海空一體戰，也對也不對

【Comment】

The Concept of AirSea Battle originated from the strategy of AirLand Battle, which was developed in the 1980s by the Pentagon to engage war with USSR.  The US did not fear to have war with USSR, yet things have changed profoundly now. 

The US had little relationship with USSR in terms of trade among others, which allowed Uncle Sam to carry out the containment policy easily.  Meanwhile, the US kept helping China to develop its economy to deter USSR since 1980s.  The USSR dissolved in 1990.

Decades later, the US found China stronger than she had expected in 1980s.  The worst part, or the best part, is that there are rooted engagements between China and the US.  Neither side could wage an easy war against the other.

The situation promotes peace while neutralizing any battle strategy, including the AirSea Battle.

Is the AirSea Battle dangerous?  That depends on whether the AirSea Battle is in or out of the US re-balance policy and how the US sees Chinese intention: a greater participant or a rogue who undermines the world order.    Revised on 20131113

美專家：海空一體戰或不利美亞太再平衡戰略◎VOA（2013.11.11）http://www.voafanti.com/gate/big5/www.voachinese.com/content/air-sea-battle-us-pivot-20131111/1788066.html

華盛頓 — 2010年初，美國國防部正式推出“海空一體戰” (Air-Sea Battle)這一戰略理論，以應對中國不斷壯大的反介入/區域阻絕(Anti-Access/Area Denial)作戰能力。但一些美國的軍事專家認為，海空一體戰強調先發制人地打擊和摧毀敵軍武器系統和設施，恐怕不利於美國的亞太再平衡策略。
美國前卡特政府高級顧問阿米塔伊·伊茲昂尼 (Amitai Etzioni) 不久前在日本《外交家》雜誌 (The Diplomat)上撰文稱，美國五角大樓與2010年正式出臺的“海空一體戰”作戰理論是一種危險的震懾中國不斷崛起軍事實力的軍事戰略。
美國國防部在2010年2月公佈的《四年國防評估》報告中正式確立“海空一體戰”的作戰概念。報告説，美國海軍和空軍正在合作研發一套全新的海空聯合作戰概念，用以擊敗具備先進反介入/區域阻絕作戰能力的對手。 “海空一體戰”戰略被認為是美國直接針對中國解放軍近年來不斷壯大的反介入/區域阻絕作戰能力。美國的軍事戰略家認為，解放軍的反衛星、彈道反艦導彈和網路作戰能力正威脅到美軍在西太平的自由採取行動 (freedom of actions) 和力量投放（power projection）能力。
伊茲昂尼在《外交家》雜誌的文章説，“海空一體戰”要求美軍首先打擊解放軍的偵察和指揮系統，隨後摧毀設在中國本土的陸基反艦導彈發射裝置和防空系統，這無異於要和中國打一場全面戰爭。
美國海軍分析中心 (Center for Naval Analysis) 研究員丹尼爾·哈特尼特(Daniel Hartnett)認為，從“海空一體戰”來看，美國軍方的戰略似乎與美國總體的外交策略脫節。他説：“這其中的問題是軍方所做的與美國的整體改善與中國雙邊關係的外交目標存在脫節。”
今年3月，時任美國國家安全顧問多尼倫 (Tom Donilon) 在亞洲協會 (Asia Society) 就美國亞太再平衡政策發表講話時説，與中國建立穩定、富有成效和有建設性的關係是美國亞太再平衡政策中一個重要組成部分。美國的亞太再平衡策略一直飽受中國的猜忌和質疑，被認為是美國遏制中國崛起的新冷戰思維。
哈特尼特表示，儘管美國官員多次強調“海空一體戰”概念不針對某個國家或某個地區，但顯然這一戰略令中國感到不悅。他説：“如果中國把自己看成是海空一體戰的對象，當然這種想法也許對也許不對，認為這一戰略包括對中國本土的打擊，那麼中國就不會熱衷於改善同美國的關係，也會讓北京的鷹派立場觀點佔到上風。”
“海空一體戰”概念的支援者認為，該戰略是建立在美中開戰的可能性微乎其微的前提下，旨在震懾北京的反介入/區域阻絕作戰能力。但最近中日因東中國海領土糾紛而導致兩國緊張關係不斷升級，軍事分析人士擔心，中日一旦擦槍走火而爆發衝突，美國將不得不根據美日安保條約而介入。
澳大利亞戰略家、前總理霍克的高級顧問休·懷特 (Hugh White) 不久前在華盛頓就美國亞太再平衡策略發表看法時表示，美中的軍事對抗將是危險的，華盛頓和北京應構建一種你中有我的新格局。他説：“如果亞太沒有這樣一種新格局的話，那麼美中對抗升級的可能性就會變得非常高。這是一種美國和中國之間任何一方都贏不了的對抗。”
懷特表示，美中之間爆發衝突的可能性完全存在，而這一風險正變得越來越高。

Air-Sea Battle: A Dangerous Way to Deal with China◎Amitai Etzioni（2013.09.03）http://thediplomat.com/2013/09/03/air-sea-battle-a-dangerous-way-to-deal-with-china/?all=true

Air-Sea Battle seems a particularly risky response to China’s growing capabilities, and of questionable necessity.

On the face of it, the Pentagon’s Air-Sea Battle plan makes eminently good sense; it is a clear response to a clear challenge.  China has been developing a whole slew of weapons (especially anti-ship missiles) over the past two decades that are of great concern to the U.S. military.  These weapons, known in Pentagon-speak as anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, could undermine the international right to free passage in China’s surrounding waters or, in the case of a conflict over Taiwan or contested islands in the South and East China Seas, prevent the U.S. from making good on defense commitments to its friends in the region.

In response, the Pentagon developed Air-Sea Battle (ASB), the employment of which entails, according to position papers developed to promote it, a blistering assault on China’s mainland.  A report by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) gives a detailed account of how an ASB-style war with China would unfold.  In the opening “blinding campaign,” the U.S. attacks China’s reconnaissance and command-and-control networks to degrade the PLA’s ability to target U.S. and allied forces.  Next, the military takes the fight to the Chinese mainland, striking long-range anti-ship missile launchers.  Given that this is where the anti-ship missiles are located, it is only logical that the U.S. would target land- based platforms.  And to go after them, one of course needs to take out China's air defense systems, command control centers, and other anti-access weapons.  In short, ASB requires a total war with China.

As word of this plan spread, it generated a great deal of buzz in defense circles—and considerable push back.  Some in the Army saw ASB as an attempt by the Air Force and Navy to grab future missions and a larger share of a shrinking defense budget.  They were somewhat mollified when planners later carved out more room in the plan for land forces.  Others fear that it would lead to an arms race between the U.S. and China just when both powers must focus on nation building at home.  Still others claim that the same goal could be achieved by a much less aggressive strategy, such as imposing a blockade on China.  Above all, critics hold that ASB is highly escalatory and may lead to nuclear war.  Defense analyst Raoul Heinrichs warns that the deep mainland strikes “could easily be misconstrued in Beijing as an attempt at preemptively destroying China’s retaliatory nuclear options.  Under intense pressure, it would be hard to limit a dramatic escalation of such a conflict, including, in the worst case, up to and beyond the nuclear threshold.”

Faced with these objections, the Pentagon, to use the term employed by Colonel T.X. Hammes, a retired U.S. Marine Corps officer, “walked back” the plan.  Air-Sea Battle’s chief architects argued repeatedly that it is merely a “concept” and that it was not designed “for a specific region or adversary.”  Pentagon officials repeat that it is not a “strategy for a specific region or adversary,” and they describe ASB as a tiny office, only seventeen personnel, charged with improving cross-domain coordination and operability.  However, the “operational concept” has driven major acquisition decisions and priorities.  According to the nonpartisan and highly regarded Congressional Research Service (CRS), “the Air-Sea Battle concept has prompted Navy officials to make significant shifts in the service's FY2014-FY2018 budget plan” towards exactly the sorts of electronic, cyber, and anti-submarine weapons systems that the war plan for China calls for.”  Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert stated that the Air-Sea Battle Office has “more than 200 initiatives” in progress and that the 2011 and 2012 Presidential Budgets included related investments in “anti-submarine warfare, electronic warfare, air and missile defense, and information sharing” and that the 2013 budget “sustains these investments and really provides more resilient C4ISR investments” in line with the dictates of ASB.

As to the Pentagon’s assertion that the plan is not aimed at a particular adversary—there are only two countries with advanced A2/AD capabilities: China and Iran.  China is by far the strongest challenger to unfettered U.S. domination of the seven seas, while Iran comes in a remote second place, and according to the CBSA, “cannot hope to match China when it comes to developing an advanced A2/AD network.”  When reporters inevitably ask about ASB’s connection to China, its planners respond that “the inclination to narrow down on a particular scenario is unhelpful.”  Note: Not false or misleading but – unhelpful to the military’s desired message.  Off the record, officials have allowed that “Air-Sea Battle is all about convincing the Chinese that we will win this competition.”

The main flaw Air-Sea Battle is not merely that it is a particularly aggressive military response to the anti-access/area-denial challenge.  The problem is that ASB is developing in a foreign policy vacuum.  If the U.S. were to conduct a thorough review of China’s military capabilities and its regional and global ambitions—and found that the Chinese were planning to forcefully expand their territory or unseat the U.S. as the global power, perhaps Air-Sea Battle might be deemed appropriate.

There are few signs, however, that China is on this path.  China’s leaders have embraced a foreign policy of “peaceful development” and are moving the country toward greater participation in the prevailing world order rather than trying to undermine it.  It participates in the United Nations where it often votes “absent” rather exercise its veto power; it plays by the World Trade Organization rules and increased its contribution to the IMF; and it has used legitimate channels to resolve most recent trade and territorial disputes.  Moreover, the U.S. and China have surprisingly many complimentary interests that could serve as the basis for cooperative relations, including counterterrorism, economic stability, preventing the spread of pandemics, and environmental protection.

Even if such a review concluded that a military clash with China was a possibility, then the U.S. would still very likely have the time and space to pursue alternatives before embracing a strategy as risky as ASB.  One possible way forward is a policy of “Mutually Assured Restraint” modeled after the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.  Under MAR, the U.S. and China would agree to place verifiable limits on weapon systems (especially anti-ship, space and cyber capabilities) and refrain from seeking to pull China neighbors into their sphere of influence, treating them instead as neutral buffer states.

In contrast, Air-Sea Battle not only makes war with China more likely; it shifts attention and resources from where they are needed most—suppressing the ongoing threat of terrorism in the Middle East and Africa and contributing to nation building at home.  For now, it would be best to turn ASB into what the Pentagon says it is: the work of a tiny office, with a few officers, laboring to improve coordination and communication among the services.

Amitai Etzioni is a university professor and professor of international relations at The George Washington University. He served as a senior adviser to the Carter White House and taught at Columbia University, Harvard University, and the University of California at Berkeley. His latest book is Hot Spots: American Foreign Policy in a Post-Human-Rights World.