美國擬在日本建新軍事機構以更密切協調行動 法廣 20230805

【雙魚之論】英文拷到 G / D 找中文翻譯
The new permanent joint headquarters of Japan is expected to launch in March 2025. What does that mean?

美國擬在日本建新軍事機構以更密切協調行動    法廣 20230805

美國考慮在日本部署新軍事機構，以加強與日本自衛隊協調行動，因為台灣突發事件需要迅速的集體反應。

日經亞洲8月5日報道，美國參議院於七月底批准的《2024 年國防授權法案》（NDAA）--美國的軍事預算案--包括要求國防部研究修改美國在日本的指揮結構的措辭。

目標是找到協調美國在日本所有軍事行動的方法，促進與東京的綜合軍事規畫，並採取行動配合日本建立新的聯合總部。

考慮到台灣危機，眾議院軍事委員會副主席羅布-威特曼（Rob Wittman）表示支持參議院的條款，並指出眾議院將在預算談判中討論這一問題。

「日經亞洲」報導，美國參議院於7月下旬通過2024財政年度國防授權法案（National Defense Authorization Act，NDAA），提供美國國防部總額達8860億美元預算，其中包括要求國防部考慮調整美國在日本的指揮結構。

弗吉尼亞州共和黨人威特曼先生接受《日經新聞》採訪時說："在高度競爭的環境中，在非常困難的條件下，[與日本進行雙邊行動協調]的時間越多，有時就意味着可以決定勝負"。

美國參眾兩院將於秋季舉行會議，起草2024年《國防授權法案》的最終文本。預計日本的指揮結構將是參眾兩院需要解決的問題之一。

與此同時，喬-拜登總統的政府也開始就駐日美軍的結構改革進行初步討論。

日經亞洲說，隨着日本實施二戰以來最大規模的國防改革，美日之間長期以來明確的角色分工--即所謂的"劍盾關係"正在消失。在這種關係下，人們通常認為美國將負責進攻行動，而日本只扮演防禦角色。

日本正在獲取戰斧巡航導彈等遠程打擊能力，並表示更願意參與保衛台灣的軍事行動。日本還在努力推進包括太空和網絡在內的所有領域防禦能力的發展。

總部位於華盛頓的戰略與國際問題研究中心（CSIS）日本問題主任克里斯托弗-約翰斯頓（Christopher Johnstone）說，美國需要在日本設立聯合指揮機構，以避免行動重疊，並在緊急情況下迅速採取聯合行動。

該報說，駐日美軍總部並不負責監督在日本的聯合行動。相反，總部設在夏威夷的印太司令部發揮着與各軍種和日本自衛隊協調的作用。

在2011年，美軍在東京成立了一支由太平洋艦隊司令領導的聯合支援部隊，以應對福島大地震和核事故。該部隊負責協調駐日各軍種的日常行動，並就聯合應對措施與日本政府進行磋商。

總部設在華盛頓的美國笹川和平基金會（Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA）高級主管詹姆斯-肖夫（James Schoff）說，福島事件表明，美國目前的指揮結構並不適合促進與日本的行動協調。

蘭德公司（RAND Corporation）高級政治學家傑弗里-霍農（Jeffrey Hornung）提出東京和夏威夷之間遠程協調的風險，指出，因為中國可能通過對通信基礎設施的網絡攻擊破壞通信。

五角大樓拒絕就日本未來的指揮結構發表評論，但國防部長勞埃德-奧斯汀此前承認美軍有必要加強行動協調。

奧斯汀今年 5 月對《日經新聞》說："我們目前沒有改變（美軍）作戰指揮結構或權力的計畫，但我們將繼續探索更有效的指揮控制關係，以加強與日本的互操作性和反應能力。

奧斯汀還重申，他的部門"支持"日本建立永久性聯合總部的決定，並表示東京期待已久的組織改革將有助於深化雙邊協調。

 

U.S. weighs new military element in Japan for closer coordination    Nikkei Asia 20230804

Japan's bold defense reform, Taiwan crisis require enhanced operational arrangement

WASHINGTON -- The U.S. is weighing deploying new military elements in Japan to better coordinate operations with the Japan Self-Defense Forces, as a Taiwan contingency would necessitate a swift collective response.

The 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) -- the country's military budget -- approved by the Senate in late July includes language requiring the Department of Defense to look into modifying the U.S. command structure in Japan.

The objective is to find ways to coordinate all U.S. military operations in Japan, facilitate integrated military planning with Tokyo and take actions to complement Japan's establishment of new joint headquarters.

With a Taiwan crisis in mind, House Armed Services Committee Vice Chairman Rob Wittman voiced support for the Senate's provision and noted that the House will take it up in budget negotiations.

"More time [for bilateral operational coordination with Japan] in a highly contested environment, under very strenuous conditions, sometimes can be the difference between victory and defeat," Wittman, Republican of Virginia, said in an interview with Nikkei.

He stressed: "I think we should always look at: 'Is this the most effective way to manage our force? Is this the most effective way to manage coordination between Japanese forces and U.S. forces?' Especially in relation to how the two command structures mesh with each other."

The Senate and House will hold a conference to draft a final text of the 2024 NDAA in the fall. The command structure in Japan is expected to be one of the issues both chambers need to address.

Concurrently, President Joe Biden's administration has begun initial discussions on structural reform of U.S. forces in Japan, people familiar with the matter told Nikkei.

As Japan implements its biggest defense reforms since World War II, the long-standing clear division of roles between the U.S. and Japan -- known as the "sword and shield relationship" -- is disappearing. Under that relationship, it has typically been assumed that the U.S. would handle offensive operations, while Japan would only play a defensive role.

Japan is acquiring such long-range strike capabilities as the Tomahawk cruise missile, and has indicated that it is more willing to get involved in military operations in defense of Taiwan. It is also working to advance the development of defensive capabilities in all domains, including space and cyber.

Christopher Johnstone, Japan chair at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the U.S. needed joint command elements in Japan to avoid overlap in operations and to take swift joint action in a contingency.

"In the early days of alliance, there was no expectation that Japan would play a significant military role of any kind," Johnstone told Nikkei.

"Given where Japan is headed as a defense partner, and in particular given the kinds of defense-related missions Japan is now preparing to take on, we need a much closer arrangement," he said.

The headquarters of U.S. Forces Japan is not intended to oversee joint operations in Japan. Instead, the Indo-Pacific Command headquartered in Hawaii plays a role in coordinating with each service and with the Japan Self-Defense Forces.

In 2011, however, the U.S. military established a Joint Support Force in Tokyo led by the commander of the Pacific Fleet to respond to the major earthquake and nuclear accident in Fukushima. It coordinated day-to-day operations among the services in Japan, consulting with the Japanese government on joint responses.

The Fukushima experience demonstrated that the structure of the current U.S. command was not well-suited to facilitating operational coordination with Japan, said James Schoff, a senior director at the Washington-based Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA.

Without U.S. standing joint elements in Japan, Schoff stressed that "valuable time could be lost when responding to a crisis, and it will take a while for all participants to get up to speed." Having joint elements should enhance deterrence overall, because the level of alliance readiness would be higher, but without some kind of threatening buildup of military forces in advance," he added.

Jeffrey Hornung, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, raised the risks around remote coordination between Tokyo and Hawaii, given that China could disrupt communications by cyberattacks on communication infrastructure.

"We can't assume that every order coming out of [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] is going to be transmitted a hundred percent, because the satellites could go down from a cyberattack," Hornung said. "Any number of things could happen."

The Pentagon declined to comment on the future command structure in Japan, but Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin previously recognized the necessity for the U.S. military to enhance operational coordination.

"We do not currently have plans to change our combatant command structure or authorities [within the U.S. military], but we will continue to explore more effective command-and-control relationships to enhance interoperability and responsiveness" with Japan, Austin told Nikkei in May.

Austin also reiterated that his department "supports" Japan's decision to establish a permanent joint headquarters, suggesting that Tokyo's long-awaited organizational reform could contribute to deepening bilateral coordination.

Expected to launch by March 2025, the new headquarters will oversee operations of all three branches of the Japan Self-Defense Forces.