掌控海洋、結交盟友、以及為小事抓狂：為何1894的甲午戰爭還打不完 by Jim Holmes ○ Taimocracy翻譯

【Comment】

感謝網友 SW 為讀者花費這些時間，翻譯網友 Mat 所報知的 Rule the Sea, Build Alliances, and Sweat the Small Stuff○Foreign Policy (2014.06.16)

本文作者提出許多精闢見解，如：小戰爭大輸贏、盟的作用、過往戰術無用、中國先輸了海洋從而輸了東亞等。

作者更觀察到現今中國對於甲午戰爭的戰敗，仍多歸咎於海軍戰術不如人，很少人願意承認對方表現更好。然而解放軍海軍，面對前輩的恥辱，則將原因歸咎於官僚，不是前輩。

然而，作者在最後幾段論述有點混亂：一方面承認日本自衛隊較佳，另一方面又說北京在智識與情緒上佔了贏面。顯示作者也不敢把握假使發生了「短暫而激烈的戰爭」，最後的結果會是什麼。
這或許是所有評論人共同的忐忑吧？

Rule the Sea, Build Alliances, and Sweat the Small Stuff

掌控海洋、結交盟友、以及為小事抓狂

Why Tokyo and Beijing are still fighting a war that began in 1894.

為何1894的甲午戰爭還打不完

by Jim Holmes

Foreign Policy (2014.06.16)

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/06/16/lessons_china_and_japan_learned_from_the_sino_japanese_war_diaoyu_senkaku

Taimocracy翻譯

With all eyes locked on Iraq and Ukraine, China and Japan keep ratcheting up tensions over islands and waters in the East China Sea.

當全世界的目光集中在伊拉克、烏克蘭的時候，中國與日本在東海的緊張情勢正在不斷升溫。

On June 11, two Japanese planes flew dangerously close to a Chinese plane -- with both sides blaming the other for the encounter.  This follows an incident in late May, when armed Chinese fighter planes buzzed Japanese maritime patrol aircraft, passing within 100 feet in one case -- a hand's breadth for high-speed aircraft.  In mid-June, China Defense Ministry spokesman Col. Geng Yansheng blustered that Japanese airmen have "engaged in close-up tailing" of Chinese aircraft, revealing Tokyo's "malign intentions" and exposing its "hypocrisy and two-facedness in relations with China."

五月底中國武裝戰鬥機近距離掠過日本海上巡邏飛機 (最近距離是驚險的100英呎)，接著六月11日兩架日本飛機也以危險的近距離掠過一架中國飛機，雙方互控挑釁。六月中，中國國防部發言人耿雁生譴責日本飛行員「對中方艦機近距離跟蹤監視」，顯示東京「別有用心」，暴露了它「在對華關係上的虛偽性和兩面性」。

Minor encounters such as these can explode into major problems between nations, and a clash of the Asian titans is far from unthinkable.  And perhaps it's no coincidence that this year marks the 120th anniversary of the conflict that started it all: the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.  That's when a makeshift Japanese navy crushed China's, allowing Imperial Japan to wrest land and a boatload of cash from China's Qing Dynasty.

這種小衝突有時候會造成兩國之間爆發嚴重問題，而亞洲大國的衝突並非不可能。今年是中日甲午戰爭 (1894-1895第一次中日戰爭) 120周年，或許並不算巧合。當年，日本以拼湊的艦隊打垮了中國的北洋艦隊，讓日本帝國從清朝手中奪走了土地也載走了滿船的現金。

Strategists across East Asia are investigating that long-ago conflict for lessons relevant to today's controversies.  The first lesson is geopolitical: that limited conflicts can deliver sweeping gains.  The 1894 Battle of Yalu -- a minor duel between Chinese and Japanese battle fleets -- gave Japan command of the Yellow and East China seas.  The Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed in Japan in April 1895, compelled China's rulers to relinquish Taiwan and its outlying islands, territory along the Asian coast, and to pay a massive indemnity to Japan.  No longer could China oppose Japanese military movement up and down the Asian seaboard.  With maritime command, then, came dominance of Northeast Asia.

東亞的戰略家都在研究甲午戰爭，試圖從過去的衝突經驗，汲取仍適用於今日爭議的教訓。他們學到的第一個教訓屬地緣政治：規模有限的衝突可以帶來大量的收穫。1894年鴨綠江海戰是中日艦隊的小規模戰鬥，卻使日本獲得黃海與東海的控制權。1895年四月於日本簽訂的〈馬關條約〉，迫使中國統治者割讓亞洲沿岸的台灣及偏遠島嶼，並付給日本大量贖金。從此中國再也無法於亞洲沿岸與日本對抗。而日本控制了海岸，就可以進而控制東北亞。

Beijing would like to reset the terms of this geopolitical status quo.  Indeed, as my colleague Sally Paine noted in her masterful 2002 history of this half-forgotten war, ever since 1895 "the focus of Chinese foreign policy has been to undo its results whereas the focus of Japanese foreign policy has been to confirm them."  Seems the old military maxim holds true: no war is over until the vanquished agree it's over.

如今北京想要重新設定區域現狀。確實，根據我的同事 Sally Paine 的觀察，自1895年開始，「中國外交政策的重心就在於解除甲午戰爭所造成的結果，而日本外交政策則是確保這些成果。」有個戰爭箴言似乎很有道理：戰敗者同意戰爭已經結束，戰爭才會真的結束。

While the Senkaku/Diaoyu -- the tiny islands in the East China Sea that are the locus of today's conflict -- weren't formally part of the settlement, Japan did occupy them in 1895.  To Chinese eyes, consequently, wrenching it back probably looks like a good first step toward repealing an unjust peace settlement, reversing Japanese adventurism, and avenging an old defeat.

今日的衝突地點「尖閣諸島/釣魚島」 (東海上的小島嶼)，並非當年官方割讓的領土，但日本確實在1895年佔領它們。因此在中國人眼裡，想要廢除一個不平等條約、翻轉日本的冒險所得、湔雪前恥，奪回釣魚台是踏出漂亮的第一步。

Which leads to the second lesson: even though the territories concerned are small, the stakes are huge for the contestants.  The struggle for mastery is about more than material interests.  It's about national honor and renown, motives sure to fire passions on both sides.  The war's outcome was a political symbol as much as it was an operational defeat for China.  Indeed, the fleet action at the Yalu upended the regional order.  Vanquishing China's navy signified the Middle Kingdom's fall from atop the regional order after centuries of primacy.  Just as humiliating, it announced Japan's arrival as top gun in Asia.

這就是第二個教訓：即使爭奪的領土很小，對雙方而言輸贏卻很大。爭奪控制權，利益並不僅限於小小的領土，而是國家的榮耀與聲望，而此動機定會點燃雙方的激烈情緒。戰敗對中國而言，並不僅僅是作戰失敗，它其實是個政治上的象徵。鴨綠江海戰，確實翻轉了區域秩序。中國艦隊的挫敗，意味著獨享數百年區域霸主地位的中原大國已然衰落。讓日本成為亞洲新霸主，則更添恥辱。

Beijing is obsessed with turning the world right-side-up again.  The debacle still rankles with China, even after 120 years and several regime changes, while democratic Japan intends to lock in the status quo.  Both Tokyo and Beijing attach enormous value to their material interests and their international standing -- and are prepared to pay dearly for those interests in lives, treasure, and military hardware.

現在北京一心一意要回復世界秩序。就算已經過了120年且政權已數次更迭，中國仍然對甲午戰敗怨恨難消，而蛻變為民主國家的日本則意圖堅守現狀。東京與北京都相當重視實質的利益及國際聲望──也準備要為這些利益在生命、財產、軍備武器上付出巨大的代價。

Ergo, the third lesson: for great powers, sea power is the keystone of national status as well as an implement for defending offshore interests.  Great powers need great navies to fulfill their destinies.  Japan's emperor decreed that the island nation would modernize following the Meiji Restoration of 1868.  From then it took shipwrights about two decades to bolt together a battle fleet from a hodgepodge of imported boilers, guns, and other components.  Tokyo's Frankenfleet then took to the seas to humble an established -- and what conventional wisdom considered a superior -- Qing fleet.

所以接下來就是第三個教訓：對大國而言，海上權力不但是保衛離岸利益的工具，更是國家地位的基石。大國需要強大的海軍來順應天命，所以明治維新之後，日本天皇敕令島國必須現代化，讓造船匠花了二十年時間，把進口的鍋爐、槍砲、及其他元件，拼湊成一支大雜燴的艦隊。東京的「科學怪艦」就這樣出海作戰，把當時公認最強的北洋水師打到全軍覆沒。

Sea power clearly matters.  For contemporary Tokyo and Beijing, then, the Sino-Japanese War's outcome reaffirms the need to press ahead with naval construction.  China has built advanced destroyers, large numbers of missile-armed diesel submarines, and its first aircraft carrier, all backed up by shore-based combat aircraft and anti-ship missiles able to strike hundreds of miles out to sea.  Japan has taken halting steps to match China's progress, bulking up its world-class submarine force while undertaking its first increase in defense spending in more than a decade -- though China's far larger military budget is growingmuch faster.  Tokyo has also reached out to the Philippines, Vietnam, and other Asian coastal states embroiled in territorial disputes with Beijing -- coalition partners can pool their resources while pushing back against Beijing politically.

海上權力確實重要。對當代的東京與北京而言，當年中日戰爭的結果又確認了建設海軍的迫切性。中國目前已經擁有先進的驅逐艦、眾多配備飛彈的柴油潛艇、首架航空母艦，在陸地上還有戰鬥機以及射程數百英里的反艦導彈支援作戰。日本則斷斷續續地想趕上中國的實力，強化它世界級的潛艇，並在二十年來首度增加國防支出──雖然中國龐大軍費預算的成長快速得多。東京並往外拓展，接觸菲律賓、越南、及其他與北京有領土爭議的亞洲沿岸國家──盟友在政治面逼退北京時可以集中資源。

To be sure, there are limits to history as a guide to war-making, especially with regards to tactics and hardware.  And of course, time and technological advances have transformed the face of naval warfare over the past 120 years.  A conflict pitting fleets of armored steamers against each other offers few pointers on how ultramodern navies packing guided missiles and fighter jets should wage war.  Beyond the need to concentrate superior naval might at the decisive place and time, the Sino-Japanese War has little to teach about tactics.  Understandably, then, few Japanese or Chinese commentators say much about this dimension of the war.  History speaks mainly to the larger political and strategic purposes for which nations fight on the high seas.  The lesson, now as then: the nation that rules the sea amasses vast economic and geopolitical leverage over its rivals.

無疑地，拿歷史當作今日作戰的借鏡，有其限制，尤其是在戰術與武器方面。120年來，時間與科技進步當然改變了海戰的樣貌。最新穎的現代海軍配備了導彈與噴射戰鬥機，其戰術不是古老的蒸氣裝甲輪船大戰所能比擬的。必須在決定性的時間與地點集結優勢的戰艦軍力，除此之外，中日甲午戰爭所提供的戰術在現代都不管用。所以，極少中日評論者在這方面著墨。歷史有關海上戰鬥的論述，主要在於較大層面的政治與戰略目標。最後這個教訓古今皆然：控制海洋的國家，可以擁有龐大的經濟與地緣政治的優勢。

What about lessons unlearned?  Is Japan or Chin a missing something, or learning false lessons that might distort its strategy?  One lesson Japan has learned, but to which China appears indifferent, is the value of alliances.  The Sino-Japanese War was a one-on-one affair.  But France, Germany, and Russia intervened diplomatically after the war to strip Japan of its newly won holdings in north China.  Europeans fretted that a dominant Japan would lock the imperial powers out of the China trade and otherwise upend the regional power balance.

但是，沒學到的教訓呢？日本或中國有沒有漏掉了甚麼，或者誤學了甚麼而扭曲其戰略？有個教訓日本學到了，中國卻仍然漠視：盟友的價值。中日甲午戰爭是一對一的衝突，但是法德俄三國卻在戰後進行外交干涉，迫使日本放棄剛在中國北方贏來的戰利品。當時歐洲人擔心，強勢的日本將獨占中國貿易，再不就是翻轉整個區域的權力平衡。

That was bad enough from Japan's standpoint.  But Russia subsequently grabbed some of Japan's gains for itself -- notably the stronghold at Port Arthur, the maritime gateway to northern China.

對日本而言，這損失已經夠慘重了，可是俄國隨後又奪走了日本在中國的一些收穫──最顯著的是亞瑟港 (旅順口)，它是進入中國北方的海上門戶。

To avoid a repeat of this humiliation, Tokyo concluded an alliance with Britain before initiating the next round of fighting, against Russia in 1904-1905.  While it didn't take up arms, Britain did close the Suez Canal to the Russian Navy, compelling Moscow's naval reinforcements to steam 20,000 miles around Africa, through the Indian Ocean, and into Far Eastern waters to do battle.  The detour so enfeebled the Russian Baltic Fleet that it made easy pickings for the Imperial Japanese Navy at the climactic Battle of Tsushima Strait, named after the narrow sea between Japan and the Korean Peninsula.  In 1905, Japan regained the territory it had lost to great-power intervention in 1895, and humbled a European imperial power in the bargain.

為了避免重蹈覆轍，東京在1904-1905挑起日俄戰爭之前就與英國締結盟約。英國雖然沒有參與戰爭，但是對俄國海軍關閉了蘇伊士運河，使得莫斯科的補給船多跑兩萬英里，繞過非洲，經由印度洋，到達遠東水域打仗。俄軍繞遠路而疲乏不堪，因此大日本帝國艦隊得以在對馬海峽的關鍵戰役中輕取俄國波羅的海艦隊。1905年，日本奪回1895年因三強干涉而失去的中國領土，另外還使得歐洲的一個帝國威嚴掃地。

Alliances, it seems, can pay off handsomely.  That's Strategy 101, and a lesson the postwar security alliance with the United States has reconfirmed for Japan time and again.  China, by contrast, stands aloof from its East Asian neighbors even on its best days.  On its haughtier days -- most of the time, lately -- China goes out of its way to browbeat and sometimes threaten them.  That's no way to win friends and allies.

看起來，結盟的好處多多。那是入門的基本戰略，而戰後與美國締結安全盟約更使得日本確認此教訓。相反地，中國狀況好的時候，在東亞鄰國面前趾高氣昂。狀況差的時候──最近常常狀況很差──就特意去威逼甚或去威脅鄰國。這絕非交友之道。

Chinese commentaries on the Sino-Japanese War, furthermore, reveal an apparent blind spot toward the human factor in naval warfare.  Strategists grudgingly concede Imperial Japan's impressive accomplishments in the material realm.  But at the same time they tend to scapegoat rather than admit the enemy outthought or outfought China.  They hunt for culprits within the Qing government or naval establishment.  The tenor of such critiques: Japan can't possibly have won, ergo China must have lost.

而且，中國評論家在述及甲午海戰時，明顯在人力因素上有盲點。中國戰略家勉強承認日本艦隊的表現亮眼，但是不願承認敵人在思考上或實力上勝過中國。他們寧可在滿清政府或海軍內部尋找代罪羔羊。此類的批評基調是：日本不可能贏過中國，所以一定是中國自己搞輸掉的。

For instance, opinion-makers long faulted Chinese naval commanders for tactical and technical malpractice.  Some senior officers of China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), now want to exonerate Qing commanders, and instead blame the Qing Dynasty itself.  Bureaucratic institutions, they maintain, were backward, inflexible, and unable to keep up with an inferior but dynamic Meiji Japan. Shifting the blame to Qing mandarins restores luster to China's maritime traditions that reach back into the dynastic age.

譬如，輿論製造者常常怪罪當時海軍將領在戰術與技術上的失誤。有些人民解放軍的高級軍官現在卻想要放過清朝的將領，把罪過推到朝廷身上。他們說，官僚體制落伍僵化，無法趕上劣等但效率高的倭人。怪罪滿清官吏，他們就可以恢復回溯至清朝的海軍傳統的榮耀。

Whatever the truth of this reappraisal, criticizing a dead Chinese regime slights Imperial Japanese Navy seamanship, gunnery, and sheer élan.  Sometimes one contender loses not because of its own fecklessness but because the other side fights better.  Refusal to acknowledge Japan's past superiority in the human dimension hints at China's contempt toward its rival in the present day.  And as Japan's Self-Defense Forces don't often trumpet their power, PLA Navy battle-worthiness could suffer from myopia.

不論這番重新評估是否正確，批鬥一個已經消失的政權，意味著蔑視大日本帝國艦隊的航海技術、大砲射擊術、以及十足的衝勁。有時候參戰者敗北並不是因為自己不中用，而是因為對手實力較佳。拒絕承認日本過去人力上的優越，暗示著中國瞧不起現今的對手。日本的自衛隊不常誇耀自己的實力，而人民解放軍對自己海軍戰鬥力的評價卻可能缺乏遠見。

Shortsightedness aside, Beijing has the intellectual and emotional edge on this one.  Japan learned the lessons catalogued here long ago, and thus may be complacent.  Modern-day Japanese researchers are few compared to Chinese strategists combing through history for insights.  Why the disparity? Maybe defeat and dishonor concentrate the mind, while guarding a longstanding status quo deadens it.  Maybe resolving to take something from someone else lights a fire in the belly in a way that holding what one already possesses doesn't.  Either way, Beijing simply seems to want it more.

儘管短視，北京這次在智識與情緒上佔了贏面。日本老早就習得本文所羅列的歷史教訓，所以可能有點自滿。許多中國戰略家努力爬梳歷史，以獲取洞察力，今天的日本學者卻少有人這麼做。為何有這樣的差異？或許，失敗與恥辱使人心志專一，而守成卻使人心智遲鈍。或許，當一個人決心要搶奪別人財物時，體內會燃起熊熊的慾望，而固守已有財物者卻不會有這樣強烈的情緒。不管是以上哪種情形，中國的動機就是比較強。

How the belligerents read history won't decide a short, sharp war should one transpire in the East China Sea.  But history could make a difference by fixing attention on naval development -- and stirring the mad blood in Beijing and Tokyo.

萬一「短暫而激烈的戰爭」在東亞爆發，交戰國如何解讀歷史並不能決定勝負。但是歷史可以發揮作用，如果大家因此而專注於培養海軍實力──並且讓北京與東京的熱血瘋狂地沸騰起來。