【Comment】
作者 Robert Kagan 的文章刊登於 The New Republic 。
文章融合了國際關係、歷史與文學。頗有見地，推薦給讀者。文章頗長，分四批刊出。
Superpowers Don't Get to Retire
What our tired
country still owes the world
The New Republic (2014.05.26)
by Robert Kagan
超級大國沒有隱退這回事
疲憊的美國責任未了
作者：Robert Kagan
翻譯：Taimocracy
Almost 70 years ago, a new world order was born from the rubble of World
War II, built by and around the power of the United States. Today that world order shows signs of
cracking, and perhaps even collapsing. The
Russia-Ukraine and Syria crises, and the world’s tepid response, the general
upheaval in the greater Middle East and North Africa, the growing nationalist
and great-power tensions in East Asia, the worldwide advance of autocracy and
retreat of democracy—taken individually, these problems are neither unprecedented
nor unmanageable. But collectively they
are a sign that something is changing, and perhaps more quickly than we may
imagine. They may signal a transition
into a different world order or into a world disorder of a kind not seen since
the 1930s.
約七十年前，美國以其權力為核心，在二戰的廢墟之上建立了全新的世界秩序。而今，那個秩序出現了裂解的前兆，甚或整個崩盤。烏克蘭以及敘利亞的危機、國際間的冷淡反應、中東與北非的動盪、盛行的國族主義與崛起的大國在東亞造成的緊張、全世界獨裁的興盛與民主的衰退----這些事件單獨來看都不是新鮮事，也不是想像不到的事，但整體而言卻是個警訊。世界在改變當中，變化之速，恐超乎我們想像。這可能預告了世界將轉入新的秩序，或者進入30年代以來未曾有過的混亂。
If a breakdown in the world order that America made is occurring, it is
not because America’s power is declining—America’s wealth, power, and potential
influence remain adequate to meet the present challenges. It is not because the world has become more
complex and intractable—the world has always been complex and intractable. And it is not simply war-weariness. Strangely enough, it is an intellectual
problem, a question of identity and purpose.
美國所建立的世界秩序如果面臨瓦解，並非由於美國實力減弱 (美國的財富、權力、及潛在的影響力仍足堪應付目前的挑戰)；並非國際局勢變得複雜不易處理 (這世界向來如此)；亦非單純的厭戰情緒。很奇特地，它是個智識的問題，自我定位與目標的問題。
Many Americans and their political leaders in both parties, including
President Obama, have either forgotten or rejected the assumptions that
undergirded American foreign policy for the past seven decades. In particular, American foreign policy may be
moving away from the sense of global responsibility that equated American
interests with the interests of many others around the world and back toward
the defense of narrower, more parochial national interests. This is sometimes called “isolationism,” but
that is not the right word. It may be
more correctly described as a search for normalcy. At the core of American unease is a desire to
shed the unusual burdens of responsibility that previous generations of
Americans took on in World War II and throughout the cold war and to return to
being a more normal kind of nation, more attuned to its own needs and less to
those of the wider world.
許多美國人及兩黨領導者，包括歐巴馬在內，要不是忘了就是否認過去七十年來美國外交政策的基本假設。尤其是，美國外交政策可能正逐漸淡化了對全球安全的責任感，轉身去保護較為狹隘的、地域性的國家利益，不再等量齊觀美國的利益與他國的利益。有人稱之為孤立主義，但正確說法應該是尋求常態的國家定位。美國人的不安，主要是渴望擺脫二戰以來貫穿整個冷戰時期的超級重擔，渴望回去當個比較正常的國家，顧好自己國家的需求，少去理會全球義務。
If this is indeed what a majority of Americans seek today, then the
current period of retrenchment will not be a temporary pause before an
inevitable return to global activism. It
will mark a new phase in the evolution of America’s foreign policy. And because America’s role in shaping the
world order has been so unusually powerful and pervasive, it will also begin a
new phase in the international system, one that promises not to be marginally
different but radically different from what we have known these past 70 years. Unless Americans can be led back to an
understanding of their enlightened self-interest, to see again how their fate
is entangled with that of the world, then the prospects for a peaceful
twenty-first century in which Americans and American principles can thrive will
be bleak.
如果絕大部分美國人都這麼想，那麼目前的樽節退守就不是暫時的過渡期，而是個劃時代的美國外交政策的轉變期。由於美國過去對世界秩序的建立，影響不凡而深遠，所以美國的轉變也將大幅改變世界的結構，使它與過去七十年來的樣貌截然不同。除非美國人徹悟何謂私利，再次明瞭他們與這個世界的命運是如何地糾結在一起，否則美國與美國理念即將式微，和平的21世紀將無從實現。
To understand where America, and the world, may be heading, it is useful
to remind ourselves where we have been—of the choices that Americans made
decades ago and of the profound, world-changing consequences of those choices.
為了瞭解美國與世界的未來方向，我們有必要回顧來時路，溫習美國數十年前所做的決定，以及這些決定如何改變了世界。
For Americans, the choice was never been between isolationism and
internationalism. With their acquisitive
drive for wealth and happiness, their love of commerce, their economic and (in
earlier times) territorial expansiveness, and their universalistic ideology,
they never had it in them to wall themselves off from the rest of the world. Tokugawa Japan and Ming China were
isolationist. Americans have always been
more like republican Rome or ancient Athens, a people and a nation on the move.
對美國人而言，這從來就不是在孤立主義與國際主義之間作抉擇。以他們追求財富與幸福的嗜好、對商業的熱愛、對經濟與 (早期) 對領土的擴張慾望、以及普遍性的意識形態，他們從未想過要孤立於世界之外。幕府時代的日本、明朝的中國，才是孤立主義者。美國則比較像羅馬共和或者古代雅典，是不斷往前衝的民族、國家。
When, roughly 70 years ago, American foreign policy underwent a
revolutionary transformation, it was not a transformation from isolationism to
internationalism. What Americans had
rejected before World War II was a steady global involvement, with commitments
to other nations and responsibilities for the general well-being of the world. That was what the so-called
“internationalists” of the time wanted for the United States. Theodore Roosevelt, John Hay, Henry Cabot
Lodge, Elihu Root, Henry Stimson, Woodrow Wilson, and many others believed that
Americans ought to take on a much bigger role in world affairs, as befitted
their growing power. The United States
had become “more and more the balance of power of the whole globe,” Roosevelt
observed, and it ought to behave accordingly.
And indeed, following the Spanish-American War and for the first two
decades of the twentieth century, the United States did pursue a wider and
deeper global involvement than it had ever done before, culminating in the
dispatch of two million troops to France.
When World War I ended, Wilson, like Roosevelt before him, ambitiously
set out to make the United States a central player in world affairs. Beseeched by all the European powers after
the war—for American financing aid to steady their economies and for American
security guarantees against each other—Wilson wanted the United States to
commit itself to an enduring global role.
The world, he warned Americans, would be “absolutely in despair if
America deserts it.” Wilson’s League of Nations (actually it had been
Roosevelt’s idea first), although couched in the idealistic language of
universal principles and collective security, was meant above all to serve as
the vehicle for American power and influence in support of a new liberal world
order.
約七十年前，美國外交政策有了革命性的改變時，美國並不是由孤立主義轉向國際主義。二戰前美國人所排斥的，只是長期的涉入全球事務，對其他國家的承諾以及守護全球的責任，也就是一戰前後美國領導者所倡導的國際主義。Theodore Roosevelt (老羅斯福)、John Hay (國務卿)、Henry Cabot Lodge (參議員)、Elihu Root (戰爭部長、國務卿)、Henry Stimson (史汀生：戰爭部長、菲律賓總督、國務卿)、Woodrow Wilson (威爾遜)，還有其他很多人都認為美國人應該在國際扮演更吃重的角色，這符合美國逐漸強盛的國力。老羅斯福觀察到美國已經「愈來愈像全球的權力平衡者」，因此美國的行為應該配合這個實力。確實，在美西戰爭之後以及二十世紀最初20年，美國對國際事務的涉入比之前更深更廣，派遣兩百萬部隊到法國最為顯著。一戰結束後，威爾遜展現企圖心，繼承前任老羅斯福總統的理念，讓美國成為國際事務的核心。因為受到歐洲各國的懇求——經濟支援與安全保證——威爾遜要美國承擔永久的全球角色。他警告美國人，這個世界「會陷入絕望如果美國人棄世界於不顧」。威爾遜的「國際聯盟」(其實是老羅斯福的主意) 雖然在文字上提倡理想的世界理念與共同安全，其實最重要的功能是，以美國權力與影響力為支柱，建立自由的世界新秩序。
But Americans rejected this role. Disillusioned
by the compromises and imperfections of the Versailles Treaty, mourning the
loss of more than 100,000 dead soldiers, skeptical about American participation
in the league, and spurred on by Republicans eager to defeat Wilson and
recapture the White House, a majority of Americans came to oppose not only the
league but also the internationalists’ broad vision of America’s global role. This was no absentminded lapse back into
nonexistent isolationist traditions. It
was a deliberate decision to turn away from the increasingly active global
involvement of the previous two decades, to adopt a foreign policy of far
greater restraint, and above all to avoid future military interventions beyond
the Western Hemisphere. Wilson’s Republican
successors promised, and the American public welcomed, what Warren Harding
called a “return to normalcy.”
但美國人排斥這樣的角色。〈凡爾賽和約〉過於妥協而不健全，美國人相當失望；十萬美國士兵喪生於一戰，全國仍在哀傷當中；對於加入國際聯盟，美國人也抱著懷疑的態度；再加上共和黨急於擊敗威爾遜以奪取白宮，大多數美國人不但跟著反對加入國際聯盟，也連帶地拋棄了國際主義者為美國所定位的全球角色。這並不是糊里糊塗地陷入不曾存在的孤立主義傳統，而是刻意地背離前二十年益趨積極的涉入全球事務，轉而大幅收斂外交政策，最重要的是，迴避未來在西半球以外地區的軍事干預。於是共和黨接管白宮，保證實行沃倫哈定總統所稱之「回復常態」，頗得民心。
Normalcy in the 1920s did not mean isolation. Americans continued to trade, to invest, and
to travel overseas; their navy was equaled in size only by Britain’s, and had
fleets in the Atlantic and the Pacific; and their diplomats pursued treaties to
control the arms race and to “outlaw” war.
Normalcy simply meant defining America’s national interests the way most
other nations defined theirs. It meant
defending the homeland, avoiding overseas commitments, preserving the country’s
independence and freedom of action, and creating prosperity at home. The problems of Europe and Asia were not
America’s problems, and they could be solved, or not solved, without American
help. This applied to global economic
issues as well. Harding wanted to
“prosper America first,” and he did. The
1920s were boom years for the American economy, while Europe’s postwar
economies stagnated.
20年代所謂的「常態」，並非孤立。美國人仍繼續在海外貿易、投資、旅行；美國海軍強大，其規模只有英國能夠並駕齊驅，艦隊遍及兩大洋；外交人員忙於締結條約，以控制武器競賽，制止戰爭。常態，意味著美國跟大多數正常國家一樣地定義自己的國家利益，保家衛國，避免國際承諾，維護自身的獨立自主，創造內部繁榮。歐亞的問題可以自己解決，與美國不相干。國際經濟也一樣。哈定總統優先發展國內經濟，也確實在歐洲經濟蕭條的20年代打造了美國的榮景。
To the vast majority of Americans, normalcy seemed a reasonable response
to the world of the 1920s, after the enormous exertions of the Wilson years. There were no obvious threats on the horizon. Postwar Weimar Germany was a faltering
republic more likely to collapse than to take another stab at continental
dominance. Bolshevik Russia was wracked
by civil war and economic crisis. Japan,
though growing in power and ambition, was a fragile democracy with a seat on
the League of Nations permanent council. To most Americans in the 1920s, the greatest
risk to America came not from foreign powers but from those misguided
“internationalists” and the greedy bankers and war profiteers who would involve
the nation in foreign conflicts that were none of America’s business.
對絕大多數的美國人而言，在威爾遜的猛操之後，20年代的「常態」是合理的休養生息。放眼國際，看不到甚麼明顯的威脅。戰後的德國威瑪共和搖搖晃晃，不可能再度掌控歐洲；布爾什維克蘇聯則受到內戰與經濟危機的蹂躪；日本雖然權力與企圖心增長，在國際聯盟佔有一席常任理事，卻是個脆弱的民主國家。對20年代的美國人而言，真正的威脅不是來自國外，而是國內搞不清楚狀況的國際主義者、貪婪的銀行家、發戰爭財的投機者，這些人想讓國家陷入不相干的國際衝突之中。
This consensus was broad, deep, and bipartisan, and Americans stayed on
the course of normalcy for two full decades.
They did so even as the world order—no longer upheld by the old
combination of British naval might and a relatively stable balance of power in
Europe and Asia—began to fray and then collapse. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931;
Hitler’s rise to power in 1933; Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935;
Germany’s remilitarization of the Rhineland, and the German and Italian
intervention in the Spanish Civil War, in 1936; Japan’s invasion of central
China in 1937; Hitler’s absorption of Austria, followed by his annexation and
eventual conquest of Czechoslovakia in 1938 and 1939—all these events troubled
and at times appalled Americans. They
were not ignorant of what was going on. Even
back then information traveled widely and rapidly, and the newspapers and
newsreels were filled with stories about each unfolding crisis. Reports of Mussolini’s dive-bombers dropping
their ordnance on spear-carrying Ethiopians; Germany’s aerial bombing of the
civilian population of Guernica; Japan’s rampage of rape, pillage, and murder
in Nanking—they were horrific and regrettable.
But they were not reasons for the United States to get involved. On the contrary, they were reasons for not
getting involved. The worse things
looked around the world, the more hopeless it all seemed, the less Americans
wanted to have anything to do with it. The
United States, it was widely believed, had no vital interests at stake in
Manchuria, Ethiopia, Spain, or Czechoslovakia.
此共識頗深，並遍及兩黨，美國就這樣「常態」了整整20年，即使外面的世界不斷在崩解當中。當時英國海軍已經無力支撐全球秩序，歐亞兩洲權力失衡。1931年日本入侵滿州，1933年希特勒掌權，1935年墨索里尼侵犯衣索比亞，1936年納粹將萊茵省軍事化、德義干涉西班牙內戰，1937年日本侵犯中國內陸，1938年希特勒吞併捷克，接著在1939年征服奧地利——這些事件使美國人感到不安甚或驚恐。當年媒體傳遞消息既快又廣，報紙與新聞短片充塞著陸續上演的危機。墨索里尼以俯衝轟炸機炸死執矛抵抗的衣索比亞人，德國地毯式轟炸西班牙的平民區格爾尼卡，日本在南京屠殺擄掠——這些事件既恐怖又不幸。但是美國並不覺得應該因此而涉入，相反地，應該要遠離。國際情勢愈糟糕愈無助，美國人愈不想沾上邊。大家都認為，美國跟滿洲、衣索比亞、西班牙、捷克沒甚麼利害關係。
In fact, it was not clear that the United States had vital interests
anywhere outside the Western Hemisphere.
Even after the German invasion of Poland in 1939, and the outbreak of a
general European war that followed, respected American strategic
thinkers, priding themselves on “realistic thinking,” the “banishment of
altruism and sentiment” from their analysis, and “single-minded attention to
the national interests,” advised that, with two oceans and a strong navy
standing between America and every great power in the world, the United States
was invulnerable. A Japanese attack on,
say, Hawaii, they ruled out as literally impossible. Republican Senator Robert A. Taft felt
confident in saying that no power “would be stupid enough” to attack the United
States “from across thousands of miles of ocean.” Nor would the United States suffer
appreciably if Nazi Germany did manage to conquer all of Europe, including
Great Britain, which by 1940 the realists regarded as a foregone conclusion. Taft saw no reason why the United States
could not trade and conduct normal diplomacy with a Europe dominated by Nazi
Germany just as it had with Great Britain and France. As the historian Howard K. Beale put it,
nations “do not trade with one another because they like each other’s
governments but because both sides find the exchange of goods desirable.”
事實上，美國在西半球之外好像也覺得沒甚麼重大的利害關係。即使德國在1939入侵波蘭，歐洲大戰爆發，受到敬重的美國戰略家仍自傲於能夠展現冷靜的「現實主義思維」，分析時能夠「摒棄利他主義與感傷」，「全心全意專注於國家利益」。他們認為，兩大洋與強盛的海軍可使美國不受波及。日本的攻擊，譬如攻擊夏威夷啦，簡直就是不可能。共和黨議員 Robert A. Taft 堅信沒有國家「會愚蠢到飛越數百英里的海洋」去攻擊美國，並認為就算納粹攻下整個歐洲 (現實主義者在1940年就認定英國也會淪陷)，美國也無大礙。Taf t認為美國沒有甚麼理由不能像跟英法互動一樣地跟納粹掌控的歐洲進行貿易與外交。歷史學者 Howard K. Beale 說，國家與國家之間「相互貿易並不是因為他們喜歡對方的政府，而是因為雙方都想跟對方做生意」。
Holders of such views were tagged with the disparaging label of
“isolationist,” but as Hans Morgenthau later pointed out, they believed at the
time that they were upholding the “realist tradition of American foreign
policy.” The United States should not
range “over the world like a knight-errant,” Taft admonished, “[protecting]
democracy and ideals of good faith and [tilting] like Don Quixote against the
windmills of fascism.” Taft insisted on
seeing the world as it was, not as idealists wished it to be. The European war was the product of “national
and racial animosities” that had existed “for centuries” and would continue to
exist “for centuries to come,” he argued.
To make a difference in the war, the United States would have to send
millions of troops across the ocean, make an impossible amphibious landing on
shores heavily defended by German forces, and then march across Europe against
the world’s strongest army. The very
thought was inconceivable. Much as they
might wish to help Europe, therefore, Americans had “no power, even if we have
the will, to be its savior.”
抱持這種看法的人被貶為「孤立主義者」，但 Hans Morgenthau 後來指出，他們當時自認只是高舉「美國外交政策的現實主義傳統」。Taft警告，美國不能「像個俠遊在全世界漫遊」，「為了民主信念，學唐吉軻德跟法西斯主義的風車戰鬥」。Taft 堅持要著眼於真實世界，而不是理想主義者所渴望的世界。他辯稱，歐洲戰爭的起因是「國族與種族仇恨」，而它已經存在「好幾世紀」了，鐵定還會繼續數百年。若要影響戰事，美國必得派數百萬軍隊遠渡重洋，去德軍重兵駐守的海灘做不可能的兩棲登陸，然後在歐洲陸地迎擊世界最強的陸軍。這是不可思議之事。所以，即使他們很想幫助歐洲，美國人「想當歐洲的救世主，是心有餘而力不足的」。
This view was so dominant and so politically popular that Franklin
Roosevelt spent his first years in office muzzling his internationalist
instincts and vowing to keep America out of another war—“I hate war!” he roared
in a famous address in 1936. After
Munich, however, he grew panicked, sensing that the Western powers, Britain and
France, had lost the will to stand up to Hitler. And so he began trying to warn Americans of
what he regarded as the coming threat. Yet
it was difficult to counter the realists’ hardheaded analysis. Roosevelt could not prove that American
security was directly endangered by what was happening in Europe. He was left making a case that really did
appeal more to sentiment and idealism than to demonstrable threats to the
American homeland.
現實主義當道，在政治上相當普遍，迫使小羅斯福在主政頭幾年壓抑國際主義的傾向，甚至在1936年一場有名的演講中吼出：「我痛恨戰爭！」但是，〈慕尼黑協定〉之後，他深感不安，感知到英法等西方國家已經失去挺身對抗希特勒的意願。所以他開始試著警告美國人民即將來臨的威脅，然而，想反駁實用主義的冷靜分析是艱鉅的任務。他無法證明歐洲的動亂直接危及美國安全，只好訴諸情感與理想主義。
Even if the United States faced no immediate danger of military attack,
Roosevelt argued, if Hitler, Mussolini, and Imperial Japan were allowed to have
their way, the world would be a “shabby and dangerous place to live in—yes,
even for Americans to live in.” America
would become a “lone island” in a world dominated by the “philosophy of force.” The “institutions of democracy” would be
placed at risk even if America’s security was not, because America would have
to become an armed camp to defend itself.
Roosevelt urged Americans to look beyond their immediate physical
security. “There comes a time in the
affairs of men,” he said, “when they must prepare to defend, not their homes
alone, but the tenets of faith and humanity on which their churches, their governments,
and their very civilization are founded.
The defense of religion, of democracy, and of good faith among nations
is all the same fight. To save one we
must now make up our minds to save all.”
小羅斯福對美國人民說，如果德義日遂行其道，美國即使未受到直接攻擊的威脅，這世界對美國人而言也會變得破敗、危險。美國會變成一座孤島，被暴力世界所包圍。美國本身即使安全，民主制度也會陷入危機，因為美國為了自衛將必須整個武裝起來。小羅斯福力勸美國人把視野放遠，不要侷限在眼前有形的安全。他表示，「有些時候，人類不能只保衛自己的家園，同時也要準備好去保衛他們的教會、政府、文明所賴以建立的信念與人性。國際之間的宗教、民主、信念的保衛戰同屬這樣可貴的奮鬥。為了拯救其中之一，我們現在必須下定決心去拯救全體。」
Such arguments, along with the fall of France and the Battle of Britain,
did help convince Americans that they had a stake in the outcome of the
European struggle, but it did not convince them to go to war. That decision followed only after Pearl
Harbor. The Japanese attack, Hitler’s
subsequent declaration of war, and America’s full-scale entry into the
conflicts in both Europe and Asia were a traumatic shock to Americans,
especially for those in positions of power.
That which had been deemed impossible had proved possible, and long-held
assumptions about American security in a troubled world collapsed in a single
day.
這樣的說詞，在法國淪陷與不列顛戰役之後，有助於說服美國人民：歐洲動亂與他們有利害關係。但是，這無法說服他們走上戰場，是珍珠港事變讓他們決定參戰的。日本的攻擊、希特勒的宣戰、美國的整個投入歐亞兩洲的戰場，對美國人來說是相當痛苦的震撼，尤其是身處戰場的美國人。不可能發生的事情都發生了，長久以來認定處於亂世的美國安全無虞的說法，一夕之間瓦解。
The events of 1941 forced a fundamental reassessment not only of
America’s global strategy but also of how to define America’s interests. Even as they waged the struggle against
Germany and Japan, Roosevelt and his advisers during the war began thinking of
how the postwar world ought to be shaped, and they took as their guide what
they considered the lessons of the previous two decades.
1941年的事件迫使美國人不只重新評估全球戰略，也重新定義美國國家利益。甚至尚在對德日大戰之時，小羅斯福已經與他的顧問們著手擘劃戰後的秩序，並以過去20年來所得的教訓作為指導方針。
The first had to do with security.
The Japanese attack had proved that vast oceans and even a strong navy
no longer provided adequate defense against attack. More broadly, there was the realization—or
rather the rediscovery—of an old understanding: that the rise of a hostile
hegemonic power on the Eurasian landmass could eventually threaten America’s
core security interests as well as its economic well-being. As a corollary, there was the “lesson of
Munich”: would-be aggressors in Eurasia had to be deterred before they became
too strong to be stopped short of all-out war.
第一個教訓有關安全。日本的攻擊，證明廣大的海洋甚至強大的海軍都不能保障免受攻擊。更廣義地說，美國領悟 (或者再次發現) 了一個舊道理：歐亞大陸的敵對霸權崛起，最終必然威脅到美國的核心利益與經濟。這個領悟也就必然地導向了「慕尼黑的教訓」：在歐亞意圖當侵略者的國家，必須在引發全面戰爭之前被制止。
Another lesson was that the United States had an interest in political
developments in Eurasia. Walter Lippmann
argued that, for Americans to enjoy both “physical security” and the
preservation of their “free way of life,” they had to ensure that “the other
shore of the Atlantic” remained always in the hands of “friendly,” “trustworthy”
democracies. For two decades, people had
sneered at “Woodrow Wilson’s demand that the world must be made safe for
democracy,” Lippmann commented, but Wilson had been right. Under the control of “free governments the
shores and waters of the Atlantic” had become the “geographical center of human
liberty.” The Atlantic Charter and
Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms reflected this revived conviction that the well-being
of democracy in the world was not only desirable but important to America’s
security.
另一個教訓是，歐亞的政治發展與美國利益有關。Walter Lippmann (美國政治評論家) 評論，美國要長治久安，必須保有「物理性安全」與「自由的生活方式」，為此確保「大西洋的另一岸」永遠在「友善」、「值得信賴」的民主國家手中。他說，「威爾遜曾要求必須讓這個世界變成民主的樂土」，這個要求被揶揄了20年，而今證明是對的。「大西洋海上與周圍陸地上自由民主的政府」已經成為「人類自由的地理中心」。〈大西洋憲章〉與羅斯福的「四個自由」，顯示人們已回頭相信：民主世界的安康不只是個理想狀態，同時對美國安全而言極也是重要的條件。
Then there was the global economy.
In the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, the United States had sought
mostly domestic remedies for the Great Depression, raising its own tariffs,
choking off lending abroad, refusing to join other nations in a common monetary
policy, and generally protecting the American economy while ignoring the world
economy. By 1941, however, Roosevelt and
his advisers had concluded that both America’s prosperity and its security
depended on a healthy world economy. Poverty
and economic dislocation had played a major role in the rise of both Hitler and
Bolshevism. The United States bore much
of the blame, for although it had been the world’s leading economic power in
the 1920s and 1930s, it had failed to play a constructive and responsible role
in stabilizing the global economy.
接著的教訓與全球經濟有關。20年代末期到整個30年代，美國為了應付大蕭條所尋求的解決之道，大都著眼於國內經濟。它提高自己的關稅、禁止借貸給外國、拒絕加入國際金融政策、只管自己的國家，不管世界經濟的死活。但是到了1941年，小羅斯福及其團隊卻斷定，美國的繁榮與安全繫於健全的國際經濟。貧窮與經濟混亂，是納粹與布爾什維克崛起的重要推手，美國責無旁貸，因為身為世界經濟強國的美國並未在20、30年代扮演建設性、負責任的角色，以穩定全球經濟。
Finally, there was the issue of American public support for global
involvement. In the 1920s and 1930s,
Americans had been allowed and even encouraged by their political leaders to
believe that the United States was immune to the world’s troubles. They could not be allowed to fall back into
such complacency. They could no longer
regard events thousands of miles away as of no concern to them. To Roosevelt, assuring public support for a
larger and more consistent American role in the world was going to be among the
greatest challenges after the war. Americans
had to understand, as Reinhold Niebuhr wrote in April 1943, that “the world
problem cannot be solved if America does not accept its full share of
responsibility in solving it.”
最後則是美國公眾支持介入全球事務。20與30年代，美國人被容許甚或被政治領導者鼓勵去相信：美國不受世界災難的波及。現在這樣的自滿已經不可能了，因為數千英里之外所發生的事情，美國無法置身度外。取得美國公眾對美國更廣泛、更長久的全球角色的支持，是小羅斯福的最大的挑戰之一。Reinhold Neibuhr (美國神家、倫理學者、評論家) 在1943年四月說，美國人必須了解，「美國如果不願意負起責任解決國際問題，國際問題就無從解決。」
That share was to be sizeable. Convinced
that World War II had been the result not of any single incident but rather of the
overall breakdown of world order, politically, economically, and strategically,
American leaders set out to erect and sustain a new order that could endure. This time it was to be a world order built
around American economic, political, and military power. Europeans had proved incapable of keeping the
peace. Asia was entirely unstable on its
own. Any new order would depend on the
United States. It would become the
center of a new economic system that would encourage open trade and provide
financial assistance and loans to nations struggling to stay afloat. It would take a substantial and active part
in the occupation and transformation of the defeated powers, ensuring that some
form of democracy took root in place of the dictatorships that had led those
nations to war. America would also have
to possess preponderant military strength and when necessary deploy sufficient
power to preserve stability and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.
這份責任將十分龐大。美國領導者必須著手建立並維續一個可以長治久安的國際秩序，因為明白了二戰不是源自單一事件，而是整個國際秩序的崩盤，包含了政治、經濟、與戰略層面。這次全球秩序的建立，將必須以美國經濟、政治、軍事為核心。歐洲無法維持和平，亞洲本身就不安定，新秩序只能靠美國。以美國為核心的經濟結構，將鼓勵開放的貿易，提供財政協助與貸款給盡力維持局面的國家。它將實質且積極地佔領並改變戰敗國，培育民主，以取代引發戰爭的獨裁政治。美國也將發展壓倒性的軍事力，必要時足以在歐、亞、中東維持穩定安全。
Military force played a central part in the calculations of Roosevelt and
his advisers as they set out to establish and defend the new liberal world
order. “Peace must be kept by force,”
Roosevelt insisted. There was “no other
way.” He anticipated that an American occupation force of one million
troops would be necessary to keep the peace in Europe, for at least a year and
perhaps longer. During the war, the
Joint Chiefs envisioned establishing military bases around the world in “areas
well removed from the United States” so that any fighting would take place
“nearer the enemy” rather than near American territory.
小羅斯福及其顧問群推測，將依賴軍力去維持民主自由的新秩序。他堅稱，「和平必須以武力維持」，「沒有其他的辦法」。他預料需要百萬雄軍駐紮歐洲至少一年或更久。戰爭尚未結束，參謀長聯席會議就已經預見，美軍必須在「遠離美國的地區」建立基地，使戰事「較靠近敵人」，而不是靠近美國領土。
Roosevelt naturally hoped to avoid the repeated and extended deployment
of American ground forces overseas, since he feared the public would not
tolerate it. But he did expect that the
United States would have to send at least planes and ships whenever called upon
by the U.N. Security Council. As Cordell
Hull insisted at the Dumbarton Oaks conference in 1944, American military
forces had to be “available promptly, in adequate measure, and with certainty.” In fact, Roosevelt anticipated that requests
from the Security Council would be so frequent that he did not want the
president to have to go to Congress each time for approval of the use of force. The Security Council had to have “the power
to act quickly and decisively to keep the peace by force, if necessary,”
Roosevelt explained, and so the American representative had to be given advance
authority to act.
美國人民恐難以接受經常調派美國陸面部隊並延長其境外任務，小羅斯福當然也不樂見。但是他確信必須隨時回應聯合國安理會的要求，派遣飛機與船艦。就如同國務卿 Cordell Hull 在1944的敦巴頓橡樹園會議中所說的，美國軍隊必須「立即出動、人員充裕、態度確切」。事實上，小羅斯福預料安理會的要求會很頻繁，他不希望每次都必須讓總統去國會要求批准使用武力。他解釋，安理會必須「在必要時，有能力快速且果決地以武力維持和平」，因此必須賦予美國聯合國代表先行裁決的權力。
Roosevelt supported the United Nations but was not a great believer in
collective security. American power, he
believed, would be the key. He saw the
United Nations much as Wilson had seen the League of Nations, as a vehicle for
U.S. global involvement. Indeed, as the
historian Robert Dallek has noted, for Roosevelt the United Nations was partly
meant to “obscure” the central role American power was to play in the new world
order—obscure it, that is, from Americans.
小羅斯福支持聯合國，但並不信任集體安全，他認為美國權力仍是關鍵。就如同威爾遜看待國際聯盟，小羅斯福也把聯合國當作美國涉入國際事務的工具。確實，就如同歷史學家 Robert Dallek 所觀察到的，對小羅斯福而言，聯合國的部分功能是掩護美國在世界新秩序中所扮演的核心角色 —— 掩護它，以使美國人民不易察覺。【待續】
勘誤：1994的敦巴頓橡樹園會議--->1944
回覆刪除慕容大細心，感恩不盡。
刪除已經更正。特此稟告。