避免長期戰爭的構想 RAND報告的結論 Taimocracy翻譯

【縛雞之論】英文拷到 G / D 找中文翻譯
Although the RAND report “Avoiding a Long War--U.S. Policy and the Trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict” raises the thinking and the options other than the military to serve U.S. interests in a reasonable frame of time, it understands in the present hot war stage that all the members are not easy to face a sudden change of policy other than military perspective.
However, war is born to serve the related political purpose and interests that start it. The Russia-Ukraine war will eventually face its destiny: ending by negotiation.

The RAND report is critical to Taiwan -- we are now concerning issues of when and how the Chinese invasion of Taiwan happened, but how it ended is equally significant.
To shift the dynamics of the policy environment, the report presents four options to the U.S. -- clarifying its plans for future support to Ukraine, committing to Ukraine's security, ensuring the country's neutrality, and setting conditions for sanctions relief for Russia.
We may see similar options in the future around Taiwan.

Avoiding a Long War--U.S. Policy and the Trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict  避免長期戰爭——美國政策與俄烏衝突的軌跡   Samuel Charap, Miranda Priebe＠RAND 20230123

https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA2510-1.html

Conclusion  結論

The debate in Washington and other Western capitals over the future of the Russia-Ukraine war privileges the issue of territorial control. Hawkish voices argue for using increased military assistance to facilitate the Ukrainian military’s reconquest of the entirety of the country’s territory.  華盛頓和其他西方國家首都就俄烏戰爭的未來展開辯論，特別關注領土控制問題。鷹派聲音主張使用更多的軍事援助來促進烏克蘭軍隊重新征服該國的全部領土。

 

Their opponents urge the United States to adopt the pre-February 2022 line of control as the objective, citing the escalation risks of pushing further.  其反對者敦促美國以 2022 年 2 月之前的控制線為目標，理由是進一步推進有升級風險。

 

Secretary of State Antony Blinken has stated that the goal of U.S. policy is to

enable Ukraine “to take back territory that’s been seized from it since February 24.”  國務卿安東尼·布林肯表示，美國政策的目標是使烏克蘭能夠“收回自 2 月 24 日以來從其手中奪取的領土”。

 

Our analysis suggests that this debate is too narrowly focused on one dimension of the war’s trajectory. Territorial control, although immensely important to Ukraine, is not the most important dimension of the war’s future for the United States. We conclude that, in addition to averting possible escalation to a Russia-NATO war or Russian nuclear use, avoiding a long war is also a higher priority for the United States than facilitating significantly more Ukrainian territorial control. Furthermore, the U.S. ability to micromanage where the line is ultimately drawn is highly constrained since the U.S. military is not directly involved in the fighting. Enabling Ukraine’s territorial control is also far from the only instrument available to the United States to affect the trajectory of the war. We have highlighted several other tools—potentially more potent ones—that Washing-ton can use to steer the war toward a trajectory that better promotes U.S. interests. Whereas the United States cannot determine the territorial outcome of the war directly, it will have direct control over these policies. President Biden has said that this war will end at the negotiating table.  我們的分析表明，這場辯論過於狹隘地集中在戰爭軌跡面向上。領土控制雖然對烏克蘭極其重要，但對美國來說並不是戰爭未來最重要的面向。我們得出的結論是，除了避免可能升級為俄羅斯-北約戰爭或俄羅斯使用核武器之外，避免長期戰爭對美國來說也是一個比促進烏克蘭領土控制更優先的事項。此外，美國在最終劃定的界線進行微觀管理的能力受到高度限制，因為美軍沒有直接參與戰鬥。使烏克蘭能夠控制領土，也遠非美國可以用來影響戰爭軌跡面向的唯一手段。我們強調了華盛頓可以用來將戰爭引向更好地促進美國利益的軌道的其他幾種工具——可能更有效的工具。儘管美國無法直接決定戰爭的領土結果，但它可以直接控制這些政策。拜登總統曾表示，這場戰爭將在談判桌上結束。

 

But the administration has not yet made any moves to push the parties toward talks. Although it is far from certain that a change in U.S. policy can spark negotiations, adopting one or more of the policies described in this Perspective could make talks more likely. We identify reasons why Russia and Ukraine may have mutual optimism about war and pessimism about peace. The literature on war termination suggests that such perceptions can lead to protracted conflict. Therefore, we highlight four options the United States has for shifting these dynamics: clarifying its plans for future support to Ukraine, making commitments to Ukraine’s security, issuing assurances regarding the country’s neutrality, and setting conditions for sanctions relief for Russia.  但政府尚未採取任何行動推動各方進行談判。雖然遠不能確定美國政策的改變是否會引發談判，但採用本「觀點」中描述的一項或多項政策可能會增加談判的可能性。我們確定了俄羅斯和烏克蘭可能對戰爭持樂觀態度而對和平持悲觀態度的原因。關於終止戰爭的文獻表明，這種看法會導致曠日持久的衝突。因此，我們強調美國有四種選擇來改變這些動態：闡明其未來支持烏克蘭的計劃，對烏克蘭的安全做出承諾，就該國的中立作出保證，以及為俄羅斯解除制裁設定條件。

 

A dramatic, overnight shift in U.S. policy is politically impossible—both domestically and with allies—and would be unwise in any case. But developing these instruments now and socializing them with Ukraine and with U.S. allies might help catalyze the eventual start of a process that could bring this war to a negotiated end in a time frame that would serve U.S. interests. The alternative is a long war that poses major challenges for the United States, Ukraine, and the rest of the world.  美國政策在一夜之間發生戲劇性的轉變在政治上是不可能的——無論是在國內還是與盟國——而且在任何情況下都是不明智的。但是現在開發這些工具並將它們與烏克蘭和美國盟友聯繫起來可能有助於促進最終啟動一個進程，該進程可以在符合美國利益的時間框架內通過談判結束這場戰爭。另一種選擇是一場對美國、烏克蘭和世界其他國家構成重大挑戰的長期戰爭。