又見CIB

連發的照片，從盧媽開始

2025
8/27　1801　AIT發表：古立言、高雄處長與陳其邁
8/27　1401　AIT發表：古立言見黃國昌
8/25　2246　AIT發表：見國民黨立委
8/25　1713　AIT發表：見顧立雄
8/24　1901　蔡英文發表：官邸見賴總統
2020　
12/16　AIT酈英傑台中見盧秀燕（閉門會議被盧媽發採訪通告公開）

親中總統，川普以基地為籌碼

【雙魚之論】
The U.S.–ROK alliance has long revolved around two contentious issues: wartime operational control (OpCon) and the sharing of costs for stationing U.S. forces in Korea. The former, however, is largely a false issue. Even under a combined command structure, each national contingent ultimately reports to its own commander-in-chief. In practice, without presidential authorization, a South Korean general cannot exercise command authority over U.S. forces. This limitation stems not only from sovereignty concerns but also from the fundamental differences in training and operational doctrine. The latter issue—burden-sharing—reflects a more tangible imbalance. For decades, South Korea benefitted disproportionately from the security guarantee provided by U.S. forces on the peninsula. With South Korea’s growing economic and military capacity, Washington’s demand for a more equitable distribution of costs merely restores balance rather than altering the alliance’s fundamentals.
Recently, President Lee Jae-myung rejected the idea of employing U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) in the event of a Taiwan contingency. Yet this, too, constitutes a false debate. A conflict in the Taiwan Strait would automatically escalate into a regional crisis, with the Korean Peninsula inevitably becoming a critical flashpoint. Moreover, given that USFK is structured primarily around ground forces with limited air assets, any large-scale redeployment to Taiwan would undermine deterrence and stability on the peninsula without meaningfully altering the balance in the Strait.
Former President Trump’s proposal to link U.S. basing rights to “land ownership” also warrants closer scrutiny. The ownership and management of military base territories fall squarely within sovereign jurisdiction; they cannot be reduced to simple real estate transactions. Seen in this light, Trump’s rhetoric aligns with his broader pattern of treating territorial arrangements—such as Greenland or parts of Canada—as bargaining chips in national security negotiations. Put differently, if Seoul is unwilling to expand its cost-sharing contributions, Washington may well press for land-based concessions as an alternative.
By contrast, both Japan and South Korea host sizable U.S. deployments, whereas Taiwan has had no American troop presence since the drawdown of the late 1970s and the final withdrawal in 1980. Beyond limited intelligence facilities, the U.S. investment in Taiwan’s security infrastructure remains minimal. This disparity raises a pressing question: have Taiwan’s negotiators ever sought to leverage this fact to argue for trade treatment at least on par with Japan’s?

美韓軍事同盟的核心爭議，長期集中於戰時作戰指揮權（OpCon）以及駐軍經費分攤比例。前者實際上屬於假議題：即便編制為聯軍，各國部隊的指揮鏈最終仍回歸本國三軍統帥。換言之，若無本國總統同意，韓軍司令並無權直接指揮美軍。其理由既涉及主權，也關乎不同的軍事訓練與運作體系。後者則是韓國長期仰賴駐韓美軍防衛而受惠較多，如今韓國國力增強，美國僅要求調整至更為均衡的水準。
近期，韓國新任總統李在明表態，拒絕美國在台海發生衝突時動用駐韓美軍的提議。然而，這同樣是一種假議題：因為台海有事即等同東亞有事，朝鮮半島勢必成為敏感熱區。更何況，駐韓美軍以陸軍為主、空軍為輔，若大規模抽調陸軍支援台海，勢將削弱對朝鮮半島安全的維持，對台海衝突也無直接助益。
至於川普曾提出的「基地領土所有權」構想，也須細加解讀。大部分軍事基地的土地所有或管理權屬於國家主權範疇，並非單純不動產交易。若將此視作川普一貫以領土（如格陵蘭、加拿大部分領域）作為國安談判籌碼的延伸，更能理解其脈絡。換言之，若韓國不願提高軍費分攤，也可能改以土地作為抵充。
與此相較，日韓均有美軍駐防，而台灣自1970年代起美軍大幅裁撤，1980年後更完全無駐軍。除了情報設施外，美國在台安全投資與支出極為有限。此一差異，談判代表是否曾積極爭取，要求至少在關稅待遇上比照日本？

繼格陵蘭、加拿大之後！川普向南韓拋「駐軍基地歸美」    自由 20250826

俄羅斯不要和平，烏克蘭放膽溯源攻擊

【雙魚之論】
烏克蘭戰爭即將產生重大改變，俄羅斯的軍事行動已經被證明不會和平所改變。
鼓勵烏克蘭攻擊俄羅斯本土？ 川普：球隊防守再好禁止進攻不可能贏    中廣 20250821

美國總統川普美東時間21日疑似表態，支持烏克蘭主動進攻俄羅斯。在俄烏談判陷入僵局之際，相關言論備受關注。

瑞典能源轉向，押注小型模組化核電

【雙魚之論】
很奇怪的思考是，核電被賦予要回收、處理廢料（包括最終儲存）的責任，也被多國賦予要負擔事故的賠償，這責任很「美妙的」還要回溯到外國廠商。但同時，與氣候變遷有關的火力發電，特別是燃煤發電，只要做好粉塵收集，其溫室氣體（包括CO2、NOX）便可以幾乎任意排放。
前述失衡的問責制度表示，人類自己陷在相互指責的漩渦中樂此不疲，既無意願所以也無法解決氣候變遷問題。
以相同標準考量各種發電方式可知，沒有一種萬全的發電方式，任何發電方式都有成本與風險，因此，合理的政策便是調和風險與利益，以及管理與承擔風險。
有趣的是，今天核三重啟的公投失敗，雖然無拘束力，但賴總統反而宣布要尊重民意，核安會先訂立標準，台電啟動舊核電機組自我安全檢查，定期向社會報告風險與進度，若符合標準就依法送核安會審議。
當政策變成神主牌不讓討論，施政就只能不明不白～

瑞典能源轉向，押注小型模組化核電    科技新報 20250822

Vattenfall 計劃在瑞典西南部的 Ringhals 現有廠址建設新機組，選項包括採購 GE Vernova 的五座 BWRX-300 反應爐（SMR），或是 Rolls-Royce 的三座 SMR，總發電量均約 1,500 MW。此外，公司仍在評估是否再新增 1,000 MW 產能，以取代已除役的機組。

所謂「開羅宣言」中的「各軍事使節團」

【雙魚之論】
每隔一段時間，去閱讀已經閱讀不知多少次的歷史文件（包括條約），常有新的收穫。表示自己的成長。

全國性公民投票案第21案 中央選委會

全國性公民投票案第21案    中央選委會

主文：您是否同意第三核能發電廠經主管機關同意確認無安全疑慮 後，繼續運轉？

理由書：

本提案為複決重大政策之公民投票案，有鑑於台電核三廠二號機除役後，我國完全停止核電機組運轉及發電，政府設定之2025年溫室氣體排放減量目標已難達標，加以開發新能源成效不彰，光電弊案層出不窮、台電連年虧損，需政府編列預算撥補。我國缺乏自產能源，高度仰賴進口，核電廠停機後，僅能以火力燃煤發電填補缺口，違反淨零碳排減碳目標，亦不利能源自主之國安考量。為維繫產業供電、民生用電平穩，基於地理環境及國際政治情勢的風險評估，應保留一定程度可運轉之核能發電設施，作為落實2050淨零排放之輔助過渡能源。在確保核子反應器設施運轉安全無虞的條件下，應儘速恢復運轉供電並配合立法院114 年5 月13日三讀通過之《核子反應器設施管制法》第六條修正規定，以強化台灣能源供應韌性。故主張就「第三核能發電廠經主管機關同意確認無安全疑慮後，繼續運轉」之重大政策案，交由全體公民投票決定，以展現公民意志。提案理由分述如下：

尋找戰後臺灣誕生的印記—陳儀深館長於「從中日戰爭到終戰接收」學術研討會閉幕式致詞 20250817

【雙魚之論】
This text originates from an informal and seemingly effortless conversation—perhaps not even preceded by a prepared transcript. Yet within this casual exchange, the Director of the Academia Historica raised several questions (or counter-questions) that were anything but light. Each compels us to reflect: how astonishing it is that certain misconceptions have persisted with such obstinacy, and how many crucial lines of inquiry remain underexplored. The endeavor is thus necessarily interdisciplinary, requiring every scholar in this field to cultivate at least a grounding in related disciplines.
Much like the entangled international arrangements and historical contingencies surrounding the “Republic of China (Taiwan),” the overarching question—“How did postwar Taiwan come into being?”—is equally intricate. It resists fixation to a single definitive moment; indeed, it continues to evolve. From Formosa to the Republic of China, from “Free China” to Taiwan, and now to the contested formulation of “Republic of China (Taiwan),” the island’s trajectory has been subject to the shifting calculations of major powers. Its future course remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that we have no alternative but to move forward with resolve, shaping Taiwan into a polity of quality, democracy, and self-rule.
If the commitment toward Taiwan articulated by the great powers in the Cairo Declaration of November 1943 did, in fact, exist—and if it was briefly upheld in the immediate postwar years until June 1950, only to be fundamentally rewritten by the outbreak of the Korean War and Truman’s subsequent statement—then the meaning of the term “Republic of China” as employed in that declaration must likewise be reinterpreted. Its connotation shifts from an “active” sense, whereby Formosa was secured as a prize of war by the great powers, to a more “defensive” sense, wherein the people of Taiwan came to safeguard a way of life grounded in freedom and democracy against external alteration.
It cannot be denied that Taiwan was once a colony of the Japanese Empire. The reference made by the Director to the Constitutional Archives of Japan’s National Diet Library points directly to the deep relevance of such sources to Taiwan’s postwar trajectory. Should Academia Historica in the future obtain access to these electronic archives for preservation, they would contribute greatly to a fuller and more multidimensional representation of this complex history. In so doing, future generations, when engaged in debates with the great powers regarding Taiwan’s destiny and best interests, would be able to speak with substantiated authority, no longer easily blurred or fragmented by imposed narratives. This would stand as yet another profound historical and documentary undertaking—following upon the repatriation of the Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo diaries—that strikes at the very foundations of Taiwan’s historical consciousness.

本文看似是國史館長一場輕鬆隨性的談話紀錄，或許連文字稿都未事先預備，但在閒談之中，館長所拋出的幾個疑問（甚至是反問）卻絲毫不輕鬆。每一個問題都迫使我們自省：過去那些理所當然的認知，竟可能是偏誤卻仍被頑固維持的「常識」；而真正值得深入探究的課題，仍舊浩瀚無涯。這正顯示，相關研究絕非單一學門能獨力承擔，而是一項跨領域的長遠志業，每一位投入者都必須具備其他不同學科的基本功。
如同「中華民國（台灣）」的歷史定位與國際政治安排之複雜，對於「戰後台灣如何誕生」這一根本性大哉問，也難以簡單歸納於某一個確切時點，甚至可以說至今仍在演變之中。從「福爾摩沙」、「中華民國」、「自由中國」、「台灣」，再到「中華民國（台灣）」的各種演變，無一不受制於大國博弈的全局考量，未來走向更難預測。然而，我們別無選擇，只能堅定前行，努力將台灣建構為一個具有厚實質地、能自主民主的共同家園。
若1943年11月大國在〈開羅宣言〉對台灣的承諾確曾存在，並短暫地在戰後被奉行至1950年6月，卻因韓戰爆發與〈杜魯門聲明〉而被徹底改寫，那麼「中華民國」這一〈開羅宣言〉用語的內涵也必須隨之轉換：由原本具「積極性」的戰利成果（大國取得做為戰利品的福爾摩沙），轉變為帶有「防衛性」的存在（台灣住民守護自由民主的生活方式免於改變）。
不可諱言，台灣曾經是日本帝國的殖民地。館長特別提及的日本東京國會圖書館憲政資料室，必然與戰後台灣有著深刻關聯。假使未來國史館能取得相關電子檔案作為典藏，將有助於全面呈現這段歷史的複雜性。如此一來，後世世代在與大國辯論台灣前途、爭取最佳利益時，便能引據充分言之有物，而不再輕易被模糊、被切割。這將成為繼「兩蔣日記」返台之後，又一項直探根基、意義深遠的文史工程。

尋找戰後臺灣誕生的印記—陳儀深館長於「從中日戰爭到終戰接收」學術研討會閉幕式致詞    20250817

沒有什麼特別的儀式，但我們表定的節目有一個閉幕式。像剛才最後一場討論會的話題，為什麼要問戰犯、或者是漢奸？這個問題其實都是我們最近在談「終戰八十年」，它的意義是什麼？反侵略、或者說要團結這類的意義。不是打架打完以後，大家包一包傷口就沒事了。應該是要去反省戰爭的原因，以及戰爭的過程中有沒有犯罪、戰爭罪。我記得有一篇論文是在講「戰爭權利」，戰爭是要照規矩來的，戰爭的權利例如沒有宣戰的話，能不能封鎖？如果是在戰爭的狀態才可以做什麼，如果不是戰爭的狀態的話就不能超越，這牽涉別的國家在中國的領域裡面的權利問題，所以這些討論其實是有很多層的意義。

許卓雲的過世與「口嫌體正直」現象

【雙魚之論】
Hsu Cho-yun（許倬雲）, a historian born in Xiamen, China, raised in Taiwan, and flourishing in the United States, passed away at 96.

His life, a tapestry woven across three lands, embodies a poignant tension between cultural longing and pragmatic survival, a theme that resonates deeply in the diasporic experience.

歐洲負起安全責任 美國空出一手專注中國

【雙魚之論】
For an extended period, China has both claimed and been perceived to wield significant influence in halting the Ukraine war, leveraging its "no-limits" quasi-alliance with Russia. This perception appeared plausible, given China's purchases of sanctioned Russian oil and its provision of drones and mercenaries.
However, China's limited experience in navigating multifaceted international interests, coupled with the inherent tension between its long-standing non-interference policy and the pursuit of commercial interests, has hindered its effectiveness. Consequently, international expectations of China's diplomatic influence have steadily eroded. Compounded by domestic economic imbalances and authoritarian governance, China's actions are increasingly confined to exerting military and diplomatic pressure on smaller neighboring states, revealing a marked deficiency in managing complex global affairs.
Meanwhile, the assertion made during President Trump's first term—that European nations must assume greater responsibility for their own security—is becoming reality in his second term. The collective engagement of Europe's five major powers, the European Union, and NATO at the White House to address the Ukraine war underscores Europe's proactive stance. In contrast, China's diminishing influence leaves the war's outcome increasingly clear. What remains is the negotiation of a viable framework for peace and its faithful implementation.

值得注意的是，長期以來，中共自認並被外界認為，憑藉與俄羅斯「不封頂」的準盟友關係，能在終止烏克蘭戰爭中發揮關鍵影響力。鑑於中共購買俄羅斯受禁運的石油並提供無人機與傭兵等支持，這一說法看似可信。
然而，中共在處理多方利益的國際事務上經驗不足，更因其長期堅持的不干涉他國內政政策與保護本國商業利益的矛盾，難以有效調和。國際社會對中共影響力的期待已逐漸消退。加之國內經濟失衡與高壓治理，中共的國際作為日益侷限於對周邊中小國家的武力施壓與單邊利益主張，凸顯其處理複雜國際事務能力的匱乏。
與此同時，川普在第一任期提出的歐洲應承擔更多安全責任的觀點，在其第二任期正逐步成為現實。歐洲五大國、歐盟及北約為應對烏克蘭戰爭，聯手前往白宮協商，顯示歐洲正積極行動。相較之下，中共影響力不足，烏克蘭戰爭的結局已逐漸明朗，當前僅需談判出可行的停戰框架並確保其執行。 

BBC專訪德國總理默茨：美國要與中國競爭而無暇顧及歐洲    BBC 20250718

「美國現在更關心世界上其他地區，他們認為自己正處於與中國之間的激烈競爭中。」

德國總理默茨（Friedrich Merz）接受BBC專訪。他表示，美國的「轉向亞洲」正在發生，因此要求歐洲在國防和安全方面投入更多。

台疑美論升溫 葛來儀：美國應公開表明台灣重要性 自由 20250819

【雙魚之論】
Amid rising U.S. skepticism in Taiwan, prominent scholars, including Bonnie Glaser, caution that Taipei must avoid conflating reciprocal tariffs stemming from trade imbalances—specifically, country-targeted surcharges—with assurances of national security. This distinction is critical. Yet, for emotionally charged segments of the public or politically motivated actors, the temporal coincidence of tariff disputes and security concerns fosters a misperception of causality, exemplifying the fallacy of mistaking correlation for causation. This misinterpretation is further amplified by the Chinese Communist Party’s relentless cognitive warfare, which exploits such ambiguities to deepen mistrust. Glaser emphasizes that unchecked U.S. skepticism risks undermining American strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific. To counter this, she advocates for immediate, actionable, and legally sound measures to address and mitigate the growing distrust.

隨著疑美論情緒高漲，除Bonnie Glaser外，美國學者普遍認為，台灣不應將貿易逆差導致的對等關稅（針對特定國家的附加關稅）與國家安全保障混為一談。事實確實如此，但對情緒化的人群或別有用心的政客來說，關稅與安全議題既同時發生，容易被誤解為因果關係，成為時間序與因果錯置的典型案例。更何況，台灣面臨中共無處不在的認知作戰，進一步加劇了這種誤解。Bonnie Glaser警告，若美國對疑美情緒放任不管，終將損害自身利益。為此，她並提出立即可行且合法的應對措施，以緩解未來可能的不利情勢。

星期專論》台灣已經失去川普了嗎？ 馬明漢（Michael Mazza）＠自由 20250817
星期專論》美台關係的警訊 韓儒伯（Rupert Hammond-Chambers）＠自由 20250810
台灣如何失去川普 Christian Whiton＠Domino Theory 20250804

台疑美論升溫 葛來儀：美國應公開表明台灣重要性    自由 20250819

華府智庫「德國馬歇爾基金會」（GMF）印太計畫主任葛來儀（Bonnie Glaser）指出，台灣民眾過去一直對美國抱持友好態度，但最近這種觀感逐漸轉向負面。自從2022年俄羅斯全面入侵烏克蘭後，美國拜登政府選擇不直接派兵協防烏克蘭，引發對美國是否可靠的質疑。儘管這類疑慮曾一度降溫，但如今類似情緒又再次升溫。

星期專論》台灣已經失去川普了嗎？ 馬明漢（Michael Mazza）＠自由 20250817

【雙魚之論】
星期專論》美台關係的警訊 韓儒伯（Rupert Hammond-Chambers）＠自由 20250810
台灣如何失去川普 Christian Whiton＠Domino Theory 20250804 

星期專論》台灣已經失去川普了嗎？    馬明漢（Michael Mazza）＠自由 20250817

台灣已經失去川普。或者，至少一位前美國國務院官員兼說客，希望我們這麼相信。惠頓（Christian Whiton）在網路媒體Domino Theory撰文，列舉種種理由，主張賴清德政府與川普政府的關係可能已經破裂—而且一切都是賴清德的錯。雖然惠頓的許多說法帶有誤導性，或者只是搞不清楚狀況的片面之詞，這篇文章無意間還是有助於揭露「讓美國再次偉大」（MAGA）世界觀的一個重要面向。

惠頓文章 揭MAGA世界觀重要面向

邁向戰後 澤倫斯基二訪白宮 美歐俄元首全面協商

【雙魚之論】
This marks the second one-on-one meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, following their initial encounter during the funeral of a pontiff. Russia has demanded that Ukraine relinquish its claim to Crimea, effectively seeking to revert to the pre-1954 status when Crimea, then an oblast within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), was transferred to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Ukrainian SSR).

Regarding Ukraine’s commitment to forgo NATO membership, several alternatives have been proposed: first, participation in the European Union’s collective defense framework (commonly referred to as the “EU army”); second, the establishment of multilateral trilateral alliances with neighboring countries; or third, the conclusion of a bilateral military alliance with the United States. While the EU’s defense mechanisms and trilateral alliances are already operational, a U.S.-Ukraine military alliance remains under discussion.
On the issue of Ukraine’s involvement in the development of Russian rare earth minerals and European investment, these are components of a previously announced postwar economic reconstruction plan and mineral cooperation agreement. Initially, President Zelenskyy expressed uncertainty about the security guarantees embedded in the mineral agreement. However, during their meeting in the Vatican, President Trump provided a detailed explanation, leading Zelenskyy to understand and endorse the arrangement.
As for the question of “how to prevent future Russian invasions,” the answer is straightforward: warfare reflects a nation’s comprehensive strength. Following multiple rounds of comprehensive Western sanctions, particularly financial measures, Russia’s economy—despite its nuclear arsenal and vast territorial expanse—has been reduced to a level comparable to that of Spain. This diminished economic capacity renders Russia ill-equipped to sustain prolonged military engagements that could precipitate the collapse of its regime.

這是美國總統川普與烏克蘭總統澤倫斯基（Volodymyr Zelenskyy）的第二次一對一會談，首次會晤發生在教宗葬禮期間。俄羅斯要求烏克蘭放棄對克里米亞的主權，這意味著恢復1954年之前的狀態，即克里米亞作為俄羅斯蘇維埃聯邦社會主義共和國（RSFSR）的克里米亞州（Crimean Oblast）被劃歸烏克蘭蘇維埃社會主義共和國（Ukrainian SSR）之前的歷史安排。
關於烏克蘭永不加入北約的問題，存在若干替代方案：一是加入歐盟的共同防務機制（即所謂「歐盟軍隊」）；二是與鄰國建立多邊三方聯盟；三是與美國簽署雙邊軍事同盟協定。除了與美國的軍事同盟尚待商討外，歐盟防務合作與三方聯盟均為現有且運作中的機制。
關於烏克蘭參與俄羅斯稀土礦開發以及歐洲的投資，這是先前公布的戰後經濟復興計劃與礦產合作協議的一部分。澤倫斯基最初對礦產協議中的安全保障條款存有疑惑，但在梵蒂岡會晤中，經川普親自解釋後，他最終理解並同意了相關安排。
至於「如何防止未來俄羅斯入侵」的問題，答案顯而易見：戰爭是國力的綜合體現。在美歐多輪全面制裁，尤其是金融制裁的壓力下，當前俄羅斯的經濟實力已萎縮至僅與西班牙相當。儘管俄羅斯擁有核武和廣袤的國土，但其經濟基礎難以支撐可能導致國家崩潰的長期戰爭。

澤倫斯基抵美　歐洲領袖大陣仗陪　川普提「停火2條件」    TVBS 20250818

東鄉茂德日記中終戰前的日本 Joel來談日本 20250817

【雙魚之論】
From the diary of Japanese Foreign Minister Tōgō Shigenori, one can discern how arduous it was to reach the decision to surrender and end the war. The so-called hardliners were not necessarily driven by unwavering conviction; more often, their obstinacy stemmed from the refusal to admit error and the preservation of face. They neither confronted reality nor offered reasons and solutions, but merely pressed deeper into what was already a doomed endgame.
History resonates with striking familiarity—the ongoing efforts to bring the war in Ukraine to an end evoke similar dynamics. One may ask whether Donald Trump resembles Japan’s wartime civilian government: in possession of accurate intelligence yet misinterpreting it, particularly by disregarding the Soviet Union’s structural incentives.
The initiation of war is deceptively easy, often requiring nothing more than a single act of “courageous” will. Bringing war to an end and securing peace, however, is profoundly difficult. The Pacific War was especially so, for negotiations toward peace unfolded just as the Cold War alignment was emerging. The Communist victory in China accelerated “Reverse of Hostility”: yesterday’s enemies became allies, while erstwhile allies turned into adversaries. Under such conditions, how could peace be possible?
The difficulty of peace lies not only in the challenge of establishing treaty terms. For military regimes devoid of deliberative environments, surrender or even a ceasefire faces formidable obstacles. Hardline doctrinal factions are quick to denounce pragmatism with slogans and, in some cases, to resort to coups or violence. On the eve of Japan’s surrender, even one as exalted as the Emperor himself nearly fell victim to a coup or assassination.
To the doctrinaire, the world is reduced to a shocking simplicity: chant the formulas of the past ever louder, and if they fail, accept national ruin as a badge of honor. What is far more difficult, however, is to recognize the few decisive elements that can preserve the nation’s future, and to uphold them with pragmatic determination.

從日本外務大臣東鄉茂德的日記中可見，做出終戰投降的決定何其艱難。所謂「死硬派」未必真是出於堅定信念，更多時候只是死不認錯的面子問題。他們既不面對現實，也不提出理據或解方，只是一味鑽進必死的棋局之中。
歷史的回聲在今日依然鮮活——烏克蘭戰爭的終戰努力，正呈現類似的困境。川普是否如同當年的日本文官政府，手中掌握正確情報，卻因誤讀而忽視了「蘇聯自身的結構性誘因」？
挑起戰爭往往容易，只需一個「勇敢」的意志即可；但結束戰爭、爭取和平，卻是極為艱難的任務。太平洋戰爭更是如此，因為在和平談判過程中冷戰格局逐漸浮現，尤其隨著中國赤化，出現了「敵性反轉」的局面——昔日的敵人成為盟友，而盟友卻轉為新的敵人。和平如何可能？
所謂「和平不容易」，並不僅指和約條件難以確立；對於缺乏公共辯論空間的軍事政體而言，投降或停戰同樣充滿阻力。死硬的基本教義派，往往更擅長以口號打擊務實，甚至不惜以政變或暴力相向。終戰前夕，即使尊貴如日本天皇，都就幾乎遭遇政變或暗殺。
基本教義派的世界總是簡單到令人吃驚，只要大聲複誦過去的八股口號，假使錯了就不惜玉碎即可；然而，能夠識破其中少數足以保全未來命脈的關鍵要素，並以務實之道加以維護，卻是難上加難。

台灣歷史的複雜性　國史館陳儀深館長「中日戰爭到終戰接收學術討論會」暨《蔣中正日記（1937-47）》新書發表會開幕致詞
日本戰略錯誤在先，注定失敗
台灣教授協會　終戰八十週年：應正視台灣地位國際法理與歷史真相

東鄉茂德日記中終戰前的日本    Joel來談日本 20250817

所有的故事要從今年才被家屬公開的當時外務大臣東鄉茂德的日記說起…

日本戰略錯誤在先，注定失敗

【雙魚之論】
The Second Sino-Japanese War (1931–1945), commonly referred to as the War of Resistance, can only be meaningfully understood in its later phase when situated within the broader framework of the Pacific War. In this respect, research fellow at Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Kuo Tai-Chun’s essay makes only a cursory and speculative reference to the “two atomic bombs,” while leaving unaddressed the critical strategic contributions of the United States in the Pacific War—namely, the combined use of embargoes, submarine warfare, and island-hopping campaigns that ultimately severed Japan’s overstretched supply lines.
From a balanced perspective, Japan adopted two major strategic blunders. First, the ineffective Tripartite Pact foreclosed opportunities for significant diplomatic gains like the Concert of Europe in 19^th Century did. Second, its choice to launch a surprise attack on the United States, thereby opening simultaneous fronts, overstretched its resources and rendered its war effort unsustainable. These failures, in turn, highlight the respective strengths of China’s protracted war of attrition as a continental power and America’s supply-line interdiction as a maritime strategy. The atomic bombs themselves symbolized the stark disparity between the two opposing blocs in technological and industrial capacity. In demographic and territorial terms, the gap between them was already measured in multiples, providing the structural foundation of victory and defeat.
Naturally, scholars can specialize only in particular dimensions of such a vast conflict. Yet the historical reality was multi-layered and expansive, extending across diverse domains. Paradoxically, the closer a scholar stands to politics, the more likely they are to cling to narrow interpretations and to argue them with fervor—debates that, even after eight decades, show little sign of exhaustion.

1931～1945的第二次中日戰爭（即「抗戰」）的後半段，必須放在太平洋戰爭的整體架構下來理解，才能更有意義地掌握事件的本質。郭岱君的文章僅以簡略且帶有臆測的方式提及「兩顆原子彈」，卻未觸及美國在太平洋戰爭中所採取的關鍵戰略貢獻——包括禁運、潛艦作戰與跳島戰術，最終達成「截斷日本補給線」的決定性效果。
就客觀而言，日本首先犯下兩大戰略錯誤：其一是無效的三國軸心同盟，使其錯失如十九世紀「歐洲協調」班取得重大外交利益的機會；其二是以偷襲美國為起點的多點同步作戰，最終導致戰線過度擴張、捉襟見肘。這些錯誤反而凸顯出大國所能發揮的戰略優勢，如中國「持久消耗戰」，以及美國「截斷補給線」。至於原子彈，則象徵了兩大陣營在科技力與工業實力上的懸殊差距。若從人口與領土規模來比較，雙方本就存在數倍之差，這也構成了勝負的根本基礎。
當然，學者往往只能專精於其中某一面向；然而，歷史的實際發展卻是經緯萬端、涵蓋極廣。也因此，越是貼近政治的學者，往往越容易固守狹隘的觀點，並樂於爭辯不休，縱使已歷八十年仍未稍歇。

如果沒有兩顆原子彈？郭岱君斷言中國不會輸，但日本面臨「這個下場」    張鈞凱＠風傳媒 20250816

考驗下的光電真實成本

【雙魚之論】
In our real world, nothing exists with only virtues and no flaws. Yet people persist in believing that whatever they cherish must bring nothing but benefit, free of harm. The ordeal of Typhoon Denise has already exposed what was once concealed in the solar energy projects—the staggering costs of large-scale damage or decommissioning rival, if not exceed, those of construction itself. Thus, when discussing Taiwan’s energy policy, the guiding principle must always be diversity and balance. And yet, politicians of the past, pursuing their own narrow interests, propagated one-sided narratives for political gain. Even as times change, they continue to deny citizens the space to question, to reflect, and to let go.

人世間的事物，絕無只有優點沒有缺點，但是人總是堅信自己所衷情的事物百利無一害。在丹尼絲颱風考驗下，光電提早顯現被隱藏的缺失—大規模受損或除役後的成本並不亞於興建預算。因此，討論台灣的能源政策，基本原則總是多元與平衡。但，過去政客以一偏之私宣傳而獲取政治利益，即便物換星移，也當然不允許選民思考與放手。

嘉義滯洪池堆滿光電廢棄物！彭啓明震怒：8／19前不改善再罰300萬    ETtoday 20250817

嘉義縣多處滯洪池因颱風重創，受損光電板與浮具堆置問題延宕未決，環境部長彭啓明16日南下視察時，竟當場目睹業者違規在現地破碎浮板，痛斥處理態度消極，限令業者須於8月19日前完成改善，否則每個案場將再重罰300萬元。