Building a Regional Order in East Asia: Community, Competition, Conflict 2016.03.31

Building a Regional Order in East Asia: Community, Competition, Conflict  2016.03.31

American foreign policy interests include:

• Preserving and strengthening national security;

• Supporting the values and the practice of political, religious, and cultural pluralism;

• Advancing human rights;

• Addressing non-traditional security challenges such as terrorism, cyber security and climate change;

• Curbing the proliferation of nuclear and other unconventional weapons; and

• Promoting an open and global economy.

US-China Overall Relations

Recommendations:

• It may sound simple, but dialogue, dialogue, dialogue! Communication at the top levels is essential.  The next U.S. president should send an early signal to President Xi, laying out his/her commitment to certain principles and concepts for managing the bilateral relationship.  An early visit to Beijing, as well as to our key allies in Seoul, Tokyo, Manila and Canberra, by the new Secretary of State would make sense.

• Continued participation at the highest levels in Asian gatherings, including APEC, EAS and ASEAN-plus, not only allows Washington to show the flag but also provides opportunities for quiet bilateral exchanges with key players from throughout the region, including President Xi and his top officials.

• This should also involve continued mil-to-mil contacts, in both directions, as well as visits by key cabinet-level officials in the economic, trade and finance departments.

• Receiving key PRC counterparts in Washington is all part of this same process.  It can also involve side meetings at any variety of international fora, including the UNGA, IMF, ADB and the proliferating number of international gatherings that warrant participation by top governmental officials.

• Previous administrations have embraced annual bilateral meetings like the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) and the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) to permit senior officials to engage in discussions on a whole range of political, security, economic and trade issues.  The next president should consider continuing this engagement in some form, adjusting to the incoming administration’s top priorities. Whatever the format, the goal is to preserve the practice of regular high-level engagement between our two countries.

V. Taiwan

Taiwan’s democratic elections on January 16, 2016, could introduce new tensions in a longdormant bilateral issue.  Many worry that the PRC might decide to launch a new campaign of hostility at the island over its election of the Democratic Progressive Party’s Tsai Ing-wen as President.  Madame Tsai’s party has long been associated with a quest for independence, though this has been downplayed in recent years.  And while her recent statements have highlighted a desire to work constructively with the mainland, we can expect some heightened tensions in the run-up to Tsai’s May 20 inauguration.  China has long objected to U.S. support for Taipei, and in particular to continued arms sales to the island.  Yet American support has been consistent through multiple presidents of both parties, buttressed by the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in 1979 which followed the shift of U.S. diplomatic relations to the government in Beijing.  Congress has been a special supporter of the island, and both Democratic and Republican administrations have also championed the safety and security of Taiwan and its 23 million people.  President Xi Jinping has suggested some desire to accelerate efforts to reunify Taiwan with the Mainland.  That said, if anything the current attitude of Taiwan citizens, particularly younger ones, suggests less a sense of identification with either the Mainland or “Chinese-ness,” in favor of a sense of being “Taiwanese.”  The growing military capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have alarmed most of its neighbors, but hold particular concern for Taiwan.  Thus the American commitment to provide suitable defensive weaponry to the island has become, if anything, more urgent in current conditions.  The island’s recent elections highlight the deepening split between Beijing’s rhetoric and the attitude of the people of Taiwan.  China is insisting that the Tsai Government, which takes office May 20, 2016, adhere to the “one-China principle” and the related “1992 consensus,” which the current KMT Government under President Ma Ying-jeou has long embraced.  It remains possible that Xi will choose to exert greater pressure on Taiwan on the timetable and rhetoric of reunification in coming months.  This will play directly into U.S. relations with the Mainland, as any sharper rhetoric or actions toward the island will become both a security and a political issue for the Obama Administration over the next twelve months.  Overhanging all of this is the American election process, which will yield a new President by the beginning of 2017.  As usual, many candidates have been speaking in general terms of the need to take a harder line toward China on a variety of issues.  While this has long been a staple of American political campaigns, the list of potential grievances seems longer than usual.

Recommendations:

• The U.S. should continue the careful management of this sensitive issue by cautioning our friends on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to carefully weigh both their words and actions.  That is, for China to adhere to strictly peaceful means of pursuing the cross Strait relationship, while Taipei must avoid pushing the envelope on sovereignty issues that could cross a red line with Beijing.

• At the same time, respect for Taiwan’s strong democratic system should continue to be a major part of our relations with the island.

• Continuing provision of suitable defensive weaponry to Taiwan, as mandated by the TRA, should continue.

• The U.S. military should also maintain its strong presence in the Asia-Pacific region.

• Washington must continue to speak plainly to Beijing about our long-term insistence that cross-Strait ties can only be pursued in the absence of the use or threat of force.  A clear understanding that America stands by our friends in Taiwan on this issue must continue to be a central tenet of Sino-American dialogue.