暴風前的混亂：理解藍綠陣營的初選 寇謐將 20190509 Taimocracy翻譯

暴風前的混亂：理解藍綠陣營的初選   寇謐將 20190509  Taimocracy翻譯

THE MESS BEFORE THE STORM: MAKING SENSE OF THE BLUE AND GREEN CAMPS’ PRIMARIES    Michael Cole ＠ Taiwan Insight 20190509

In recent months, no subject has been brought up more often by Taiwan watchers than the party infighting that has been developing within the blue and green camps in the lead-up to Taiwan’s general elections next January.  Much of that interest stems from the impact that the candidate selection, and of course the election itself, will have on Taiwan’s future external policy at a time of unprecedented engagement opportunities for the island-nation.  Unsurprisingly, the uncertainty that has surrounded the primaries has led many decision makers and analysts in foreign capitals to wonder whether the parties, and on January 11 the voters, will seek continuity or a new policy direction from their government.

最近幾個月，沒有任何話題比明年1月台灣大選前藍綠陣營內發展的黨內鬥爭，更吸引台灣觀察家。這種興趣很大程度上源於候選人選擇，當然還有選舉本身對台灣未來外部政策的影響，這是這個島國前所未有的參與機會。不出所料，圍繞初選的不確定性，導致外國首都的許多決策者和分析家懷疑，是否各參與者以及1月11日的選民，會尋求政府的連續性，或尋求或新的政策方向。

Below are some of my observations on what has happened so far, and where we can expect this to take us.  While the analysis is my own, it reflects and is inspired by many of the hopes and concerns that I have heard through my interactions with foreign officials and analysts from a number of countries since the beginning of this year.

以下是我對迄今為止發生的事情的一些觀察，以及我們可以期待它帶給我們的地方。雖然分析是我自己的，但它反映了我自今年年初以來，透過與來自一些國家的外國官員和分析員的互動，所聽到的希望和關注而受到啟發。

First, the green camp, where the battle for the nomination involves two aspirants — President Tsai Ing-wen and her former premier, William Lai. Since her election in January 2016, Tsai has positioned herself firmly in the middle ground of Taiwanese politics. She has emphasized the “status quo” in the Taiwan Strait and has equated Taiwan with the Republic of China (ROC), with the clear indication that under her watch, no referenda would be held on a declaration of de jure independence or name rectification (a position which has been extremely reassuring to Washington, D.C.). President Tsai has drawn firm lines on the need to protect Taiwan’s democracy and institutions but has generally shied away from statements or policies that could derail the delicate balance in the Taiwan Strait.  Much of her Cabinet has reflected a conscious attempt, from very early on, to bring both “light greens” and “light blues” on board; by doing so, Tsai retained a number of officials and diplomats who had previously served in “blue” administrations.

首先是綠營，提名的爭奪戰涉及兩位參選這—蔡英文總統和她的前院長賴清德。自2016年1月當選以來，蔡英文一直將自己置於台灣政治的中間地帶。她強調了台灣海峽的「現狀」，並將台灣與中華民國（ROC）等同起來，明確表示在她的監督下，不會就法律上的獨立或名稱糾正宣言舉行全民投票（這個位置讓華盛頓特區非常放心）。蔡總統已經就保護台灣民主和制度的必要性提出了堅定的立場，但一般都迴避可能破壞台灣海峽微妙平衡的言論或政策。她的大部分內閣都反映了一種有意識的嘗試，從很早開始就將「淺綠」和「淺藍」帶到了船上；透過這樣做，蔡保留了一些以前曾在「藍色」政府服務的官員和外交官。

While welcome in foreign capitals, her careful and predictable approach has alienated many in the deep-green camp, who regard her ostensible unwillingness to openly challenge Beijing, or to retaliate for military incursions or the poaching of diplomatic allies, as a sign of weakness.  Besides her New Southbound Policy, President Tsai has also responded well to shifting geopolitical currents and seized various opportunities to engage and collaborate with a number of significant democracies, among them the U.S., Japan, Australia, the E.U. and others, on projects with regional ramifications.  Arguably, a more confrontational government in Taipei would not have been invited to join a fledging coalition of democracies; the stars were aligned, and pragmatism paid off, even if the quiet way in which, by necessity, much of that engagement has occurred means that the Tsai administration cannot turn around and use this for its electoral benefit with the Taiwanese public.

雖然受到外國首都的歡迎，但她的謹慎和可預測的做法，疏遠了許多深綠的人，他們認為她表面上不願意公開挑戰北京，或者報復軍事入侵或挖取外交盟友，這是一種軟弱的表現。除了她的新南行政策外，蔡總統還對地緣政治潮流的轉變，做出了很好的反應，並抓住了各種機會與一些重要的民主國家進行接觸和合作，其中包括美國，日本，澳大利亞，歐盟，以及其他有關區域影響的項目。可以說，台北若是一個更具對抗性的政府，則不會被邀請加入一個剛剛起步的民主聯盟；各國站在一起，實用主義得到了回報；即使這種必要的安靜方式參與，也意味著蔡政府無法轉用於台灣的選舉利益。

For his part, Lai has garnered support among a segment of the green camp that has grown impatient with the Tsai administration’s careful approach to Beijing and policymaking in general. More focused on the “ethnic” side of the divide, the deeper green camp has also lamented President Tsai’s use of “blue” officials, seeing in this, as in her refusal to countenance a possible referendum on name rectification, evidence that she is little more than a Kuomintang (KMT) politician wearing different clothing. (A good number of the more vocal critics in that camp are also former officials who expected to obtain, but did not secure, positions in the Tsai administration.) That segment of the green camp has also been frustrated with what they see as slow progress on a variety of policy issues (e.g., transitional justice, the economy, government restructuring), while civil society and many in the younger age group have grown disillusioned with her administration’s foot-dragging on matters such as marriage equality.  Ironically, the deeper green camp that supports Lai also tends to be more conservative on LGBTQI and other issues, which points to a generational clash among supporters in the green camp.  Unlike Tsai, who among other things was a trade negotiator, Lai lacks international experience and is a mostly unknown commodity with foreign governments, who often prefer to deal with people they know. (Following her defeat in the 2012 elections Tsai invested a lot of time and energy engaging foreign officials and academics and understanding their expectations of a future president.)  A self-described “independence worker,” Lai is also regarded overseas as a possible source of instability in the Taiwan Strait, due primarily to what is believed to be a more activist approach to securing Taiwan’s sovereignty.  There are also fears that perceptions of Lai as a more “erratic” leader — i.e., more similar to Chen Shui-bian — could give Beijing the ammunition it needs to adopt a more coercive, and potentially destabilizing, policy toward Taiwan.  Tellingly, the New Tide faction within the DPP, to which Lai belongs, has overwhelmingly supported a Tsai candidacy for 2020.

就他而言，賴已獲得綠營的一部分支持，他們對蔡政府對北京和整個政策制定的謹慎態度感到不耐煩。更加關注分歧的「族群」方面，深綠陣營也感嘆蔡總統使用「藍色」官員，在此看到，因為她拒絕支持可能進行名稱的公投，證據表明，她很少不止是國民黨（KMT）政客穿著不同的衣服。（在那個陣營中有很多更直言不諱的批評者也是前任官員，他們希望獲得但不能確保在蔡政府中擔任職務。）綠營的這一部分也因為在各種政策問題上（例如，過渡時期司法，經濟，政府重組），進展緩慢而感到沮喪，而民間社會和許多年輕人群體對她的政府在婚姻平等等問題上的拖延感到失望。諷刺的是，支持賴的深綠陣營在非傳統性別議題(LGBTQI)，和其他問題上往往更為保守，這表明綠營中的支持者之間發生了代際衝突。與蔡不同，賴除了其他東西之外，還是貿易談判代表，賴缺乏國際經驗，不為多數外國政府所知，外國政府往往更願意與他們認識的人打交道。（繼2012年選舉失敗後，蔡在外國官員和學術界投入了大量時間和精力，並了解他們對未來總統的期望。）自稱為「台獨工作者」的賴，也被海外視為台灣海峽不穩定的可能來源，主要是因為人們認為這是一種更積極的方式，來保護台灣的主權。還有人擔心，賴作為一個更「不穩定」的領導者—即更像陳水扁—可能會給北京提供一種對台灣採取更具強制性，和可能破壞穩定的政策所需的彈藥。引人注目的是，賴所屬的民進黨內新潮派，壓倒性地支持了2020年蔡的候選資格。

For foreign governments that hope for continuity from 2020 and a greater role for Taiwan in the region, another Tsai administration is unquestionably their preferred choice.  They like what they have seen so far, and President Tsai has returned the favour, even if, in doing so, this has cost her some support domestically among members of the public who would like to see a more robust approach to countering China.  The main questions are whether President Lai would maintain such a course, and whether foreign governments would be reassured enough to keep the kind of engagement that we have seen since 2016 on track.

對於希望看到從2020年起政權連續，以及台灣在該地區發揮更大作用的外國政府來說，另一屆的蔡政府毫無疑問是他們的首選。他們喜歡到目前為止看到的情況，並且蔡總統已經回報了這一點。即使在這樣做的情況下，這也使她在國內成員中得到了一些支持，他們希望看到更強有力的方法來對抗中國。主要問題是，賴總統是否會保持這路線，以及外國政府是否會得到足夠的保證，以保持我們自2016年以來所看到的那種參與進展順利。

On the blue side, the road to 2020 has become increasingly confusing, with in-fighting getting more prevalent — and vicious — by the day.  Since its electoral disasters in the November 2014 local elections and the 2016 presidential/legislative elections, the KMT had been regarded by some as a spent force, with many in the green camp expecting it would soon be a thing of history (I personally didn’t buy that for a second). Struggling to rebuild and rejuvenate itself, the party had a break in the 11/24 elections last year when, benefiting among other things from discontent among former public servants caused by Tsai’s pension reform and an awkwardly implemented two-day weekend policy, the KMT regained control of a number of municipalities and saw the emergence of a new star in the person of Han Kuo-yu, who rode to victory, against all seeming odds, in the southern port city of Kaohsiung.  Soon after his victory, the so-called “Han wave” made headlines worldwide, and his populist image made him a seemingly unstoppable figure whose rise could only propel him to the next level — the presidency in 2020. From November onwards, a number of KMT politicians chose to attach themselves to Han, hoping, in the process, that some of his magic would improve their own electoral prospects.

從藍營來看，通向2020年的道路變得越來越令人困惑，連日的內戰越來越普遍—而且越來越惡毒。自2014年11月地方選舉，和2016年總統/立法選舉中的選舉災難以來，一些人認為國民黨是一支耗盡精力的隊伍，綠營中許多人都期待它很快成為歷史（我個人完全不接受這看法）。為了重建和振興自己，受益於蔡因養老金改革引起的前公務員的不滿以及尷尬實施的為期兩天的周末政策，國民黨在去年11月24日的選舉中重新獲得了選舉。贏取一些城市，並看到韓國瑜在南部港口城市高雄的逆轉勝，成為一顆新星。他勝利後不久，所謂的「韓流」成為世界各地的頭條新聞。他的民粹主義形象，使他成為一個看似勢不可擋的人物。他的崛起能推動他進入下一個層級—2020年的總統職位。從11月開始，一些國民黨政治家，將自己與韓國瑜綁在一起，希望在此過程中，他的一些魔力將改善他們自己的選舉前景。

Soon enough, however, Han began running into difficulties, which a visit to Hong Kong and China, where he met a number of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials, didn’t help dispel.  It was one thing for Han, an outlier within KMT central, to win a local election and for his popularity to give a new sense of mission to the deflated party.  It was another, however, when Han’s worldview and aspirations began to clash with more established members within the party, including its “princelings.”  That relationship was further poisoned when Han’s supporters turned on his critics and whomever within the KMT dared to suggest that other party members should be the candidates in the 2020 elections.  Little by little, Han the outlier has lost some ground within the party, which has its own set of policy preferences and a long tradition of candidate-selection which the Han camp is now seeking to bypass altogether. Former president Ma Ying-jeou has re-emerged in recent weeks, and there is little doubt that he will be kingmaker in the primaries.  And one thing is certain: Ma epitomizes KMT central and party traditions, which inevitably favour people with the “right” family background and connections, all of which Han is lacking. Consequently, it is highly likely that, if normal candidate-selection mechanisms are retained, the party’s next presidential candidate will be Terry Gou, with Eric Chu on the vice-presidential ticket.  A long-running dispute between Ma and former Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, who has also thrown in name in for the presidency, will hurt Wang’s ability to get the nomination, even if only as the vice-presidential candidate.  Although his generally moderate politics would likely appeal to light green voters, Wang, who belongs to the “Taiwanese” faction within the KMT, is regarded by the old guard as being of the wrong “ethnicity.”

然而，韓國瑜很快陷入困境，他訪問香港和中國，在那裡見了一些中共官員，也無濟於事。韓國瑜是國民黨中央的一個異類，他贏得一次地方選舉，以及他的受歡迎程度，為垂危的政黨賦予了新的使命感，是一回事；然而，當韓國瑜的世界觀和願望，開始與黨內既得者發生衝突時，包括其「太子黨」，是另一回事。當韓的支持者轉向批評，國民黨內其他人敢於暗示非韓國瑜是2020年候選人時，這種關係進一步受損。一點一滴地，韓這位異類在黨內已失去了一些基礎，韓陣營現在正試圖完全繞過，有自己的政策偏好和候選人選擇的悠久傳統。最近幾週，前總統馬英九重新出現，毫無疑問，馬將成為初選中的操刀者。一件事是肯定的：馬是國民黨中央和黨派傳統的縮影，這不可避免地有利於具有「正確」家庭背景和關係的人，而韓所缺乏這種關係。因此，很有可能的是，如果保留正常的候選人選拔機制，該黨的下一任總統候選人將是韓國瑜，朱立倫將出現在副總統候選人票上。馬英九與前立法議長王金平之間長期爭執，即使僅作為副總統候選人，也會損害王的獲得提名的能力。儘管他普遍溫和的政治，可能會吸引淡綠選民，但屬於國民黨內「台灣」派的王金平，被老派捍衛者視為屬錯誤的「族群」。

For outside observers and governments which hope for continuity, Han would be a tremendous source of uncertainty, especially given his pro-Beijing slant and position as an outlier within the KMT.  Much, if not all, of the bilateral and multilateral engagement that we have seen since 2016 under Tsai would likely grind to a halt under President Han.  For all its supposed pro-China inclinations, meanwhile, “mainstream KMT” is arguably no longer a viable partner for unification for the CCP: it has internalized the democratic rules of the game, and much of its ideology remains attached to the ROC.  This approach clashes with Beijing’s own worldview and explains why many KMT officials felt compelled to state their opposition when, earlier this year, President Xi Jinping made it clear that “one China” was now solely on Beijing’s terms and included acceptance of the “one country, two systems” formula. Han, on the other hand, along with other possible “independent” candidates (e.g., Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je, whose star appears to have dimmed somewhat since Han’s emergence), could be more easily controlled by Beijing and therefore present the likeliest candidates for backing by China in 2020, should they run for election.

對於那些希望保持連續性的外部觀察者和政府來說，韓將是個巨大的不確定性來源，特別是考慮到他親北京的傾向和國民黨內部的異議。我們自2016年以來在蔡之下看到的雙邊和多邊參與的很多（如果不是全部的話），很可能在韓總統時代停滯不前。同時，對於所謂的親中傾向，「主流國民黨」可以說不再是中共統一的可行夥伴：它已經將遊戲民主規則內化了，其大部分意識形態仍然依附於中華民國。這種做法與北京自己的世界觀相衝突，並解釋了為什麼許多國民黨官員在今年早些時候習近平主席明確表示「一個中國」現在完全符合北京的條件，並包括接受「一國」時，不得不表示反對。「一國兩制」公式。另一方面，韓和其他可能的「獨立」參選人（例如，台北市長柯文傑，自韓出現後，其明星態勢似乎有些暗淡）可能更容易被北京控制，因此如果他們參選，中國將在2020年支持他們。

As to Mr. Gou, his very substantial business interests in China, along with incipient anti-Americanism, have also raised some apprehensions in Washington circles about the shape of U.S.-Taiwan relations under his watch.

至於郭台銘先生，他在中國的巨大商業利益，以及初期的反美主義，也引起了華盛頓圈子對他所關注的美台關係形態的擔憂。

Regardless of who wins the KMT nomination, a KMT victory in 2020 would almost certainly have implications for Taiwan’s engagement with the U.S. and likeminded democracies on issues of common interest; a blue administration, even if it weren’t committed to unification, would nevertheless rekindle a policy that focuses more on interactions with China.  The question, then, is one of degree: under Han or Gou, the China engagement would presumably be significant (akin to what we could have expected had Hung Hsiu-chu remained the KMT’s candidate for 2016 and won the election), while under, say, President Wang or Chu, bilateral exchanges with China would, while increasing, nevertheless be more balanced and inspired by the pitfalls which President Ma encountered during his tenure.

無論誰贏得國民黨的提名，國民黨在2020年的勝利幾乎肯定會影響台灣與美國和民主國家在共同關心的問題上的接觸；一個藍色政府即使不致力於統一，也會重新制定一項更加註重與中國互動的政策。 那麼，這個問題就是程度問題：在韓或郭之下，中國的介入可能是顯著的（類似於我們所預期的，如果洪秀柱仍然是國民黨2016年的候選人並贏得大選），而在 比如，王總統或朱總統，與中國的雙邊交往雖然在增加，但會更加平衡，並記取馬總統任職期間遇到的陷阱。

Due to conditions created by an idiosyncratic geopolitical environment, never before has Taiwan had such an opportunity to play a role within the region and beyond, and the Tsai administration has made it one of its key policies to jump on board. At the same time, never before have general elections in Taiwan been expected to have so consequential an impact on the future course of Taipei’s foreign policy. The array of candidates who are vying for their party’s nomination at the moment all have very different personalities and policy preferences. It will be up to party members, and to Taiwanese voters, to decide which direction they want their country to take after 2020 — continued engagement in a unique period in history whose duration is itself unknown, or a return to a more inwards-looking, China-centric posture that will inevitably erode some of the alliances that Taipei has been building since 2016.

由於特殊的地緣政治環境所造成的條件，台灣從來沒有這樣的機會在該地區內外發揮作用，而蔡政府已將其作為加入其中的關鍵政策之一。此時，預計台灣大選從未對台北外交政策的未來走向產生如此重大的影響。目前競爭黨派提名的候選人群體，都有著截然不同的個性和政策偏好。由黨員和台灣選民決定他們希望自己的國家在2020年之後採取哪個方向—繼續參與歷史上一個獨特的時期，其持續時間本身是未知的，或者回歸更加內向的，以中國為中心的態勢，將不可避免地侵蝕台北自2016年以來一直建立的一些聯盟。

J. Michael Cole is a Taipei-based senior fellow with the Taiwan Studies Program, University of Nottingham, UK, senior fellow with the Global Taiwan Institute in Washington, D.C., senior fellow with the Macdonald-Laurier Institute in Ottawa, Canada, and associate researcher with the French Center for Research on Contemporary China. Mr. Cole was employee of the Thinking Taiwan Foundation, a think tank created by Tsai Ing-wen, from January 2014 until June 2016. Image credit: CC by Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan)