超級大國沒有隱退這回事
疲憊的美國責任未了—2/4
作者：Robert Kagan
翻譯：Taimocracy
II.
This new American grand strategy for the postwar world could not have
been a more radical departure from “normalcy.” Its goals were not simply defense of the
territory, prosperity, and sovereign independence of the American people, but
also the promotion of a liberal world order that would defend not only
America’s interests but those of many other nations as well. The rise of a Eurasian hegemon would threaten
other nations long before it would threaten the United States, for instance,
yet Americans now accepted primary responsibility for preventing it. The new strategy was not selfless or
altruistic. American officials believed
that it was in the best interest of the United States. But neither did it fit the normal definition
of the “national interest.” As Dean Acheson explained, Americans had to learn
to “operate in a pattern of responsibility which is greater than our own
interests.” This was the real revolution in American foreign policy.
美國這個戰後大戰略與過去所秉持的「常態」完全背道而馳。它不只保衛美國的領土、財產、主權獨立，也提升惠及美國與它國的自由世界秩序。如果歐亞霸權崛起，美國是最後遭殃的國家，但是美國現在卻願意去負起防範霸權的最大責任。因為符合美國的國家利益，新戰略並非無私或者利他，但所謂的國家利益也與一般的定義不盡相同。Dean Acheson (艾奇遜) 說美國人仍必須學著「在超乎自身利益的責任模式下操作」。這是美國外交政策上真正的革命。
The new strategy was not directed at any particular nation or any
specific threat—at least not at first. The
Soviet Union had not yet emerged as the next great challenge to the new global
order. During World War II, Roosevelt
and most other top officials expected mutual cooperation with the Soviets after
the war, and even as late as 1945, Acheson still believed in the possibility of
partnership with Moscow. Rather than
responding to a specific threat, the new grand strategy aimed at preventing a
general collapse of global order, which meant supporting an open international
economic system, enforcing principles of international behavior, supporting,
where possible, democratic governments, encouraging a minimum of respect for
human rights, as defined in the U.N. Charter, and generally promoting the kind
of world that suited Americans and those who shared their beliefs.
這個新戰略一開始並沒有針對某個國家或者特定的威脅，當時蘇維埃還不是新世界秩序的挑戰。二戰還未結束時，羅斯福與大多數官員仍計畫著與蘇聯的戰後合作，甚至到了1945年，Acheson 還認為有可能與莫斯科成為夥伴。新戰略並不是針對特定的威脅，它的目標是預防全球秩序的全面性瓦解，這意味著：支持開放的國際經濟架構、施行國際行為的準則、盡可能支援民主政府、鼓勵對人權的基本尊重 (如聯合國憲章所言)、並且整體性地創造一個適合美國及理念相同者的世界。
This new and wide-ranging set of goals and responsibilities completely
reoriented the posture of American foreign policy. Instead of essentially leaning back, waiting
for threats to emerge, responding, and then pulling back again, the new
strategy required a constant and pervasive forward involvement in the affairs
of the world. The new economic strategy
aimed to prevent economic crises before they resulted in revolution or
despotism. The new military strategy
aimed to discourage would-be aggressors before they became aggressors, or as
Roosevelt put it, to “end future wars by stepping on their necks before they
grow up.”
嶄新而涉獵廣泛的整套目標與責任，將美國外交政策導向全新的方向。美國不再閒閒沒事等著威脅出現、被動地回應、然後再瑟縮回去。新戰略必須長久且全面性地積極涉入國際事務。經濟方面，積極防治危機，以避免滋生革命與獨裁。軍事方面，採取先發制人的策略，不給侵略者壯大的機會，以避免戰爭，就像小羅斯福說的，「未來的戰爭還沒來得及長大之前，先一腳踩斷它們的脖子。」
The new forward-leaning posture became especially pronounced as the
postwar era transitioned into the cold war.
The Marshall Plan aimed to shore up Western European economies and
democracies before they collapsed and succumbed to communism. The Truman Doctrine aimed to bolster Greece
and Turkey before they fell to communist subversion. When the communist revolution triumphed in
China in 1949, American critics blamed the Truman administration for not doing
enough to prevent it—a charge, fair or not, that no one would have thought to
make before World War II. The
unanticipated North Korean invasion of the South produced panic in Washington
and, in the minds of Truman and his advisers, powerfully reinforced the “lesson
of Munich.” Henceforth the United States would have to be vigilant and ready to
act, with force, anywhere in the world.
這種主動積極的新姿態，在冷戰之初特別明顯。《馬歇爾計劃》扶持歐洲經濟與民主，預防歐洲崩潰而赤化。杜魯門主義支撐希臘與土耳其，遏止共產主義在當地的顛覆。中國在1949年赤化時，美國批評家責備杜魯門政府沒有事先預防 —— 不管這個批評是否公允，二戰前是不可能有這種論調出現的。韓戰出乎意料，震驚華盛頓，在杜魯門及其團隊的腦中也強化了「慕尼黑教訓」。從此，美國在世界各地，都必須保持警戒，隨時準備動武。
All of this was precisely what the anti-interventionist critics had
warned about in the 1930s. Taft, a
thoughtful and intelligent man, had indeed predicted that, once sent off to the
war, American forces would never come home again. Victory would prove as much a curse as a
blessing. American troops, Taft had
warned, “would have to police Europe or maintain the balance of power there by
force of arms” indefinitely. Beale had
cautioned that, if freedom and democracy were the goals, as Roosevelt claimed,
then the United States was going to have to “maintain democracy by armed force
on the Continent of Europe” and keep a “navy large enough to establish ‘freedom
of the seas’ ... on all the oceans of
the world.” It was a prescription at
once for bankruptcy and militarism at home and “unadulterated imperialism”
abroad.
所有這一切正好是30年代「反干涉主義者」所曾警告的現象。細心聰明的 Taft 曾預言，美軍一旦出門打仗就回不來了，勝利將同時帶來痛苦，因為美軍必須無限期地留在歐洲維持穩定。Beale也曾告誡，如果目標就如羅斯福所宣稱是民主自由，美國將必須「以武力維護歐洲的民主」，「超大規模的船艦隊則須巡護世界所有的海洋以建立『海洋的自由』」，這將在國內造成破產及軍國主義，在國外則呈現純粹的帝國主義。
Roosevelt and other American statesmen originally hoped that the United
States would not have to do everything by itself. Roosevelt planned to share global management
among the “Four Policemen”—the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union,
and China. And Truman in 1945 was bound
and determined to slash the defense budget and bring as many troops home as
possible. Yet within two years after the
war ended, the new world order was already teetering on the edge of collapse
along with hopes for global partnership with the other great powers. Britain quickly signaled its inability to
play its historic role, even in the Mediterranean. China descended into civil war and revolution. And the Soviet Union emerged not as a
supporter of the new order but, to American eyes, as its greatest opponent. The result was the disheartening realization
that the United States was going to carry the lion’s share of the burden, just
as Taft had warned. As Acheson later put
it, the United States was going to have to be “the locomotive at the head of
mankind,” while the rest of the world was going to be “the caboose.”
剛開始時。羅斯福及其他政治家曾寄望美英蘇中「四大國際警察」分擔全球任務。1945年的杜魯門還想砍國防預算，把軍隊盡量召回國內。但戰後世界新秩序不到兩年就危如累卵，與其他大國合作的希望也破滅了。英國很快就表示沒有能力擔負歷史責任，甚至在地中海區域也沒轍。中國陷入內亂與革命。蘇聯不是來支持世界新秩序的，它在美國眼中成了最主要的敵人。美國終於沮喪地發現被 Taft 不幸而言中，美國必須負起全責。Acheson 後來比喻，美國將必須成為「人類的火車頭」，其餘都是掛在車尾的「守車」。
Roosevelt had always worried that the American people would never accept
such an expansive and seemingly open-ended global role. Three months before he died, in his last
State of the Union address, in January 1945, he attempted to rally them for the
task ahead. “In our disillusionment
after the last war,” he reminded the American public, “we gave up the hope of
gradually achieving a better peace because we had not the courage to fulfill
our responsibilities in an admittedly imperfect world. We must not let that happen again, or we
shall follow the same tragic road again—the road to a third world war.”
羅斯福一直擔心同胞不肯接受如此龐大又似乎沒完沒了的全球角色。在他過世前三個月 (1945年一月) 的國情咨文演講中，他試圖團結全國人民：「上次戰爭之後，我們很沮喪。因為沒有勇氣在公認不完美的世界中擔負責任，而放棄了提升和平的希望。這次絕不可讓歷史重演，否則我們將沿著一樣的悲劇路線，步向第三次世界大戰。」
That was the last time, before 1989, that an American statesman
would think of American global responsibilities without reference to the
Soviet Union or to international communism.
The onset of the cold war, the panicked American response to Soviet
policies in Eastern Europe and in the Middle East, and the recurrent American
paranoia about the danger of communist subversion at home answered FDR’s fears
about public support. To many Americans,
Soviet communism seemed an even more direct threat to their way of life than
Hitler and the Nazis. Fighting it,
therefore, proved an easier strategy to comprehend and support than shouldering
“responsibilities in an admittedly imperfect world.” Although there was intense
and often divisive debate over foreign policy during the cold war, and much
dissent voiced by critics of anti-communist containment, especially during and
just after the Vietnam war, a majority of Americans proved consistently willing
to go to great lengths in the name of containing communism. In the late 1940s and 1950s, they provided
billions of dollars for European reconstruction and made military alliances
with former adversaries such as Japan and Germany and other European powers
they had once disdained and mistrusted. They
even extended nuclear guarantees to deter a Soviet conventional invasion of
Europe, voluntarily making themselves targets of Soviet nuclear weapons in the
event of a European war. In the 1950s
and 1960s, they often spent 10 percent or more of their GDP on defense. They deployed hundreds of thousands of troops
overseas, indefinitely, in Europe and Asia—almost a million during the
Eisenhower years. They fought in costly
wars in Korea and Vietnam, with uncertain and unsatisfying results.
這是1989年之前，美國政治家最後一次談到美國全球任務時，沒有提到蘇聯或者國際共產主義。羅斯福根本毋須擔憂民眾不支持。冷戰的開張、美國人對蘇維埃的東歐及中東政策的驚慌、以及美國人因恐懼國內共產顛覆而罹患的週期性妄想症，迫使美國民眾轉而高度支持國際主義。蘇維埃共產主義對美國民眾的威脅，比希特勒與納粹還要直接。對抗蘇共，遠比「在公認不完美的世界中擔負責任」更容易理解、更能獲取民意。雖然在冷戰時期的外交政策上意見相當分歧，許多人也質疑反共的圍堵政策，尤其是在越戰期間及越戰後，但是，大多數美國人還是堅定地全力支持圍堵共產黨。他們在40及50年代提供數十億美元重建歐洲，與過去的敵人德國、日本結盟，也與他們曾經不屑或不信任的歐洲國家結盟。他們甚至長期以核武阻嚇蘇聯對歐洲進行傳統戰爭，萬一歐洲爆發戰爭，美國人等於是自願地將自己暴露於蘇聯核武的威脅之下。50及60年代，美國至少有百分之十的GDP投資在國防。他們無限期地派遣數十萬軍隊到歐亞兩洲，艾森豪時期的駐外美軍甚至高達一百萬人。美國人還打了相當昂貴的韓戰與越戰，結局既不明朗也不令人滿意。
Justifying everything in terms of the anti-communist struggle may have
been, to borrow Acheson’s phrase, “clearer than truth,” but it worked. Fear of communism, combined with fear of the
Soviet Union as a geopolitical threat, allowed a majority of Americans and
American policymakers to view practically any policy directed against communist
forces, or even against suspected communist forces, anywhere in the world as
directly serving the nation’s vital interests.
In 1965, even David Halberstam believed that preventing a communist
victory in Vietnam was “vital to our national interest.” A decade and a half later, Jimmy Carter, who
had come to office warning, not entirely unreasonably, against an “inordinate fear
of communism,” was forced to announce a dramatic shift of policy in response to
a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a country that not two Americans in a million
could have found on a map and where no direct American interest could be
identified, other than the fact that the Soviets were there. Yes, the general feeling went, the United
States had taken on unprecedented global responsibilities, but it had done so
because American interests were directly threatened by an unprecedented global
challenge.
凡事都從反共的立場來辯護，可能「比事實還明確」(借用Acheson的話)，但是很管用。恐懼共產主義，加上恐懼蘇聯成為地緣政治的威脅，使得大多數美國人及美國決策者把世界任何角落對抗共產勢力 (甚至是對抗有此嫌疑的勢力) 的任何政策，都視為符合國家重大利益。1965年，甚至連 David Halberstam (美國歷史學家) 都相信，防止越南赤化「對我國家利益極為重要」。15年後，卡特總統上任之初曾警告國人不要對共產主義過度恐懼，但是他在蘇聯侵犯阿富汗時被迫宣布重大的政策改變。當時一百萬美國人當中不到兩個可以在地圖上找到阿富汗，它對美國也無直接利害關係，可是美國人反應激烈，就只是因為蘇聯跑去那裡。是的，當時美國人普遍覺得：美國承擔了史無前例的全球責任，但它之所以這樣做，是因為直接威脅到美國利益的也是史無前例的全球挑戰。
So Americans for more than four decades proved willing to support the
expansive and active foreign policy that Roosevelt and his advisers had envisioned—indeed,
probably much more than they envisioned—and the results were extraordinary. In the half-century following World War II,
the United States successfully established, protected, and advanced a liberal
world order, carving out a vast “free world” within which an unprecedented era
of peace and prosperity could flower in Western Europe, East Asia, and the
Western Hemisphere. Although tensions
between the United States and the Soviet Union sometimes rose to dangerous
levels, the period was characterized above all by peace among the great powers. The United States and the Soviet Union did
not come to blows, and just as importantly, the American presence in Europe and
East Asia put an end to the cycles of war that had torn both regions since the
late nineteenth century. The number
of democracies in the world grew dramatically.
The international trading system expanded and deepened. Most of the world enjoyed an unprecedented
prosperity. There was no shortage of
disasters and near-disasters, as well as the two costly wars in Asia—but the
strategy was largely successful, so much so that the Soviet empire finally
collapsed or voluntarily withdrew, peacefully, under the pressure of the West’s
economic and political success, and the liberal order then expanded to include
the rest of Europe and most of Asia. All
of this was the result of many forces—the political and economic integration of
Europe, the success of Japan and Germany, and the rise of other successful
Asian economies—but none of it would have been possible without a United States
willing and able to play the abnormal and unusual role of preserver and
defender of a liberal world order.
就這樣，美國人支持羅斯福擴張而積極的外交政策，長達四十多年 (可能比羅斯福所預見的還久)，成果非凡。二戰後的半世紀，美國成功地建立、保護、促進一個自由的世界秩序，在西歐、東亞、西半球開拓出寬廣的「自由世界」，其和平繁榮，史無前例。雖然美蘇之間迭有緊張危急時刻，但這時期的特色是大國之間相安無事。美蘇並未真的打起來，一樣重要的是，美國鎮守歐洲與東亞，結束了這兩個區域自十九世紀末以來的戰亂頻繁。全世界民主國家的數量激增，世界貿易拓展並深化，大多數地區享受了有史以來最大的繁榮。世界仍有大小災難，亞洲還打了兩個昂貴的戰爭，但是這個戰略大體上是成功的，成功到促使蘇維埃帝國終於瓦解，或者說，蘇聯在西方成功的經濟與政治壓力下和平地自動退讓，並使得更多歐亞國家得以加入自由世界。這一切的是許多力量結合的結果：歐洲在政治與經濟上的整合、日本與德國的成功、其他亞洲經濟體的成功崛起——但如果沒有美國願意且有能力扮演這個不尋常、非凡的自由世界秩序守護者的角色，前述的任何一項都不可能實現。
America’s ability to play this role at all was due less to the special
virtues of the American people than to some remarkable advantages that put the
United States in a historically unique position. The most important advantage was geography. For centuries the world’s cockpits of
conflict had been in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, where multiple powers
shared common neighborhoods, jostled for primacy, and engaged in endless cycles
of military competition and warfare. When
the United States emerged as a great power at the end of the
nineteenth century, it alone enjoyed fundamental security in a
neighborhood in which it was already the unquestioned hegemon. This, along with its wealth and large
population, gave the United States the ability to dispatch the bulk of its
armed forces thousands of miles away to engage in protracted military
operations. It also allowed the United
States to station large numbers of troops permanently overseas if it so desired. And it could do all of this without leaving
itself vulnerable to a neighboring power.
美國之所以能夠承擔這樣吃重的角色，主要原因不在偉大的美國人民，而是一些極佳的優勢，這些優勢使美國得以佔據歷史獨特的位置。其中最大的優勢是地理位置。數世紀以來，歐、亞、中東等地區陷入無止境的掠奪與戰爭。當美國在十九世紀末崛起時，很自然地成為該區域的霸主。搭配龐大的財富與人口，這個地理優勢使它有能力派遣大量軍隊於千里之外，長時間投入戰事，也可以在必要時在海外長久派駐軍隊，不愁鄰國趁虛而入。
No other nation in the world was ever so situated. Even that other great island superpower,
Great Britain, sat too close to the European continent to be invulnerable to
attack, especially when the airplane and the long-range missile became major
tools of warfare. Nor had Britain
succeeded in securing its core strategic requirement: preventing the emergence
of a hegemon on the continent. Although
successful for two centuries in maintaining and managing its overseas empire,
Britain failed to prevent the rise of German hegemony twice in the
twentieth century, leading to two devastating wars that ultimately undid
British global power. Britain failed
because it had tried to play the role of balancer in Europe from “offshore.”
Britons’ main concern was always defense of their far-flung empire, and they
preferred to stay out of Europe if possible.
Their inability or unwillingness to station troops on the continent in
sufficient number, or at least reliably to guarantee that sufficient force
would arrive quickly in an emergency, led would-be aggressors to calculate that
decisive British military force would either not arrive on time or not arrive
at all.
沒有任何其他國家像美國這麼幸運地擁有地利之便。英國即便是強盛的島國，卻太過靠近歐洲大陸而易受攻擊，尤其是在飛機與遠程飛彈出現之後。英國一直無法達成它的核心戰略要求：防止歐陸霸權崛起。雖然英國的日不落國風光了兩個世紀，但是德國霸權兩次崛起，造成兩次大戰，使得英國國力衰弱。英國之所以失敗，是因為它奢望不上岸就能當歐陸的離岸平衡手。英國因為專注於遼闊帝國的經營，盡可能地不要待在歐洲。它不能或者不願在歐陸駐紮充裕的軍隊，也未能可靠地承諾有事時迅速派遣足夠軍隊支援，因此導致意圖侵略的霸權肆無忌憚，算定英國軍隊不是趕不及就是根本不會到。
After World War II, Americans’ unique geographical advantage made
possible an unprecedented global strategy.
The United States was able to move beyond traditional national defense
and beyond offshore balancing. It was
able to become effectively both a European power and an Asian power, with
troops permanently stationed “onshore” in both theaters simultaneously. The presence of American troops acted to
remove doubt by potential aggressors that the United States would fight if its
allies were attacked. For the next seven
decades, this American presence enforced a general peace and stability in two
regions that for at least a century had known almost constant great-power
conflict.
二戰後的美國靠著得天獨厚的地理位置，成功地執行了空前的全球戰略。美國得以略過傳統的國土防衛，也不須煩惱離岸平衡，直接派遣軍隊長久地同時駐紮在歐洲及亞洲陸地上，成為這兩洲的強權。美軍的駐紮，使得潛在的侵略者不再懷疑美國保護盟國的決心。接下來七十年，美軍的存在使得動盪至少一世紀之久的這兩個戰區維持了整體性的和平穩定。
Just as remarkable was the degree to which the rest of the nations in the
liberal world generally accepted and even welcomed America’s overwhelming power. Again, the reason had as much to do with
power and geography as with ideological affinity. It was true that for most nations in the
world the United States appeared to be a relatively benign hegemon. But the core geopolitical reality was that
other nations faced greater and more immediate threats from their neighbors
than from the distant Americans. When
those neighbors grew menacing, they looked to the United States as a natural
partner—comforting for its ability to project power and defend them but
comforting also for its distance.
面對美國壓倒性的勢力，自由世界的其他國家對它的接受或歡迎程度，也一樣令人注目。原因不只是意識型態的接近，更重要的是權力與地理位置。確實，大部分國家覺得美國是較為友善的霸權，不過，還有個最重要的地理現實：其他國家所面對的是來自鄰國的威脅，比來自遙遠的美國的威脅，更大、更直接。所以當這些國家遭受鄰國威脅時，會將美國當作是很自然的夥伴。不只因為美國勢力夠強，也因為美國的距離遙遠，令人安心。
The United States thus violated some of the cardinal rules of
international relations. For decades,
realists had believed that the only peaceful and stable world order was
one based on a multipolar balance of power, a “concert” of nations poised in
rough equilibrium in a system that all the players regarded as necessary and
legitimate—like Europe in the years following the Congress of Vienna. This was the world with which Henry Kissinger
felt comfortable and which he constantly predicted, even in the 1960s, was just
right around the corner. Unipolarity was
supposed to be inherently unstable and short-lived, because other great powers
would always band together to balance against a power grown too strong—as had
happened in Europe in response to the rise of France and Germany in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Richard Nixon expressed this alleged realist truism in a speech, no
doubt penned under Kissinger’s influence, in 1972. “We must remember,” Nixon declared, that “the
only time in the history of the world that we have had any extended period of peace
is when there has been balance of power.
It is when one nation becomes infinitely more powerful in relation to
its potential competitor that the danger of war arises. So I believe in a world in which the United
States is powerful. I think it will be a
safer world and a better world if we have a strong, healthy United States,
Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan, each balancing.” But the United States was
already disproving this thesis.
美國的全球戰略因此違背了國際關係的一些基本法則。當時的現實主義者數十年來都認為，唯一能夠帶來和平穩定的國際秩序，是「多極」的權力平衡才，亦即所謂的「協調」，就像維也納會議之後幾年的歐洲。季辛吉覺得這是最佳的世界狀況，他甚至在1960年代就經常預言，「多極」平衡的世界即將來臨。「孤極」的權力分配，本質就極不穩定，因為小國必然群起反抗唯一的霸權，譬如十九、二十世紀法國或德國崛起後的歐洲。而尼克森在1972年演講中也強調了這個被貶為現實主義陳腔濫調的觀點——這無疑是受了季辛吉的影響。他宣稱：「我們必須記住，歷史上較長的和平時期都處於權力平衡狀態。當某個國家比潛在的競爭者強盛，無限地壯大，就會有戰爭的危險。所以我希望美國富強，我相信如果美國、歐洲、蘇聯、中國、日本都一樣富強、健全，達到勢力均衡，這個世界會更安全、更美好。」問題是，美國當時的現狀已經駁斥了這個命題。
The broad acceptance of American power, best demonstrated by the large
number of its allies and the absence of powerful nations joining the Soviet
Union against it, created a unique situation in the world. No other nation in history had ever played
such a role on a global scale, and arguably no other nation possibly could. The situation could not conform to a theory
because it could not be replicated. It
was sui generis.
當時美國盟友眾多，亦無大國轉而加入蘇聯，這證明世界廣泛地接受了美國的強盛。這樣高度的接受，是個相當獨特的現狀。過去從來沒有任何其他國家扮演過這樣國際級的角色，可以說也沒有其他國家辦得到。這個現狀無法複製，所以也無法套用任何理論。它自成一格。
Geography made it possible for the United States to play this unique role
in the world, but as the 1920s and 1930s showed, the question of whether the
United States would take it on was up to the American people. Nothing required them to play such an
abnormal part in world affairs. During
the cold war, they did it primarily out of fear of communism. But what would happen when the Soviet Union
disappeared and the threat of communism vanished? The question seemed moot for four
excruciatingly long decades when no one ever really expected the Soviet Union
to give up the geopolitical competition.
But the unanticipated fall of the Soviet empire and the collapse of
international communism after 1989 inevitably raised anew the question of how
to define America’s purpose and its interests in the absence of an obvious
threat. Suddenly, Americans were back to
where Roosevelt had left off in the early 1940s, when the challenge had been to
avoid the mistakes of the 1920s and 1930s.
But would anyone remember the original grand strategy, devised in the
brief moment before the Soviet Union arose to dominate American strategic
thinking? Would the original grand
strategy still seem relevant at the end of the twentieth century? Or had Americans, as the political scientist
Robert Osgood worried in the 1950s, “become so transfixed by their fears of
communism” that they had forgotten “what they are for in their obsession with
what they are against”?
地理位置使美國能夠扮演這個獨特的角色，不過，20、30年代的情形顯示，必須由美國人民自己決定是否接受這樣的角色。沒有甚麼東西可以規定他們在國際事務上扮演這麼不正常的角色。冷戰時，他們因為恐懼而接受全球任務，但是蘇聯與共產威脅消失了之後呢？這個問題痛苦地拖了四十年而沒有答案，因為沒有人真的料到蘇聯會放棄地緣政治的競賽。1989年蘇聯與世界共產主義崩解，問題又回來了，沒有威脅的狀況下要如何定義美國的目標與利益？突然間，美國人又回到了羅斯福的40年代初期，當時的挑戰是，不要重複20、30年代的錯誤。還有人記得大戰略的最初版本嗎？那個在蘇聯崛起、支配美國戰略思考之前的短暫時光，羅斯福所設計的大戰略？它適用於二十世紀末嗎？或者如 Robert Osgood (美國學者與NSC顧問) 所言，美國人民「被共產主義嚇壞了」，以至於「過度執迷於對抗，而忘了初衷」？
【待續】
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