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2022-02-12

明斯克困境 Duncan Allan@Chatam House 20200522 Taimocracy翻譯


The Minsk Conundrum: Western Policy and Russia’s War in Eastern Ukraine    Duncan Allan
Chatam House 20200522  Taimocracy翻譯

Summary

  • The Minsk agreements of September 2014 and February 2015, which sought to end Russia’s war in eastern Ukraine, rest on two irreconcilable interpretations of Ukraine’s sovereignty – what could be called the ‘Minsk conundrum’: is Ukraine sovereign, as Ukrainians insist, or should its sovereignty be limited, as Russia demands?  為結束俄羅斯在烏克蘭東部,是戰爭的20149月和20152月的〈明斯克協議〉基於對烏克蘭主權的兩種不相容的解釋——這可以被稱為「明斯克難題」:烏克蘭是否像烏克蘭人堅持的那樣擁有主權,還是應該按照俄羅斯的要求,它的主權受到限制?
  • Ukraine sees the agreements as instruments with which to re-establish its sovereignty in line with the following sequence: a ceasefire; a Russian withdrawal from eastern Ukraine; return of the Russia/Ukraine border to Ukrainian control; free and fair elections in the Donbas region; and a limited devolution of power to Russia’s proxy regimes, which would be reintegrated and resubordinated to the authorities in Kyiv. Ukraine would be able to make its own domestic and foreign policy choices.  烏克蘭將這些協議視為按照以下程序重建其主權的工具:停火;俄羅斯從烏克蘭東部撤軍;俄羅斯/烏克蘭邊界回歸烏克蘭控制;頓巴斯地區的自由和公平選舉;以及有限的權力下放給俄羅斯的代理人政權,這些政權將被重新整合併重新服從基輔當局。烏克蘭將能夠做出自己的國內和外交政策選擇。
  • Russia sees the Minsk agreements as tools with which to break Ukraine’s sovereignty. Its interpretation reverses key elements in the sequence of actions: elections in occupied Donbas would take place before Ukraine had reclaimed control of the border; this would be followed by comprehensive autonomy for Russia’s proxy regimes, crippling the central authorities in Kyiv. Ukraine would be unable to govern itself effectively or orient itself towards the West.  俄羅斯將〈明斯克協議〉視為破壞烏克蘭主權的工具。它的解釋顛倒了一系列行動的關鍵要素:被佔領的頓巴斯的選舉將在烏克蘭重新控制邊界之前舉行;隨之而來的是俄羅斯代理人政權的全面自治,削弱了基輔的中央當局。烏克蘭將無法有效治理自己或將自己定位於西方。
  • These contradictory provisions are testimony to a stunning failure of Russian foreign policy. In 2014 Russia launched a campaign of violent subversion to compel Ukraine to ‘federalize’ its political system. Belying Russian expectations, Ukrainians fought back en masse, forcing Russia to resort to increasingly open military intervention. Russia inflicted crushing defeats on Ukrainian forces, yet was unwilling to pay the price that further high-intensity war would have exacted.  這些相互矛盾的條款證明了俄羅斯外交政策的驚人失敗。2014年,俄羅斯發起了一場暴力顛覆運動,以迫使烏克蘭「聯邦化」其政治制度。出乎俄羅斯的意料,烏克蘭人集體反擊,迫使俄羅斯訴諸日益公開的軍事干預。俄羅斯大勝烏克蘭軍隊,但不願為進一步的高強度戰爭付出代價。
  • Western views on how to implement the Minsk agreements are imprecise and inconsistent. One prevalent view is that implementation means finding a mid-point between the Russian and Ukrainian positions. However, attempts to do so have failed – heaping pressure on Ukraine, risking political instability in Kyiv, and not leading to any discernible change in Russian policy. Instead of trying to resolve an unresolvable contradiction, Western policymakers should acknowledge the starkness of the Minsk conundrum.  西方對如何執行〈明斯克協議〉的看法不準確且前後矛盾。一流行觀點是〈明斯克協議〉意味著在俄羅斯和烏克蘭的立場之間找到一個中間點。然而,這樣做的嘗試失敗了——對烏克蘭施加壓力,會冒著基輔政治不穩定的風險,並且不會導致俄羅斯政策發生任何明顯的變化。西方決策者不應試圖解決無法解決的矛盾,而應承認「明斯克難題」的嚴重性。
  • An alternative approach would make the defence of Ukraine’s sovereignty the unambiguous premise of Western policy. It would view the Minsk and Normandy processes mainly as conflict management tools. In line with the priority attached to upholding Ukraine’s sovereignty, Western governments would meanwhile maintain support for long-term political and economic reform in Ukraine, using the EU/Ukraine Association Agreement as the anchor.  另一種方法將使捍衛烏克蘭主權成為西方政策的明確前提。它將明斯克和諾曼地進程主要視為衝突管理工具。根據維護烏克蘭主權的優先事項,西方政府將同時以歐盟/烏克蘭結盟協議為支柱,繼續支持烏克蘭的長期政治和經濟改革。
  • This approach would also encourage the authorities in Kyiv to engage more inclusively with those living in occupied Donbas. Yet it would proceed from the assumption that the region should not be legally reincorporated into Ukraine for the foreseeable future. Finally, this approach would logically entail a lengthy stand-off with Russia over Ukraine – a prospect that many decision-makers in the West would find troubling and unnerving.  這種方法也將鼓勵基輔當局更包容地與居住在被佔領的頓巴斯的人們接觸。然而,它將基於這樣的假設,即在可預見的未來,該地區不應合法地重新併入烏克蘭。最後,這種做法在邏輯上會導致與俄羅斯在烏克蘭問題上的長期對峙——西方許多決策者會對此感到不安和不安。

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