【縛雞之論】
今天報章再度出現楊西崑「中華台灣民國」的提議，文章作者王景弘整理了重點，但最重要的缺失是未附原始出處與時間。本部落格在許文堂教授提點下找到原文，並予以翻譯以饗讀者。感謝許文堂教授校正。
〈理想與幻滅：中華民國外交史的 1960 年代〉(軟精裝)
174. Telegram From the Embassy in the
Republic of China to the Department of State1 美國駐中華民國大使館致電國務院 Taimocracy 翻譯
Taipei,
November 30, 1971, 1130Z. 1971.11.30全球標準時間1130台北
5869. Eyes
Only for the Secretary and Assistant Secretary Green. Subj: Conversation of
Vice Foreign Minister Yang Hsi-kun With Ambassador.2 給國務卿（羅吉斯）和主管東亞事務的國務助卿（格林）（限閱）。副標題：外交部副部長楊西崑與大使（馬康衛）的對話。
1.
Following is an account of an important presentation which Foreign Vice Minister Yang Hsi-kun made to me end of last week at a tête-à-tête luncheon. Its extremely sensitive nature will be self-evident. I feel any additional distribution should be severely restricted but undoubtedly White House should be aware of it. I hope that Green will be in a position to discuss it with me preliminarily when I see him in Honolulu next week. 以下是外交部次長楊西崑在上週末的私密午餐上向我介紹的一個重要情況。其極其敏感的性質將是不言而喻的。我覺得應該嚴格限制本文件任何額外的分送，但毫無疑問，白宮應該要知道。我希望下周我在檀香山見到Green時，他能與我初步討論此事。
2.
H.K. Yang
launched almost immediately into discussion of critical situation facing GRC following October 25 expulsion from UN. He
recalled he had told President Chiang last winter that withdrawal from UN would
mean “eventual political suicide” for GRC. Expulsion amounted to about the same
thing as withdrawal, and he feared that the increasing isolation that the
Chinese Communists can force on the GRC from their improved position within the
UN will mean the rapidly increasing besiegement and eventual strangulation of
the GRC unless drastic change is undertaken immediately. 楊西崑幾乎立即開始討論中華民國政府（GRC）在去年10月25日被逐出聯合國後面臨的嚴峻形勢。他回顧說，去年冬天他曾告訴蔣總統，退出聯合國對GRC來說意味著「最終的政治自殺」。驅逐相當於退出，他擔心中國共產黨在聯合國內的地位提高後，可以迫使GRC越來越孤立，這意味著除非立即進行大的變革，GRC將被迅速圍困，最終被扼殺。
3.
Yang
continued that he has spoken very privately and frankly to President Chiang
since his recent return after the UN debacle. Yang
had found President Chiang impressively open-minded and willing to listen.
Yang said he had spelled out the full depth of his misgivings and had indicated
in a general way the sweeping nature of the changes which he felt would be
mandatory if not only the GRC but the future of the people
on Taiwan is to be preserved. He characterized the [Page 600]President
as not necessarily concurring in any proposed changes but as showing a profound
awareness of the
existing realities and dangers and a willingness to examine the case for
far-reaching changes in the existing structure.
楊繼續說，自從蔣總統在聯合國失敗後最近回來後，他已經與蔣總統進行了非常私下和坦誠的交談。楊發現蔣總統思想開放，願意傾聽，令人印象深刻。他說自己已經鉅細靡遺闡明所有疑慮，並籠統地指出了變局的顛覆性質，他認為如果不僅要維護GRC，而且要維護台灣人民的未來，就必須進行這種改革。（第600頁）他認為總統不一定同意任何擬議的變革，但卻表現深刻認識既存的現實和危險，並願意研究對現有結構進行深遠變革的理由。
4.
Yang said
he had told the President that it is of paramount importance to issue in the
near future a formal declaration to the world that the government on Taiwan is entirely separate and apart from the government on the
Mainland and that henceforth the government here will “have nothing to do with the Mainland.” The
declaration should prescribe a new designation for the government here, namely “the Chinese
Republic of Taiwan.” It would be stipulated that the term Chinese did not have any political connotation but was
used merely as a generic term stemming from the
Chinese ethnic origin of the populace on Taiwan. It would be used in a
way similar to the manner in which the various Arab countries use “Arab” in
their official governmental titles. 楊說，他已經告訴總統，最重要的是在不久的將來向世界發佈一個正式聲明，即台灣政府完全分離於大陸政府，今後這裡的政府將「與大陸沒有任何關係」。該宣言應該為這裡的政府規定一個新的名稱，即「中華民國台灣」。明訂「中華」一詞沒有任何政治含義，而只是作為一個源於中國的民族的台灣住民通用術語。它的使用方式類似於各阿拉伯國家在其官方政府名稱中使用「阿拉伯」的方式。
5.
Yang said
that most of the President’s top advisers around the President see the need for some sort of sweeping move to counter
the ChiCom drive to isolate the GRC
internationally and force general recognition of ChiCom right to take over
Taiwan as an integral part of China. It does not mean they necessarily endorse
his formula but they are showing some resilience in the face of the crisis and
are open to persuasion. 楊說，總統身邊的大多數高階顧問都認為有必要採取某種徹底的行動來抗衡中共在國際上孤立GRC，並迫使人們普遍承認中共有接管台灣作為中國的一個組成部分的權利。這並不意味著他們一定贊同楊的方案，但他們在面對危機時表現出一定的韌性，並願意接受勸說。
6.
He said
that the principal negative, stand-pat influence was exerted by Mme. Chiang who
seems determined not to budge an inch from the old claims, pretensions and
“return to the Mainland” slogans. He believes she still wields considerable
influence on the President. He said she in turn is greatly influenced by her
nephew, K.L. Kung, the son of Mme. Chiang’s elder sister and her deceased
husband H.H. Kung. He said K.L. Kung from the security of his New York
residence is waging a reactionary campaign for the GRC to stand absolutely
rigid. He termed K.L. Kung’s influence extremely malign. He said that K.L. Kung
is very vocal in various influential quarters. Yang said that he had refused to
see K.L. Kung on his trips to New York in recent years despite various requests
from Kung. Yang spoke contemptuously of the Soong–Kung family group as
fanatically advocating a die-hard line, although he said most of them were among the first to retreat to safety
when the Communists moved. 他說，主要的負面、不改變的影響來自蔣夫人，她似乎決心堅守舊的主張、自命正統和相信「反攻大陸」口號。楊認為她對總統仍有相當大的影響力。他說，她又受到其甥孔令侃的影響，他是蔣夫人的姐姐和已故孔祥熙的兒子。孔令侃在紐約的安全住所裡，正在發動一場反動活動，企圖讓GRC的立場絕對僵化。楊描述孔令侃的影響極為惡意。他說孔令侃在各個有影響力的地方很有發言權。楊說，儘管孔令侃提出各種要求，但他近年來在前往紐約時都拒見孔令侃。楊氏輕蔑地談到宋慶齡家族集團，認為他們狂熱地鼓吹死硬路線，儘管他說他們中的大多數人在共產黨行動時是第一批撤退到安全地帶的。
7.
Yang said
that when Chang Chun was in Japan last summer, he had a very significant talk
with Prime Minister Sato and ex-Prime Minister Kishi. After that talk Sato and
Kishi transmitted a closely-guarded message to President Chiang through Chang
Chun to the effect that the only hope for the future of the Republic of China
was to adopt a course of separation, giving up all Mainland claims and
pretensions. 楊說，去年夏天張群在日本時，與佐藤首相和前首相岸信介進行了一次非常重要的會談。會談後，佐藤和岸通過張群向蔣總統轉達了一個絕對機密的訊息，大意是中華民國未來的唯一希望是採取分離路線，放棄所有對大陸的要求和主張。
[Page 601]（第601頁）
The message
strongly urged President Chiang to adopt such a course. He felt sure that CCK knew of the message but he believed that
neither Vice President C.K. Yen nor Foreign Minister S.K. Chow knew about
it. 該訊息強烈敦促蔣總統採取這種做法。他覺得蔣經國肯定知道這個電文，但他相信副總統嚴家淦和外交部長周書楷都不知道。
8.
Yang said
that in his view the President in making the sort of declaration described
should concurrently, or very soon thereafter, use
his emergency powers to set aside the Constitution and dissolve all of the
parliamentary type bodies. He should then set up a new unicameral provisional representative body to be
composed of two-thirds Taiwanese and one-third Mainlanders. A new cabinet
should be formed with some Taiwanese and some younger men included. He said a
new image needed to be created with the government freed of the outworn
trappings, encumbrances and shibboleths of the party and the establishment. He
said the emergency decree of the President
should provide for an island-wide referendum
with universal suffrage to determine the future status of Taiwan and provide
for a constituent body. Yang indicated
further that he felt that the President might do well to make these fundamental
moves next spring just before the end of his current term, and then move up to
an emeritus position as head of the reformed party and revered elder statesman
(somewhat parallel to Mao’s position), with C.K. Yen taking over as Chief of
State and Chiang Ching-Kuo as Premier. 楊認為蔣總統在發表上述聲明時，應同時或在不久後使用其緊急權力，擱置憲法，解散所有議會機構。然後他應該建立一個，由三分之二的台灣人和三分之一的大陸人組成的新的一院制臨時代表機構。應該組建一個新的內閣，其中包括一些台灣人和一些年輕人。他說，需要創造一個新的形象，讓政府擺脫黨和體制的陳舊束縛、包袱和桎梏。他說，總統的緊急法令應該規定在全島範圍內進行全民公投，以決定台灣的未來地位，並建立一個制憲機構。楊進一步表示，他認為總統最好在明年春天本屆任期結束前採取這些基本行動，然後成為改革後的政黨領袖和受人尊敬的資深政治家的名譽職位（與毛澤東的職位類似），由嚴家淦接任國家元首，蔣經國擔任總理(行政院長)。
9.
Yang
identified George Yeh and Y.S. Tsiang as associated with his thinking.3 He
identified as top officials who are concerned, realistic and open-minded, but
not yet committed: Vice President C.K. Yen, Presidential Secretary General
Chang Chun, Director of the National Security Council Huang Shao-ku, and
Secretary of the KMT. 楊指出葉公超、蔣彥士贊同他的想法。他認為關注、現實和開放但尚未承諾的高級官員有：副總統嚴家淦、總統府秘書長張群、國家安全委員會秘書長黃少谷和國民黨秘書。
10.
Yang said
no member of the current cabinet is informed of his thinking and none of them
are involved or likely to take a position. He spoke rather deprecatingly of
Foreign Minister S.K. Chow as not inclined to become exposed and he said K.T. Li
and Y.S. Sun were nonpolitical in the sense he was talking about. He added that
former Foreign Minister Wei Tao-ming was entirely out of the picture,
also. 楊說他沒有告知目前的內閣成員自己的想法，他們並沒有參與或可能採取立場。他頗有微詞地談到了外交部長周書楷不傾向表態。李國鼎和孫運璿是他所說的非政治性的。他補充說，前外交部長魏道明也完全不在其中。
11.
Yang said
that although President Chiang is increasingly convinced of the imperative
requirement for some early and radical action, [Page 602]he is not
likely to move without the application of a powerful
persuasive effort by the US Government. He felt that Vice President
Agnew would be the right man to present the US position and make the major
effort, supported of course by myself. He felt that Agnew even with direct message and mandate from President Nixon
would need the help of an advance group of private
American citizens who are old and close friends of President Chiang and
completely trusted by him. (Presumably he has in mind such personages as Dr.
Judd, Admiral Radford, ex-Senator Knowland and General Wedemeyer.) He said even
Americans who know China can hardly visualize how difficult it will be for the
President to fly in the face of all the deepest traditions and articles of
faith by which he, his government and his people have lived since departure
from the Mainland. Such a reversal of the course
would be traumatic in the extreme. But he felt that the President is
showing incredible adaptability and flexibility for a man of such advanced age.
He had not yet given in to the urgings of his wife and he is keeping his
options open. 楊說，儘管蔣總統越來越相信必須儘早採取一些激進的行動，但如果美國政府不進行強有力的說服工作，他就不可能採取行動。（第602頁）他覺得副總統安格紐將是提出美國立場和作出主要努力的合適人選，當然我也當然會支持。他感覺，即使有尼克森總統的直接資訊和授權，安格紐也需要一個由美國公民組成的先遣小組的協助，這些人是蔣總統的老朋友和親密朋友，並且完全被蔣總統信任。（據推測，他想到的是Judd周以德博士、Radford雷德福海軍上將、前參議員諾蘭Knowland和Wedemeyer魏德邁將軍等人。）他說，即使是瞭解中國的美國人也很難想像，總統要違背自己、他的政府和他的人民自離開大陸以來一直遵循的所有最深刻的傳統和信仰將是多麼困難。這樣的逆轉會給人帶來極端的傷害。但他覺得，對一個如此高齡的人來說，總統正表現出令人難以置信的適應性和靈活性。他還沒有屈服於其妻的要求，而保持開放態度。
12.
Yang
indicated that he had shared some but not all of what he had just said with
Ambassador Christopher Phillips at USUN Headquarters.4 I gather
that Phillips is the only other American representative who has been even
partially clued in. Yang said he knew he did not need to urge on me the extreme
and vital sensitivity of the subject and the absolutely overriding need of
total security. Any leak would be disastrous
and he hoped the number of persons informed could be kept to the absolute
minimum of those who had to know in order to support the handful of senior
officials who should be involved on the US side. 楊表示，他已經與聯合國總部的Christopher Phillips大使分享了他剛才所說的部分內容，但不是全部。楊說，他知道毋需向我強調這個問題的極端和重要的敏感性，以及絕對壓倒一切的絕對安全。任何洩漏都將是災難性的，他希望被告知的人數可保持在必須知道的絕對最低限度，只供美國方面應該參與的少數高級官員知情。
Comment: I have
reported this conversation at length because it seems so pertinent to the kind
of study you have requested regarding the prospect of US–Taiwan relations.5 I should
emphasize, however, [Page 603] that
although H.K. Yang is an important and highly responsible official, his views
reflect the outer dimension of tolerable concepts and undoubtedly go beyond the
point where practical considerations are likely to lead the government in the
near future. Yang himself is imaginative and broad-gauged; he is also bold and
seems to feel adequately protected to pursue his proposals. However, he tends
to underrate the practical complications that inescapably concern the principal
ROC leaders, or he rather casually seeks to enlist external intervention to
help overcome resistance from his fellow countrymen. For example, there is not
much real prospect that President Chiang would sweep away institutions and
commitments of the past and establish a legislature composed of two-thirds
Taiwanese and one-third Mainlanders. Similarly Yang
probably underestimates the domestic and foreign consequences of changing the
ROC’s international identity. 【評論】：我詳細報告了這次談話，因為它似乎與你要求的關於美台關係前景的研究非常相關。（第603頁）然而，我應該強調，儘管楊是一位擔重要的高層官員，但他的觀點反映超出可容忍的概念，無疑超越能引導政府在即近未來的實際可行考慮。楊本人很有想像力，視野開闊；他也很大膽，似乎覺得有足夠的保護以推行其建議。然而，他往往低估了中華民國主要領導人難以避免的實務上的複雜性，或者他相當隨意地尋求外部干預以克服來自同僚的阻力。例如，要蔣介石總統掃除過去的機構和改變承諾，建立一個由三分之二台灣人和三分之一大陸人組成的立法機構，前景並不實際。同樣，楊可能低估了改變中華民國國際身份的國內外後果。
14.
Nevertheless,
Yang’s views strike me as highly important, both as an indication of the
direction in which some responsible officials are thinking and as a symbol of
the considerable ferment developing on Taiwan concerning the future. In brief,
the evolution of US China policy and the UN defeat have precipitated some of
the thinking that many would not have expected at least until President Chiang
departed the scene. 然而，楊的觀點給我的印象是非常重要的，它既表明了一些負責任的官員的思考方向，也象徵著台灣在未來的發展上有相當大的可能性。簡而言之，美國對華政策的演變和聯合國的失敗促成了一些至少在蔣總統離任前許多人都想不到的想法。
McConaughy
- Source:
National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHINAT–US. Secret;
Priority; Nodis.↩
- This was
not the first time that Yang had spoken with Americans about the Republic
of China’s foreign policy and domestic politics. In July Yang met with
McConaughy to discuss his efforts to have the ROC “keep its
representatives in any diplomatic capital or in UN or any multilateral
organization where they will be accepted.” Yang noted that Chiang was in
“virtual isolation” in order to consider “the crises facing the GRC.” 這並不是楊第一次與美國人談論中華民國的外交政策和國內政治。7月間，楊會見了馬康衛，討論他為使中華民國「在任何邦交國首都或聯合國或任何多邊組織中保留其代表並被接受的努力」。楊指出，蔣介石為了考慮「GRC面臨的危機」而處於「幾乎孤立」的狀態。(Telegram
3541 from Taipei, July 20; ibid., UN 6 CHICOM) On November 3 Yang made
similar statements to Green (memorandum of conversation; ibid.) and to U.
Alexis Johnson and Brown (memorandum of conversation; ibid., U. Alexis
Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695, Memcons, 1971).↩
- ↩ In 1970, President Richard Nixon nominated
Phillips to serve asthe Permanent Representative of the United States to
the United Nations Security Council.
- “The
Future of Taiwan” grew out of a September 30 memorandum from Kissinger,
not found. According to handwritten notes on a November 15 memorandum from
Lin-wood Starbird (EA/ROC) through Brown to Green, Starbird and Brown
discussed Kissinger’s request and decided to expand its focus from
succession and contingency planning for the ROC to a more general
discussion of Taiwan’s future. Although Starbird wrote that the paper was
to be submitted to the NSC’s Washington Special Actions Group by December
10, there is no record that it was discussed in subsequent WSAG
meetings. 季辛吉9月30日的一份備忘錄〈台灣的未來〉，未找到。根據11月15日Lin-wood
Starbird（EA/ROC）經由Brown給Green的備忘錄的手寫記錄，Starbird和Brown討論了季辛吉的要求，並決定將其重點從中華民國的繼承和應急計畫擴大到對台灣未來更廣泛的討論。儘管Starbird寫道，該文件應在12月10日前提交國家安全委員會的華盛頓特別行動小組，但沒有記錄表明該文件在隨後的華盛頓特別行動小組會議上曾被討論過。
(National Archives, RG 59, EA/ROC Files: Lot 74 D 25, Political Files
(1964–1972), POL 1–1 Contingency Planning) On November 30 Brown submitted
the 12page paper (drafted in EA/ROC) to U. Alexis Johnson. (Ibid., Central
Files 1970–73, POL 19 TAIWAN) See Document
208.↩
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d174
沒有留言:
張貼留言
請網友務必留下一致且可辨識的稱謂
顧及閱讀舒適性，段與段間請空一行