜勒斯先生遞交了一份備忘錄，表示蘇聯政府希望澄清杜勒斯先生10月26日就日本和平條約提出的美國初步原則聲明中的若干要點。美國政府的結論是，蘇聯政府提出的大多數問題實際上已在10月26日向馬利克先生發表的原則聲明回答。但是，為了消除任何可能的誤解，蘇維埃政府提出的問題進一步討論如下：

1. The United States Government hopes that all nations at war with Japan will participate in the conclusion of peace. The United States does not, however, concede that any one nation has a perpetual power to veto the conclusion by others of peace with Japan. The wartime declaration of January 1, 1942, referred to by the Soviet Union, was designed to assure that all nations at war with Japan, or with the other Axis powers or their associates, would continue to fight until victory had been won. That they did. The United States does not accept the thesis, often put forward by the Soviet Union, that there cannot be peace except on terms that one power dictates. Japan, after its defeat, has now for over five years loyally complied with the agreed terms of surrender and is entitled to peace. The United States should be glad to know whether it is the view of the Soviet Union that there can never be any peace with Japan unless terms can be found which are fully satisfactory to each one of the 47 nations which signed or adhered to the Declaration of January 1, 1942.  美國政府希望所有與日本交戰的國家都參加締結和平。然而，美國並不承認任何一個國家都有永久的權力來否決其他國家與日本締結的和平協定。蘇聯提到的 1942 年 1 月 1 日的戰時宣言旨在確保所有與日本或其他軸心國或其同盟國交戰的國家將繼續戰鬥，直到取得勝利。他們做到了。美國不接受蘇聯經常提出的論點，即除非在一個大國規定的條件下才能實現和平。日本戰敗後，五年多來一直忠實地遵守商定的投降條件，並有權享受和平。美國應該很高興知道蘇聯是否認為，除非能找到對每個國家都完全滿意的條件，否則永遠不可能與日本實現任何和平。

2. The Cairo Declaration of 1943 stated the purpose to restore "Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores to the Republic of China". That Declaration, like other wartime declarations such as those of Yalta and Potsdam, was in the opinion of the United States Government subject to any final peace settlement where all relevant factors should be considered. The United States cannot accept the view, apparently put forward by the Soviet Government, that the views of other Allies not represented at Cairo must be wholly ignored. Also, the United States believes that declarations such as that issued at Cairo must necessarily be considered in the light of the United Nations Charter, the obligations of which prevail over any other international agreement.  1943 年的〈開羅宣言〉闡明瞭「將滿洲、福爾摩沙和澎湖歸還中華民國」的目的。美國政府認為，該宣言與〈雅爾達宣言〉和〈波茨坦宣言〉等其他戰時宣言一樣，必須遵守任何應考慮所有相關因素的最後和平解決辦法。美國不能接受顯然是蘇聯政府提出的觀點，即必須完全無視沒有派代表參加開羅會議的其他盟國的意見。此外，美國認為，必須根據〈聯合國憲章〉審議在開羅發表的聲明，因為〈憲章〉的義務優先於任何其他國際協定。

3. The United States Government does not understand the reference by the Soviet Union to "territorial expansion" in connection with the suggestion that the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands might be placed under the United Nations trusteeship system, with the United States as administering authority. Article 77 of the United Nations Charter expressly contemplated the extension of the trusteeship system to "territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War" and certainly the trusteeship system is not to be equated with "territorial expansion."  美國政府不理解蘇聯在建議將琉球群島和波寧群島置於聯合國託管制度之下，由美國作為管理當局時提到「領土擴張」。〈聯合國憲章〉第七十七條明確規定，將託管制度擴大到「因第二次世界大戰而可能脫離敵國的領土」，當然，託管制度不應等同於「領土擴張」。

The Government of the United States also does not understand the suggestion of the Soviet Union that, because the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands are not mentioned in either the Cairo Declaration or the Potsdam Agreement, their consideration in the peace settlement is automatically excluded. The Government of the Soviet Union seems to have ignored the fact that the Potsdam Declaration provided that Japanese sovereignty should be limited to the four main islands, which were named, and "such minor islands as we determine." It is, therefore, strictly in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement that the peace settlement should determine the future status of these other islands.  美國政府也不理解蘇聯的建議，即由於〈開羅宣言〉和〈波茨坦協定〉中都沒有提到琉球群島和波寧群島，因此在和平解決中自動排除了對它們的考慮。蘇聯政府似乎忽略了這樣一個事實，即〈波茨坦宣言〉規定，日本的主權應限於被明示的四個主要島嶼和「我們確定的小島嶼」。因此，嚴格按照〈波茨坦協定〉，和平解決應決定這些其他島嶼的未來地位。

4. It is the view of the United States Government that, upon conclusion of a peace settlement, the military occupation of Japan would cease. The fact that a "new order of peace, security and justice," as envisaged in the Potsdam Declaration, has not been established, and that irresponsible militarism has not been driven from the world, would at the same time make it reasonable for Japan to participate with the United States and other nations in arrangements for individual and collective self-defense, such as are envisaged by the United Nations Charter and particularly Article 51 thereof. These arrangements could include provision for the stationing in Japan of troops of the United States and other nations.  美國政府認為，一旦達成和平解決，對日本的軍事佔領將停止。〈波茨坦宣言〉所設想的「和平、安全與正義新秩序」尚未建立，不負責任的軍國主義尚未被趕出世界，但與此同時，日本有理由與美國和其他國家一起參加單獨和集體自衛的安排。〈聯合國憲章〉，特別是其中第五十一條所設想的。這些安排可包括為美國和其他國家駐紮在日本的軍隊提供條件。

The United States does not propose for Japan a peace settlement which will deny to Japan what Prime Minister Stalin has described (March 10, 1939) as "the policy of collective security, the policy of collective resistance to the aggressors."  美國並未提出對日本的和平解決方案，該方案將否定總理史達林於1939年3月10日所描述的日本「集體安全政策，對侵略者的集體抵抗政策」。

5. Referring to a policy decision of the Far Eastern Commission, which decisions have been commonly considered to be legally operative only for the period of the occupation except as the substance of particular provisions may be embodied in the peace settlement, the Soviet Government raises two questions relating to the security of Japan after the conclusion of a peace treaty.  關於遠東委員會的一項政策決定，這些決定通常被認為只在佔領期間具有法律效力，除非具體條款的實質內容可能體現在和平解決中，蘇聯政府提出了兩個與締結和平條約後日本的安全有關的問題。

Both questions are answered by paragraph 4 of the statement of principles handed to Mr. Malik on October 26 and by the comment thereon expressed above.  10月26日致馬利克先生的原則聲明第4段和上文發表的評論回答了這兩個問題。

6. The United States considers that the Japanese peace treaty should not limit the Japanese peacetime economy nor deny Japan access to sources of raw material or participation in world trade. The United States, without awaiting the formal conclusion of peace, has made very large financial grants to Japan to enable it to acquire food and raw materials needed for its economic livelihood and has encouraged the establishment by Japan of trade promotion offices in many parts of the world in an effort to help Japan to develop a prosperous peacetime economy and steadily advance the living standards of the Japanese people.  美國認為，日本和平條約不應限制日本和平時期的經濟，也不應剝奪日本獲得原材料來源或參與世界貿易的機會。美國不等正式締結和平，就向日本提供巨額財政援助，使日本能夠獲得經濟生活所需的糧食和原材料，並鼓勵日本在世界許多地方設立貿易促進辦事處，説明日本發展繁榮的和平時期經濟，穩步提高日本人民的生活水準。

7. The present conversations are being con- ducted by the United States through diplomatic channels and, as the Soviet Union well knows, the Government of the United States has no diplomatic relations with the so-called "Government of the Chinese People's Republic".  目前的對話是由美國透過外交管道進行的，正如蘇聯所熟知的那樣，美國政府與所謂的「中華人民共和國政府」沒有外交關係。

It is the earnest hope of the United States that the close attention which the Government of the Soviet Union has given to the peace proposals of the United States in relation to Japan signifies the desire and intention of the Soviet Union not only to enter into discussions of a peace treaty for Japan but to act in cooperation with other nations at war with Japan to make peace a reality.  美國殷切希望，蘇聯政府密切關注美國對日本的和平建議，表明蘇聯不僅希望和打算與日本進行和平條約的討論，而且要與和日本交戰的其他國家合作採取行動，使和平成為現實。

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

Department of State Bulletin, January 8, 1951, pp.65-66

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=osu.32437010893283&seq=72