【Comment】
中國不斷進行侵台的海空演習。日前通過巴士水道的演習,就是其之一。
戰爭時,中國可以針對台灣動員8-12師的兵力。目前,中國已經動員演習2萬噸級的民船,運兵。
但渡海兩棲攻擊,有賴制空權、制海權、快速集結、灘頭持續補給、不間斷的支援。中國沁略台灣將引起國際干預。中國似乎不會採行傳統的兩棲攻擊模式侵台。
2015年元月,中國宣稱將加倍其兩棲機械化步兵師到四個師,最多到6萬兵員。補充其現有的2萬海軍陸戰隊。
五角大廈研究如下:PLA已經完成攻台兩棲能量。中國已經可以拿下東沙島與太平島。也可以拿下具有良好防衛能力的中型島嶼如金門與馬祖。
How China Practices the Invasion of Taiwan○The Diplomat(2015.06.17)
Recent Chinese military maneuvers in the Bashi Channel
had only one purpose.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has recently been practicing the invasion
of Taiwan with a number of joint air-sea military exercises in and around the Bashi
Channel, in close proximity to Taiwanese territory.
As I reported last week (see: “China Holds Naval Drills Near Taiwan and Philippines”), the
most recent exercise involved the simulation of real combat conditions in the waters
east of the Bashi Channel, including long-range precision strikes and aerial combat.
According to IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, the Chinese naval task force
consisted of a Type 052B destroyer, a Type 054A frigate — side note: two ships of this class also
recently participated in a joint Sino-Russian maritime exercise – and a Type 904 general stores issue ship.
The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) deployed a number of H-6G/K
strategic bombers and J-11B air superiority fighter jets. The H-6K can carry
six KD-20 land attack cruise missiles as well as “a wide range of new precision-guided
munitions available from four Chinese weapon manufacturers,” IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly states.
The article also discussed a PLA Daily review of another
naval drill — a mobility exercise involving a 20,000-ton
civilian roll-on/roll-off (ro-ro) ferry, which was seconded to the PLAAF
Transportation Department, and transported troops and
vehicles from the Bohai to the South China Sea. IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly summarized the rationale behind
this move:
To compensate for the relatively small size of its formal naval amphibious
transport fleet the PLA has co-funded construction of
a large number of ferries used by civilian companies. They will be made available to the PLA during emergencies
and are a frequent element in civil-military transport exercises.
Additionally, IHS Jane ’s
points out that the PLA Daily article included an officer giving a briefing
with a map that resembled Taiwan. The article
also notes that China might be capable of moving eight
to 12 divisions to Taiwan in the event of war. However, as a 2014
U.S. Department of Defense report emphasizes:
Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult
military operations the PLA might pursue in a cross-Strait contingency. Success would depend
upon air and sea superiority, rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies on shore,
and uninterrupted support. An attempt
to invade Taiwan would strain China’s armed forces and invite international intervention
…. China does not appear to be building the conventional amphibious lift required
to support such a campaign.
Back in January, the PLA also announced that it will double the number of
its Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Divisions (AMID) from two to four (see: “China Just Doubled the Size of Its Amphibious Mechanized Infantry
Divisions”). Total manpower in the AMIDs
will soon be around 52,000 – 60,000, up from 30,000. These new amphibious forces are meant to complement
the roughly 20,000
strong elite PLA Marine Corps in future conflicts with Taiwan.
Yet the DoD study also puts this in perspective:
The PLA is capable of accomplishing various amphibious operations short of
a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few
overt military preparations beyond routine training, China could launch an invasion
of small Taiwan-held islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas or Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better defended
offshore island such as Matsu or Jinmen is within China’s capabilities.
沒有留言:
張貼留言
請網友務必留下一致且可辨識的稱謂
顧及閱讀舒適性,段與段間請空一行