【縛雞之見】
On August 31, the reveal of two
originals: the interpretation cable and the Six Assurance, from the Department
of State to AIT, as a part of the Sino-US Communiqués of 1982, indicates what Beijing
agreed in 1982 and what it violates in the 21st century.
- State
Cable Subject: Taiwan Arms Sales, Date: 1982-07-10 (200235), (PDF, 100 KB)
- State
Cable Subject: Assurances for Taiwan, Date: 1982-08-17 (200235), (PDF, 24
KB)
Notes that the reveal put under AIT’s “Home | Our Relationship | Policy & History | Key U.S. Foreign Policy Documents for the Region | Declassified Cables: Taiwan Arms Sales & Six Assurances (1982)” as the fifth document besides:
- Taiwan
Relations Act (01/01/1979)
- U.S.-PRC
Joint Communique on Arms Sales (the 1982 Communique) (08/17/1982)
- U.S.-PRC
Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations (Normalization
Communique) (01/01/1979)
- U.S.-PRC
Joint Communique (Shanghai Communique)(02/27/1972)
In the final, the US is juxtaposed Taiwan and China, stressing the
separateness of the two.
1982年解密電報:對台軍售 & 對台各項保證 AIT 20200831
以下第一則解密的電報是1982年7月10日由時任美國國務院次卿勞倫斯·伊格爾伯格發送給時任美國在台協會處長李潔明,該電報提供美國對1982年《八一七聯合公報》的解釋,因其與美國進行中的對台軍售有關。此電報闡述美國逐步減少對台軍售的意願,取決於中華人民共和國和平解決兩岸分歧的持續承諾。倘若中華人民共和國採取更為敵對的態度,則美國將增加對台軍售。
這項立場表明,美國的主要關切為維持兩岸的和平,因此,對台軍售的性能和數量將完全取決於中華人民共和國所帶來的威脅。文件以「最後一項保證:美國將持續對台軍售」作結。
這些原則呼應了1982年8月17日雷根總統草擬的內部總統備忘錄,該備忘錄為美國針對1982年《八一七聯合公報》的解釋提供了指南。
第二則電報是1982年8月17日由時任美國國務卿喬治·舒茲發送給時任美國在台協會處長李潔明,該電報揭示對台六項保證,強化上述立場。對台六項保證為,美國:
- 未同意設定終止對台軍售的日期
- 未同意就對台軍售議題向中華人民共和國徵詢意見
- 不會在台北與北京之間擔任斡旋角色
- 未同意修訂《台灣關係法》
- 未改變關於台灣主權的立場。
- 不會對台施壓,要求台灣與中華人民共和國進行談判
「六項保證」始終是美國對台及對中政策的根本要素。
The first declassified cable below, sent on July 10, 1982, from then U.S.
Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to then AIT Director James Lilley,
provides the U.S. interpretation of the 1982
Communiqué as it relates to ongoing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. The cable explains that the U.S. willingness to
reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is conditioned upon
the continued commitment of the PRC to a peaceful solution of cross-Strait
differences. Further, if the PRC were to become more hostile, then the United
States would increase arms sales to Taiwan.
The directive indicates that the United States’ chief concern was maintaining
peace across the Taiwan Strait, and thus, the quantity and quality of arms provided
to Taiwan would be conditioned entirely on the threat posed by the PRC. The memo ends by offering “this final assurance:
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan will continue.”
These same ideas are echoed in an internal
presidential memo drafted by President Ronald Reagan on August 17, 1982, which
serves as guidelines for U.S. interpretation of the
1982 Communiqué.
The second cable, sent on August 17, 1982, from then U.S. Secretary of State
George Shultz to then AIT Director Lilley, offers six assurances to Taiwan, reinforcing
the message above. The United States:
- Has not
agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan
- Has not
agreed to consult with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan
- Will not
play a mediation role between Taipei and Beijing
- Has not
agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act
- Has not
altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan.
- Will not
exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC.
The “Six Assurances” have been a foundational
element in U.S. policy towards Taiwan and the PRC.
網友eachouchen對馬「逐條宣讀」〈六項保證〉的評論 / 雲程譯
台情資外洩中國 美確曾表達關切◎自由(2011.09.01)
小評:美國在台協會主席薄瑞光媒體茶敘●AIT(2011.02.01)
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