拯救台灣的海軍陸戰隊○外交家雜誌/Taimocracy摘譯

【Comment】

馬的過份裁軍，已經有文章點名警告。

馬的行為模式是，一直在玩「打著藍旗反藍旗」的伎倆：口說美國的話（人道救援），手做中國的事（不管國安，裁撤武力）。說馬是PLA的同路人，並不為過！
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Saving Taiwan's Marine Corps○The Diplomat(2015.11.26)

拯救台灣的海軍陸戰隊○外交家雜誌/雲程摘譯

Taiwan’s amphibious capabilities are becoming dangerously weak

台灣的兩棲戰力逐漸衰弱而危及安全

海峽對岸愈來愈具侵略性的解放軍，公開宣稱要以武力拿下台灣的同時，馬政權卻在這幾年將台灣海軍陸戰隊(TMC)，從16,000人縮編到9,000人，甚至考慮完全裁撤。

亞太國家加緊打造兩棲戰力時，台灣卻反其道而行，逐漸瓦解本身的海軍陸戰隊，造成國防漏洞，危及己身安全，並破壞盟友的威攝力量及信心。

此主要戰略軍力，不可繼續被掏空。台灣領導人必須以前瞻性的眼光做適量的投資，重新打造海軍陸戰隊，使它成為「不對稱防衛」計畫中的決定性資產。

作者提及要重新打造TMC為輕量、機動、行動彈性、能從台灣一岸到另一岸的沿岸火力旅團。那需要自己的空中運輸與武力支援，需要能即刻戰鬥的「海陸空對地機動部隊」(TAGTF)，包括整合地面、航空、後勤為單一機動單位。以達到彈性、自我維持、任意規模。

台灣需要保留兩棲攻擊能力，但不是攻擊對岸。

台灣幾十年沒打戰，但兩棲作戰能力在人道救援即為重要。莫拉克颱風時，已經展現海陸兩棲救援能力。但台灣亟需更換老舊的AAVs。

台灣也可進行區域的人道救援任務。海陸轉型為TAGTF後，可以與美軍的海陸遠征單位(MEU)合作。MEU是兩棲船艦加上海陸、後勤、海外機動航空資產，而能支應訓練精良、即刻救援的任務。

台灣的區域人道救援概念過時，空軍僅空投物資便回航，留下徒手的災民自行謀生。這是台灣國際孤立的後果。當台灣自能力與政治允許時，應使武裝力量直接進入地面支援。

參與區域救援能使台灣軍隊獲得經驗。更大的人道救援能見度也讓台灣獲取相稱的政治利益。

藉由專業，TMC的轉型能以不對稱防禦，加強台灣整體國防。包括

1.  成為都市地區軍事行動專家(MOUT)

2.  過渡到輕砲兵與反艦巡弋飛彈(ASCM)任務

3.  擴充空海火力支援(ANGLICO)能力

4.  發展基於美國海陸的輕裝甲車輛(LAV)武裝能力

5.  改善防空角色

6.  取得佈雷專業能力

7.  維持與提升兩棲偵察組(ARG)

台灣海陸不對稱戰爭致勝之道。

1.  停止孤立。美國可以也應該主導。2016美國國防授權法案(NDAA 2016)：應允許台灣軍力參與美國所主辦的雙邊訓練活動，以提升台灣的嚇阻能力。美國應持續與支援，以使台灣整合到創新與不對稱手段，以平衡PRC的擴張。

美國海陸，特別是海軍，應允許TMC加入人道救援行動。首先，美國海陸應仿效對日本陸自與其他區域軍方，派遣一或二位說中文的聯絡官到TMC。

2.  不要再裁減TMC了！！反而要擴大。至少數千名的員額，或需要的員額，以支應上述各種任務。在這幾年的裁軍中，TMC已經減損了許多精良、具創意與紀律的軍官與軍隊。

3.  加強上述任務的能力，充實台灣不對稱防禦的能力，以增加入侵者的成本。

4.  增加國防預算。現在已經證實全募兵制對台灣不切實際，特別是TMC。需要進一步增加國防預算，假使運用得當，會有必要性的改善。台灣是個富裕的國家，近幾年卻削減軍費，令人費解。台灣面對如此巨大的威脅，不能不維持投資維持適當武力。

消除台灣最好的、關鍵地面以及最好的海岸防衛武力單位，是錯誤的。這會削弱台灣的安全與讓美國誤會台灣承諾防衛自己的決心。

台灣政府必須重新組織TMC並重新定目標，以使其更嚴肅對待自己的國防，當然要更進一步投資。台灣的朋友才會更願意在有事時幫忙。

台灣必須了解並承認，本就虛弱的國防力量之中，TMC是關鍵的戰力。否則，它將會被削弱到微不足道，使台灣國防出現漏洞，讓裝備齊全、訓練有素、日益強悍的主要敵人稱心如意。

Saving Taiwan's Marine Corps○The Diplomat(2015.11.26)

Taiwan’s amphibious capabilities are becoming dangerously weak

While other Asia/Pacific nations are building amphibious capabilities, Taiwan (the Republic of China) is going the other way – at its great peril.  Taiwan’s slow self-destruction of its Marine Corps creates a dangerous gap in its defense, and undermines both deterrence and the confidence of its friends.

Rather than continue to eviscerate this strategically vital force, with vision and relatively modest investment Taiwan’s leaders must re-forge it to make it a decisive national asset for its “asymmetric defense” plans.

How Taiwan’s Marines Got to This Point

The Ma Administration shrank the Taiwan Marine Corps (TMC) from 16,000 to 9,000 troops in recent years, and even considered disbanding it – at a time when its militarily powerful, increasingly aggressive adversary across the Taiwan Strait is openly advertising its ability to take Taiwan by force.

These decisions were nominally linked to an overall decline in defense spending.  More accurately, however, they reflect a glaring failure by Taiwan’s defense establishment to recognize the TMC’s essential role in national defense, and the vital role it can play in making Taiwan “too tough a nut to crack.”

The Taiwan Marine Corps was established on Mainland China as an amphibious assault force.  When the Nationalist government fled to Taiwan following the Communist victory in the civil war, the TMC’s main mission shifted over time from amphibious assault to retake the mainland to a more static defense of Taiwan and its few outlying islands.

Tough and disciplined, the Taiwan Marines mastered that particular role, particularly the difficult maneuvers designed to disrupt PRC amphibious assaults.  But the TMC suffered increasingly serious deficiencies.

Much like species on the Galapagos Island cut off from outside contact and influence, the TMC has been cut off from most interaction with foreign militaries.  As a result, it resembles a 1979 version of the U.S. Marine Corps.  Although TMC’s ethos and professionalism are superb – indeed, the best in the Taiwan Armed Forces – the Taiwan Marines “froze” in time where the U.S. Marines were 35 years ago: relatively heavy, mechanized, and not particularly mobile.

Eventually its skillsets did not seem to match Taiwan’s defense requirements, as the PRC’s strengthened military and offensive capabilities altered the regional security environment.  Consequently, the TMC has fared badly in bureaucratic resource battles.

Redefine the TMC

The TMC’s current need to redefine itself resembles the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  In the immediate post-Vietnam War era, the USMC had to reshape itself into a lighter (though still hard-hitting) expeditionary force making use of a “new” old concept: “maneuver warfare.”  The USMC knew they had to offer distinctive war-fighting capability – that they could not simply try to be a better version of the U.S. Army that was also familiar with the ocean and ships.

Similarly, the Taiwan Marine Corps’ organization and purpose needs to be radically transformed.  To this end, the TMC should become Taiwan’s essential “Rapid Deployment Counterattack Force” – a hybrid of the USMC and the British Royal Marines.  It must be become light, mobile, operationally flexible in its thinking, and able to operate as a lethal fire-brigade from one end of Formosa to the other.

Mobility requires an “air wing” for transportation and fire support.  This aviation element can be established within the TMC itself in a manner akin to USMC aviation, or with helicopters and crews from the Taiwan Navy or Taiwan Army, permanently attached and integrated into the TMC.

With an embedded aviation element, TMC could then adopt the combat-proven “MAGTF” (Marine Air-Ground Task Force) structure and a doctrine akin to the USMC.  The MAGTF combines ground, aviation, and logistics elements into a single coherent and mobile force.  The TMC is well-suited for this sort of organization, which offers flexibility, self-sustainment, and “scalability” – i.e. it can be as big or as small as commanders need it to be, it, depending on the mission. 

Taiwan Marine Corps’ Amphibious Role – Keep It

Keep the TMC’s amphibious capability and mission.  For Taiwan, amphibious assault is still feasible in most scenarios, except for an assault against a well-defended coastline or in an extremely high-threat environment far from Taiwan.  There are a number of ways to employ a properly sized and equipped amphibious force in a counter-attack role in the context of a strategic defense of Taiwan.

An amphibious capability is also indispensable in Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations.  Although war in East Asia is not unthinkable, particularly in light of the PRC’s increasing bellicosity and acquisitive actions in the region, Taiwan has not had to fight pitched battles for decades.  However, natural disasters frequently occur in Taiwan and the region, and HA/DR alone warrants an amphibious capability.  The TMC, operating with Taiwan Navy (TN) amphibious ships, is the ideal force to spearhead HA/DR efforts as it combines sea/ground/air capabilities and is able to move rapidly with substantial supplies, equipment, and personnel to affected locations – both domestically and regionally.

The TMC has already proved its usefulness in domestic HA/DR on a number of occasions, to include the 2009 flooding when TMC amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs) were the only vehicles capable of accessing certain afflicted areas.  The TMC’s AAVs are old, but they still have life in them.  When newer versions of amphibious vehicles are developed overseas, the Taiwan Marines should acquire them.

Engage in Regional HA/DR Support

Looking beyond Taiwan, one notes that the majority of regional natural disasters require an amphibious response.  Following the TMC’s transformation into MAGTFs, it must learn to work with the Taiwan Navy to build a truly amphibious force along the lines of the U.S. “Marine Expeditionary Unit” (MEU).  A MEU is a combination of amphibious ships with Marines and their logistics and organic aviation assets aboard, trained, equipped, and ready to join fully in regional HA/DR missions and training exercises.

Taiwan’s involvement in regional disaster response operations to date has been limited.  Generally speaking, the Taiwan Air Force flies in relief supplies and goes home – leaving a handful of Taiwanese civilians behind to handle relief operations.  This concept is outdated, and serves only to keep Taiwan isolated and marginalized in the international arena.  When physically and politically possible, Taiwan Armed Forces (Marines and Navy taking the lead) should get directly involved on the ground.

Beyond obvious foreign policy benefits, this approach has practical operational benefits.  For example, the Taiwan military (with its organization, manpower, and equipment) gets practical experience assisting the overall relief effort and ensures that supplies and aid are used properly.  As importantly, Taiwan gets greater visibility (and, hence credit) for humanitarian activities with the attendant political benefits.  This political angle to HA/DR also applies domestically as well, since failure to effectively respond to local disasters discredits both the Ministry of National Defense and whatever administration is in power.

One anticipates criticism from certain quarters of Taiwan Armed Forces’ more active role in regional humanitarian activities.  However, those who’ve been involved in disaster relief understand that the victims don’t care where help comes from.

Strengthen Specialized Roles for TMC

Besides reorganizing and improving mobility and maintaining an amphibious capability, the Taiwan Marine Corps can also strengthen Taiwan’s overall defense by improving or taking on the following specialized roles.  These roles will directly support Taiwan Ministry of National Defense plans for an “asymmetric” defense of Taiwan.

Become the MOUT (Military Operations in Urban Terrain) specialists. Taiwan’s terrain is either vertical or it is urbanized, particularly in central and northern parts of the island. A MOUT capability is essential to defending Taiwan, and is a specialized skill that requires focused, complex training. The Taiwan Marines have already developed considerable expertise in MOUT and should enhance and expand these capabilities.

Transition to light artillery and ASCM (anti-ship cruise missiles) missions. Replace the TMC’s heavy, self-propelled artillery with light, mobile artillery, and take advantage of advances in precision-guided munitions. Taiwan Marines might also adopt the ASCM and establish anti-ship cruise missile units. Land based, mobile, and easily concealed, ASCMs are almost impossible to destroy from the air while giving an attacking naval force migraines. ASCMs are a perfect weapon for the TMC, with its littoral warfare expertise. Sea-going by nature, Taiwan Marines might potentially operate ASCMs aboard Taiwan Navy ships.

Expand ANGLICO (Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company) capabilities. Taiwan Marines are already proficient in coordinating combined arms – air, artillery, naval surface, and ground fires. The TMC can expand this capability – and improve overall lethality – by deploying ANGLICO teams throughout the entire Taiwan Armed Forces

Develop an armored capability based on the USMC’s Light Armored Vehicle (LAV). The wheeled LAV-25 (and its variants) would give the Taiwan Marines an added dimension of agility, high maneuverability and firepower – all of which are necessary attributes for a newly designed TMC. The LAV’s core mission sets are Security Missions, which provide the commander with early warning, allowing him to concentrate combat power at the right place and time. Such economy of force missions are, again, perfectly suited for the TMC and defense of Taiwan.

Improve TMC’s Air Defense role.  TMC has played a role in air defense for years, but in a static way. Instead, the Taiwan Marines deploying shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles and other mobile SAM systems can provide a highly mobile air defense capability, thereby complicating PRC targeting of Taiwan’s AAA capabilities by PLA missiles, aircraft, and Special Operations teams and sleeper agent cells.

Take on Mine Warfare specialty.  Sea mine technology has improved markedly in recent times, to include “smart” mines. Properly employed, these cheap, highly effective weapons are particularly valuable in defending Taiwan, and are a role TMC might take on given their expertise in littoral operations and boat operations.

Maintain and upgrade TMC Amphibious Reconnaissance Group (ARG).  The Amphibious Reconnaissance Group (ARG) Marines are tough customers able to do the “sexy stuff” – parachuting, ocean swimming, SCUBA, etc. – along with their main mission of serving as “eyes and ears” in the ocean, on the beach, and on land and direct action missions. Special Forces such as the ARG are potentially an asymmetric force multiplier, but they need appropriate doctrine and to be properly trained and employed. Like much of the Taiwan Armed Forces, the ARG suffer from professional isolation – lack of exposure to other militaries. In addition to developing opportunities to interact with other foreign special operations units, the Amphibious Reconnaissance Group could use a thorough outside review of its doctrine, missions, and employment concepts.

The Taiwan Marines’ Road Ahead: The Path to Asymmetric Warfare Success

First, end the Taiwan Marine Corps’ isolation.  Decades of near-isolation and lack of interaction with other militaries have resulted in a less-capable Taiwan Marines Corps – and the Taiwan Military writ large.  The United States can, and should, take the lead in this regard – and has at least nominally stated its intention to do so.  The U.S. National Defense Authorization Act 2016 (NDAA 2016) states that “military forces of Taiwan should be permitted to participate in bilateral training activities hosted by the United States that increase credible deterrent capabilities of Taiwan.”

Moreover, NDAA 2016 also notes that “the United States should continue to support the efforts of Taiwan to integrate innovative and asymmetric measures to balance the growing military capabilities of the People’s Republic of China….”  A re-shaped and re-purposed Taiwan Marine Corps certainly qualifies as an asymmetric and innovative measure.

The U.S. Marines and U.S. Navy in particular should be allowed to bring the TMC (and Taiwan Navy) back into the fold – particularly for HA/DR operations.  As a first step, the U.S. Marine Corps should send one or two Mandarin-speaking officers as Liaison Officers to the Taiwan Marine Corps, as it has done in sending LNOs to the Japan Ground Self Defense Force and other regional militaries.

Second, do not cut the TMC any further, and instead consider enlarging it.  At least maintain the current size of the TMC and, if necessary, expand the Corps by a few thousand Marines or however many are necessary, depending on a proper assessment of what’s needed for the TMC’s new role as described in this article.  The Taiwan Marines have lost a number of superb, creative, and well-disciplined officers and troops from downsizing in recent years.  Consider enticing some of them to return.

Third, strengthen the specialized roles outlined in this article, to fill vital niches in Taiwan’s asymmetric defense capabilities and geometrically increase the costs to an aggressor.

Fourth, increase defense spending.  The shift to an all-volunteer force has proven difficult for Taiwan’s armed forces – especially for the TMC – owing to low pay and perceived harsh training and living conditions.  A bigger defense budget is needed, and if spent right, would allow the necessary improvements.  Taiwan’s decreasing defense spending over recent years is perplexing given that Taiwan is a wealthy country.  For a country facing such a daunting military threat, Taiwan simply cannot provide an adequate defense without investing money.

Conclusion

Eliminating a large, vital component of Taiwan’s best ground troops – and the ones best able to operate in the littorals where land and sea come together – was ill-advised.  This move undermined both Taiwan’s security and many knowledgeable Americans’ perception of Taiwan’s commitment to its own security.

Taiwan’s government must recognize that a reorganized and re-purposed Taiwan Marine Corps will substantially improve Taiwan’s overall defense capabilities. Moreover, it must recognize that Taiwan making a more serious effort to defend itself – and spending the money to do so – has a deterrent effect on adversaries while also making Taiwan’s friends more willing to assist in the event of trouble.

The Taiwan Marine Corps is a key element of Taiwan’s fragile defense capability, and it needs to be understood and recognized as such.  Otherwise, it will be whittled away into irrelevance, leaving a void in Taiwan’s defense framework that its well-armed, well-trained, increasingly assertive chief adversary will deeply appreciate.

Grant Newsham is senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies, and a retired U.S. Marine Colonel. He served as the first U.S. Marine Liaison Officer to the Japan Ground Self Defense Force and was instrumental in the development of the Japan Self Defense Force’s nascent amphibious capability. He remains active in amphibious development in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Kerry Gershaneck is a Senior Associate with Pacific Forum CSIS, and a professor at a major Asian military academy. Through his Marine Corps and civil service career, he helped develop ROC/Taiwan military capabilities at the tactical through strategic levels.