蔡英文與台灣在南海的利益○Sheryn Lee at The Strategist(2016.05.23) Taimocracy翻譯

Tsai Ing-wen and Taiwan’s stake in the South China Sea○Sheryn Lee at The Strategist(2016.05.23)

Posted By Sheryn Lee on May 23, 2016 @ 2:30 pm

Taiwan’s new government already faces two major foreign policy challenges.  The first is China’s disappointment over President Tsai Ing-wen’s inauguration speech last week.  The second—which has hardly been mentioned in the strategic debate—is Taipei’s position on the upcoming ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in the Philippines versus China case.

台灣的新政府已經面對了兩個重大的外交挑戰。第一，中國對上週蔡英文總統的就職演說不滿意。第二，幾乎不曾以戰略觀點受到討論的，對於即將出爐的「菲律賓訴中國」案的國際法庭 (PCA) 仲裁，台北的立場如何？

In April 2016, the government-linked Chinese (Taiwan) Society of International Law submitted evidence to the PCA, arguing that Itu Aba (Taiping), located in the Spratly Islands chain, is an island with the right to an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and that it belongs to Taiwan.  Two days before Tsai’s inauguration last week, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned that the Taiwanese government wouldn’t accept the PCA ruling unless the five PCA arbitrators and the Philippines’ representatives visit Itu Aba.  Yet despite Taiwan’s vested interest in the matter, its intervention in the arbitration could have an adverse effect on its strategic and political interests.

在2016年4月，與台灣政府有關聯的中國國際法學會向PCA提交證明，主張位於南沙群島的太平島是島嶼，因此享有200海哩的專屬經濟區，且太平島屬於台灣。上週，就在蔡英文就任前兩天，台灣的外交部警告，台灣政府絕不接受PCA的仲裁，除非5位PCA法官與菲律賓的代表訪問太平島。儘管台灣已享有既得利益，其干預仲裁的舉動恐不利其戰略與外交。

Itu Aba is the largest feature in the Spratlys. Taiwan has occupied the island since 1945 when it became terra nullius after Japan renounced its claims in the Treaty of San Francisco and the Treaty of Taipei.  Taipei’s claim dates back to 1947 when it published its U-dash line, strikingly similar to China’s infamous nine-dash line covering almost the entire South China Sea.

太平島為南沙群島的最大島。台灣從1945年起即佔領此島，當時日本在舊金山和約與台北和約中放棄此島，使其成為無主地。台北的主張可回溯1947年，當時它出版U形線，與中國幾乎涵蓋整個南海的九段線幾乎一模一樣。

The PCA will rule on two issues: first, it will decide which features in the Spratlys are a low-tide elevation (LTE), a rock or an island.  That has implications for the range of nautical miles of territorial waters granted around the features—EEZs can claim 200nm of territorial waters, rocks can claim 12nm, and LTEs can claim neither.  Second, it will reach a verdict on the validity of the claims of China’s nine-dash line—that is, determining whether claims within a country’s EEZ are enforceable.  The court, in line with the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, doesn’t have any jurisdiction over sovereignty.

PCA即將對下列兩個爭議作出裁決：首先，決定南沙群島各個島礁是屬於低潮高地、礁岩、或島嶼。這將牽涉到領海的海里範圍：島嶼可以主張200海里領海的專屬經濟區(EEZ)，礁岩則可主張到12海里，但低潮高地(LTE)卻兩者皆無。其次，PCA將裁決中國九段線的有效性，亦即決定：侵入他國EEZ範圍的主張是否合法。這個法庭乃基於聯合國海洋法公約，其裁判權並不涉及主權。

Arguably, Taiwan has the strongest claim to an EEZ within the disputed area.  Taiping Island is dry land with ‘a weak water lens’—meaning it has fresh water, and therefore potential for agriculture and permanent residency.  Added to Taiwan’s continuous presence, it’s therefore the only feature in the Spratly island chain likely to be ruled an island and granted an EEZ.  Taiping’s EEZ could also include an additional 150nm under Article 7 of UNCLOS, due to the rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf.  Currently, Taiping is also home to one of only two airstrips in the area long enough to accommodate larger aircraft.  As I have previously written on The Strategist, Taiwan has increased military and economic investments on Taiping.  This month it also completed a US$100 million port upgrade and the installation of a new lighthouse.

台灣在爭議海域中，可說是擁有最強的EEZ主張。太平島是帶著「脆弱水透鏡」的乾燥土地，也就說它擁有淡水，從而具有農業與永久定居的潛力。加上台灣持續的駐留，它是南沙群島中最有可能被判定為島嶼並賦予EEZ的地方。太平島的EEZ還可外加UNCLOS第7條所規定的150海里的大陸棚權利。目前南沙群島有兩條飛機跑道，太平島擁有其中之一，足以起降較大型的飛機。本人先前刊登在「戰略家」的文章中曾指出，台灣已經加強對太平島的軍事與經濟投資。本月，已經完成1億美元的港口升級與新建燈塔。

There are two key reasons Taiwan maintains an interest in Taiping: first, the geostrategic location supports its maritime awareness in the South China Sea.  In the future, Taiping could serve as a base for Taiwan’s upgraded P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft.  Second, the island is critical to Taiwan’s assertions as a sovereign state.   Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty is under increasing pressure from Beijing.  Relinquishing its claim over Taiping would be a blow to Taiwan’s national pride, erode its informal independent status and undermine its sense of security.  Indeed, in her inauguration speech, Tsai stated that it was her ‘responsibility to safeguard the sovereignty and territory of the Republic of China’.

台灣堅持它在太平島的利益有兩個主要理由。首先，其地緣位置讓台灣可於南海進行海洋警戒。未來，太平島將可成為台灣升級的P-3C獵戶座反潛巡邏機的基地。其次，對於台灣的主權國家主張，此島嶼有關鍵重要性。台灣的實質主權，一直處於北京不斷加碼的壓力下。如果放棄對於太平島的主張，將會打擊台灣的國家光榮感，侵蝕其非正式的獨立地位，並危及其安全。蔡英文在就職演說中表明，鞏固中華民國的主權與領土是她的職責。確實如此。

However, Taiwan’s claim in the South China Sea is a double-edged sword.  Despite China challenging the PCA’s jurisdiction and the Philippines’ right to bring the case to court, China has backed Taiwan’s submission.  The reasons are obvious: Taipei’s challenge to the Philippines implicitly supports Beijing’s claims, and should China one day wrestle back control over Taiwan, Taiping and its EEZ would fall under Beijing’s jurisdiction.  China’s control of its ‘near seas’ would also complicate the ability of the US Navy to operate in the South China Sea.

然而，台灣對南海的主張是一把雙面刃。雖然中國挑戰PCA的仲裁及菲律賓向法庭提訴的權利，中國卻支持台灣的主張。中國的理由很明顯：台北挑戰菲律賓，暗示著支持北京的主張，且萬一中國有朝一日取得台灣的控制權，太平島與其EEZ將落入北京的管轄之內。中國對於近海的控制，將使美國海軍在南海的行動更形複雜。

Although Taiwan’s political leadership has made it clear that its claim over Taiping is incompatible with that of China, its submission to the PCA could paradoxically benefit China and damage the new government’s goal of increased engagement with ASEAN through its 'New Southbound policy'.  Moreover, while Taipei shouldn’t relinquish Taiping, a PCA ruling in favor of the Philippines would strengthen the regional rules-based order underpinned by Washington and its allies.  Taiwan’s submission threatens to undermine that result.  Consequently, Washington’s de facto embassy in Taipei called former President Ma Ying-jeou’s January 2016 visit to Taiping ‘extremely unhelpful’.  The PCA process will also pressure Taiwan to legally interpret its own claim over Taiping, and thus its U-dash line, which would implicitly support China’s own nine-dash line due to the historical contest over Taiwan’s independence.  At the end of the day Taiwan might have best secured its interests in maritime Asia by keeping quiet.

儘管台灣的政治領袖澄清：其對太平島的主張與中國不同步。但其向PCA提送證據，卻弔詭地有利於中國，並傷害到新政府意欲加強與東協交往的「新南向政策」。而且，台北雖然不應放棄太平島，PCA若做出有利於菲律賓的仲裁，卻將強化基於規則的區域秩序，而該秩序乃由華盛頓及其盟國所支撐。台灣提交證據，卻威脅到這樣的仲裁結果。所以，華府在台的實質大使館「美國在台協會」稱前總統馬英九在2016年元月的太平島之行為乃「極端無益」。PCA的仲裁程序也將會施壓台灣，命其法理解釋對太平島及其U形線的主張。此舉將帶出台灣獨立的歷史爭論，反而有利於中國九段線的主張。諸多衡量之下，台灣最好保持緘默，以保衛其在亞太海洋的利益。

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Sheryn Lee is an associate lecturer in Security Studies at the Department of Security Studies and Criminology, Macquarie University.