包子看不懂也枉然 Understanding from the Rival's Perspective is Crucial

【雙魚之論】英文拷到 G / D 找中文翻譯
Rear Adm. Jeffrey Jablon, the commander of the Submarine Force in the US Pacific Fleet (SUBPAC), stated: "If the adversary doesn't know anything about that specific deterrent, it's not a deterrent."
This is because the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is a regime that only values hard power, and sometimes even coercive power. It tends to view soft power or polite and indirect expressions as signs of weakness or fear.
That's why in recent years, the United States has aimed to publicize its military cooperation with other countries, especially with Taiwan, in a manner that is more open and transparent than before.
Whatever actions the United States has taken in the past or is currently taking, its intention is not to provoke a war with China. On the contrary, the United States will do everything it can, without fear, to prevent a war.
This information needs to be conveyed in a way that is understandable to Chinese leaders.

美國太平洋艦隊（SUBPAC）潛艇部隊指揮官傑佛瑞·賈布隆少將表示：“如果對手對那種特定的威懾一無所知，它就不會起到威懾作用。”
這是因為中國共產黨（CCP）是一個只認識硬實力，甚至是銳利實力的政權。它傾向將軟實力或禮貌、間接的表達視為卑下或恐懼的象徵。
因此，近年來美國尋求公開其與其他國家的軍事合作，尤其是與台灣的合作，不再保持低調。

無論美國過去或現在所做的事情，其目的並不是與中國開戰。相反，美國將盡一切可能無畏地避免戰爭。
而這個訊息，要以中國看得懂方式傳達給中共領導人。

〈無聲服務不再？太平洋潛艇艦隊是太平洋威懾的關鍵部分〉The Silent Service no more? Pacific submarine fleet a key part of Pacific deterrence    Defense News 20230512 / Taimocracy摘譯

This is the latest in a series of regular columns by Robbin Laird, where he will tackle current defense issues through the lens of more than 45 years of defense expertise in both the US and abroad. The goal of these columns: to look back at how questions and perspectives of the past should inform decisions being made today.

I have just returned from a five week visit to Australia and to Hawaii. During that visit, I had the chance to talk with US and Australian officers about the challenge of deterring the Chinese in the Pacific —not forgetting the other two nations threatening Western interests, namely the Russians and the North Koreans.

The salience of submarines to Australian deterrence and their contribution to allied deterrence was evident with the AUKUS announcement of the Australian government’s decision to acquire nuclear submarines to replace their aging diesel Collins-Class submarines.

In a presentation to the Williams Foundation, Vice Admiral Mead, the key ADF officer involved in working the submarine program with the United States and the United Kingdom, emphasized that his Navy had not done as good of a job explaining the impact of the submarine decision on Australia’s deterrence capabilities as they needed to do.

When I got to Hawaii, I had a chance to meet with Rear Adm. Jeffrey Jablon, the Submarine Force, US Pacific Fleet (SUBPAC) commander who provided a robust discussion of the role of submarines in the evolving deterrent approach of the United States and its allies in the Pacific.

As he put it: “I would no longer characterize ourselves as a silent service. Deterrence is a major mission for the submarine force. You can’t have a credible deterrent without communicating your capabilities; if the adversary doesn’t know anything about that specific deterrent, it’s not a deterrent.” （我不再將自己描述為無聲的服務。威懾是潛艇部隊的一項主要任務。如果不傳達您的能力，就無法獲得可信的威懾力；如果對手對這種特定的威懾一無所知，它就不是一種威懾。）

To illustrate the importance of communicating these capabilities, Jablon told me that as we spoke, there were 18 submarines underway in the Pacific Ocean. Of these, seven were operating west of the international dateline.

It’s not hard to see ways in which the service is trying to create deterrence through signaling.

In recent years the Navy has begun demonstrating visibly its presence in various ways, such as SSBN port visits. At the same time as my visit to Pearl Harbor, the Navy had released photos of the ballistic missile submarine USS Maine (SSBN 741) visiting Guam, and a joint meeting of the leaders of the US and South Korea came with the announcement of future submarine port visits to the ROK Port visits and pursuing diverse locations from which to resupply the force are increasingly important, especially in times of conflict.

In addition, the Navy is stepping up its cooperation with allied and partner submarine forces, as illustrated by Jablon recently hosting the Submarine Warfare Commanders Conference. This was a core meeting with other submarine commanders from Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Australia, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom. As he underscored: “During the conference, the submarine force commanders discussed the coalition approach to interoperability, which is a key part of deterrence.”（在會議期間，潛艇部隊指揮官討論了聯盟的互操作性方法，這是威懾的關鍵部分。）

Jablon underscored that they were stepping up exercises with allies in common ASW and USW operations. For example, he mentioned a recent exercise with South Korea and Japan in working joint capabilities. It’s another example of how Chinese actions in the region are driving countries together in the Pacific and providing new opportunities for the US Navy to work with those allies.（他提到了最近與韓國和日本在聯合能力方面的演習。這是中國在該地區的行動如何推動太平洋地區各國團結起來併為美國海軍與這些盟國合作提供新機會的另一個例子。）

Of course, there is the less-public — and more pointy — end of the deterrent stick. There are a number of ongoing developments that need to be highlighted to understand exactly how the US views its submarine force and its evolution. It must be understood that the submarine force can operate separately or work with the joint force to provide joint force solutions. （需要強調一下，以準確瞭解美國如何看待其潛艇部隊及其演變。必須理解，潛艇部隊可以單獨行動，也可以與跨軍種合作提供解決方案。）As the joint force works enhanced kill web capabilities, what Ed Timperlake and I have previously defined as ”combat clusters” can operate together to deliver joint fires or, in other words, very different types of platforms can come together to create a joint effect.（「戰鬥集群」可以一起行動以提供跨軍種火力，或者換句話說，非常不同類型的平台可以組合在一起以產生跨軍種效果。）

In addition, the submarine force is adding autonomous systems capabilities. Jablon specifically mentioned two. The first is the ability to operate a UUV out of a torpedo tube, with the UUV coming back after its mission to offload data specifically onboard the submarine. The second is the ability to launch a UAV from a submerged submarine to enable joint fires. He said that the submarine force has specifically worked with the USMC in their development of the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) solution set.（潛艇部隊正在增加自主系統能力。賈布隆特別提到了兩個。首先是能夠從魚雷發射管中操作UUV，UUV在執行任務後返回，專門卸載潛艇上的數據。第二個是從水下潛艇發射無人機以實現跨軍種射擊的能力。他說，潛艇部隊特別擅長與美國海軍陸戰隊合作開發遠征先進基地作戰（EABO）解決方案組。）

Finally, the joint force, including the submarine force, are developing new ways to do expeditionary logistics to enable resupply of the force when operating in a contested environment. For food or critical parts, an Osprey has been tested to provide vertical replenishment. For weapons, the submarine tenders have been working to resupply submarines who operate from various bases in the region to conduct the rearm mission. Obviously, the command element would work submarine operations in such a way that a cascading approach to weapons resupply would be worked in times of conflict.（最後，包括潛艇部隊在內的跨軍種部隊正在開發進行遠征後勤的新方法，以便在有爭議的環境中作戰時能夠為部隊提供補給。對於食物或關鍵部件，魚鷹已經過測試，可提供垂直補給。在武器方面，潛艇聯絡船一直在努力為從該地區各個基地行動的潛艇提供補給，以執行重新武裝任務。顯然，指揮單位將以這樣一種方式進行潛艇行動，以便在衝突時期採用多重的武器補給方法。）

As Jablon concluded, “The submarine force is now becoming part of the ‘combat clusters’ that you’re talking about instead of an independent operator. In the Cold War, we operated independently, alone, and unafraid. During the land wars, we started becoming part of the joint force as we provided land fires via the TLAM. Now, we are fully integrated with the joint force in terms of targeting and communications. But, of course, we can also conduct independent operations as the ‘silent service’ when directed.”（ 潛艇部隊現在正在成為您正在談論的「戰鬥集群」的一部分，而不是獨立的操作員。在冷戰時期，我們獨立、孤軍奮戰、無所畏懼。在陸戰期間，我們開始成為聯合部隊的一部分，因為我們通過TLAM提供陸地火力。現在，我們在瞄準和通信方面與聯合部隊完全融合。但是，當然，我們也可以根據指示作為「無聲服務」進行獨立操作。）

So, a less silent service — but one that still recalls its core function