想盡辦法避免玉石俱焚—卻也不是台灣單方面的責任

【縛雞之見】
預防戰爭，不是也不能是懼戰，是知道戰爭的毀滅性，所以應盡一且可能去避免其發生。
正反觀點都要看，否則就不是負責任的思考。

即使美軍協防 台灣亦成廢墟    邵玉銘＠聯合 20211116

今年二月，美國極具權威之「外交協會」，發布「美國、中國及台灣：一個預防戰爭的策略」報告書。該書對台海危機問題分析極為深入，經過幾個重要機構討論，頗獲好評，包括美國前國防部長馬提斯等人。該書將近百頁，簡介如下，敬供國人參考。

報告書的第一部分，討論中共對台動武的三種情況。

一、進攻台灣外島地區。

二、中共對台灣海空交通實行隔離（Quarantine），即宣稱台灣海空域為中國主權範圍，要求出入該海空域船隻及飛機，到中共沿海港口或機場接受檢查。

三、中共直接登陸台灣。該書認為台灣目前不具足夠防衛能力，必須執行五年國防提升計畫，及修改募兵制。

報告書的第二部分，提出美國對台灣衝突的因應策略。此一策略包括三部分。

一、在中共隔絕、包圍與進攻台灣時，美國應即運送武器及物資給台灣。假如中共攻擊這些船艦，甚至造成傷亡，責任將在於中共。

二、美國可立即凍結中共在美資產，斷絕與中共任何經濟及資金來往。報告書相信中共會有同等報復行動，這即會觸發一個影響全世界財務及經濟之嚴重危機。

三、美國應即進入全國軍事動員狀態。

報告書特別強調兩點：

一、美國將限制台海為一局部戰爭，除非中共攻擊美國本土，美國將不攻擊大陸，以避免擴大成為一個全面戰爭（general war）。

二、美國應盡早與中共展開高階層會談，將美方立場據實以告，讓中共充分瞭解，以避免最壞結果發生。

筆者對此報告書有些感觸與建議。

第一、我們必須要認知，即使美軍協防台灣，美國為避免將戰爭擴大成全面大戰，美國將不會主動攻擊大陸，所以台海之戰一旦發生，戰爭將以台灣為主戰場，無論最後能否保住台灣，台灣恐將成廢墟或血海一片。麥克阿瑟將軍對戰爭曾引用柏拉圖一句名言：「只有戰死的人，才看到戰爭的結束！」難道非等到台灣陷入血海殘壁後，國人及世人才看到台灣戰爭的結束？今日，我們不能要求國軍「我死則國生」，我們更不能讓台灣變成廢墟而苟活！

第二、今日兩岸已經走向戰火邊緣，政府再繼續募兵制，實應檢討改進。今日許多國家都採徵兵制，以色列更採男女皆兵制。空軍前副司令張延廷近日指出，現代戰爭打的是科技戰和資訊戰，即使每年花費上千億元購買先進武器，如軍事訓練只有四個月及兵員專業程度不足，如何發揮一流戰力？

第三、今日中美雙方衝突廣泛，民族情緒高漲，但若中美發生戰爭，其原因應是雙方許多爭端無法解決，我們不希望台灣成為任何一方對他方動武之藉口。西諺有云：不要成為兩隻大象打鬥之草坪，我們必須切記！

美國中共戰爭

 

The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War    Council on Foreign Relations 202102

To preserve peace in the Taiwan Strait, Robert D. Blackwill and Philip Zelikow propose the United States make clear that it will not change Taiwan’s status, yet will work with allies to plan for Chinese aggression and help Taiwan defend itself.

Taiwan “is becoming the most dangerous flash point in the world for a possible war that involves the United States, China, and probably other major powers,” warn Robert D. Blackwill, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy, and Philip Zelikow, University of Virginia White Burkett Miller professor of history.   

In a new Council Special Report, The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War, the authors argue that the United States should change and clarify its strategy to prevent war over Taiwan.   “The U.S. strategic objective regarding Taiwan should be to preserve its political and economic autonomy, its dynamism as a free society, and U.S.-allied deterrence—without triggering a Chinese attack on Taiwan.” 

“We do not think it is politically or militarily realistic to count on a U.S. military defeat of various kinds of Chinese assaults on Taiwan, uncoordinated with allies.  Nor is it realistic to presume that, after such a frustrating clash, the United States would or should simply escalate to some sort of wide-scale war against China with comprehensive blockades or strikes against targets on the Chinese mainland.”

“If U.S. campaign plans postulate such unrealistic scenarios,” the authors add, “they will likely be rejected by an American president and by the U.S. Congress.” But, they observe, “the resulting U.S. paralysis would not be the result of presidential weakness or timidity. It might arise because the most powerful country in the world did not have credible options prepared for the most dangerous military crisis looming in front of it.”

Proposing “a realistic strategic objective for Taiwan, and the associated policy prescriptions, to sustain the political balance that has kept the peace for the last fifty years,” the authors urge the Joe Biden administration to 

• affirm that it is not trying to change Taiwan’s status;
• work with its allies, especially Japan, to prepare new plans that could challenge Chinese military moves against Taiwan and help Taiwan defend itself, yet put the burden of widening a war on China; and
• visibly plan, beforehand, for the disruption and mobilization that could follow a wider war, but without assuming that such a war would or should escalate to the Chinese, Japanese, or American homelands.

“The horrendous global consequences of a war between the United States and China, most likely over Taiwan, should preoccupy the Biden team, beginning with the president,” the authors conclude.