Tightening the Chain, implementing a strategy of Maritime Pressure in the Western Pacific--Strategy in Brief 《上緊島鏈發條：實施西太平洋海上壓力戰略》戰略簡介 Taimocracy翻譯

Tightening the Chain, implementing a strategy of Maritime Pressure in the Western Pacific--Strategy in Brief  《上緊島鏈發條：實施西太平洋海上壓力戰略》戰略簡介      Taimocracy翻譯

The strategy of Maritime Pressure aims to persuade Chinese leaders that attempting military aggression in the Western Pacific will fail, thus discouraging them from trying it. The strategy gives the PLA a taste of its own A2/AD medicine, improving America’s prospects in both peace and war.  The strategy calls for establishing highly survivable precision-strike networks along the First Island Chain featuring increased quantities of U.S. and allied ground-based missiles backed by naval, air, electronic warfare, and other capabilities.  These networks would be operationally decentralized and geographically dispersed along the archipelagos of the Western Pacific.  The networks would function as an “inside” force optimized to attack the PLA from within China’s A2/AD threat envelope, supported by “outside” air and naval forces able to join the fight from further afield.  To use a football analogy, the survivable inside strike networks would act as a defensive line while the mobile outside air and naval forces would act as linebackers.

海上壓力戰略的目的，是說服中國領導人其在西太平洋地區進行軍事侵略將失敗，從而阻止他們試圖進行。該戰略讓解放軍了解了自己的A2 / AD方案，提高了美國在和平與戰爭中的展望。該戰略要求，在第一島鏈上建立高度可生存的精確打擊網路，其中包括由海軍，空中，電子戰和其他能力支持的大量美國和盟軍陸基導彈。這些網路將在任務上分散，並在地理上分布在西太平洋群島。這些網路將作為一種「內部」力量發揮作用，優化從中國的A2 / AD威脅範圍內攻擊解放軍，由「外部」空中和海軍部隊支持，可以從更遠的地方加入戰鬥。使用足球賽做類比，可生存的內部攻擊網路將充當防禦線，而移動的外部空中和海軍部隊將充當前鋒。

Implementing this Inside-Out Defense concept will require some U.S. forces to operate and survive within range of Chinese missiles.  This forward posture would differ from the current expeditionary model focused on marshaling massive combat power and then gaining dominance in all domains before counterattacking decisively.  In a fait accompli scenario, the expeditionary model takes too much time. If the U.S. military does not demonstrate the ability to delay, degrade, and deny a PLA attack from the outset, the Chinese leadership might believe it can perpetrate aggression before the United States arrives in force.  Making the forward posture credible will require American and allied military forces to coordinate across the Services’ traditional domains.  Cross-domain operations would become the norm under a Maritime Pressure strategy, to include Army and Marine Corps forces launching ground-based anti-ship missiles against targets at sea.

實施這種由內而外防禦概念，將需要一些美國部隊在中國導彈射程內運行和生存。這種前進的姿態將不同於當前的遠征模型，該模型的重點是編組大規模戰鬥力，然後在果斷反擊之前，在所有領域獲得優勢地位。在既成事實情景中，遠征模型花費太多時間。如果美國軍方從一開始就沒有表現出推遲，貶低和否認解放軍攻擊的能力，中國領導層可能會認為它可以在美國到來之前進行侵略。使前進的姿態可信，需要美國和盟國的軍事力量協調整個服務的傳統領域。在海上壓力戰略下，跨域作戰將成為常態，包括陸軍和海軍陸戰隊部隊向海上目標發射地面反艦導彈。

Land-based anti-ship, anti-air, and electronic warfare capabilities form the backbone of the Inside-Out concept.  Although air and naval forces possess the advantage of strategic and operational mobility, ground and amphibious forces ashore possess the advantage of survivability.  Ground forces can harden themselves and exploit terrain for concealment and dispersal, forcing the enemy to acquire precise targeting and expend many munitions to attack them successfully.  Amphibious forces can create and exploit temporal and geographic uncertainty to impose costs on the enemy. For decades, America’s enemies have exploited the advantages of mobile land-based forces against the U.S. military.   It is time for the United States to turn the tables.

陸基反艦，反空和電子戰能力構成了「從內而外」概念的支柱。雖然空中和海軍部隊，具有戰略和作戰機動性的優勢，但岸上的陸地和兩棲部隊，具有生存能力的優勢。地面部隊可以自我加強，並利用地形進行隱蔽和驅散，迫使敵人獲得精確的目標，並為成功攻擊而被迫消耗許多彈藥。兩棲部隊可以創造和利用時間和地理上的不確定性，來消耗敵人的成本。幾十年來，美國的敵人利用機動陸基部隊對美軍的優勢。現在是美國扭轉局勢的時候了。

Land-based strike forces deployed along the First Island Chain would anchor the defense against a Chinese attack.  Upon warning, the forces would move to pre-selected, dispersed positions after potentially linking up with pre-positioned equipment.  Forward-based air forces would disperse to expeditionary airfields under new adaptive basing concepts.  Naval forces would sortie to locations behind the First Island Chain or hug the coastlines to reduce their signatures.  Using land-based forces to contest Chinese offensive operations will free up U.S. surface ships and aircraft to perform higher-priority tasks, such as striking critical nodes in China’s surveillance and sustainment systems.  The ships and aircraft could operate from the less-threatening environs beyond the First Island Chain.  They would plug gaps in forward defenses and exploit opportunities created by land-based strike networks.  Coordinated properly, the joint force could achieve the virtues of mass without the vulnerabilities of concentration by spreading its combat power over many smaller points of operation rather than focusing it in a few bigger bases.

在第一島鏈上部署的陸基打擊部隊，將防禦中國的攻擊。發出警報後，部隊可能會在與預置設備連接後，移動到預先選定的分散陣地。在新的彈性基地概念下，前置空軍將分散到遠征機場。海軍將出發到第一島鏈後的位置，或進入海岸線以減少暴露。利用陸基部隊對抗中國的進攻行動，將釋放美國水面艦艇和飛機，執行更高優先的任務，例如打擊中國監視和維持系統中的關鍵節點。這些船隻和飛機，可以在第一島鏈以外，威脅較小的環境中運行。它們將填補前線防禦的空白，並利用陸基打擊網路創造的機會。透過適當協調，協同部隊可以透過在更多較小的作戰點上擴展其戰鬥力，而不是將其集中在少數更大的基地，來實現沒有集中脆弱性的質量優勢。

The highly contested communications environment might require individual commanders to lead operations without continuous connectivity with higher echelons and without information from space-based assets.  Yet American combat leaders possess individual initiative second to none.  If given a desired outcome and the tools to achieve it, they will find a way to succeed.  Many PLA commanders cannot yet say the same.  Additionally, American commanders are unlikely to fight alone; U.S. allies who are acquiring their own land-based sea- and air-denial systems will also likely be involved.  Using new unmanned aerial and surface platforms, troposcatter communications, and stratospheric systems, U.S. forces would form a terrestrial command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture that would degrade more gracefully than legacy systems, permitting U.S. and allied militaries to continue operations even in a contested electromagnetic environment.

激烈的通訊環境，可能會要各指揮官在斷絕與上層連續連接，且沒有衛星的資訊的情況下領導運作。然而，美國戰鬥領導人擁有首屈一指的個人主動權，如果設定了期望的結果和實現它的工具，他們將找到戰勝方法。這點，許多解放軍指揮官還辦不到。此外，美軍指揮官不太可能只是獨自作戰；美國盟友正在購置其陸基、海空軍防禦系統，他們也可能聯合作戰。使用新的無人航空和地面平台，對流層散射通信和平流層系統，美軍部隊將建立地面指揮，控制，通信，計算機，情報，監視和偵察（C4ISR）架構，這種架構將比傳統系統更優雅地彈性適用，讓美國和盟軍軍隊，即使在有爭議的電磁環境中也能繼續作戰。

Chapter 3 includes a list of numerous actions needed to implement the strategy of Maritime Pressure outlined here.  Among other things, the Department of Defense (DoD) should:

第3章列出了實施此處概述的海上壓力戰略所需的眾多行動。除其他外，國防部（DoD）應該：

•  Develop this report’s approach into a joint operational concept;

•  Experiment with new organizational structures for ground forces in the Pacific;

•  Develop sustainment concepts to support a Maritime Pressure strategy;

•  Accelerate fielding of mobile, land-based, long-range missile capabilities;

•  Build a resilient multi-domain C4ISR architecture and develop and field counter-C4ISR capabilities;

•  Integrate all bomber aircraft with payloads for offensive maritime missions;

•  Deepen cooperation with Indo-Pacific allies and partners; and

•  Reexamine Service roles and missions.

•     將本報告的方法納入協同運作概念；

•        試驗太平洋地面部隊的新組織結構；

•        制定可持續的概念，以支持海上壓力戰略；

•        加速部署移動，陸基，遠程導彈能力；

•        構建彈性多域的C4ISR架構，開發和戰場的反C4ISR功能；

•        整合所有轟炸機與有效載荷在一起進行攻擊性海上任務；

•        深化與印度太平洋盟友和夥伴的合作；和

•        重新檢查服務角色和任務。

CSBA estimates that these actions would cost from $8 billion to $13 billion by 2024 depending on the specific investments selected by DoD.  The costs represent additional spending beyond what DoD’s five-year budget plan currently contains. Longer-term costs could total $30 billion or more depending on how extensively DoD reorganized its forces and posture in the decades ahead.  Although significant, such costs are affordable—especially if DoD spends less on legacy forces unsuited to contested environments and spends more on the innovative concepts and capabilities proposed by this report.

CSBA估計，到2024年，這些行動的成本將從80億美元增加到130億美元，具體取決於國防部選擇的具體投資。這些成本代表了目前國防部五年預算計劃外的額外支出。長期成本可能達到300億美元或更多，這取決於國防部在未來幾十年內，對其部隊和情勢的重組程度。雖然成本高，特別是，如果國防部在不適合競爭環境的傳統武力上花費更少，而在本報告提出的創新概念和能力上花更多，但這花費是可以承受的。

https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/implementing-a-strategy-of-maritime-pressure-in-the-western-pacific/publication