觸控螢幕太難用了，美國軍艦要改回機械控制系統 Tech News 20190813

【Comment】

Readers may be remembered that there was a PLAN vessel Long Hu Shan (Type 071 amphibious transport dock) tailed USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) when the latter collided with Alnic MC, a chemical tanker, on August 21, 2017.

There were four fatal collisions of McCain and USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62), plus two other incidents in the Western Pacific.

It might be a consequence of electronic jamming by PLAN Long Hu Shan.

Two years later, the US Navy scheduled to revise the current steer-by-wire system through touch PADs.  It is expected to go back a little bit to the mechanical-steering-system, allowing persons to take over when unexpected things happen.

The revision implied that the accidents in 2017 were caused by the incompatible of Human-machine interface.  The example was CAL’s A300B4-622R at Nagoya Airport on April 26, 1994, besides recent accidents of B-737 MAXs.

There is another side story recently.

At midnight of July 31, 2019, Long Hu Shan collided with Taiwanese cargo vessel Yu-Tai No.1 in the waters around Kingsmen.  Long Hu Shan dropped some vital parts in this collision.  Having no right to do so, Long Hu Shan insisted to detained Yu-Tai No.1 at first place.  However, Long Hu Shan quickly left when Taiwan’s Coast Guard vessel came. 

NTSB: Lack of Navy Oversight, Training Were Primary Causes of Fatal McCain Collision    USNI News 20190806

中國震洋：美國軍艦南海巡航後被撞「疑遭中國黑客攻擊」

領導力：太平洋美軍即撤換第七艦隊司令

神盾艦連遭撞，專家疑電訊系統遭駭

觸控螢幕太難用了，美國軍艦要改回機械控制系統    Tech News 20190813

觸控螢幕已成為電子產品的主流互動模式，伴隨觸控螢幕裝置長大的年輕人都稱為「觸控螢幕世代」。

除了智慧手機，觸控螢幕還應用到汽車、軍艦等大型交通工具，科幻電影裡，經常會將所有介面變成觸控螢幕呈現，似乎觸控螢幕就是互動的未來。

然而不是所有人都喜歡觸控互動。

據美國 USNI 新聞報導，美國海軍計劃從 2020 年開始，不再於驅逐艦全部使用觸控螢幕節流閥和舵機控制系統，要恢復機械控制系統。

這不是科技倒退嗎？美國海軍為什麼要這麼做？說到底就是驅逐艦的觸控螢幕太難用了，以致威脅到船員的生命安全。

美國國家運輸安全委員會（NTSB）近日發表 2017 年一起碰撞事故報告，指出驅逐艦控制系統設計是造成事故的原因。

根據事故調查報告，2017 年 8 月 21 日，約翰‧S‧馬侃號（USS John S. McCain，DDG-56）驅逐艦在新加坡海域與賴比瑞亞油輪 Alnic MC 相撞，報告詳細敘述了事故原因：

當船員在主控台嘗試轉換操作推進系統時，失去對軍艦的控制，讓軍艦駛入油輪航道。此次事故共造成驅逐艦 10 名船員死亡，48 人受傷。

報告稱，儘管疲勞駕駛和缺乏訓練是導致事故的部分原因，但複雜的觸控螢幕控制系統難辭其咎。主控台（SCC）位於軍艦艦橋中央，船員透過主控台兩側觸控螢幕操控驅逐艦，但控制權移轉程序十分複雜，容易因操作不當就造成事故。

因此調查人員認為在軍艦使用機械節流閥才較好，因為這可以給操控者提供即時的觸覺回饋。報告指出，如果事故軍艦當時採用機械控制系統，可能會更早發現問題，並建議海軍應該遵循更好的設計標準。

美國海軍海上系統司令部（NAVSEA）發言人 Colleen O’Rourke 表示，海軍正計劃為所有配備綜合艦橋和導航系統的亞里‧伯克級驅逐艦都安裝機械節流閥，第一個機械節流閥計畫於 2020 年夏季完成。

但駕駛台觸控螢幕控制系統不會完全取消，海軍總工程師 Lorin Selby 表示，需透過軟硬體最佳化，統一不同船隻的主控台設計，讓船員無縫操作人機介面，更快了解軍艦的各種功能。

美國軍艦事件也引出一個問題，觸控螢幕真能完全能取代按鍵等實體互動嗎？

以前提過，儘管智慧手機逐漸將實體鍵砍掉，但我們對按鍵的本能還在，更準確來說，互動觸感依然不可取代，只是不再透過物理按鍵回饋。

因此，當觸控螢幕出現像美國軍艦遇到的問題時，或許不用因噎廢食全部改回物理互動介面，還能用技術將觸控和物理互動的觸覺回饋結合改良。

NTSB: Lack of Navy Oversight, Training Were Primary Causes of Fatal McCain Collision    USNI News 20190806

Almost two years after the collision between a U.S. destroyer and a merchant ship off Singapore, the first in-depth independent investigation has determined the most probable cause for the incident that killed 10 sailors was lack of adequate Navy oversight and training.

The National Transportation Safety Board found that the most likely cause of the fatal collision of guided-missile destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) and chemical tanker Alnic MC on Aug. 21, 2017, “was a lack of effective operational oversight of the destroyer by the U.S. Navy, which resulted in insufficient training and inadequate bridge operating procedures,” reads the investigation.

The conclusion of the report breaks from the Navy’s own assessment of the incident, which placed the blame for the early morning collision almost entirely on the leadership of McCain and not on what the NTSB determined were the service’s own “insufficient training and inadequate bridge operating procedures.”

The 2017 Comprehensive Review of Recent Surface Force Incidents, led by then-U.S. Fleet Forces Command commander Adm. Phil Davidson, placed blame at the feet of the ship’s commander, Cmdr. Alfredo Sanchez, and “leaderships’ loss of situational awareness in a high traffic area and failure to follow safe navigational practices, coupled with watchstanders who were not proficient with ship control console operations (steering and throttle control) or associated casualty response procedures.”

Both Davidson and the NTSB report agreed on the basic facts: watchstanders on the bridge had not understood how the Northrop Grumman-designed integrated bridge and navigation system (IBNS) helm controls functioned in depth.

As the warship approached the busy shipping lane off of Singapore, an attempt to split the steering and throttle to two different consoles in fact transferred all controls to the lee helmsman – a sailor who was less familiar with the intricacies of the IBNS and had not slept the night before.  The mistake led the helmsman to believe he had lost control of the ship.  Meanwhile, the ship’s throttles – operated by touch screen – became unlinked.

“Control of the port shaft and steering was now at the lee helm station, while control of the starboard shaft remained at the helm station,” read the report.

When the helmsman thought he was slowing down both propellers, he was in fact only reducing the speed of the port screw, causing a sharp turn in front of the tanker.

The confusion around how the controls had been configured led to three minutes of the watch being unable to control the ship, allowing McCain to move in front of Alnic MC – unbeknownst to most of the bridge team.  The collision occurred shortly after the bridge regained control of McCain.

According to the NTSB report, the watchstanders aboard McCain were qualified to stand their watches under the Navy-wide Personnel Qualification Standard (PQS).  However, investigators found that the Navy-approved PQS didn’t address the nuances of the new navigation system.

“The PQS booklet did not specify the transfer of control between bridge stations,” read the report.

McCain was the first ship in U.S. 7th Fleet to be equipped with the IBNS that was installed in 2016 as part of a repair period in Japan.

The destroyer’s enlisted head of the deck department, then-Chief Boatswain’s Mate Jeffery Butler, was in charge of training sailors to operate the new system that replaced the manual throttle controls with touch screens.

During his court martial last year, Butler testified that the extent of training he received to operate the IBNS was an hour-long session with a master helmsman on the waterfront who was familiar with IBNS and then the tech manuals.  With that knowledge, he in turn had to train the crew of McCain to operate the IBNS

“[It was] difficult to get training,” he testified.  “We asked for the techs to come over, but they never showed.”

Though qualified to stand their watches by Navy standards, the crew’s understanding of the less-than-one-year-old navigation system was poor, the NTSB found.

“Their misunderstandings expressed during the post-accident interviews and the misunderstandings of other crewmembers who were permanently assigned to the John S McCain point to a more fundamental issue with the qualification process and training with the IBNS,” the NTSB report found.

In a statement to USNI News, the service acknowledged that it had addressed concerns on IBNS training as part of Davidson’s review and through Secretary of the Navy Richard V. Spencer’s separate Strategic Readiness Review.

“The Navy released 22 fleet advisories governing the safe and effective operation for all variants of ship steering systems, to include IBNS,” reads the statement.  “These system-specific advisories validated and updated existing directives governing the configuration, operation, and control of steering and propulsion systems during normal and casualty control scenarios.”

In addition to the unfamiliarity of the controls, the report found that the lack of sleep of the bridge team was a factor in the collision.

“According to Navy records, the 14 crew on the bridge averaged just over 4.9 hours of rest in those 24 hours,” read the report.

In total, the NTSB found seven safety issues associated with the crash.

Safety issues identified in this accident include the following:

• The decision to transfer the location of thrust control on board the John S McCain while the vessel was in a congested waterway
• The lack of very high frequency radio communications between the vessels
• The automatic identification system data transmission policy for Navy vessels
• The procedures for the transfers of steering and thrust control on board the John S McCain
• The training of Navy bridge watchstanders
• The design of the destroyer’s Integrated Bridge and Navigation System
• Navy watchstanders’ fatigue

The fatal collisions of McCain and USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62), plus two other incidents in the Western Pacific, prompted the Navy to take a holistic look at how it operates its surface forces and trains its surface officers and enlisted sailors.  The service has said it has implemented more than 100 changes to that end.