中國電信吞噬大量歐洲手機流量達2小時之久 China Telecom Swallows Huge Amount of European Mobile Traffic For Over Two Hours Dell Cameron＠Gizmodo 20190706 Taimocracy翻譯

【縛雞之見】

所以，黑警解放軍攻進香港網路中心，豈是單純的治安目的。

想一想，香港網路資訊被控制的後果。

中國電信吞噬大量歐洲手機流量達2小時之久China Telecom Swallows Huge Amount of European Mobile Traffic For Over Two Hours    Dell Cameron＠Gizmodo  20190706  Taimocracy翻譯

For more than two hours on Thursday, one of China’s largest internet providers forced a huge chunk of European mobile traffic to be rerouted through its own servers.

周四，中國最大的網路提供商之一迫使歐洲很大一部分的移動流量重新改變途徑，通過中國的伺服器，時間長達的兩個多小時。

China Telecom has been implicated in similar incidents before. For about 18 minutes in April 2010, roughly 15 percent of the world’s internet traffic suddenly traversed through Chinese servers. This included traffic flowing to and from U.S. government and military websites, including NASA. Commercial sites for companies such as Dell and Microsoft were similarly affected.

中國電信此前曾捲入過類似事件。在2010年4月的大約18分鐘內，全球大約15％的網路流量突然通過中國伺服器穿越。這包括往返美國政府和軍事網站（包括NASA）的流量。戴爾和微軟等公司的商業站點也受到類似的影響。

Thursday’s incident, the result of what’s known as a BGP route leak, is said to have swallowed massive amounts of mobile traffic originating from service providers in France, Switzerland, and Holland. Users reportedly experienced significant slowdowns in data speeds.

據說，週四的事件是BGP路由器洩漏的結果，吞沒了來自法國，瑞士和荷蘭的服務提供商的大量移動流量。據報導，用戶的數據速度明顯下降。

At the time of writing, China Telecom has yet to be formally accused of intentionally causing the routing leak, though the duration of the episode is unusual, experts say, and such incidents can be malicious.

專家稱，在撰寫本文時，尚未正式指責中國電信故意造成路由器洩漏，儘管事件持續時間不尋常，但此類事件可能是惡意的。

As ZDNet reported in October, academic research out of the US Naval War College and Tel Aviv University fingered China Telecom’s behavior as highly suspicious, revealing that the company had seamlessly “hijacked the domestic US and cross-US traffic and redirected it to China over days, weeks, and months.” While BGP leaks can be explained by routine configuration errors, the incidents reviewed by researchers suggested “malicious intent,” they said.

正如ZDNet十月份報導，美國海軍戰爭學院和特拉維夫大學的學術研究，指責中國電信的行為高度可疑，這表明該公司無縫地「劫持了美國國內和跨美國的流量，並在幾天之內將其重定向到中國」。他們說：雖然BGP洩漏常可被解釋為配置錯誤所致，但研究人員審查的此事件屬於「惡意」。

“Two hours is a long time for a routing leak of this magnitude to stay in circulation, degrading global communications,” said Doug Madory, director of Oracle’s internet analysis division.

甲骨文公司網路分析部門主管道格·馬多里（Doug Madory）表示：「兩個小時對於這樣的路由器洩漏持續很長的時間，會降低全球通信水平。」

BGP route leaks—so named after the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) that helps routers determine the best route to reach a particular network destination—are not uncommon. They can result when an autonomous system (AP) illegitimately advertises that it can deliver traffic to blocks of IP addresses, which are grouped by network prefixes.  This frequently happens by mistake and there are often few safeguards in place, as BGP trusts all AP announcements by default.

BGP路由器洩漏（以幫助路由器確定到達特定網路目的地的最佳路由的邊界網關協議（BGP）命名）並不罕見。當自治系統（AP）非法宣告它可以將流量傳遞到IP地址塊（按網路前綴分組）時，就會產生這些錯誤。由於BGP預設信任所有AP公告，因此這種情況經常是由於錯誤而發生的，而且很少有適當的防護措施。

On Thursday, a major data center in Switzerland, Safe Host, leaked more than 70,000 routes to China Telecom, which in turn announced the routes on the global internet, causing huge amounts of traffic destined for European networks to be rerouted through its own servers.

週四，瑞士的一個主要數據中心Safe Host向中國電信洩漏了7萬多條路由，而中國電信又在全球網路上宣布了這些路由，導致發往歐洲網路的大量流量以其中國電信自己的伺服器重新更改路由。

The incident shows that BGP route leaks are still a critical problem for the global communications, said Madory, adding that China Telecom had clearly “neither the basic routing safeguards” nor proper procedures in place “to detect and remediate them in a timely manner when they inevitably occur.”

Madory表示，此事件表明BGP路由洩漏仍然是全球通信的關鍵問題，並補充說，中國電信顯然要不是「無基本的路由保護措施」，就是無沒有適當的程序以「以致於在不可避免地發生時，無法及時檢測並修復。」