【縛雞之見】
Professor Ho Szu-Shen, whose major is the international relations of
Taiwan, Japan, and China, shares some details around the conclusion of the
Peace with Japan (SFPT) of 1951 and the Peace Treaty between Japan and ROC
(Treaty of Taipei) of 1952. He especially
indicates the opposite positions of the Treaty of Taipei among Taipei, Tokyo,
and Beijing.
The U.S. forced Japan was to choose Taipei, the self-claimed Republic of China,
as the party to the Treaty of Taipei.
China, regarding itself as the sole legitimate government of China,
rejected the treaty from the very beginning.
However, Japan felt confusing about
Beijing’s position in the normalization in 1971. If Beijing's assertion is right, the state of
war between China and Japan has not come to an end in 1951. That could lead to tons of problems,
including Japan’s membership in the UN and the alliance with the U.S.
John Foster Dulles, the advisor to the U.S. Department of State, explained why
the Treaty of Peace with Japan became this way in his remark at the San
Francisco Conference on September 2nd, 1951.
Dulles stated that even Beijing is not invited to the Peace due to the
political problem of the split of Chinese representation, Beijing’s interest
has been well preserved by confiscating both Japanese public and private properties
on the soil of China.
I do not understand the point of Professor Ho’s conclusion, in which he blames
Beijing for its eliminating the colors of the Republic of China during the
peace with Japan. Beijing is born to annihilate
ROC. The conclusion is irrelevant to his
discourse.
專長在台灣、日本和中國國際關係的何思慎教授，圍繞1951年的《對日和約》（SFPT）和1952年的《日本與中華民國和約》（《台北條約》）的締結，分享一些細節。他特別指出台北、東京和北京對《台北條約》的相反立場。
美國強迫日本選擇台北，即自稱的中華民國，作為《台北條約》的一方。中國認為自己是中國的唯一合法政府，從一開始就拒絕了該條約。
然而，日本對北京在1971年的正常化中的立場感到困惑。如果北京的說法是正確的，那麼中國和日本之間的戰爭狀態在1951年就沒有結束。這可能會導致大量的問題，包括日本在聯合國的成員資格和與美國的同盟關係。
美國國務院顧問約翰-福斯特-杜勒斯（John Foster
Dulles）在1951年9月2日的三藩市會議上解釋了為什麼與日本的和平條約會變成這樣。杜勒斯說，由於中國代表權分裂的政治問題，即使北京沒有被邀請參加和約，但通過沒收日本在中國領土上的公共和私人財產，北京的利益得到了很好的維護。
我不明白何教授的結論是什麼，他指責北京在對日和平期間消除了中華民國的色彩。北京生來就是要消滅中華民國的。這結論與他的論述間毫無關係。中文由DeepL翻譯，Taimocracy修正。
中華民國台灣化的教訓 何思慎＠中時 20210428
1952年4月28日，《舊金山和約》生效，二戰結束後東亞秩序定錨。但1951年9月8日，《舊金山和約》簽訂時，兩岸皆未參與。當時，英、美就對日媾和的中國代權問題達成「國民政府與中共的任何一方代表皆不參加《舊金山和約》」，待「和約生效後，由日本選擇中國任何一方的政府締結和約」的共識。
然而，美國了解日相吉田茂傾向與中共政權締約，無意讓日本在兩岸間自由選擇，刻意在參議院擱置和約審議，對日本傳達「若日本不繼續信守美國的路線，是不可能締結和約的」。在美國壓力下，1951年12月24日吉田茂接受時任杜魯門外交顧問杜勒斯起草的文件，聲明日本將與美國齊一步調，採行承認中華民國代表中國，史稱「第一次吉田書簡」。
「書簡」中，吉田對美承諾，若中國國民政府有此願望，即依《舊金山和約》所揭原則，與該政府締結重建兩國政府間正常關係之條約。隨後，1952年2月20日，中華民國與日本在台北展開談判，並在《舊金山和約》生效日，簽訂《中日和約》，確立戰後中日關係，如處理領土、戰爭賠償、財產、人民等問題。
《中日和約》即為中國與日本戰後處理的法律結果，此在1972年日本與中共政權談判建交時成為障礙。北京認為，《中日和約》不是兩個主權國家間合法行為的產物，不具備條約成立的要件，作為《中日和約》締約一方的國民黨當局無法代表中國，無權以中國的名義與他國締約。因此《中日和約》自始無效。
近來，香港「小學常識科」教科書修訂即迎合前述中共史觀，將「中華民國政府」遷至台灣的描述，改成「中國國民黨」遷至台灣。針對香港修訂教科書，大陸國台辦發言人馬曉光表示，1949年國民黨政權於反人民內戰中失敗，退居台灣島，從此喪失代表中國政府的合法地位。
其實，回顧戰後中日關係，即可駁斥國台辦昧於歷史之言。在北京與東京談判建交時，田中內閣堅持《中日和約》並非自始無效，故中、日間的戰爭狀態，日本認定於1952年8月5日，《中日和約》生效之日起，即告結束。因此，在建交「共同聲明」中僅言明，「自本聲明之日起，中華人民共和國及日本國之間迄今為止的不正常狀態宣告結束。」
在此，應當注意到日本以「不正常狀態」一語，取代「戰爭狀態」的表述實具有法律上之特殊義意，其代表日本要求中共政權在某種程度上，繼承國民政府所簽訂的《中日和約》中，就戰爭狀態之結束，或戰爭賠償等有關戰後問題之處理等處分條款的效力。此意味北京在國際間難以否認中華民國政府於戰後代表中國簽訂和約之合法性。對此，北京亦不堅持，遂將「對日賠償請求權」中之「權」字除去。
前事不忘，後事之師。國台辦應記取當年周恩來的務實，面對兩岸分治的事實，一味否定中華民國，掏空中華民國的「中國意涵」，徒令中華民國「台灣化」，無助兩岸關係正向發展。（作者為輔仁大學日文系所特聘教授兼日本暨東亞研究中心主任）
美國國務卿杜勒斯在1951.09.05「舊金山和會」的開場演講（English）2/2
回覆刪除The absence of China from this Conference is a matter of deep regret. Hostilities between Japan and China first began in 1931 and open warfare began in 1937. China suffered the longest and the deepest from Japanese aggression. It is greatly to be deplored that the Sino-Japanese war cannot be formally terminated at this occasion. Unhappily, civil war within China and the attitudes of the Allied Governments have created a situation such that there is not general international agreement upon a single Chinese voice with both the right and the power to bind the Chinese nation to terms of peace. Some think that one government meets these tests. Some think another meets them. Some doubt that either meets them. No majority can be found for any present action regarding China. Thus the Allies were faced with hard choices.
They could defer any peace with Japan until they could agree that there was in China a government possessed of both legitimacy and authority. It would, however, be wrong, cruel, and stupid to penalize Japan because there is civil war in China and international disagreement regarding China.
As another approach, each Allied Power could refuse to sign a treaty of peace with Japan unless a Chinese government of its choice was cosigner with it. That, we ascertained, would leave Japan at war with so many Allied Powers that Japan would get only a small measure of the peace she has earned. Indeed, there is no reason to believe that Japan, an essential party, would willingly cooperate in a program leading to that end. To exert compulsion in this matter would create resentment in Japan, and it would activate and aggravate Allied division in the face of a grave world-wide menace which requires maximum unity.
The remaining choice was for the Allied Powers generally to proceed to conclude peace without any present Chinese cosignature, leaving China and Japan to make their own peace, on terms, however, which would guarantee full protection of the rights and interests of China.
That is the choice reflected by the present treaty. By article 26, China is given the right to a treaty of peace with Japan on the same terms as the present treaty. The victorious Allies, which sign the treaty, take nothing for themselves that they do not assure equally to China. Also, by article 21, China, without need of signature, gets the sweeping renunciation by Japan (article 10) of all Japan's special rights and interests in China, in accordance with a formula suggested by the Republic of China. Also, China receives automatically, and without need of signature, the benefit of article 14 (a) 2 which validates the seizure of Japanese property subject to its jurisdiction. The treaty preserves, in full, the rights of China as one of the Allied victors in this war.
[Title] John Foster Dulles's Speech at the San Francisco Peace Conference
[Place] San Francisco
[Date] September 5, 1951
[Source] Gaimusho joyaku-kyoku hokika, Heiwa joyaku no teiketsu ni kansuru chosho VII, pp.267-284.
轉引自：http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPUS/19510905.S1E.html
雖然是個日文系教授，卻是持反日立場；測不準的說，比較接近日本左翼，就是說：不是一個台派，
回覆刪除而比較接近是中華民國派，或者說：是個和中派；立場曖昧的馬桶文膽。
〉〉〉一味否定中華民國，掏空中華民國的「中國意涵」，徒令中華民國「台灣化」，無助兩岸關係正向發展。〈〈〈
反對「台灣化」倒也罷了，問題在 “中華民國” 目前有幾種內涵，互不相同。這位仁兄如果吾道一以貫之沒有變化，
應該就是 “趙少康派”，因為這才是當年的正統。 “趙少康派” 固然不一定是華獨，卻不同於傳統的 “中華民國派”
（兩蔣），而成了華統。狀態模糊，讓他這篇文章顯得論述貧弱，而一廂情願。
“北京亦不堅持”－時空背景不同之下的妥協文字，隨著時空轉變，都要兵戎相見了，談 “和約之合法性” 實在是笑話。