（附中文）An open letter to Mr. Kuo Pei-hung and his colleagues Richard C. Bush@Brookings 201920190211

【Comment】

感謝網友「楓巢求悟」轉中文翻譯貼文

I treat the reason that Richard Bush wrote this open letter for good will. 

An open letter to Mr. Kuo Pei-hung and his colleagues    Richard C. Bush@Brookings 201920190211

【芋傳媒】卜睿哲給郭倍宏的一封公開信 (中文翻譯)

https://taronews.tw/2019/02/12/251808/

Editor's Note:

After Taiwan’s local elections on November 24, 2018, in which the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) lost a number of mayor and magistrate positions, there was increased finger-pointing in the party.  People in the base of the DPP, the so-called “Deep Greens,” criticized President Tsai Ing-wen, the party’s leader, for having been insufficiently aggressive in pursuing their agenda of resisting China and taking steps toward de jure independence for Taiwan.  Deep Green politicians formed groups to pressure President Tsai to move in their policy direction.  At stake is not only the DPP’s policy and ideological direction but the face it presents to the voters in presidential elections that will be held in January 2020.

One of these activists is Kuo Pei-hung, who is chairman of pro-independence Formosa TV.  With a number of like-minded colleagues, he has formed the Formosa Alliance (literally “Joyful Alliance” in Chinese) to promote a Deep Green agenda and specifically to liberalize the use of referendums.  Currently, the requirements for holding referendums on domestic policy issues are relatively modest, but more restrictive regarding questions of Taiwan’s sovereignty and, by implication, its relationship with China.  The open letter below to Mr.  Kuo argues that such an effort would, if successful, have significant implications for the United States.

I have read the statement that the Formosa Alliance released on January 31 and your own related press statement in which you say that “Taiwan next year should create in independent state and advance towards being a normal country.”  You wish to amend the referendum law to make it easier to have a popular vote on these issues.  But given China’s clear opposition to an independent Taiwan and the position of the United States that it does not support Taiwan independence, the Alliance’s proposals are certain to stimulate controversy.

我(卜睿哲) 已閱讀了有關喜樂島於 2019 年 1 月 31 日發表的聲明。在你們自己的相關新聞稿中你們提到：台灣應於明年創造（create）一個獨立國家（independent state），並邁向一個成為一個正常國家。你們希望能透過修公投法的方式來讓這些問題更容易獲得投票支持。然而，中國對台灣獨立的明確反對，以及美國的立場，並不支持台灣獨立，因此，喜樂島的這些提案必然引發與刺激更多爭議。

It is probably not appropriate for me to comment on the substantive wisdom of the Formosa Alliance’s proposal.  It is up to people in Taiwan to render a judgement on ideas such as making Taiwan a “normal country” through a referendum.

或許我不適合評論喜樂島此具智慧分量的提案。是否讓台灣成為一個「正常國家」這樣的想法與提議，是需要仰賴台灣人民是否透過公投來提出判斷／裁判。

Yet on two aspects of your proposal, I believe it is proper for me to offer my views for your consideration.  The first aspect is that the proposal touches on the national interests of the United States, specifically its abiding interest in peace and security in the Taiwan area and its longstanding view that neither side of the Taiwan Strait should try unilaterally to change the status quo.  One reason for this American policy, of course, is that the People’s Republic of China holds that Taiwan is a part of China, and Article 8 of its 2005 Anti-Secession Law authorizes the use of “non-peaceful means” to respond what it regards as a Taiwan move on towards “secession.”

然而，就您的提案，在兩個方面，我相信我很適合提供我的看法，給予您參考。首先，此提案碰觸到美國的國際利益，特別是遵守台灣區域的和平與安全與台灣海峽兩岸任何一方單方面企圖改變現狀。美國之所以維護這個政策，當然的一個原因是在於，中華人民共和國認為台灣是中國的一部分，在 2005 年《反分裂國家法》第 8 條，其更通過當其認為台灣向「分裂」前進，將使用「不和平手段」來作為回應。

Now I know that you reject China’s claim concerning the legal status of the territory of Taiwan, but that happens to be its formally held position.  Also, neither you nor I can control how the Beijing government interprets developments on Taiwan and whether they trigger Article 8 of the Anti-Secession Law.  I’m sure you agree with me that a war in the Taiwan Strait, however it began, would be a tragedy for the island and for all that its people have achieved.

我當然知道您回絕中國自己所認為台灣領土的合法地位，但那剛好也是其正式持有的立場（formal held position）。再者，您或我都無法控制北京政府如何解讀台灣的發展，或他們是否觸動《反國家法》的第 8 條。我相信您會同意，若台灣海峽引發戰爭，無論戰爭是如何開始的，也將是這個島與建立這個島的人民的悲劇。

If China were to use “non-peaceful means” in response to what it concluded was secession by Taiwan, that in turn would raise the at least implied commitment of the United States to come to Taiwan’s defense.  Yet that commitment has never been absolute.  If the men and women of the U.S. armed forces are to risk their lives for the safety of Taiwan, American leaders would want to be certain that such a sacrifice was clearly necessary in light of U.S. interests.  At a minimum, U.S. leaders would insist, if actions by Taiwan created the risk of war and might trigger American intervention, that they be consulted in advance by the Taiwan authors of those actions.  I wonder, therefore, whether you have thus consulted with anyone in authority in the U.S. government about the risks that your proposal might create.  Or do you assume that the Trump administration’s support for Taiwan is so strong that it will support initiatives from Taiwan that might create the risks of conflict?

倘若中國使用「非和平」手段來回應其下的結論，即台灣走向分裂，這樣會至少提高美國承諾維護台灣的承諾。但這樣的承諾也從來未獲得證實或確定。若美國國防軍隊的男女軍人需要為了捍衛台灣的安全而冒著生命危險，美國領導者／領袖至少需要確定這樣的犧牲對與美國利益是必須的。至少，美國領袖會堅持需要提前被告知，起碼讓台灣陷入戰爭危機的始作俑者需要先諮詢美國領袖的看法，畢竟是非常有可能需要美國的介入。因此，我在想，你們任何一人是否有先與美國政府權責單位進行溝通與諮詢有關此提案的潛在風險？或者，您們直接認定川普政府對台灣的支持強大到其一定會支持台灣所有倡議，即便這些倡議會引發對立或對抗的風險？

Of course, the United States and Taiwan have been in this situation before.  The Eisenhower administration worried that the defense treaty it concluded with Taiwan in 1954 might induce adventurist actions by Chiang Kai-shek, and so it insisted that Taipei get American approval before it undertook any major military action against the mainland.  More recently, President Chen Shui-bian undertook initiatives regarding Taiwan’s legal and political character.  He proposed using the mechanism of referendum on issues that concerned Taiwan’s sovereignty.  He did not consult with the George W. Bush administration in advance because he knew in advance the answer he would get.

當然，美國與台灣曾經歷過這樣的情況。當時艾森豪政府擔心其與台灣於 1954 年簽定的中美共同防禦條約將促使蔣介石進行冒險行為，因此，堅持台北（Taipei）需要取得美國的同意後，才能進行任何對大陸（mainland）大規模的軍事行為。在近期，陳水扁總統對台灣的合法地位與政治特性提出相關倡議。他提出使用公投機制來處理台灣主權問題。他沒有事先與喬治布希政府（George w. Bush）諮詢過，因為他已先知道諮詢後的答案會是什麼。

These initiatives did great damage to U.S.-Taiwan relations.  You will recall that President Bush publicly criticized Mr. Chen in December 2003 for trying to unilaterally change the status quo.  In September 2007, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Christensen warned that Mr. Chen was putting Taiwan’s security at stake for the sake of the DPP’s electoral advantage.  If Mr. Chen assumed that he would have U.S. support whatever he did, he was badly mistaken.

這些提案倡議的確對美台關係是個傷害。您會記得布希總統在 2003 年 12 月公開批評陳水扁單方面改變現狀。2007 年 9 月，當時的副國務卿 Thomas Christensen 警告陳先生為了獲得民進黨選舉有利位置，將台灣的安全暴露於危險中，若陳先生認為／假定無論他做了什麼，他將能獲得美國的支持，他這樣是徹底失誤了。

In my view, one of the reasons that the United States has expressed support for President Tsai and her administration is precisely because she is cautious and careful.  She does not take the U.S. commitment for granted and understands the value of close communication.

以我來看，美國之所以表達對蔡總統與她的政府之支持，其中的一個原因恰恰／精確（precisely）來說就是她很謹慎與小心。她不會把美國的承諾當成理所當然，她也了解緊密溝通的價值。

I do not know how firm the Trump administration’s commitment to Taiwan’s defense would be if military conflict were likely.  There are certainly those who see Taiwan as a useful asset in its campaign to resist what they regard as China’s revisionist objectives.  But valuing Taiwan’s partnership in this way is not the same thing as giving Taiwan, or political forces in Taiwan, a green light to act unilaterally to change the status quo, a principle that remains a central element of U.S. policy.

我不清楚若可能發生軍事衝突，川普政府對捍衛台灣的承諾穩固程度多寡。一定有一些人把台灣當成在競選／戰役（campaign）中以中國為修正主義對手的一個有利的籌碼／物件（asset）。但以這樣的方式珍惜台灣夥伴關係並不等同於給予台灣或台灣的政治力量一個綠色行走燈號，准許能單方面改變現狀，不單方面改變現狀是美國政策一個中心內涵／原則。

I do know that President Trump himself is skeptical about any U.S. security commitment to Taiwan.  At a meeting of the National Security Council on January 19, 2018, Mr. Trump asked his senior national security team, “even more than [Korea], what do we get from protecting Taiwan?”  The implication of that question is the U.S. commitment to Taiwan is not justified, as far as he is concerned.  I have seen no evidence that this skepticism has changed.  It is consistent with his long-standing opposition to U.S. defense commitments to U.S. friends and allies.

我倒是很清楚知道川普總統本人對於任何美國防衛台灣安全的承諾懷有遲疑態度。在 2018 年 1 月 19 日的一場國家安全委會會議中，川普先生詢問他的資深國家安全團隊，「超越韓國（韓國之外之上），我們保護台灣能獲得什麼？」這樣的發問所隱含的是對川普而言，美國對台灣的承諾並沒有全面正當性。我並沒有看川普改變這個懷疑態度的相關證明。川普反對美國給予其長期盟友與朋友的防護承諾的態度是一致／不變的。

Secondly: I said that I would not comment on the specific substance of your proposal and I have not done so.  But I do believe I have the right to speak on Taiwan’s democratic system generally.  That is because I worked with the late Representative Steve Solarz from 1983 to 1992 to promote democracy and human rights on the island.  For example, I spent September 28, 1986 drafting and getting approval of a letter by Rep. Solarz, Rep. Jim Leach, Senator Claiborne Pell, and Senator Edward Kennedy urging President Chiang Ching-kuo not to crack down on the newly announced Democratic Progressive Party.

第二，我說我不會對您的提案所提到的特定內容表達意見，我也確實並沒這麼做。不過我相信我有權利對於台灣的民主體制提出一般性看法。這是因為我與國會議員 Steve Solarz 自 1983 年至 1992 年便投入推動這個島的民主與人權。例如，我在 1986 年 9 月 28 日撰擬並取得一些國會議員，包括 Solarz、Jim Leach、參議員 Clariborne Pell，以及 Edward Kennedy 等人同意簽署一封信，呼籲蔣介石總統不要制裁／處置剛剛宣布成立的民主進步黨。

When it comes to democratic mechanisms, none is perfect in my view.  Whether it is indirect democracy in a legislature or direct democracy through a referendum, distortion and manipulation of the popular will occurs.  So a referendum is not necessarily better than other mechanisms.

對於民主機制運作，在我看來，沒有一個是完美的。無論是立法機構的間接民主或公投的直接民主，扭曲或操弄群眾的情況一定會發生。因此，公投並不必然是比其他機制更好。

If referendums are to be employed on routine policy issues, in my view, they should be crafted in a way so the result truly reflects the view of the majority of all citizens.  I’m not sure one can say that about the referendums that were held on November 24 last year.

若公投的執行是運用在一般性的政策議題，就我看來，應是更細膩的雕塑成形／成案，期最終的成果將能確切反映大多數人民的看法與意見。就去年 11 月 24 日所進行的公投案，我不認為我們可以說我們看到這樣的成果。

All the more so when the referendum is on questions regarding the fundamental identity of a state and a nation.  For these, it is a good thing to set a high bar for authorizing a referendum and passing a referendum.  The stakes are so high and the consequences of being wrong are so great, that it is appropriate—even mandatory—to require a broad public consensus through a super-majority for passage.  Witness the trouble that Great Britain is now in because only a simple majority of those voting for Brexit was required for passage.

對於一個政府，一個國家的基本定位這樣的問題進行公投，更是如此，即是需要更細膩的雕塑成形。為此，對這類問題設定高公投門檻是好事，因為賭注非常高，且若錯誤的話，後果太大／不堪設想，因此，以透過「超級多數」方能達成公投門檻是恰當的，甚至應強制性，這樣才能代表獲得廣泛的民意共識。我們可以目睹現在英國脫歐面臨困境，這之所以會發生，就是因為簡單多數決公投的後果。

Thank you for your consideration.  I look forward to receiving any response you may have.

我感謝您能就以上參考，我期待收到任何您的可能回應。

Richard Bush卜睿哲

The Brookings Institution