當戰爭早已開始：軍事威懾與制度滲透的雙軌布局 When the War Has Already Begun: A Dual-Track Strategy of Military Deterrence and Institutional Penetration

【雙魚之論】
The article argues that the intense actions observed at the outset of the PLA exercises late last year were not accidental “misfires,” but rather what the author describes as a deliberately designed “tactical prelude.” In other words, these were not the result of misjudgment at lower levels, but intentional directives from the top—“the order from above was precisely to create sparks.”

This raises an immediate question: if such an order indeed came from above, why did it ultimately fail to produce the anticipated “sparks”? The author speculates that this may have been related to Zhang Youxia’s failure to fully cooperate, further extending the inference to suggest that Zhang may have been placed under control or even detained. At present, however, this line of reasoning remains unverified and should be regarded as conjectural.
Conventional military assessments generally hold that the periods from April to late June and from mid-September to mid-October are the most favorable windows for the PLA to launch large-scale military operations against Taiwan, primarily due to considerations of weather, sea conditions, and logistical support. Against this backdrop, the high-intensity, ad hoc exercises conducted in late December 2025 can be interpreted as an attempt to break through these “seasonal constraints”—signaling that even under the most adverse climatic conditions, Xi Jinping might still retain the option of ordering military action against Taiwan.
That said, the author’s analysis focuses primarily on the conventional military dimension, pointing to the conclusion that “war may not be far off, and preparations must be intensified.” However, once the perspective is expanded to include non-traditional forms of warfare, the situation becomes more complex. If infiltration forces have indeed entered key nodes within Taiwan’s political system and are exerting a paralyzing effect on governmental operations at the institutional level—for example, through the actions of certain legislators within the parliamentary framework—then it could be argued that the CCP’s new-type warfare against Taiwan has already been underway for at least two years and has achieved a measurable degree of effectiveness.
Within this framework, the primary battlefield is no longer confined to the median line of the Taiwan Strait or to live-fire exercise zones. Instead, it has shifted to arenas such as Taiwan’s arms procurement programs, special defense budgets, and the deliberation and execution of the central government’s annual budget. In other words, the battlefield has moved from the traditional military domain to the realm of institutional and decision-making contestation.

本文指出，去年底解放軍軍演初期所出現的激烈行為，並非偶發性的「擦槍走火」，而是一種作者所指經過設計的「戰術開場白」。換言之，並非基層誤判，而是來自高層的刻意指令——「上面給的命令，就是要產生火花」。
然而，問題隨之而來：若確有「上面的命令」，為何最終並未如預期般真正「產生火花」？作者據此推論，可能與張又俠未全力配合有關，進而引申出張又俠遭到控制或被捕的說法。此一推論目前尚無法獲得證實，仍屬推測層次。
傳統軍事判斷普遍認為，每年「4月至6月下旬」以及「9月中旬至10月中旬」較適合解放軍對台發動大規模軍事行動，主要基於氣候、海象與後勤條件等因素。因此，2025年12月底所進行的臨時性高強度演習，可被解讀為刻意突破上述「季節性障礙」——即便在最惡劣的氣候條件下，習近平仍可能下令對台動武。
不過，作者的分析主要集中於傳統軍事面向，結論指向「戰爭不遠，應積極備戰」。若將視角擴展至非傳統作戰領域，情勢則更為複雜。倘若所謂滲透力量已進入台灣政治運作的關鍵節點，甚至在制度層面對政府運作產生癱瘓效果——例如透過部分立法委員在國會體系內的運作——那麼可以說，中共對台的新型態戰爭其實早已開打，且持續至少兩年，並取得相當程度的效果。
在此框架下，當前的主要戰場不再僅限於海峽中線或實兵演訓區域，而是集中於台灣的軍購案、國防特別預算，以及中央政府年度總預算的審議與執行層面。換言之，戰場已從傳統軍事空間，轉移至制度與決策層面的博弈。

原來，我們離戰爭這麼近    James Jseng FB 20260211

隨著《金融時報》對於去年年底中共軍演中一些細節的披露，我們才知道，從演習的第一天開始，12月29日，我們的空軍就已經跟中共軍機有過激烈的交手，當時，為了社會的安定，國軍選擇保持沉默，直到如今，我們才知道，戰爭，早就已經與我們擦身而過。

就在中共突襲式的宣布演習後，12月29日清晨，東部戰區的海空域，共機很快就出現了高度危險性的行為。

當天中共殲-16戰機不僅越過中線，更與台灣F-16發生近距離對峙，甚至出現發射熱焰彈以及採取「豬背式」（Piggybacking）戰術等危險動作，這一些動作，都更加接近「實戰化」，也更加具有挑釁的意味。

所謂的「豬背式」欺敵（Piggybacking）戰術，意思是中共多架殲-16戰機採取緊貼在轟-6K 轟炸機腹部的隱蔽編隊，利用大飛機的雷達截面積掩護，試圖欺騙我方跟美日的雷達系統，模擬「大規模隱蔽滲透」的作戰方式，在雷達上看起來只有一個點，等我攔截機到達時，機腹下的兩架戰鬥機再竄出，主打一個攻其不備。

而當殲-16 脫離掩護，與我方 F-16 發生近距離對峙的時候，共機還採取了「佔據開火位」，側飛露出所攜帶飛彈的挑釁動作，甚至還發射熱焰彈，這些在軍事上都是極為嚴重的攻擊訊號，意在展示他是處於隨時可開火的戰備狀態，測試我方的交戰規則，也就是說，在同一天，他們的海空軍都有備而來，而且這一次不只是來繞台、對峙而已，上面給的命令，就是要產生火花。

面對這樣的態勢提升，在情報分享之後，美軍也隨即出動 RC-135 電偵機破解電子干擾，日本自衛隊同時密集升空攔截，美日台三方的即時情資共享，在這次危機中起到了關鍵的威懾作用，讓中共知道我方是早有準備，所謂的共同防線，並非只是一句空話而已。

12 月 29 日的這起挑釁並非孤立事件，它是整場軍演的「戰術開場白」，空軍的欺敵滲透，海軍的越界挑戰，再加上火箭彈的實彈操演，中共的海陸空兵力不斷在測試我們的預警極限，進行準衝突邊緣的武力恫嚇。

這一些，已經不再只是政治喊話，而是紮紮實實的軍事角力，甚至，這樣的衝突可能還讓中共高層覺得不夠滿意，導致了後來張又俠被捕的衝突，如果真的是這樣，那麼，下一次，就再也沒有人能夠拒絕，扛得住壓力，而台海的衝突，恐怕也就來到了臨界線，唯一的問題就只剩下一個，那就是，到底誰會先一個不小心，扣下了扳機？