【雙魚之論】英文拷到 G / D 找中文翻譯
Regarding the sudden death of former Chinese Premier Li Keqiang,
yesterday morning I initially believed the following:
1. The death was confirmed;
2. Myocardial infarction was the cause;
3. The reason for the ineffective emergency treatment was unknown (it could
also be related to the SARS-II virus), so it could be a matter of unfortunate
luck.
Later, when I considered the following events, I found it reasonable to
entertain some conspiracy theories: Whether Li, in fact, remains a significant
political rival to Xi, despite stepping down, largely depends on subjective
rather than objective factors. If Xi believes that Li may be up to something,
then regardless of whether he is actually doing so, Xi will consider Li a
political rival and take various corresponding actions.
Let's revisit the leaks from the Beidaihe Conference, the most important annual
summer gathering of the CCP's top leaders: 1. Chi Haotian, Zhu Rongji, and
others criticized in front of Xi harshly; 2. Xi shouted at the seashore, saying,
"Responsibility is not solely mine;" 3. Xi brought a few trusted
high-ranking officials to vent their anger. Therefore, Xi will undoubtedly take
precautions against political rivals or subordinates plotting rebellion or a
coup d'état in the future. In any case, any attempt at rebellion would require
a "representative figure," and this figure must inevitably be a
former high-ranking official to possess the necessary social prestige for such
actions to succeed. When you think about this, it comes down to Hu Jintao,
former Chairman, Wen Jiabao, former Premier, and Li Keqiang. Considering their
health conditions, only Li is qualified to play the role. Therefore, in Xi's
mind, Li poses a threat to Xi's regime.
Nevertheless, what the free world should not forget is that the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) has a long-term strategy "world revolution,"
and any policy they adopt is just a short-term tactic. Deng Xiaoping did not
abandon the ideal of global revolution; he simply believed the time had not yet
come, which is why he advocated "keeping a low profile" and quietly
strengthening while waiting for the right moment. Xi Jinping, on the other
hand, believes that China's power is already strong enough and has abandoned
Deng's low-profile approach in favor of a more assertive stance.
If, in the future, the leader of the CCP is not Xi but Li Keqiang, China's
strength may grow even stronger under the banner of peace, but its world
revolution strategy is unlikely to change a bit. As a result, Li’s regime could
be even more dangerous to the free world.
關於前中國總理李克強突然去世,當天早上我最初的看法是:1. 死訊屬實;2. 心肌梗塞是死因;3. 無法解釋為何急救無效(可能與Covid病毒有關),所以可能僅是不幸運的結果。在考慮以下事件時,後來,我認為應該考慮某些陰謀論:
李克強是否仍然是習近平的重要政敵?儘管已卸任,主要取決於習的主觀認定而非客觀事實。如果習近平認為李可能有所企圖,那麼無論李是否真的有所行動,習近平都會將李克強視為政治對手,並採取各種相應的行動。
讓我們回顧北戴河會議的洩露事件,這是中國共產黨領導層的最重要的年度夏季聚會:
1. 遲浩田、朱鎔基等人強烈批評習近平;2. 習近平對著海岸大喊,稱「責任不僅僅在我身上」;3. 習近平找來幾名信任的高級官員發洩情感。面對此,習近平無疑將採取預防措施,以應對未來可能策劃叛亂或政變的政治對手或部下。無論如何,任何叛亂企圖都需要一位「代表性人物」,而這位人物必然是一名前高級官員,以具備必要的社會威望,以使此類行動能夠成功。
當你思考這一點時,涉及到胡錦濤(前主席),溫家寶(前總理),及李克強(前總理)。考慮到他們的健康狀況,只有李克強有資格擔任這個角色。因此,在習近平看來,李對他的政權構成威脅。
然而,自由世界不應忘記的是,中國共產黨(CCP)有一個長期的「世界革命」戰略,他們採取的任何和平妥協政策都僅是短期策略。鄧小平並未放棄全球革命的理念;他只是認為時機尚未成熟,這就是他倡導「韜光養晦」—悄悄地增強實力以等待合適時機時。另一方面,習近平認為中國實力已足夠強大,因此放棄了鄧的低調策略,轉而採取更加強硬的態度。如果未來中共的領袖不是習近平而是李克強,中國的實力可能會在和平的名義下變得更加強大,但其戰略不太可能改變。因此,李克強掌權對自由世界來說可能會更加危險。
說一點後見之明。就中國現在情勢而言,李克強橫死的機率極高,不管怎麼死,似乎就是得死,因為幾個非常龐大的勢力都有動機要他死,也有能力讓他死。依動機強弱分別是1.習本人,2.習周邊勢力,3.江派勢力,4.其他紅二代勢力,5.團派本身。當然,動機強弱並非就等於作案機率高低。他們有一個共同的焦點,就是後習的權力歸屬問題,誰會是那個最有可能的接替者?無疑大家最後都會得到一個結論:李克強。至少他會是每個勢力和每個角逐者的第一塊絆腳石。他一死,權力場重歸於混沌,直到另一個李克強冒出頭,或大家龜縮,直到習死,而他們認為這個日子並不遠。有人心急!
回覆刪除「動機強弱並非就等於作案機率高低」偉哉斯言
回覆刪除從而導出:「權力場重歸於混沌,直到另一個李克強冒出頭,或大家龜縮,直到習死,而他們認為這個日子並不遠。有人心急!」
值得深思~~