The Benefits of Being Clear on Taiwan○The Diplomat（2014.01.14）

【Comment】

大概從70年代美中開啟正常化起，「創造性的模糊」(creative ambiguity) 就成為美國針對中台雙方的主要手段。

作者主張，台灣問題近年來雖不緊張，但在解決之前必須先釐清地位。

其實，在尖閣群島問題上，觀察美國對於日本的行為也採如此取向。這或許是美國「季辛吉風」的中國政策，因為尖閣問題的另一造是中國。

當時，美國獨強，創造性模糊是給足了當時國力非常弱的中國一個大面子，讓中國人民有大國的印象，如此較容易達成建交、聯中制蘇的戰略目標。

現在，中國強大了，成為世界第二大貿易國。對台灣的創造性模糊是否還適宜？

作者提出一個具體的疑問：美中之間是否有默契 (implicit understanding)，甚至密約存在？

他訪問8位學者：5位說「無」、5位說「不明」、1位說「有」。

這個提問很弔詭：對所謂的默契是否「存在」，由於事情的本質所然，至今沒有人「知道詳情」。所以回答「無」是非常保險的。反過來說，「不明」也絕對是正確答案。至於「有」其實是個推論，也不算錯。

主張有默契的學者，提及默契是美國告訴中國不可攻擊台灣，美國也告訴台灣會保衛台灣。但作者評論，假使要防止雙方冒進，美國要釐清其政策。

主張無默契的學者，觀察中國從未放棄武力攻擊台灣，卻也提及《817公報》的前提是「葉九條」，即中國尋求和平解決。還說，即使有默契，中國也不會承認。

有學者提及中台之間：中國不攻擊台灣，台灣不宣布獨立。

前些時候（2008之前），中國利用台灣作為藉口來擴軍，造成美國壓制台灣獨立自主與安全失衡的呼聲。但在實力漸豐之後，中國即無需藉口的擴軍。顯見得1990年代中到2008之間的台灣問題，僅為中國軍事崛起的口實，而台灣內部無法強調這點，美國智庫也買帳（台灣是個麻煩）。

演變至今，不僅在台灣與中國，甚至連美國，多數學者也認為美國已經無法防禦台灣，而且未來也不會更樂觀。

雖說真實世界是想違約就違約，無關默契或白紙黑字，但作者主張越明確具體，越不致產生誤解，從而越能履約。換言之，建設性模糊雖可以賺得多餘的外交紅利，但實際上卻易產生誤解而發生衝突。

韓戰就是個例子！

The Benefits of Being Clear on Taiwan○The Diplomat（2014.01.14）

Could making whatever implied understanding exists on Taiwan more explicit reduce tensions in East Asia?

By Amitai Etzioni

http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/the-benefits-of-being-clear-on-taiwan/

Making more explicit that which is viewed by many as an implicit understanding between China and the United States regarding the status of Taiwan would constitute a major step in defusing tensions between the two powers. The governments of both China and the United States have already shown considerable restraint in this matter, ignoring demands from Chinese who wish to use force to “reclaim” Taiwan as part of the mainland and from Americans who call for recognizing Taiwan as an independent nation.  These measures of self-restraint should be made more explicit, by letting it be known that as long as China does not use force to coerce Taiwan to become part of the People’s Republic of China (as it did with Tibet), the United States will continue to refrain from treating Taiwan as an independent state.

True, the way Taiwan is treated is currently a much less pressing issue than settling the differences about the status of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and other territorial matters concerning the South China Sea and the various re drawings of Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ) in the region.  However, if one seeks to resolve simmering conflicts and to draw on such resolutions to build constructive relations between China and the United States based on mutually assured restraint – rather than containment or a Cold War-style arms race – clarifying the status of Taiwan could serve as a major step forward.

I recently asked eight experts on Taiwan whether there was an implicit understanding between China and the U.S. about the ways Taiwan should be treated.  Five responded that there was no such understanding; two responded by saying that the answer to my question was not clear; and one held that indeed there was such an understanding. The range of their responses serves to verify that the issue surely could benefit from clarification.  Indeed, it turns out that matter is far more complex than it may at first seem.

One scholar wrote, “You are correct that there is an implicit agreement between U.S. and China that China will not use military force to “reclaim” Taiwan. […] There is an implicit understanding between U.S. and Taiwan that should China invade Taiwan, the U.S. may intervene, partly to honor the fact that Taiwan has been an important ally in the Pacific Rim and partly to protect U.S. interests in the region.”

Another scholar, however, wrote, “I am not aware of any such implicit understanding.  That is why the Taiwan issue remains such a sensitive issue in U.S.-China relations.  Many assume that the U.S. would defend Taiwan if China attacked without provocation, but that it would not if Taiwan declared independence unilaterally.  The U.S. [government] has never made clear what its policy actually is, if it indeed has a policy other than encouraging neither side to upset the status quo.”  Note that after indicating that he is unaware of such an understanding, this expert outlines a key element of such an understanding.  The fact that it is not “clear” and merely “many assume” is what others might view as an implicit understanding.

A third scholar’s response was still different.  He held that “No, there is NO such implicit understanding on this between [China] and [the United States].  One wishes so, but it’s not the case.  China has NEVER renounced the option of using force, if necessary, but in the 1982 Joint Communiqué did use language to the effect that it seeks ‘peaceful unification.’”

A fourth expert captured the ambiguities well, writing, “It is hard to say there is an implicit agreement because an agreement implies is it is more than just implicit!  I think China would never acknowledge that there is such an agreement.  They have not given up the right to use force to resolve the Taiwan problem.  But since they have not used force to this end, you can argue that there is an implicit agreement.  [It gets] rather circular[...] The position of the [United States] has always been that the Taiwan problem should be resolved peacefully with the consent of the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.”  This scholar proceeded to note that “the United States ‘acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.  The United States Government does not challenge that position’ [according to the Shanghai Communique].  This [is the] one China ‘principle’ in contrast to China’s one China ‘policy’ (more simply that Taiwan IS in fact part of ‘one China’).  Implicit in this, though, is the understanding, expressed by various administrations[,] that the [United States] will not support a Taiwan declaration of independence.”  He closed with the pregnant line, “So this might be seen as a basis for an implicit agreement.  We oppose a declaration of independence; China forgoes the use of force.”

One may well ask whether it is not best to let sleeping dogs lie.  One reason to clarify both sides’ policies is that hawks in both nations that use the cause of Taiwan to justify building up their respective military forces in an era in which capping these and focusing on economic, social, and environmental issues at home is needed by both nations.  Thus, Daniel Twining from the Hoover Institution points out that aggressive Chinese military modernization is justified in part by the need to ready to reclaim Taiwan.  A 2013 report to Congress from the Department of Defense concurs, stating, “Preparing for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait appears to remain the principal focus and primary driver of China’s military investment.”  In the same year China carried out a military exercise – Mission 2013B – in which the PLA simulated “a Normandy-style invasion” of Taiwan.”

In the United States, a leading expert of the Center for Naval Analysis Elbridge Colby warned that the not unfounded perception that the U.S. is becoming less capable of defending Taiwan is common in the U.S. as well as in Taiwan and China, and argues that maintaining a position of strength is critical to security for Taiwan and the region more broadly.  A 2003 report from the Council on Foreign Relations examined China’s growing military power and held that “[minimizing the chances that a cross-strait crisis will occur] means maintaining the clear ability and willingness to counter any application of military force against Taiwan.”

True, even if the restraint both sides imposed on themselves (and on their respective hawks) is made more explicit, either side could violate it.  However, the more explicit the agreement the less likely is that it will be subject to misunderstandings and the more likely it is to survive.  It may well be impossible at this stage to turn the implicit understanding, such as there is – if there is one – into an explicit one; however, the more than it can be clarified and solidified, the more this important simmering point of conflict can be assuaged.

I am quite aware of the theories of the merits of “creative ambiguities”; they can enable one to squeeze extra leverage out of the relatively small amounts of power.  In East Asia, however, they are much more likely to produce miscalculations and conflicts than significant gains.

Finally, reducing the tension on this issue would help to narrow the differences between the U.S. and China, especially if integrated into a more general policy of mutually assured restraint.  That would encourage both states to focus on the many issues in which they have shared or complementary interests.

Amitai Etzioni is a university professor and professor of international relations at The George Washington University. He served as a senior adviser to the Carter White House and taught at Columbia University, Harvard University, and the University of California at Berkeley. His latest book is Hot Spots: American Foreign Policy in a Post-Human-Rights World.