20260428 美國財政部海外資產控制辦公室發佈〈與獨立煉油廠（地煉）往來的制裁風險〉 Taimocracy翻譯

與獨立煉油廠（地煉）往來的制裁風險

2026.04.28

與「茶壺」煉油廠往來的制裁風險

美國財政部海外資產控制辦公室（OFAC）正提醒金融機構注意，與中國獨立煉油廠（俗稱「茶壺」煉油廠，主要分布於山東省）往來所面臨的制裁風險。鑒於這些煉油廠在進口與提煉伊朗原油方面持續扮演關鍵角色（該情況預計將持續至2026年），OFAC自2025年3月起已指定（制裁）多家茶壺煉油廠，這些廠家合計購買並提煉了價值數十億美元的伊朗石油。

2025年2月4日，川普總統簽署了《第2號國家安全總統備忘錄》（NSPM-2），重新對伊朗政權實施「極限施壓」（Maximum Pressure），並推動全政府體系的方法，以切斷伊朗獲得核武器的所有路徑，並反擊其惡意影響。OFAC對伊朗維持全面制裁，並將繼續根據第13902號行政命令及其他制裁權限，打擊該政權的主要收入來源部門，特別是其石油與石化部門。

中國是全球最大的伊朗石油買家，目前收購了伊朗約90%的石油出口總量，而茶壺煉油廠購買了其中的大部分。這些茶壺煉油廠一直利用美國金融系統進行美元計價交易，並獲取美國的技術與貨物。自恢復對伊朗的極限施壓以來，OFAC已指定了五家茶壺煉油廠：

• 山東壽光魯清石化有限公司(Shandong Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical Co., Ltd.)
• 山東勝星化工有限公司(Shandong Shengxing ChemicalCo., Ltd.)
• 河北新海化工集團有限公司(Hebei Xinhai Chemical Group Co., Ltd.)
• 山東金誠石化集團有限公司(Shandong Jincheng Petrochemical Group Co., Ltd.)
• 恆力石化（大連）煉化有限公司(Hengli Petrochemical(Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd.)

因此，上述被指定茶壺煉油廠在美國境內、或由美國人士（U.S. persons）持有或控制的所有財產及財產權益均已被凍結（Blocked）。除非獲得豁免或授權，否則美國人士通常被禁止與這些被凍結的茶壺煉油廠進行交易。任何由被指定茶壺煉油廠直接或間接、單獨或合計持有50%或以上股份的實體，亦同樣被凍結。外國金融機構和其他非美國實體若參與涉及被指定茶壺煉油廠、或在伊朗石油部門運作之其他行為者的特定交易或活動，亦面臨受到美國制裁的風險。

據此，金融機構應採取措施，確保其未在協助涉及被指定茶壺煉油廠、或可能進口伊朗石油的其他茶壺煉油廠之交易，因為這可能使金融機構面臨制裁。鑑於與中國境內茶壺煉油廠（特別是山東省）的交易涉及伊朗原油的風險增高，美國和外國金融機構應仔細審核涉及這些煉油廠的任何交易。額外措施可能包括：

1. 向中國的代理行（Correspondent Banks）傳達關於制裁風險的預期要求；
2. 收集有關客戶和交易的額外資訊，包括相關合約及其他資料。

 

伊朗石油向「茶壺」煉油廠運輸的規避制裁手段

除了「茶壺」煉油廠外，OFAC鼓勵金融機構在與其他可能涉及伊朗對華石油供應鏈的亞洲及中東實體往來時，應進行加強盡職調查（Enhanced Due Diligence）。自《第2號國家安全總統備忘錄》（NSPM-2）發布以來，OFAC持續針對協助伊朗石油運往中國的個人、公司及船隻實施制裁，其中包括山東省的港口碼頭營運商，以及石油貨物檢驗與物流服務提供者，因其在購買或協助交付價值數十億美元的伊朗原油中扮演了重要角色。

伊朗利用位於亞洲及阿拉伯聯合大公國（UAE）的人頭公司（Front companies）來媒合貨運，並協助處理最終流向茶壺煉油廠的伊朗石油相關付款。例如，受制裁的伊朗軍方關聯企業「瑟皮爾能源公司」（Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company）曾與多家香港人頭公司合作，向中國交付多批伊朗原油並管理陸上倉儲。參與此類石油貿易的伊朗實體利用人頭公司的銀行帳戶來接收款項並獲取外匯。此外，這些人頭公司還與同謀的地方代理機構合作，進行船舶靠泊與卸貨作業，以及提供相關石油貨物的運輸與倉儲服務。伊朗還利用中間人（通常是亞洲公司，其聲稱的經營項目通常模糊且籠統）在伊朗賣方與茶壺煉油廠之間擔任經紀人。

此外，伊朗依靠「影子船隊」（Shadow fleet）向中國的茶壺煉油廠供應石油。這些船隻及其管理公司經常採取欺騙性航運手段，包括：

• 船對船轉運（Ship-to-ship transfers, STS）；
• 操縱船舶位置數據（AIS數據造假）；
• 混油偽裝：在某些情況下，伊朗石油會與第三國石油混合以進一步隱匿來源，或透過偽造文件將石油重新標註為其他管轄區的產品（最常見的是標註為「馬來西亞調和油」）。

受制裁的伊朗相關船隻還可能使用其他數據操縱技術來隱藏身分，例如冒用未受制裁船隻或已拆解報廢船隻（有時被稱為「殭屍船」）的身分資訊進行申報。

 

 

Sanctions Risk of Dealing with Teapot Oil Refineries

April 28, 2026

 

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is alerting financial institutions to the sanctions risks of dealing with independent oil refineries in China (known as “teapot” refineries), primarily in Shandong Province, given their continued key role in importing and refining Iranian crude oil, including throughout 2026. Since March 2025, OFAC designated multiple teapot refineries, which collectively have purchased and refined billions of dollars’ worth of Iranian oil.

On February 4, 2025, President Trump signed National Security Presidential Memorandum-2, reimposing maximum pressure on the Iranian regime and driving a whole-of-government approach to deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon and counter its malign influence. OFAC maintains comprehensive sanctions on Iran and will continue to target the regime’s main revenue-generating sectors, in particular its petroleum and petrochemical sectors, under Executive Order 13902 and other sanctions authorities.

China is the world’s largest purchaser of Iranian oil, currently acquiring around 90 percent of Iran’s total oil exports. Teapot refineries purchase the majority of that oil. These teapot refineries have used the U.S. financial system to conduct U.S. dollar-denominated transactions and to acquire U.S. technology and goods. Since the resumption of maximum pressure on Iran, OFAC designated five teapot refineries:

• Shandong Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical Co., Ltd.

• Shandong Shengxing Chemical Co., Ltd.

• Hebei Xinhai Chemical Group Co., Ltd.

• Shandong Jincheng Petrochemical Group Co. Ltd.

• Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd.

As a result, all property and interests in property of the designated teapot refineries that are in the United States or that are in possession or control of a U.S. person are blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with blocked teapot refineries unless exempt or authorized. Any entities owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by the designated teapot refineries are also blocked. Foreign financial institutions and other non-U.S. entities risk exposure to U.S. sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated teapot refineries or other actors operating in the Iranian petroleum sector.

Accordingly, financial institutions should take steps to ensure they are not facilitating transactions involving designated teapot refineries, or other teapot refineries that may be importing Iranian oil, because this may expose the financial institutions to sanctions. U.S. and foreign financial institutions should carefully review any transactions involving China-based teapot refineries, particularly in Shandong Province, given the heightened risk that transactions with these refineries could involve Iranian-origin oil. Additional steps may include (1) communicating expectations to correspondent banks in China about sanctions risks; and (2) gathering additional information on relevant customers and transactions, including related contracts and other information.

 

Sanctions Evasion Tactics for Iranian Oil Shipments to Teapot Refineries

OFAC encourages financial institutions to conduct enhanced due diligence when dealing with other Asia- and Middle East-based entities, beyond teapot oil refineries, that may be involved in Iran’s oil supply chain to China. Since the issuance of NSPM-2, OFAC has consistently targeted individuals, companies, and vessels involved in facilitating Iranian oil shipments to China, including port terminal operators in Shandong Province and oil cargo inspection and logistics services providers, for their role in purchasing or facilitating the delivery of billions of dollars’ worth of Iranian-origin oil.

Iran has used front companies in Asia and the United Arab Emirates to broker shipments of and facilitate payments related to Iranian-origin oil ultimately intended for teapot refineries. For example, designated Iranian military-affiliated company Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company worked with various Hong Kong-based front companies to deliver multiple shipments of Iranian-origin oil to China and to manage onshore storage of the oil. Iranian entities involved in this oil trade use front companies’ bank accounts to receive payment and access foreign currency. Further, these front companies have worked with complicit local agencies on vessel berthing and discharge operations, as well as transportation and storage services for such Iranian-origin oil cargoes. Iran has also used middlemen—typically Asiabased companies with generic or non-descript stated business purposes—to act as brokers between the Iranian sellers and teapot refineries.

Additionally, Iran relies on a “shadow fleet” of tankers to supply its oil to teapot refineries in China. These vessels and their management companies regularly engage in deceptive shipping practices, including ship-to-ship transfers and vessel location data manipulation. In some instances, Iranian oil is blended with oil from third countries to further disguise its origins, or forged documents will relabel the oil as the product of another jurisdiction, most commonly as “Malaysian blend.” Sanctioned Iran-related vessels may also engage in other data manipulation techniques to mask their identities, such as reporting identifying information for non-sanctioned vessels or scrapped vessels that are no longer in operation, sometimes referred to as “zombie vessels.”