【Comment】
Unfortunately,
PLA takes “first-mover advantages” as a creed and believes that China is a
growing power while its competitors are weakening year by year.
Like Hu,
Xi’s stressing of the coming of the strategic chance and the calling for PLA to
win any battle at any moment implies Beijing’s mentality of “now-or-never.”
The
question is when the PLA’s defense will turn offensive in its game “Strategic
offense, tactical defense?” revised on
20131215
USS Cowpens and China’s
First-Mover Advantage○The
Diplomat/ James R. Holmes(2013.12.14)http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/uss-cowpens-and-chinas-first-mover-advantage/
The main threat to
maritime Asia today is not miscalculation. It’s Beijing’s carefully calculated
policies.
Moltke the Elder
maintained that the
strongest form of warfare is strategic offense combined with tactical defense. In practice that means wresting
something from an outmatched or unready opponent and daring that opponent to
take it back. Since defense
is stronger than offense according to Clausewitz, seizing a disputed object
preemptively confers advantages. It compels the opponent to undertake a costly
offensive; he might find himself cast as the aggressor, with all the political
baggage that entails. In short, an enterprising power can obtain what business folk call a “first-mover
advantage” (hat tip: Toshi Yoshihara), preempting competitors in a
contested theater or other dispute.
Nor is the geostrategic
first-mover advantage the sole preserve of stronger competitors. Indeed, Clausewitz notes that a weaker power may pick a fight
with a stronger one if its leadership has resigned itself to using force and
believes its prospects of success are as good as they’re going to get. Clausewitz writes:
“Supposing that a minor state is in conflict with a much more powerful one and expects its
position to grow weaker every year. If war is unavoidable, should it not make the
most of its opportunities before its position gets still worse?” Now-or-never logic may goad the lesser power into
action. Now suppose the weaker
contender sees the trendlines going its way — it
believes its strength is on the upswing while its rival’s is in decay —
but frets that the favorable outlook may not last. The pressure to leap might grow unbearable.
I’m starting to think
China has contacted Moltke and Clausewitz through its strategic Ouija board. It’s possible to
interpret Beijing’s moves in the China seas — seizing disputed
islets and atolls, asserting ownership of others, trying to restrict free use
of the maritime commons — as China’s version of a first-mover strategy. To channel Moltke,
Beijing has staked claims to parts of the commons while daring fellow Asian
powers to reverse its claims at high cost and risk to themselves, and to
regional tranquility. Strategic
offense, tactical defense.
This would help explain
China’s passive-aggressive
approach to offshore quarrels. It proclaims some new policy, then acts put-upon
and oh-so-prickly when challenged. Beijing’s announcement of an air-defense identification zone (ADIZ) has
riveted commentators’ attention on the skies over the East China Sea for the
past three weeks. The South China Sea appeared somnolent. But last week, reports Bill
Gertz reports, a PLA Navy vessel ordered the cruiser USS Cowpens to stop in international
waters (but presumably within the nine-dashed line). Cowpens was evidently shadowing
the carrier Liaoning at a distance, and
Chinese commanders didn’t take kindly to its presence. When the cruiser refused to halt, a PLA Navy amphibious vessel cut across its bow so close
aboard that the crew had to maneuver to avoid colliding.
This is serious
business. U.S. officials
continually harp on the need to work out procedures whereby American and
Chinese reduce the chances and ill effects of “miscalculation.” Maybe so. But the main problem in maritime Asia isn’t
miscalculation, it’s calculation. The ADIZ, the Senkakus, Scarborough Shoal — none of these are accidents. They’re policies made in
China. By all means, let’s work
out hotlines and incidents-at-sea agreements in Asia, if possible. But let’s not kid ourselves about their
prospects for success. U.S. and
allied strategists had better ponder how to counter a Moltke.
「挑釁」當然是戰略之一。然而,「挑釁」與打第一拳,還是有天差地別。要不然,何必「挑釁」,直接打不就對嗎?「挑釁」的目的不外乎是要誘引對方打第一拳,而後整個立場就可高舉自衛或報仇的大旗,出師有名了。
回覆刪除然而,「挑釁」與「先下手為強」戰略基本上是相互矛盾的。二戰時,日本之所以會打珍珠港,可說是陷入山姆大帝的「挑釁」戰略,但從日本觀點來看,一來忍無可忍,二來是「先下手為強」。
「挑釁」者,很可能也會招到反「挑釁」。那時誰打第一拳,不重要了,關鍵就是要贏。
但目前北京真的想打架嗎?若是真的想,B52飛過去就可以幹起來了,何必再重複演出這齣攔截非武裝的測量艦?又不作啥,只是擺出警察臨檢的動作而已,所以北京目前還是僅在「挑釁」而已。
北京對「挑釁」的估算,長期而言,徹底錯誤,畢竟「挑釁」是不能玩長期的!然而,北京玩「挑釁」,玩上癮了,其因可追碩到他們思考內有佔人便宜的DNA本質,骨子存有便宜行事的傳統:夢想出現「唉唷,煩死了,乾脆讓給他們好了」達到不戰而勝的目的!
美國二戰時要找藉口很容易,譬如菲律賓盟邦的請託,歐洲盟軍(如荷蘭、英國)的求援,日本是先下手為強,但是即使先下手只要美國決心打全球大戰略,那日本當時國力差太多,又沒足夠的石油、鋼鐵,注定長期上美國會贏,所以重點在於國力和日本採取對全東亞和東南亞都攻略的戰略布局,如果只先對中國下手並且只長期佔領和不進入四川、雲南、新疆和外蒙,那至少能先站穩腳跟,獲取必要的戰略物資,而美國二戰就可能不會那麼快就和日本打起海權爭霸戰。
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