The Taiwan Straits Crises：1954–55 and 1958 MILESTONES：1953–1960＠DoS Taimocracy翻譯 20190829

The Taiwan Straits Crises：1954–55 and 1958    MILESTONES：1953–1960＠DoS    Taimocracy翻譯 20190829 

Tensions between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) in the 1950s resulted in armed conflict over strategic islands in the Taiwan Strait. On two separate occasions during the 1950s, the PRC bombed islands controlled by the ROC. The United States responded by actively intervening on behalf of the ROC.

20世紀50年代中華人民共和國（PRC）與中華民國（ROC）之間的緊張關係，導致了台灣海峽戰略島嶼的武裝衝突。在20世紀50年代的兩個不同場合，中華人民共和國轟炸了由中華民國控制的島嶼。美國的回應是代表中華民國進行積極干預。

The importance of the islands in the Taiwan Strait was rooted in their geographic proximity to China and Taiwan and their role in the Chinese Civil War. Jinmen (Quemoy), two miles from the mainland Chinese city of Xiamen, and Mazu, ten miles from the city of Fuzhou, are located approximately one hundred miles west of Taiwan. When the Nationalist Government of the ROC under Chiang Kai-shek recognized that it had lost control of mainland China during the Chinese Civil War, the officials and part of the Nationalist Army fled to the island of Taiwan, establishing troops on these two islands and the Dachen Islands further north. In the early 1950s, Chiang’s forces launched minor attacks from Jinmen and Mazu against the coast of mainland China.  Leadership on both sides of the strait continued to view the islands as a potential launching pad for an ROC invasion to retake the Chinese mainland and had an interest in controlling the islands.

台灣海峽島嶼的重要性，源於它們與中國和台灣的地理位置，以及它們在中國內戰中的作用。距離中國大陸廈門兩英里的金門（金門）和距離福州市十英里的馬祖，位於台灣以西約一百英里處。當蔣介石下的中華民國國民政府承認它在中國內戰期間失去了對中國大陸的控制權時，官員和部分國民軍逃往台灣島，在這兩個島嶼上建立軍隊，大陳群島再往北。在20世紀50年代初，蔣的軍隊對金門和馬祖進行了針對中國大陸沿海的小規模襲擊。海峽兩岸的領導層，繼續將這些島嶼視為中華民國入侵重新奪回中國大陸的潛在起點，控制這些島嶼有利益。

U.S. policy toward East Asia in the early Cold War contributed to the tensions in the Taiwan Strait. In late 1949 and early 1950, American officials were prepared to let PRC forces cross the Strait and defeat Chiang, but after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the United States sent its Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait to prevent the Korean conflict from spreading south. The appearance of the Seventh Fleet angered the Chinese Communists, who transferred their troops poised for an invasion of Taiwan to the Korean front. This served to delay military conflict in the Strait until the United States withdrew its fleet after the Korean War.

冷戰初期美國對東亞的政策助長了台海緊張局勢。1949年末和1950年初，美國官員準備讓中國軍隊越過海峽擊敗蔣介石，但在1950年6月韓戰爆發後，美國派遣第七艦隊進入台灣海峽以防止朝鮮衝突從南方蔓延。第七艦隊的出現激怒了中國共產黨人，他們將準備入侵台灣的軍隊，轉移到朝鮮戰線上。這有助於延遲海峽兩岸的軍事衝突，直到美國在韓戰後撤出其艦隊。

Over the next few years, the U.S. Government took steps that allied it more firmly to the ROC Government on Taiwan. In 1954, the United States led the creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, which was designed to unify the region against the perceived Communist threat. Moreover, U.S. officials openly debated the possibility of signing a Mutual Defense Treaty with Chiang Kai-shek. The PRC viewed these developments as threats to its national security and regional leadership. In the interest of bolstering its strategic position in the Taiwan Strait, the PRC began to bombard Jinmen in September 1954, and soon expanded its targets to include Mazu and the Dachen Islands.

在接下來的幾年裡，美國政府採取措施，更加堅定地與中華民國台灣政府結盟。1954年，美國領導了「東南亞公約組織」的成立，該組織旨在整合該地區，反對共產主義的威脅。此外，美國官員公開辯論與蔣介石簽署〈共同防禦條約〉的可能性。中國認為這些發展是對其國家安全和地區領導的威脅。為了鞏固其在台灣海峽的戰略地位，中華人民共和國於1954年9月開始轟炸金門，並很快擴大其目標，包括馬祖和大陳群島。

U.S. policymakers considered sending part of the U.S. fleet into the Strait. Discussions centered on whether this maneuver would reopen the Chinese Civil War and, if so, what effect that would have on U.S. security concerns in the region. U.S. policymakers did not want to be drawn into the conflict, but wanted the ROC to maintain control of the islands. The loss of Jinmen and Mazu to the People’s Republic might mean an irreparable blow to Nationalist Army morale and the legitimacy of the ROC regime on Taiwan. To assert its continued support of that regime, the United States signed the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC. Although the treaty did not commit the United States to defending the off-shore islands, it promised support if the ROC engaged in a broader conflict with the PRC.

美國政策制定者考慮將部分美國艦隊送入海峽。討論集中在這種策略是否會重新開啟中國內戰，如果是這樣，那將對美國在該地區的安全問題產生何種影響。美國政策制定者不想被捲入衝突，但希望中華民國保持對這些島嶼的控制。金門和馬祖對人民共和國的損失，可能意味著對國民黨軍隊的士氣，和台灣中華民國政權的合法性造成不可挽回的打擊。為了表示繼續支持該政權，美國與中華民國簽署了〈共同防禦條約〉。儘管該條約沒有讓美國承諾保護離岸島嶼，但如果中華民國與中國發生更廣泛的衝突，它承諾提供支持。

The situation in the Strait deteriorated in late 1954 and early 1955, prompting the U.S. Government to act. In January 1955, the U.S. Congress passed the “Formosa Resolution,” which gave President Eisenhower total authority to defend Taiwan and the off-shore islands.  The U.S. Government then announced its determination to defend Taiwan against communist attack, although it did not specify the territory included within its defensive perimeter.  In exchange for a private promise to defend Jinmen and Mazu, however, Chiang Kai-shek agreed to withdraw his troops from Dachen, which was strategically ambiguous and difficult to defend.

海峽局勢在1954年末和1955年初惡化，促使美國政府採取行動。1955年1月，美國國會通過了〈福爾摩沙決議〉，賦予艾森豪總統完全保衛台灣和離岸島嶼的權力。美國政府隨後宣布決心保衛台灣免遭共產主義襲擊，儘管它沒有指明其防禦範圍內的領土。然而，為了換取保衛金門和媽祖的私人承諾，蔣介石同意從大陳撤軍，這在戰略上含糊不清，難以防守。

The Eisenhower Administration considered many options, ranging from convincing Chiang Kai-shek to give up the islands to employing nuclear weapons against the PRC. Before any of these options became necessary, at the Afro-Asian Conference in April 1955 in Bandung PRC Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai announced a desire to negotiate with the United States. The PRC’s sudden shift could have stemmed from pressure from the Soviet Union to ease tensions, concern about the very real possibility of war with the United States, or changes in internal politics.  In September, 1955, the PRC and the United States began talks at Geneva to address the issue of repatriation of nationals, but also to discuss preventing the escalation of future conflicts.

艾森豪政府考慮了許多選擇，包括說服蔣介石放棄這些島嶼以及對中國使用核武器。在任何這些選擇成為必要之前，在1955年4月在萬隆舉行的「亞非會議」上，中國外交部長周恩來宣布了與美國談判的願望。中國的突然轉變，可能源於蘇聯緩和緊張局勢的壓力，對與美國發生戰爭的真正可能性的關注，或內部政治的變化。1955年9月，中華人民共和國和美國開始在日內瓦舉行會談，討論國民遣返問題，並討論防止未來衝突升級的問題。

Although there were good reasons for the PRC to stand down in 1955, it resumed its bombardment of Jinmen and Mazu in 1958. This time, the PRC took advantage of the fact that international attention was focused on U.S. intervention in Lebanon and barred ROC efforts to re-supply garrisons on the off-shore islands.  The PRC also wanted to protest continued U.S. support of the ROC regime.  Once again, President Eisenhower was concerned that the loss of the islands would hurt Nationalist morale and might be a precursor to the Communist conquest of Taiwan. The United States thus arranged to re-supply ROC garrisons on Jinmen and Mazu.  This brought an abrupt end to the bombardment and eased the crisis.  Eventually, the PRC and ROC came to an arrangement in which they shelled each other’s garrisons on alternate days.  This continued for twenty years until the PRC and the United States normalized relations.

雖然中國有充分的理由在1955年停止，但它在1958年恢復了對金門和媽祖的轟炸。這一次，中國利用了國際關注的重點是，美國對黎巴嫩的干預以阻止中華民國在離岸島嶼上重新部署駐軍的努力。中國還想抗議美國繼續支持中華民國政權。艾森豪總統再一次擔心這些島嶼的喪失會損害民族主義者的士氣，並可能成為共產黨征服台灣的先兆。因此，美國安排在金門和馬祖上重新部署中華民國駐軍。這突然結束了轟炸並緩解了危機。最終，中華人民共和國和中華民國達成了一項安排，在這些安排中他們每隔一天對彼此的駐軍進行砲擊。這種情況持續了20年，直到中華人民共和國和美國關係正常化。

https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/taiwan-strait-crises