讓金馬立委如關島 有發言權但無表決權

【雙魚之論】
After the war, having been shaped by the trials of multiple armed conflicts, residents registered as belonging to “Fujian Kinmen” and “Fujian Matsu” have long exhibited a wavering stance in both politics and daily life. In terms of political values, they tend to favor freedom and democracy; yet economically, in everyday interactions, and in geopolitical reality, they remain closely connected to Fujian in China. This has produced a clear divergence from residents of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands. Such a structural contradiction is not difficult to understand and can, to some extent, be regarded as excusable.
However, figures such as Chen Yu-jen, who almost unabashedly take the Chinese Communist Party’s position as the guiding standard for their words and actions—and whose discourse closely echoes Beijing’s talking points—can no longer be explained merely by geography or lived reality. This phenomenon is all the more startling and warrants serious vigilance.
We contend that, given Xi Jinping’s inability to reconcile his high-profile militaristic rhetoric with mounting governance difficulties, opting for a high-risk political gamble—seeking to seize Kinmen, Matsu (or one of them), taking local residents as political hostages to coerce Taipei while simultaneously challenging the United States and Japan—is not a low-probability scenario. On the contrary, it is one that deserves heightened precaution.
What further merits serious consideration is this: if some political figures in Kinmen and Matsu, along with their supporters, have already rejected a “Taiwanese” identity at the level of self-identification, should the number, qualifications, and powers of their representation in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China be reconsidered? For example, might it be appropriate to draw on institutional arrangements used in non–fully sovereign territories such as Guam, whereby elected representatives enjoy the right to speak in the legislature but do not possess voting rights?

戰後歷經多場戰事洗禮，戶籍屬於「福建金門」與「福建馬祖」的居民，其政治與生活立場長期呈現擺盪狀態：在政治價值上傾向自由民主，但在經濟、日常往來與地緣現實上，卻與中國福建高度相連，因而與台澎地區居民形成明顯差異。這樣的結構性矛盾，本就不難理解，也尚屬情有可原。
然而，如陳玉珍般，幾乎毫不遮掩地以中共立場作為其言行的判準，甚至在論述上與北京口徑高度一致，則已非單純的地緣或生活現實所能解釋，更令人錯愕與警惕。
我們認為，在習近平無法對其高調的軍國主義口號與實際治理困境作出交代的情況下，選擇以高風險的政治豪賭，試圖奪取金門、馬祖（或其一），並挾持當地居民作為政治人質，以此要脅台北、同時向美日叫板，並非低機率情境，反而值得高度防範。
進一步值得嚴肅思考的是：若部分金馬政治人物與支持者自我認同上已否定「台灣人」身分，那麼其在中華民國立法院中的代表數額、資格與職權，是否有必要重新設計？例如，是否可參考關島等非完整主權地區的制度安排，使其民意代表在國會享有發言權，卻不具表決權。

稱對岸只打台北、打賴清德！陳玉珍「我本就不是台灣人」她爆美智庫嚇壞    三立新聞 20260116

國民黨立委陳玉珍強推法案，反紫光奇遊團成員許美華指出，美國智庫友人拜訪陳玉珍，想了解她對兩岸關係的看法，沒想到陳玉珍說，「她不擔心中共打過來，因為中共討厭台獨、討厭賴清德，對岸只會打台北打賴清德，不會打金門」，還直言「我是福建人，我本來就不是台灣人」，令人傻眼。

立法部門持續違反「法治國」憲政原則

立法部門持續違反「法治國」憲政原則 The legislative branch continues to violate the constitutional principles of the constitutional state (Rechtsstaat)

【雙魚之論】
The actions of the blue-white coalition in blocking the budget, "special defense budget" etc. can, on the surface, be framed as an exercise of legislative autonomy or normal political contestation under the separation of powers. However, a closer examination of their actual conduct reveals a clear overstep of boundaries.
The essential function of the Procedure Committee is akin to a "mailroom" for legislative proceedings: it is responsible only for verifying whether proposals are formally complete and procedurally compliant. Its authority should be limited strictly to procedural review and must not extend to substantive judgments or decisions on content. Yet, under blue-white dominance, the Procedure Committee has persistently refused to place the central government budget and the special defense budget on the Legislative Yuan's plenary agenda. It has even gone further by adopting a practice of "selective clearance": extracting only certain items (such as specific livelihood subsidies) for referral to the relevant committees for review, while keeping the vast majority of the budget items blocked at the door, unable to proceed.
This approach far exceeds mere "failure to schedule" and effectively amounts to the Procedure Committee conducting preliminary substantive screening and de facto vetoes on content. It seriously erodes the budget review powers vested in the specialized committees and the plenary session. More critically, this selective and piecemeal handling fundamentally violates the constitutional principles of budget integrity and comprehensive review. It also contravenes the boundaries of power separation established by the Budget Act and relevant interpretations by the Constitutional Court (Grand Justices).
Once a branch of government acts in violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers from the outset, any resolution it produces is inherently unconstitutional and naturally lacks legal validity.
By engaging in such reckless, all-or-nothing maneuvers without regard for consequences, is the blue-white coalition so confident that it will not return to power in the near term that it feels free to act with impunity? Or is there a deeper political calculation at play? The motives behind this are truly baffling and inevitably lead one to question: Can a legislature operating in this manner still fulfill the constitutional responsibilities of oversight and checks and balances entrusted to it?

藍白陣營阻擋預算與〈國防特別條例〉等行為，表面上或許可解釋為立法機關的自治權行使，或是權力分立下的正常政治角力。然而，進一步檢視其實際作為，卻已明顯逾越界線。
程序委員會的本質功能，僅如同議事的「收發室」，負責審核提案形式是否完備、程序是否合法，其權限應止於程序審查，而不得涉入實質內容的判斷與決定。然而，藍白主導的程序委員會卻長期拒絕將總預算案及〈國防特別條例〉與其後預算案排入院會議程，甚至進一步發展出「選擇性放行」的做法：僅抽出部分項目（如某些民生補助）送交各委員會審查，其餘絕大部分預算則繼續擱置門外不得其門而入。
這種作法已遠超單純的「不予排案」，實質上等同於由程序委員會先行進行內容篩選與實質否決，嚴重侵蝕各専門委員會及院會的預算審議職權。更重要的是，這種選擇性、片段式的處理方式，完全違背預算案整體性與通盤審查的憲政原則，也牴觸《預算法》及相關大法官解釋所確立的權力分立界線。
一旦權力部門的行為自始違反權力分立的憲政原則，其所為之決議即屬「自始違憲」，自然不具合法效力。
藍白陣營如此不計後果、孤注一擲的操作，究竟是自認短期內無執政可能，因而肆無忌憚？抑或另有更深層的政治盤算？其背後動機實在令人費解，也讓人不禁質疑：這樣的國會，究竟還能否承擔起憲法所賦予的監督與制衡責任？

有關格陵蘭 Grok：格陵蘭的自治（特別是二戰期間總督同意美國建立基地）

【雙魚之論】
韓國選出親中總統，川普以基地為籌碼
格陵蘭＋加拿大　巴拿馬運河＋美洲灣
20090612〈格陵蘭自治法〉／Taimocracy翻譯
過時的溝通管道破壞了合法性 Sara Olsvig & Ulrik Pram Gad＠DIIS 20241210
川普買格陵蘭？北極圈爭霸戰
北極海變新南海 美揭中國野心 自由20190508
中國大陸在格陵蘭島投資機場 丹麥與美國緊張防範 中時 20180909
2017.04.09 中國獵地北極圈2017：中企擬購廢棄海軍基地遭丹麥拒絕
2017.04.09 中國獵地北極圈2015：俊安集團將接管格陵蘭Isua鐵礦專案
中國獵地北極圈2013：富豪看中冰島不毛之地，投資還是陰謀？
美海軍第二艦隊
海陸雙霸的中國夢
北極的第三絲路
《中國的北極政策》白皮書

為何格陵蘭（Greenland）與法羅群島（Faroe Islands）被丹麥憲法並列一起規定？
Grok：格陵蘭（Greenland）與法羅群島（Faroe Islands）在丹麥法律文件（如《格陵蘭自治法》第12條等）中經常被連在一起規定，主要是因為兩者在丹麥王國（Kingdom of Denmark / Danish Realm）的憲政地位、歷史背景與制度設計上高度相似且互相關聯。以下從多個層面說明原因：

1. 共同的憲政框架：丹麥王國的「王國統一」（Unity of the Realm / Rigsfællesskabet）

有關格陵蘭 1940年7月21日哈瓦那會議〈雪梨先驅報〉19400723 / Taimocracy翻譯 20260110

【雙魚之論】
有關格陵蘭　19400721哈瓦那會議
有關格陵蘭　19400721〈哈瓦那公約〉/Taimocracy翻譯 20260110
20090612〈格陵蘭自治法〉／Taimocracy 翻譯20250316

1940年7月21日哈瓦那會議　〈雪梨先驅報〉1940.07.23　/ Taimocracy翻譯 20260110

美國共和國的戰爭警報。 巨大的貿易卡特爾方案。 本報紐約通訊員報導。

二十一個泛美國家（包括美國在內）的外交部長，正在哈瓦那召開特別會議，尋求一個彼此都能接受的方案，以處理因歐戰影響而改變的各國與歐洲的共同及個別關係。

這次會議不僅如一位評論員所言，可能對「泛美主義的未來方向與實際效能」具有「非凡的重要性」；對世界其他地區也無疑具有嚴重意義。

討論將涵蓋目前令全人類深感困惑、或將人類分裂成兩個激烈交戰陣營、或威脅進一步影響尚未完全波及地區之經濟、政治與道德命運的所有問題。

會議將試圖解決幾個無法抑制的迫切問題。

中立區。

有關格陵蘭 19400721〈哈瓦那公約〉Taimocracy翻譯 20260110

19400721〈哈瓦那公約〉

【雙魚之論】
有關格陵蘭　19400721哈瓦那會議　
20090612〈格陵蘭自治法〉／Taimocracy 翻譯20250316 

Act of Habana Concerning the Provisional Administration of European Colonies and Possessions in the Americas  〈哈瓦那公約〉 關於美洲歐洲殖民地及屬地臨時行政之決議  Taimocracy翻譯 20260110

The Governments of the American Republics, desirous of cooperating in the common defense of the Western Hemisphere and of protecting the peace and security of the Americas against any attempt at aggression or change of sovereignty in territories belonging to non-American states,  美洲共和國各政府，冀望合作共同防衛西半球，並保護美洲之和平與安全，以防範任何針對屬於非美洲國家之領土進行侵略或主權變更之企圖，

Resolve: 決議如下：

有關格陵蘭 19400721哈瓦那會議

【雙魚之論】
Greenland falls squarely within the scope of the Monroe Doctrine—its core principle being that any aggression or interference by non-American states in the affairs of American states is absolutely intolerable to the United States and the American nations themselves.

• In the 19th century, this principle was primarily directed against European colonial expansion;
• In the 20th century, while still aimed at European powers, it specifically targeted the threat from Nazi Germany (for example, during World War II, the United States directly occupied Greenland to prevent Germany from gaining a foothold);
• In the 21st century, the focus has shifted to the activities of China and Russia, particularly their strategic penetration and resource competition in the Arctic region.

If we fail to connect these historical contexts, it becomes difficult to truly grasp on a conceptual level why the Monroe Doctrine continues to serve as a source of strategic legitimacy for the United States to this day. It also obscures the deeper logic behind the current Greenland issue: the United States regards it as part of its own backyard, tolerating no interference from external great powers.

This linkage is not merely a historicalreview—it is the key to understanding contemporary geopolitics.

格陵蘭，正位於門羅主義的適用範圍之內——其核心原則在於：任何非美洲國家對美洲國家的侵略或干涉，都是美國也是美洲國家絕對無法容忍的。

• 19世紀，這條原則主要針對的是歐洲國家的殖民擴張；
• 20世紀，雖仍為歐洲國家，卻特別指向納粹德國的威脅（例如二戰期間美國直接佔領格陵蘭以防德國染指）；
• 進入21世紀，焦點轉移到中國與俄羅斯的活動，尤其是在北極地區的戰略滲透與資源競爭。

如果我們不把這些歷史脈絡串聯起來，就很難在概念上真正理解「門羅主義」為何至今仍被美國用來作為戰略正當性依據，也難以看清當前格陵蘭議題背後的深層邏輯：美國視其為自家後院，不容外來大國插手。

這樣的連結不僅是歷史回顧，更是理解當代地緣政治的關鍵鑰匙。

 

1941-1949 年美國外交政策十年回顧：1940年 7 月 21 日至 30 日美洲共和國外交部長哈瓦那會議(1)    Taimocracy翻譯

（a）關於和平解決衝突的決議（2）

鑑於：

設計圖曝光！地下深藏208間密室 中國駐英巨型使館「疑成間諜祕密基地」 鏡週刊 20260113

【雙魚之論】
有趣的是，這張設計圖如何出現？密室會是中國向UK呈報的資料內容？或是，這是UK故意洩漏的情報？

設計圖曝光！地下深藏208間密室　中國駐英巨型使館「疑成間諜祕密基地」    鏡週刊 20260113

就在關鍵光纖旁！中國計畫在倫敦興建全新駐英使館，規模可能成為歐洲最大，但相關設計細節近日引爆巨大爭議。英國媒體披露疑似未經遮蔽的完整設計圖，顯示使館地下空間異常龐大，竟疑似規劃多達208個隱密房間，且位置緊鄰關鍵網路光纖，讓外界高度憂心恐成為間諜活動與跨境鎮壓的核心基地。

有關格陵蘭 電影：忠誠的叛國者（The Good Traitor）

Grok電影：忠誠的叛國者（The Good Traitor）

【雙魚之論】
20090612〈格陵蘭自治法〉／Taimocracy翻譯
過時的溝通管道破壞了合法性 Sara Olsvig & Ulrik Pram Gad＠DIIS 20241210
川普買格陵蘭？北極圈爭霸戰
中國大陸在格陵蘭島投資機場 丹麥與美國緊張防範 中時 20180909
2017.04.09 中國獵地北極圈2017：中企擬購廢棄海軍基地 遭丹麥拒絕
2017.04.09 中國獵地北極圈2015：俊安集團將接管格陵蘭Isua鐵礦專案

電影中透露的資訊

二次大戰中，1940.04.09丹麥幾乎無抵抗的投降，國王並未流亡，反與納粹合作，以駐美大使Henrik Kauffman為主的一些人，認為本國政府已經成為受納粹脅迫的政府並非自由的政府，且判斷盟國會贏，屆時丹麥會淪為戰敗國地位，很慘，故決定不聽從本國指揮而（獨立）成立「自由丹麥」，包括24個使館中的9個（伊朗、阿根廷、巴西、墨西哥、埃及、葡萄牙、日本、南非、加拿大、冰島）。

世界，不一定只有「那個樣子」

泰柬邊境衝突＝太子洗錢＝紅色貪腐＝藍白洞開台灣國境？

【雙魚之論】
The Thai–Cambodian Border Conflict, “Princelings” and Money Laundering, and Red Corruption

左膠 在意理論並容忍獨裁，無視實際生活利益

【雙魚之論】
The article primarily highlights the deep divide between millennial left-wing circles and Latin American communities, using the capture of Nicolás Maduro as a case in point. On the one hand, the “millennial left” takes to the streets to protest what they describe as “U.S. imperial interference in other countries’ affairs.” On the other hand, Venezuelans within Latin American immigrant communities celebrate the fall of a dictator. The key difference between the two appears to lie in whether they are connected to land and lived experience. Where such a connection exists, the central concern is whether everyday life can actually improve; where it does not, there is a stronger tendency to prioritize theoretical “correctness,” even if that means tolerating the continued rule of a dictator.
Seen in this light, the latter group is precisely the kind of partner most welcomed by foreign powers. After all, they do not live in Latin America; for them, Latin America is merely a professional topic or a discursive resource.
Recently, a video circulated online showing an NGO member confronting Marco Rubio and accusing him of disregarding the lives of people in Gaza. Rubio responded angrily, condemning the accusation as taken out of context and pointing out that it deliberately ignored the fact that Hamas had initiated the massacre. This brief exchange neatly illustrates the difference between the “millennial left” and Latin American communities—and even echoes the contrast between radical elements of Taiwan’s Blue-White camp and the Green camp. The crucial question is whether one cares about the consequences of one’s words and actions: whether one is genuinely concerned with social realities and the concrete interests of ordinary people, or instead serves foreign powers while extracting benefits from them.
The article’s final paragraph is particularly compelling: we do not need to decide our own destiny to serve any left-wing theory. We ourselves should have the right to say “Yes” or “No.” By using this principle to reflect on ourselves and our surroundings, one can likely discern the line between right and wrong in the narratives competing within the marketplace of ideas.

文章主要指出千禧世代左翼陣營與拉丁美洲社群之間的巨大分裂，並以馬杜洛被捕一事為例加以說明：一方面，「千左」走上街頭抗議所謂「美帝介入他國事務」；另一方面，拉美移民社區中的委內瑞拉人，卻歡慶獨裁者下台。兩者的關鍵差異，似乎在於是否與土地與實際生活經驗有所連結。若與土地有連結，關注的焦點便是生活是否得以改善；反之，則更傾向於堅持理論上的「正確性」，即使獨裁者繼續執政，也在所不惜。
如此看來，後者恰恰是境外勢力最樂見的合作對象。畢竟他們並不生活在拉美，拉美僅是一種工作上的議題或論述素材。
日前網路流傳一段影片，一名 NGO 成員當面指責盧比歐不顧加薩人民死活，盧比歐則憤怒反駁其去脈絡化的指控，並指出對方刻意去脈絡化，忽略哈瑪斯主動挑起屠殺的事實。這段短暫的交鋒，恰好呈現了「千左」與拉美社群之間的差異，甚至也映照出台灣藍白激進派與綠營之別——關鍵正在於是否在意其言行的後果——真正關注社會現實與人民的實際生活利益，或者是服務不為人知的境外勢力並獲取利益。
文章最後一段的論述尤為精彩：我們不需要為了服務任何一套左翼理論而決定自己的命運；我們自己，應當擁有說「Yes」或「No」的權利。以此點來觀察自己與環境，大概就知道言論市場上敘事的正邪之分了。

【雙魚之論】
雜記：細談這次千左與拉美陣營的分裂——拉美發展不須要符合左翼理論的規律    鄭紹鈺FB 20260108

背離事實的「在地協力者」

政治重建 正當性的持續與再造一樣重要

美國中情局評估：馬杜羅下台後，委內瑞拉政權核心人物最有能力接手治理國家    割蘿蔔外電譯站 20260106

一份近期的美國機密情報評估指出，如果委內瑞拉的獨裁者馬杜羅下台，包括副總統羅德里格茲在內的馬杜羅政權高層核心人物，最有可能在加拉加斯成立臨時政府，短期內穩住情勢。

一如部份立委 不惜全面否定司法與憲政秩序，彷彿生活在台灣之外

【雙魚之論】
Maduro has declared himself a "prisoner of war," asserting that he should be governed by international humanitarian law (laws of war), thereby attempting to evade all U.S. criminal charges and responsibilities. However, the U.S. capture operation this time, much like the 1989 arrest of Noriega, was led by law enforcement agencies with the aim of formally charging and prosecuting his criminal acts. Despite Maduro being the commander-in-chief of Venezuela's armed forces and having initiated the relevant conflicts, he remains unable to escape liability for potential war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The sharpest insight from this report lies in Maduro's complete denial of the court's jurisdiction. This attitude is highly consistent with what we have observed in Ko Wen-je's own outright rejection of the courts, as well as the denial of constitutional order by certain Kuomintang legislators—they seem to exist outside Taiwanese society, or to believe that some external force beyond Taiwan promised to protect them, and are thus willing to destroy the existing order and the interests of the rule of law at any cost.

馬杜洛宣稱自己為「戰俘」，主張應受國際人道法（戰爭法）管轄，以此迴避美國的所有刑事指控與責任。然而，美國此次行動一如1989年逮捕諾瑞加般，由執法部門主導，旨在完成對其犯罪行為的正式指控與執行。儘管馬杜洛身為委內瑞拉三軍統帥，且相關衝突係由其所發起，他仍無法免除潛在的戰爭罪責任與反人類罪。
本報導最尖銳的發現，在於馬杜洛對法院管轄權的全面否定。此一態度，與我們觀察到的柯文哲本人對法院的全面否定，以及部分國民黨籍立委對憲法秩序的否定高度一致——他們彷彿置身於台灣社會之外，或相信某台灣社會外的勢力承諾提供保護，因而甘願不惜毀壞既有秩序與法治利益。

馬杜羅今天堅稱自己是「戰俘」而不是刑事案件被告，這段話大有玄機    割蘿蔔外電譯站 20260106

委內瑞拉遭到推翻的前總統馬杜羅，今天在曼哈頓聯邦法院出庭時否認所有指控。他強調自己不是普通的刑事案件被告，而是一名「戰俘」。

說「副王」太沉重 這是新的佔領模式

【雙魚之論】
In the article, Marco Rubio is referred to as a "viceroy." Literally translated, this term means "vice-king," denoting a monarch's representative in a colony or province—a usage particularly fitting in the context of the Spanish Empire. In an Anglo-American context, it corresponds to "governor," meaning a ruling administrator.
In the historical process of territorial status transition, following a foreign invasion and military occupation (from conquest to unconditional surrender), foreign forces typically establish a unified military-civilian leader in the territory, or a civil administrator who also holds military rank. This is known as a "military governor"—the highest official who, backed by military power, oversees and supervises all governmental affairs. After World War II, Chen Yi's official title in Taiwan was precisely "governor."
Today, calling Marco Rubio the "viceroy" of Venezuela would be somewhat excessive, as he will not be stationed long-term in Venezuela to manage its affairs. In reality, recent events reflect a new form of military occupation—one that is far lighter than traditional indirect rule through the existing government. Without undergoing hostile military occupation, Venezuela has directly entered a phase of autonomous political reconstruction under friendly military assistance. This represents an entirely new model of international intervention and law enforcement cooperation, the future development of which merits close observation.

文章中將相關人物稱為「viceroy」，若從字面翻譯為「副王」，意指君主在殖民地或行省的代理人，此為西班牙帝國慣用的稱謂，較為貼切；若置於英美語境，則相當於「governor」，即統治長官之意。
在領土地位變遷的歷史過程中，外國入侵並完成軍事佔領（從征服至無條件投降）後，外國部隊通常會在當地設立軍民合一的領導者，或稱兼具軍職的民政長官，此即所謂的「軍事總督」（military governor）——以軍事力量為後盾，督導並監理一切政務的最高長官。二戰結束後，陳儀在臺灣的職稱即為governor（長官）。
如今若稱盧比歐（Marco Rubio）為委內瑞拉的「副王」，顯得有些過分，他根本不會長駐委內瑞拉管理。實際上，近日的事件反映了一種新型的軍事佔領型態——相較於傳統透過原政府進行的間接統治，此模式更為輕度：委內瑞拉未經敵對軍事佔領，便直接進入友善軍事協助下的自治國政治重建階段。這是一種全新的國際介入與執法合作模式，未來發展值得密切觀察。

「委內瑞拉總督」：一場暗殺陰謀如何造就盧比歐的政治地位    割蘿蔔外電譯站 20260106

2017年，委內瑞拉情報局長被指控策劃暗殺盧比歐參議員，盧比歐因此一度受到美國警察的嚴密保護。