有關北約東擴，普丁說得對嗎？Is Vladimir Putin Right? Klaus Wiegrefe＠Der Spiegel 20220215 Taimocracy翻譯

【縛雞之論】
隨著情事的變動，有時先前的樂觀期待會變成不再可行，於是就違背承諾了。

Is Vladimir Putin Right?    Klaus Wiegrefe＠Der Spiegel 20220215

Vladimir Putin insists that the West cheated Russia by expanding NATO eastward following the end of the Cold War. Is there anything to his claims? The short answer: It's complicated.

In September 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin wrote a long letter to U.S. President Bill Clinton. The letter, addressed to "Dear Bill," began with a mention of the two leaders’ "candid exchange of opinions." And then Yeltsin let loose.  1993年9月，俄羅斯總統葉爾欽給美國總統柯林頓寫了一封長信。這封信是寫給「親愛的比爾」，開頭提到兩位領導人「坦誠地交換意見」。然後，葉爾欽就直說了。

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were interested in joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was a source of concern to the Russian president. Of course, Yeltsin noted, every country can decide for itself what alliance it would like to be a part of. But the Russian public, he continued, saw the eastern expansion of NATO as "as a sort of neo-isolation" of Russia, a factor, he insisted, that must be taken into account. Yeltsin also made a reference to the Two Plus Four Treaty pertaining to Germany’s reunification in 1990. "The spirit of the treaty," he wrote, "precludes the option of expanding the NATO zone into the East."  葉爾欽說波蘭、匈牙利和捷克共和國有意加入北大西洋公約組織（NATO），這是俄羅斯總統關注的一個問題。當然，葉爾欽指出，每個國家都可以自己決定它想成為哪個聯盟的一員。但他繼續說，俄羅斯公眾認為北約的東擴是對俄羅斯的「某種新孤立」，他堅持認為這是一個必須考慮的因素。葉爾欽還提到了1990年與德國統一有關的《二加四條約》。他寫道：「該條約的精神，排除了將北約區擴大到東方的選擇」。

That letter marked the first time that Russia had accused the West of having broken its word. And despite the fact that the Americans rejected the accusation, a resolution to the conflict has never been found – a situation which has had far-reaching consequences stretching to the present-day. There is essentially no other historical issue that has poisoned relations between Moscow and the West as much in the last three decades as the disagreement over what, precisely, was agreed to in 1990.  這封信標誌著俄羅斯首次指責西方國家違背了其承諾。儘管美國人否認這一指責，但從未找到解決衝突的辦法—此情況的影響深遠，一直延續到今天。在過去的三十年裡，基本上沒有其他歷史問題像1990年達成的協議那樣，對莫斯科和西方之間的關係造成如此大的毒害。

"You Cheated Us Shamelessly"  你們無恥的欺騙我們

In the years since Yeltsin sent his letter, NATO has accepted 14 countries in Eastern and Southeastern Europe into the alliance. And the Kremlin has complained of having been duped every step of the way. Just recently, current Russian President Vladimir Putin complained: "You cheated us shamelessly."  在葉爾欽發信後幾年裡，北約接受了東歐和東南歐的14個國家加入聯盟。克里姆林宮一直抱怨在每一步都被愚弄了。就在最近，現任俄羅斯總統普丁抱怨說「你們無恥地欺騙了我們」。

The focus of the Kremlin’s ire is no longer exclusively on the Two Plus Four deal, but essentially on all accords negotiated since the fall of the Berlin Wall. "You promised us in the 1990s that (NATO) would not move an inch to the East," Putin said in late January. And he is using that history to justify his current demands for written guarantees that Ukraine will never be accepted into the Western alliance. 

克里姆林宮憤怒的焦點不再僅僅是「二加四」條約，基本上是自柏林牆倒塌以來談判達成的所有協議。普丁在1月底說：「你們在20世紀90年代向我們承諾，（北約）不會向東方移動一英吋。」他正在用這段歷史來證明他目前要求的書面保證，即烏克蘭永遠不會被接受加入西方聯盟。

But that’s not all. At the end of January, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov wrote an open letter to his Western counterparts in which he cited additional understandings. In particular, he focused on the Charter for European Security, rooted in agreements reached in 1990. East and West had concurred at the time that every country has a right to freely choose the alliance it wished to be part of, while also emphasizing the "indivisibility of security." Later, that became "the obligation of each State not to strengthen its security at the expense of the security of other States," as Lavrov explicitly mentions in his letter.  但這還不是全部。1月底，俄羅斯外交部長Sergei Lavrov 給他的西方同行寫了一封公開信，他在信中列舉了其他諒解書。特別是，他把重點放在《歐洲安全憲章》上，該憲章根植於1990年達成的協議。當時東方和西方一致認為，每個國家都有權自由選擇它希望加入的聯盟，同時還強調了「安全的不可分割性」。後來，這變成了「每個國家都有義務不以犧牲其他國家的安全為代價來加強自己的安全」，拉夫羅夫在信中明確提到了這點。

So, is Putin right in feeling that Russia has been duped by NATO’s eastward expansion?  那麼，普丁覺得俄羅斯被北約的東擴所愚弄是對的嗎？

There is no lack of accounts from a variety of witnesses to the various discussions between the West and Moscow following the fall of the Berlin Wall. In 1990, a veritable army of politicians and high-ranking officials from Moscow, Washington, Paris, London, Bonn and East Berlin met for discussions on German reunification, on the disarmament of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and on a new charter for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) – which became the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1995.  對於柏林牆倒塌後西方和莫斯科之間的各種討論，不乏各種證人的描述。1990年，來自莫斯科、華盛頓、巴黎、倫敦、波恩和東柏林的政治家和高級官員彙聚一堂，討論德國統一、北約和華沙條約組織的裁軍問題，以及歐洲安全與合作會議（CSCE）--1995年成為歐洲安全與合作組織（OSCE）的新憲章問題。

 

"Categorical Assurances"  明確的保證

But the recollections of those involved aren’t always consistent. Roland Dumas, who served as the French foreign minister in 1990, would later say that a pledge was made that NATO troops would not advance closer to the territory of the former Soviet Union. But the U.S. secretary of state at the time, James Baker, has denied that any such promise was ever made – a claim that some of his own diplomats, however, have contradicted. Jack Matlock, who was the U.S. ambassador to Moscow at the time, has said that "categorical assurances" were given to the Soviet Union that NATO would not expand eastward.  但相關人員的回憶並不總是一致。1990年擔任法國外交部長Roland Dumas後來說，當時承諾北約部隊不會向前蘇聯的領土靠近。但當時美國國務卿貝克卻否認曾有過這樣的承諾—然而他自己的一些外交官卻反駁了這一說法。當時擔任美國駐莫斯科大使Jack Matlock向蘇聯作出了「明確的保證」，即北約不會向東擴張。

The versions of the talk provided by Mikhail Gorbachev, the last leader of the Soviet Union, are particularly confusing. On one occasion, he said that German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the Americans had promised him that NATO "will not move one centimeter further east." But in another instance, he said that "the topic of NATO expansion was never discussed" – yet he nevertheless insisted that the West had violated the spirit of the agreements reached at the time.  蘇聯最後一位領導人戈巴契夫提供的談話版本尤其令人困惑。有一次，他說德國總理柯爾和美國人向他保證，北約「不會再向東移動一釐米」。但在另一個場合，他說「從來沒有討論過北約擴張的話題」—但他還是堅持認為西方違反了當時達成的協議的精神。

Luckily, there are plenty of documents available from the various countries that took part in the talks, including memos from conversations, negotiation transcripts and reports. According to those documents, the U.S., the UK and Germany signaled to the Kremlin that a NATO membership of countries like Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic was out of the question. In March 1991, British Prime Minister John Major promised during a visit to Moscow that "nothing of the sort will happen." Yeltsin expressed significant displeasure when the step was ultimately taken. He gave his approval for NATO’s eastward expansion in 1997, but complained that he was only doing so because the West had forced him to.  幸運的是，參加會談的各國都有大量文件，包括談話備忘錄、談判記錄和報告。根據這些文件，美國、英國和德國向克里姆林宮示意，波蘭、匈牙利和捷克共和國等國家加入北約是不可能的。1991年3月，英國首相梅傑在訪問莫斯科時承諾，「不會發生類似事情」。當這一步驟最終被採取時，葉爾欽表示非常不高興。他（葉爾欽？）在1997年批准了北約東擴，但抱怨說他這樣做只是因為西方國家強迫他這樣做。

There is, of course, no legally binding agreement between the two sides from the period following the fall of the Berlin Wall. The verdict as to whether the West has broken its word depends entirely on how binding one believes the assurances made by Major and the others actually were.  當然，在柏林牆倒塌後的這段時間裡，雙方沒有任何具有法律約束力的協定。西方是否食言，完全取決於人們認為梅傑等人的保證究竟有多大約束力。

The wrestling over NATO’s eastward expansion began in January 1990 with an initiative from German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Across Eastern Europe, the people had toppled Moscow’s satellite governments, and Genscher was concerned about the Kremlin’s possible response. He still had vivid memories of the 1956 uprising in Hungary. When an element of the rebellion sought to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and establish closer ties to the West, the Soviets moved in to crush the rebellion. Genscher wanted to avoid a repeat, and he was prepared to make broad concessions to the Kremlin.  關於北約東擴的角力始於1990年1月德國外交部長Hans-Dietrich Genscher的一項倡議。在整個東歐，人民推翻了莫斯科的衛星政府，Genscher對克里姆林宮可能的反應感到擔憂。他對1956年匈牙利的起義仍記憶猶新。當時叛亂分子試圖退出華沙條約組織並與西方建立更緊密的聯繫時，蘇聯採取行動鎮壓了叛亂。Genscher希望避免重蹈覆轍，他準備向克里姆林宮做出廣泛的讓步。

 

In a Jan. 31, 1990, speech, he proposed that NATO issue a statement saying: "Whatever happens to the Warsaw Pact, there will be no expansion of NATO territory to the east and closer to the borders of the Soviet Union." Genscher’s speech was well received by the allied governments in Britain, the U.S., France and Italy. In a discussion with his counterpart in London, Genscher said that he needed reassurances that "Hungary would not become part of the Western alliance in the event of a change in government."  在1990年1月31日的一次演講中，Genscher提議北約發表聲明說。「無論華沙條約組織發生什麼，北約的領土都不會向東擴張，也不會向蘇聯的邊界靠近。」Genscher的講話得到了英國、美國、法國和義大利盟國政府的好評。在與倫敦的同行討論時，Genscher說，他需要得到保證，「如果政府發生變化，匈牙利將不會成為西方聯盟的一部分」。

His American counterpart Baker "wasn’t exactly elated" by the idea, but considered it to be "the best we had at the moment." The primary concern among the Western allies was whether a united Germany would remain in NATO, and not the future of Eastern European countries, all of which were still in the Warsaw Pact.  他的美國對方貝克對這一想法「並不完全感到高興」，但認為這是「我們目前擁有的最好辦法」。西方盟國的主要關切是一個統一的德國是否會留在北約，而不是東歐國家的未來，這些國家都還在華沙條約組織中。

 

An Issue Settled  解決方案

In early February, Genscher and Baker presented the idea in Moscow independently of one another. The German foreign minister assured the Kremlin that: "For us, it is a certainty that NATO will not expand to the east. And that applies generally," clearly meaning beyond just East Germany. The American, for his part, offered "ironclad guarantees that NATO’s jurisdiction or forces would not move eastward." When Gorbachev said that NATO expansion was "unacceptable," Baker responded: "We agree with that."  2月初，Genscher和貝克在莫斯科獨自地提出了這個想法。德國外長向克里姆林宮保證說。「對我們來說，北約不會向東擴張是肯定的。這一點普遍適用，」顯然是指不僅僅是東德。美國人則提供了「北約的管轄權或部隊不會東移的鐵的保證」。當戈巴契夫說，北約的擴張是「不可接受的」時，貝克回應說。「我們同意這一點。」

Later, Baker would say that his exclusive focus had been on Germany. Apparently, he was uncomfortable with having negotiated with the Soviets to the detriment of Budapest and Warsaw. Genscher would also play down the importance of his visit to Moscow, later saying that he had wanted to "gauge" the Soviet response, nothing more. A short time after that, the Two Plus Four negotiations began, extending into September 1990. The Soviets, Genscher said, never returned to the question of NATO expansion into Eastern Europe, a fact he interpreted to mean that the issue had been settled.  後來，貝克說，他唯一關注的是德國。顯然，他對與蘇聯的談判損害了布達佩斯和華沙的利益感到不舒服。Genscher也淡化了他對莫斯科的訪問的重要性，後來他說，他想「評估」蘇聯的反應，僅此而已。不久，「二加四談判」開始，一直延續到1990年9月。Genscher說，蘇聯人從未回到北約向東歐擴張的問題上，他將這一事實解釋為該問題已經解決。

There is room for doubt regarding this version of events. As early as February 1990, it was no secret that some Eastern European countries had begun dreaming of eventual NATO membership. Newspapers were writing about it and Soviet officials mentioned it on a number of occasions to Western politicians. Without success. The West only provided general statements of reassurance. U.S. President George H. W. Bush, for example, said: "We have no intention, even in our thoughts, to harm the Soviet Union in any fashion." French President François Mitterrand told Gorbachev that he was "personally in favor of gradually dismantling the military blocs." NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner later expressed his clear opposition to the expansion of the Western alliance.  對這一版本的事件有懷疑的餘地。早在1990年2月，一些東歐國家已經開始夢想著最終加入北約，這不是什麼秘密。報紙在寫這方面的內容，蘇聯官員也在一些場合向西方政治家提及此事。但沒有成功。西方國家只提供了一般性的保證聲明。例如，美國總統老布希說。「我們無意，甚至在我們的想法中，以任何方式傷害蘇聯。」法國總統密特朗告訴戈巴契夫，他「個人贊成逐步拆除軍事集團」。北約秘書長Manfred Wörner 後來明確表示反對西方聯盟的擴張。

The message was clear. If Gorbachev were to provide his acquiescence for German reunification within NATO, the West would aim at establishing a Western security architecture that took Moscow’s interests into account.  這個資訊很清楚。如果戈巴契夫默許德國在北約內部實現統一，西方將致力於建立一個考慮到莫斯科利益的西方安全架構。

Informal assurances were not unusual during the Cold War. U.S. political scientist Joshua Shifrinson compares the 1990 discussions with the verbal agreements made between the Americans and Soviets that led to the easing of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.  冷戰時期，非正式的保證並不罕見。美國政治學家Joshua Shifrinson 將1990年的討論與美國人和蘇聯人之間達成的口頭協議進行了比較，後者導致了1962年古巴導彈危機的緩和。

This view of the situation is supported by the fact that it was extremely difficult for Gorbachev to accept NATO membership for a reunited Germany. It is difficult to imagine that the Kremlin boss would have agreed to such a step if he had believed that the pledges from Bonn, London, Paris or Washington were anything but genuine. In fact, the German government ultimately had to accept a special status for the states that formerly belonged to East Germany, guaranteeing that the region would in principle not play host to troops from NATO alliance members or any other country.  戈巴契夫極難接受統一後的德國加入北約，這一事實也支持了對形勢的看法。很難想像，如果克里姆林宮的老闆認為來自波恩、倫敦、巴黎或華盛頓的承諾不是真的，他就會同意這樣做。事實上，德國政府最終不得不接受原屬於東德的各州的特殊地位，保證該地區原則上不接待北約聯盟成員或任何其他國家的軍隊。

Given the documents available, some even speculate that the West intentionally misled the Soviets from the very beginning. A few weeks after his trip to the Kremlin, in any case, Baker expressly told Genscher that some Eastern European countries were eager to join NATO, engendering Genscher’s response that the issue "shouldn’t be touched for now." A formulation which kept all options on the table for later.  鑒於現有的文件，一些人甚至猜測，西方從一開始就故意誤導蘇聯人。無論如何，在他訪問克里姆林宮的幾周後，貝克明確告訴Genscher，一些東歐國家渴望加入北約，這引起了Genscher的回應，即這個問題「暫時不應該被觸及」。這一表述將所有的選擇都保留在桌面上，以備日後使用。

The U.S. administration at the time also included influential hardliners like Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and his neo-conservative undersecretary of state, Paul Wolfowitz. These were men who dreamed of developing the U.S. into the only global superpower, and saw NATO primarily as a tool to assert U.S. dominance in Europe. The interest shown by countries in Eastern Europe in joining the alliance was helpful in that regard. The Defense Department urged that NATO leave "the door ajar."  當時的美國政府還包括有影響力的強硬派，如國防部長Dick Cheney 和他的新保守主義副國務卿Paul Wolfowitz。這些人夢想將美國發展成為唯一的全球超級大國，並將北約主要視為宣揚美國在歐洲的統治地位的工具。東歐國家對加入該聯盟表現出的興趣在這方面很有幫助。國防部敦促北約「大門開一半」。

Such statements would seem to support Putin’s assertions that the West has "cheated" Russia intentionally. Nonetheless, that view, in its simplicity, is erroneous.  這種說法似乎支持普丁的斷言，即西方有意「欺騙」俄羅斯。然而，這種觀點，就簡單性而言，是錯誤的。

The 1990s was the decade of good intentions and vast illusions, on both sides. Gorbachev promised that the Kremlin would introduce democracy, respect human rights and recognize the right of countries to self-determination. He even broached the possibility that the Soviet Union itself could become a member of NATO. His successor Yeltsin expressed a similar confidence, claiming that "we are becoming a different country."  20世紀90年代是雙方都懷有良好願望和巨大幻想的10年。戈巴契夫承諾，克里姆林宮將引入民主，尊重人權，承認各國的自決權。他甚至提出了蘇聯本身可以成為北約成員的可能性。他的繼任者葉爾欽表達了類似的信心，聲稱「我們正在成為一個不同的國家」。

 

Growing Distrust  不斷增長的不信任感

The eastern empire looked for a time as though it was ready for reform. And with that impression foremost in their minds, Kohl, Genscher, Bush and his successor Clinton really did want to transform NATO and take the Kremlin’s interests seriously. There was, however, one potentially significant contradiction: On the one hand, all countries were allegedly united by the "indivisibility of security," while on the other, each country allegedly had the right to decide which alliance it wanted to join. Still, that seemed at the time to be nothing more than a theoretical problem.  東方帝國有一段時間看起來好像已經準備好進行改革了。帶著這種印象，柯爾、根舍、布希和他的繼任者柯林頓確實想改造北約，並認真對待克里姆林宮的利益。然而，有一個潛在的重大矛盾。一方面，所有國家都因「安全的不可分割性」而團結在一起，另一方面，每個國家都有權決定它想加入哪個聯盟。不過，這在當時似乎只是一個理論上的問題。

On top of that, Clinton, Kohl and the others spent years rejecting NATO membership for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Such an expansion was viewed as too expensive, the fledgling democracies in those countries appeared too fragile and their militaries were too reactionary. But then, the reform process in Russia slowed and distrust began to grow. And the Republicans, for their part, realized that the issue of expanded NATO membership was useful for scoring political points against Clinton. Many Americans with Eastern European roots lived in the decisive swing states in the Midwest. Leading Clinton to ultimately decide to expand the alliance.  除此之外，柯林頓、柯爾和其他人花了數年時間拒絕讓波蘭、匈牙利和捷克共和國加入北約組織。這樣的擴張被認為是太昂貴了，這些國家剛剛起步的民主制度似乎太脆弱了，它們的軍隊也太反動了。但隨後，俄羅斯的改革進程放緩，不信任開始增加。而共和黨人則意識到，擴大北約成員資格的問題對反對柯林頓的政治得分很有用。許多有東歐血統的美國人居住在中西部具有決定性的搖擺州。導致柯林頓最終決定擴大該聯盟。

In doing so, the West didn’t break any treaties, but some participants were concerned nevertheless. Years later, Genscher said that the expansion was just fine from a formally legal point of view. But it was impossible to deny, he said, that it was counter to the spirit of the understandings reached in 1990.  在這樣做的過程中，西方並沒有違反任何條約，但一些參與者還是感到擔憂。多年後根舍說，從正式的法律角度來看，擴張是很好的。但他說，無法否認的是，這與1990年達成的諒解的精神相悖。