Remarks as prepared for delivery by The
Honorable Dan Coats
Director of National Intelligence
Opening Statement
Tuesday, January 29, 2019
Chairman Burr, Vice-Chairman Warner, and Members of the Committee...
I am here today, along with leaders of the Intelligence Community, to
provide you an overview of the national security threats facing our nation. But before I do, I would like to acknowledge
the hard work and dedication of the men and women that make up the Intelligence
Community.
Their efforts rarely receive public recognition because of the nature
of the work that they do. But their
unheralded contributions play a critical role in the national security of our
great nation, and I am proud to represent them.
I also want to express on behalf of the entire IC our appreciation to
the members of this committee. The Intelligence
Community appreciates your support and values our partnership.
My goal today is to responsibly convey to you and the American people,
in this unclassified hearing, the true nature of
the threat environment without overstating some of the more significant
challenges we currently face and expect to contend with in the coming
year…
In the interest of time, I also would refer you to my Statement for the
Record for a more complete threat picture.
As I stated in my recent remarks during the release of the National
Intelligence Strategy, we face significant changes in the domestic and global environment
that have resulted in an increasingly complex and uncertain world, and we must
be ready to meet 21st century challenges and recognize
emerging threats.
The composition of the current threats we face is a toxic mix of
strategic competitors, regional powers, weak or failed states, and non-state
actors using a variety of tools in overt and subtle ways to achieve their
goals.
The scale and scope of the various threats facing the United States and
our immediate interests worldwide is likely to further intensify this year. It is increasingly a challenge to prioritize
which threats are of greatest importance.
I first want to mention election
security. This has been, and
will continue to be, a top priority for the Intelligence Community.
We assess that foreign actors will view the
2020 US elections as an opportunity to advance their interests. We expect them to refine their capabilities and
add new tactics as they learn from each other’s experiences and efforts in previous elections.
On the heels of our successful efforts to protect the integrity of the
2018 mid-term elections, we are now focused on incorporating lessons learned in
preparation for the 2020 elections.
I would now like to turn to the variety of threats that currently exist
and may materialize in the coming year.
I will begin with remarks on what I would
describe as the BIG 4 – China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran – all of
which pose unique threats to the United States
and our partners.
China’s actions reflect a long-term
strategy to achieve global superiority.
Beijing’s global ambition continues
to restrict the personal freedoms of its citizens,
while strictly enforcing
obedience to Chinese leadership, with very
few remaining checks on President Xi’s power.
In its efforts to diminish US influence and extend its own economic,
political, and military reach, Beijing will seek to
tout a distinctly Chinese fusion of strong-man autocracy and a form of western
style capitalism as a development model and implicit alternative to democratic
values and institutions. These
efforts will include the use of its intelligence and influence apparatus to shape international views and gain advantages
over its competitors – including the United States.
China’s pursuit of intellectual property,
sensitive research and development plans, and US Person data, remains a
significant threat to the US government and private sector.
China’s military capabilities and reach will continue to grow as it
invests heavily in developing and fielding advanced weapons, and Beijing will
use its military clout to expand its footprint and complement its broadening
political and economic influence, as we’ve seen with its one-belt one-road initiative.
As part of this trend, we anticipate China
will attempt to further solidify and increase its control within its immediate
sphere of influence in the South China Sea and its global presence
farther abroad.
Whereas with China, we must be concerned about the methodical and
long-term efforts to capitalize on its past decade of a growing economy and to match,
or overtake our superior global capabilities, Russia’s approach relies on
misdirection and obfuscation as it seeks to destabilize and diminish our
standing in the world.
Even as Russia faces a weakening economy, the Kremlin is stepping up
its campaign to divide Western political and security institutions and undermine
the post-WWII international order.
We expect Russia will continue to wage its information
war against democracies and to use social media to attempt to divide our
societies.
Russia’s attack against Ukrainian naval vessels in November is just the
latest example of the Kremlin’s willingness to violate international norms to
coerce its neighbors and accomplish its goals.
We also expect Russia will use cyber techniques to influence Ukraine’s
upcoming Presidential election.
The Kremlin has aligned Russia with repressive regimes in Cuba, Iran,
North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela, and Moscow’s relationship with Beijing is
closer than it has been in many decades.
The Kremlin is also stepping up its engagement in the Middle East, Africa,
and Southeast Asia, using weapons sales, private security firms, and energy deals
to advance its global influence.
Regarding North Korea…the regime has halted its provocative behavior
related to its WMD program:
o North Korea has not conducted any nuclearcapable missile or nuclear
tests in more than a year, it has dismantled some of its nuclear infrastructure,
and Kim Jong Un continues to demonstrate openness to the denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula.
Nevertheless, we currently assess that North Korea will seek to retain
its WMD capabilities and is unlikely to completely give up its nuclear weapons and
production capabilities, because its leaders ultimately view nuclear weapons as
critical to regime survival. Our assessment is bolstered by our observations of
some activity that is inconsistent with full
denuclearization.
While we assess that sanctions on exports have been effective and
largely maintained, North Korea seeks to mitigate the effects of the US-led
pressure campaign through diplomatic engagement, counter-pressure against the
sanctions regime, and direct sanctions evasion.
Now, let me discuss Iran.
The Iranian regime will continue pursuing regional ambitions and
improved military capabilities, even while its own economy is weakening by the
day.
Domestically, regime hardliners will be more emboldened to challenge
rival centrists and we expect more unrest in Iran in the months ahead.
Tehran continues to sponsor terrorism as the recent European arrests of
Iranian operatives plotting attacks in Europe demonstrate.
We expect Iran will continue supporting the Huthis in Yemen and Shia
militants in Iraq, while developing indigenous military capabilities that threaten
US forces and allies in the region.
Iran maintains the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the
Middle East.
And while we do not believe Iran is currently undertaking the key
activities we judge necessary to produce a nuclear device, Iranian officials
have publicly threatened to push the boundaries of JCPOA restrictions if Iran
does not gain the tangible financial benefits it expected from the deal.
Its efforts to consolidate its influence in Syria and arm Hizballah
have prompted Israeli airstrikes; these actions underscore our concerns about
the long-term trajectory of Iranian influence in the region and the risk of
conflict escalation.
All four of these states – China,
Russia, North Korea, and Iran – are advancing
their cyber capabilities, which are relatively low-cost and growing in potency
and severity.
This includes threatening both minds and machines in an expanding
number of ways, such as stealing information, attempting to influence
populations, or developing ways to disrupt critical infrastructures.
As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, we expect these
actors, and others, to rely more and more on cyber capabilities when seeking to
gain political, economic, and military advantages over the United States and
its allies and partners.
Now that I’ve covered the BIG 4, I’ll quickly hit on some regional and
transnational threats.
In the Middle East, President Bashar al-Asad has largely defeated the
opposition and is now seeking to regain control over all of Syrian territory. Remaining pockets of ISIS and opposition
fighters will continue to stoke violence.
The regime will focus on re-taking territory, while seeking to avoid
conflict with Israel and Turkey.
With respect to Turkey, we assess it is in the midst of a
transformation of its political and national identity that will make
Washington’s relations with Ankara increasingly difficult to manage during the next
five years. Turkey will continue to see the PKK and related Kurdish groups as
the main threat to Turkish sovereignty.
Under President Erdogan, US-Turkish relations will be important but not
decisive for Ankara.
In Iraq, the underlying political and economic factors that facilitated
the rise of ISIS persist.
And Iraqi Shia militants’ attempts to further entrench their role in
the state, with the assistance of Iran, will increase the threat to US
personnel.
In Yemen, where 75% of the population is reliant on foreign assistance,
neither side of the conflict seems committed to end the fighting, and the humanitarian
impact of the conflict in 2019 will further compound already acute problems.
In Saudi Arabia, public support for the royal family appears to remain
high, even in the wake of the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi and the Kingdom’s
continued involvement in the Yemen conflict that have generated global
pushback.
In South Asia, the focus of the region will be centered on the
potential turmoil surrounding Afghanistan’s upcoming presidential election, ongoing
negotiations with the Taliban, and the Taliban’s large-scale attacks.
We assess neither the Afghan government nor
the Taliban will be able to gain a strategic advantage in the Afghan war in the
coming year, even if Coalition support remains at current levels.
However, current efforts to achieve an agreement with the Taliban and
decisions on a possible withdrawal of US troops could play a key role in shaping
the direction of the country in the coming years.
Militant groups supported by Pakistan will continue to take advantage
of their safe haven there to plan and conduct attacks in neighboring countries,
and possibly beyond, and we remain concerned about Pakistan’s continued
development and control of nuclear weapons.
In Africa, several countries are facing significant challenges that
threaten their stability, which could reverberate throughout the region.
o Libya remains unstable and various groups continue to be supported by a
variety of foreign actors with competing goals.
o In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a new government will be
challenged to deal with ongoing violence by multiple armed groups and the
outbreak of Ebola in the east of the country.
o And instability is growing in Sudan, where the population is angry at
the country’s direction and at President Bashir’s leadership.
In Europe, political, economic, and social trends will increase political
uncertainty and complicate efforts to push back against some autocratic tendencies.
Meanwhile, the possibility of a “no-deal” Brexit, in which the UK exits
the EU without an agreement, remains. This
would cause economic disruptions
that could substantially weaken the UK and Europe.
We anticipate that the evolving landscape in Europe will lead to
additional challenges to US interests as Russia and China intensify their
efforts to build influence there at the expense of the United States.
In the Western Hemisphere, flagging economies, migration flows,
corruption, narcotics trafficking, and anti-US autocrats will challenge US
interests.
o Venezuela is at a cross-roads as its economy faces further cratering
and political leaders vie for control, all of which are likely to further contribute
to the unprecedented migration of Venezuelans. We expect that attempts by Cuba,
Russia, and to some extent China, to prop up the Maduro regime’s security or
financing will lead to additional efforts to exploit the situation in exchange
for access to Venezuelan oil.
o We assess that Mexico, under new leadership, will pursue cooperation
with the United States as it tries to reduce violence and address socioeconomic
issues, but authorities still do not have the capability to fully address the production,
flow, and trafficking of the drug cartels.
o High crime rates and weak job markets will continue to spur US-bound
migrants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
To close my remarks, I would like to address several challenges that
span the globe. I already mentioned the increased use of cyber capabilities by
nefarious actors. But we must be mindful
of the proliferation of other threats
– beginning with Weapons of Mass Destruction.
In addition to nuclear weapons, we have
heightened concerns about chemical and biological weapons.
o We assess North Korea, Russia, Syria, and ISIS have all used chemical
weapons over the past two years, which threatens international norms and may
portend future use.
o The threat from biological weapons has become more diverse as they can
be employed in a variety of ways and their development is made easier by dual use technologies.
We expect foreign governments to expand their use of space-based reconnaissance, communications, and
navigation systems.
And China and Russia will continue
training and equipping their military space forces and fielding new anti-satellite weapons to hold US and allied space
services at risk.
Space has become the new global frontier, with competition from
numerous nations.
Terrorism remains a persistent
threat and in some ways is positioned to increase in 2019.
The conflicts in Iraq and Syria have generated a large pool of skilled
and attle-hardened fighters who remain dispersed throughout the region.
While ISIS is nearing territorial defeat in Iraq and Syria, the group
has returned to its guerilla-warfare roots while continuing to plot attacks,
and direct its supporters worldwide. ISIS is intent on resurging and still
commands thousands of fighters in Iraq and Syria.
Meanwhile, al-Qa‘ida is showing signs of confidence as its leaders work
to strengthen their networks and to encourage attacks against Western interests.
We saw this most recently in Kenya as al Shabaab attacked a hotel frequented by
tourists and westerners.
Lastly, the speed and adaptation of new technology will continue to
drive the world in which we live in ways we have yet to fully understand.
Advances in areas such as Artificial
Intelligence, communication technologies,
biotechnology, and materials
sciences are changing our way of life. But our adversaries are also investing heavily
into these technologies and they are likely to create new and unforeseen
challenges to our health, economy, and security.
With that, I will leave it there. We look forward to answering your questions
about these and other unmentioned threats.
敝魯猜測,與黑市相關技術的擴散,是另一個威脅。
回覆刪除15歲青少作詐騙下線,找10歲玩伴車手領錢,
敝魯猜測這已經不全是傳統型態社會問題。
如果更多弱勢被吸進詐騙犯罪結構,黑市和地下社會膨脹,怎麼辦
TW Democracy志工 敬上