【雙魚之論】
It seems to me that the Joint Fire Coordination Center is USTDC in a way.
國軍設聯合火力協調中心 台美聯合幕僚作業 聯合 20260125
因應各軍種陸續接裝美製火力裝備加上現役國造各式特種飛彈,國防部在台北大直博愛營區新成立國軍最高層級的「聯合火力協調中心」,藉以協調各軍種不對稱火力部署;且協調中心席位,有大批美國友盟人員所屬,台美傳已實施多次聯合幕僚作業。
真如/神性/梵,是單純存在,故無內容、不變動;無形性,故遍時空;先驗,故僅存概念中
Why is Ko
Wen-je so fixated on pushing the Artificial Reproduction Act? He has
even proposed using this bill as a quid pro quo to trade with the ruling party
for the National Defense Special Budget Act.
Yet the nature, importance, and urgency of these two matters are fundamentally
incomparable. The defense budget concerns Taiwan’s very survival and national security,
whereas the Artificial Reproduction Act, while related to livelihoods and
medical rights, does not carry the same level of urgency or strategic
significance. If the ruling party were to accept such a trade, it would amount
to allowing Ko Wen-je to “take advantage of a moment of crisis,” potentially
placing Taiwan in an even more dangerous situation.
On the surface, the amendment to the Artificial Reproduction Act is being led
by TPP legislator Chen Chao-tzu, but in reality this is also an issue that Ko
Wen-je himself has been forcefully promoting—so much so that his impatience and
agitation reveal possible personal ambitions or ulterior motives. So what,
then, is his true motivation?
Recent media reports indicate that China has developed extreme and horrifying
practices in the field of biotechnology: not only involving designated organ
transplants, but even advancing to the stage of forcibly abducting people to
harvest their organs. More disturbingly, there are reported cases of targeting
vulnerable women—including prostitutes or trafficked women—for forced pregnancy
and childbirth, followed by the direct harvesting of infant organs or stem
cells. So-called “biotechnology centers” or “institutes of life sciences” in
Cambodia are reportedly cooperating with Chinese biological research
institutes, operating a “baby farm” model in which newborns’ cerebrospinal
fluid or stem cells are extracted to produce so-called “rejuvenation” or
anti-aging products for China’s elite.
Against this backdrop, Ko Wen-je’s urgency in emphasizing the passage of the
Artificial Reproduction Act—particularly provisions on surrogacy—may not be
focused on addressing infertility or helping ordinary families. Rather, it may
be an attempt to open up a manipulable channel involving surrogate mothers and
the children they bear. The draft proposed by Chen Chao-tzu has been
acknowledged by Ko himself as “rough,” lacking clear regulations on newborn
health protections and parental responsibilities. Yet he attempts to justify
pushing it through by saying, “Let’s get something first, then improve it
later.” In this context, the most critical objective of rushing the bill
through may well be to commercialize surrogate mothers and the children they
give birth to.
Although this line of reasoning is a reasonable inference and suspicion based
on existing reports—and not groundless speculation—the mere possibility of such
a scenario is deeply unsettling and terrifying. Is Ko Wen-je a “Merchant of
Venice”?
柯文哲為何如此執著於推動《人工生殖法》?他甚至提出願以該法與《國防特別預算條例》和執政黨進行對等交換。
然而,這兩者的性質、重要性與急迫性根本無法相提並論。國防預算是攸關台灣生存的國家安全議題,而人工生殖法雖涉及民生與醫療權益,卻不具同等迫切性與戰略層級。若執政黨接受這種交換條件,等於讓柯文哲「趁人之危」,甚至可能將台灣置於更危險的境地。
表面上,《人工生殖法》修法由民眾黨立委陳昭姿領銜提案,但實際上這也是柯文哲本人極力推動的議題,甚至因氣急敗壞而見其個人企圖或私心。那麼,他的真正動機究竟是什麼?
從近期媒體報導可見,中國在生物科技領域已發展出極端且駭人的做法:不僅涉及指定器官移植,甚至進化到強行擄人摘取器官的階段。更進一步,已出現直接針對弱勢女性(包括娼妓或被拐賣婦女)進行強迫受孕、生育,隨後直接摘取嬰兒器官或幹細胞的案例。柬埔寨的所謂「生物科技中心」或「生命科學院」,據報導即與中國相關生物研究所合作,涉及「嬰兒農場」(baby farm)模式,抽取新生兒脊髓液或幹細胞製成所謂「回春」或抗衰老藥物,供應給中國權貴階層。
因此,柯文哲如此急切強調人工生殖法的通過(特別是代理孕母制度),其焦點很可能不在解決不孕症或幫助一般家庭,而是試圖為「代理孕母」與所生嬰兒開啟某種可被操縱的管道。陳昭姿版本的草案被柯文哲自己承認「粗糙」,對新生兒的健康保障、養育責任完全缺乏明確規範,他卻以「先求有、再求好」來掩飾強行推動的理由。在此脈絡下,倉促通過該法,最關鍵的目標恐怕正是將代理孕母及其產下的孩子做商業使用。
這雖然是基於現有報導所做的合理推論與懷疑,並非空穴來風,但光是想像這種可能性,就令人感到極度不安與恐怖。柯文哲是「威尼斯商人」嗎?
【雙魚之論】
Trump's four-year National Defense Strategy naturally differs
significantly from those of Biden or any previous presidents. Its core is the
full integration of MAGA principles, along with the concrete goals and
pragmatic strategies needed to achieve “Make America Great Again.”
Many Taiwanese people, upon seeing that the document does not contain the word
“Taiwan,” immediately become overjoyed or deeply disappointed—this is actually
a symptom of lacking confidence in themselves. Sensationalist media are even
more prone to this: the moment the strategy is released, headlines scream that
it “does not mention Taiwan at all.”
In reality, by placing “deterring China through strength (rather than
confrontation)” as the second Line of Effort—and given that China’s various
forms of infiltration and threats against the U.S. homeland and the Western
Hemisphere are already implicitly covered under the first Line of Effort
focused on homeland and hemispheric security—this already directly encompasses
the necessary measures to strengthen defense along the First Island Chain,
including Taiwan. There is simply no need to explicitly name or elaborate on
Taiwan.
川普的四年期國防戰略,自然與拜登或其他前任總統的文件有明顯差異,其核心就是融入MAGA理念,以及達成「讓美國再次偉大」的具體目標與務實策略。許多台灣人一看到文件中沒出現「台灣」二字,就立刻欣喜若狂或失望沮喪,這其實反映出對自身信心不足的心態;媒體更常以此煽動情緒,戰略發布當天就以「對台灣一字未提」為標題大作文章。
事實上,把「以實力嚇阻中國」列為第二大努力線(而中國對美國本土與西半球的各種滲透威脅,已隱含在第一線的本土與半球安全之中),就已直接涵蓋強化第一島鏈防衛——包括台灣在內——的必要措施,根本無需特別點名或多加贅述。
INTRODUCTION
President Trump in his first term and since reentering office in January 2025 has rebuilt the American military to be the world’s absolute best—its most formidable fighting force. But it is essential to emphasize how much of an achievement this has been. 川普總統於其第一任期內,以及自 2025 年 1 月重返執政以來,已重新打造美國軍隊,使其成為全球絕對最強、最具威懾力的作戰力量。然而,必須特別強調的是,這是一項得來不易、且極具分量的成就。
1941年丹麥駐美公使致函國務卿 Henrik
Kauffmann / Taimocracy翻譯 1941.04.13
美國對外關係外交文件,1941年,歐洲,第二卷
859B.7962/123
丹麥公使(考夫曼)
J.No.3.M.½
華盛頓,1941年4月13日。
主席先生:你和我在本月九日簽署的有關格陵蘭島國防的協議序言中的第四點如下:
「雖然丹麥對格陵蘭島的主權得到充分承認,但目前的情況阻止丹麥政府對格陵蘭島行使其權力…」17a
考慮到這種情況並根據我們的理解,我直到4月10日中午公佈該協議後才向丹麥政府通報了該協議。
我在給哥本哈根外交部的電報中提到了這一點,該電報在延遲了一段時間後於4月11日送達。
我表明我已簽署協議
「......17a代表丹麥國王陛下以格陵蘭主權者的身份行事,格陵蘭當局已同意本協議,......」17a
並解釋了我採取行動的原因,並補充說
【雙魚之論】
The words of AIT Taipei Director Raymond Greene—“Freedom is not free”—go
far beyond the common media interpretation that freedom merely comes at a cost.
His message reaches deeper than that. It is a pointed critique of the reckless
conduct of Blue-White camp legislators over the past two years, during which
they have exercised power while evading responsibility and accountability.
“Freedom is not free” does not simply mean that freedom requires sacrifice; it
also implies that freedom is not limitless.
Freedom does not grant a license for arbitrary action—whether
through the unchecked exercise of power or through the refusal to bear
corresponding obligations.
AIT台北主任谷立言的“Freedom is not free”一語,除了最普遍的「自由不是免費」之外,更深層的理解是:自由不可恣意而為,包括了儘管恣意揮灑權力卻不承擔基本義務。
左膠——去脈絡化的平行正義 Naïve leftist discourse on Greenland:
decontextualized justice
This
image typically exemplifies the naïve leftist discourse — the vulnerable
situation of indigenous peoples is indeed worthy of our care, and that point
itself is not incorrect. However, concerning the recent events in Greenland,
the overall situation carries a context of "strategic threat." This
area is one of the frontlines for the United States in the Western Hemisphere,
including the First Island Chain, Central and South America, and the Arctic
Circle, while China has fully encroached upon this region. Discussions about
the strategic importance of Greenland cannot be decontextualized.
Putting together the issues of "strategic threats in the Western
Hemisphere" and "indigenous culture," there is a widespread call
online urging major powers (the U.S. and Europe) to refrain from intervening
and to allow indigenous peoples to decide for themselves, which seems
reasonable at first glance. However, the problem is that China has extensively hunted
land, emphasizing private land ownership while asserting the exclusion of
government interference, followed by immigration. Consequently, China can
continue to develop under a "civilian" guise and claim that its right
to "develop China" should not be hindered — this is one of Beijing's
national policy slogans.
這幅畫面典型地展現了左派的論述——原住民的弱勢處境是值得珍惜的,這一點本身並沒有錯。然而,針對近日格陵蘭事件而言,整體情勢有「戰略威脅」的「脈絡」。這裡是美國與西半球的前線之一,包括第一島鏈、中南美和北極圈等地,而當中國已經全面侵佔這個地區時,評論格陵蘭戰略重要性的議題不能「去脈絡化」。
將「西半球戰略威脅」與「原住民文化」問題並置在一起,在網路上流傳的大量呼籲,希望大國(美歐)不要插手,讓原住民自己決定,乍看之下看似是合理的。然而,問題在於,中國已經大量獵取土地,強調私有土地所有權,並主張排除政府干預,隨後進行移民。這樣一來,中國可以以「民間」的形式繼續發展,並且主張不應被阻止「中國發展」的權利——這是北京的國策口號之一。
【雙魚之論】
Over the past year, the constitutional disorder witnessed in Taiwan has
been rooted fundamentally in disputes over the separation of powers. At
its core, this controversy raises several interrelated questions of
constitutional theory:
過去一年在台灣所發生的憲法紛亂,根底就是「權力分立」議題,包括:
法治國的權力為何要分立?
分立的權力間關係為何?
個別權力部門在權力範圍內是否享有絕對權威?或者,是否享有阻礙其他權力部門行使其固有權威的力量?
分立之權力的上位概念或原則為何,從而任何權力部門都不應違背?
關於總統彈劾案之立法院公聽會的幾個憲法問題與回應
陳怡凱@思想坦克 20260123
一、前言
川普第二任期一開始,便公開表示希望將加拿大納入美國,成為第51州,理由是加拿大在對美貿易中長期佔得便宜,成為美國的一州就完全免關稅;不久後,他又揚言要購買格陵蘭,此次,他強調的是國家安全已經被中國滲透。
Greenland, Iceland, the Monroe
Doctrine, and Western Hemisphere Security HoonTing 20260118
Although Donald Trump is often portrayed as a highly pragmatic and transaction-driven political figure, his grasp of national strategic logic and historical context is, in fact, strikingly lucid and uncompromising. Confusing grand strategy with mere tactics—or failing to situate contemporary events within their deeper historical framework—inevitably leads to distorted judgment and repeated miscalculation. Trump’s publicly ridiculed proposal in August 2019 to purchase, or otherwise acquire, Greenland vividly illustrates this dynamic.
【雙魚之論】
Fifty years ago, there were television programs that pitted abacus users
against calculators. Later, when scientific calculators became widespread, such
shows quietly disappeared. As electronic technology continued to advance,
calculators gave way to computers—and now, to AI.
And yet, at this very moment, there is a group of young people whose thinking
seems to have gone completely off track, advocating a two-hundred-year-old
communist relic. It is as if, in the age of AI, someone suddenly discovered
that the abacus is “amazingly exciting” and started running around telling
everyone about it—an exercise in sheer anti-intellectualism.
Even China, Russia, and North Korea have effectively reverted to imperial
systems, with leaders extending their rule term after term. And still they go
on praising the “proletariat”? It’s truly a group of people with holes in their
heads and water in their brains.
50年前,有珠算拼計算機的電視節目,後來出現工程計算機,這種節目就消聲匿跡了。逐漸,電子科技繼續進步,變成電腦,現在,更是AI。此時,卻有一群年輕人腦筋有洞,要去提倡200年前的共產主義古董?好像在AI時代,發現算盤居然這樣精彩,逢人便奔相走告一樣反智。
連中、俄、朝都是變成主席連任再連任的帝制了,還吹捧什麼無產階級?真是腦殼有洞、腦筋灌水的一群人~~
蛤?「台灣革命共產黨」成立 聲稱帶領群眾「推翻中華民國統治階級」 三立
20260123
共產主義組織「革命共產國際」台灣成員經營的粉專「火花—台灣革命共產主義」宣布成立「台灣革命共產黨」,並聲稱「我們矢志成爲階級鬥爭中,足以帶領群眾推翻中華民國統治階級並建設共產主義社會的主導力量」,並表示要「為解放受到壓迫的台灣群眾以及無產階級而努力」,引起網路爭論。
【雙魚之論】
Trump’s renewed threat to acquire Greenland is less about territorial
ambition than about pressing allied nations to confront an uncomfortable
reality: Greenland represents a major vulnerability in NATO’s defensive
architecture—and, more critically, a potential breach in America’s own national
security.
China has for years conducted extensive hydrographic and geological surveys
around Greenland, while Sino-Russian joint military activities in the region
have already taken place. What once might have been dismissed as a theoretical
risk has now become an imminent strategic challenge. At its core, this is a
question of national security. As long as Greenland does not fall under the
influence of adversaries such as China or Russia, and remains aligned with the
free world, formal ownership is not the ultimate concern.
This raises an unavoidable question: do European countries genuinely value
Greenland’s security? Dispatching only single-digit numbers of troops to
military exercises amounts to little more than symbolic pageantry—police-level
deployments standing in for real military capability, and offering scant
evidence of serious defensive commitment.
Given these evolving realities, the most pragmatic course of action may be for
Denmark to proactively facilitate Greenland’s independence. As a sovereign
state, Greenland could formally join European Union, NATO and enter into a
Compact of Free Association with the United States, under which Washington
would assume full responsibility for its defense—something Denmark has
increasingly proven unable to sustain. The so-called “new European security
architecture without U.S. participation” described in the report is little more
than science fiction. Real defense is not a matter of diplomacy, but of hard
cash and concrete capabilities. Which European
country, in the end, would actually be willing to pay for it?
Otherwise, when viewed through a historical lens, it is Denmark, France, and
other European nations that will ultimately lose credibility and find
themselves in an awkward and embarrassing position.
川普再度揚言要取得格陵蘭的議題,本質上是美國強烈要求各國正視格陵蘭作為北約防衛體系的重大漏洞,同時也是美國自身國家安全的潛在破口。中國早已長期在格陵蘭周邊進行詳細水文與地質調查,中俄更有多起聯合軍演,這種威脅已非抽象理論,而是迫在眉睫的現實。核心重點在於國家安全:只要確保領土不落入中俄等敵對勢力手中,所有權歸屬本身並非絕對重點。
歐洲各國真的重視格陵蘭嗎?僅派個位數軍人參與演習,充其量只是象徵性過場,將警力當軍力使用,難以展現實質防衛決心。因此,未來情勢發展下,最合理的解決之道便是:丹麥提前允許格陵蘭獨立,獨立後的格陵蘭正式加入歐盟與北約,並與美國簽署自由聯合協定(Compact of
Free Association),由美國承擔丹麥目前無力負荷的全面防衛責任。報導中所謂「沒有美國參與的新歐洲安全架構」,幾乎是科幻小說。因為真正的防衛不是外交,而是真金白銀的事業。歐洲哪一國會願意出錢?
否則,若比對歷史脈絡,顏面盡失、陷入尷尬的必然是丹麥、法國等歐洲國家。
格陵蘭危機升溫!丹麥、美國、加拿大增兵 揭密歐盟防禦條款42.7 三立 20260120
Chinese People Laying Out the “Near-Arctic State” Strategy HoonTing
20260120
At the very start of Donald Trump’s second term, he publicly stated his desire to incorporate Canada into the United States as the 51st state, arguing that Canada had long taken advantage of trade with the U.S. and that becoming a U.S. state would eliminate tariffs entirely. Shortly thereafter, he also threatened to purchase Greenland—this time emphasizing that national security had already been infiltrated by China.
【雙魚之論】
The report cites Nicholas Kristof’s article on The New York Times titled
"How a War With China Would Begin." In fact, we must first define
what "war" means. If we do not consider direct exchanges of “hot
weapons” or the initial deployment of conventional troops on the front lines,
then—observing China's ongoing cognitive warfare against Taiwan, cyber attacks,
infiltration efforts, repeated severance of undersea cables, frequent
large-scale exercises by maritime militia, the persistent paralysis of
government operations and budgets by the blue-white camp, as well as influencers
and major politicians collectively and continuously questioning the authority
of the government system—the so-called "new form of warfare" has
already begun.
The Chinese Communist Party's aggression against Taiwan must reach a certain
threshold, with the starting line secretly shifted, before it deploys troops.
By that time, the outcome of the war will have largely been predetermined.
The author's omission is failing to account for
the CCP's "war initiation" model that exploits the blue-white camp.
報導指稱Nicholas Kristof以「與中國的戰爭會如何開始」為題撰文在紐約時報。實際上,要先定義「戰爭」為何?假使不採熱兵器的對轟,也不在第一線使用傳統軍隊,如此觀察中國對台灣已經進行的認知作戰、網路攻擊、滲透、連續切斷光纜、海上民兵多次巨型演練、藍白持續癱瘓政府與預算、網紅與主要政客集體與連續質疑政府體制權威等非傳統作戰模式,則所謂「新型態戰爭」已經開始了。中共對台灣的侵害必須達到一定程度,起跑點被暗中移動後才會出動軍隊,那時戰爭勝負已經大致底定。
作者的缺失,是沒有計算中共利用藍白陣營的「開戰」模式。
中國5年內犯台機率?紐時專欄分析2個訊號 NOWnews 20260119
美國紐約時報知名專欄作家紀思道(Nicholas Kristof)近日在紐時發表文章,以「與中國的戰爭會如何開始」為題撰文,針對中共攻台機率,他引述了「台灣海峽風險報告」的數據指出,未來5年侵台機率約30%,而中共對台實施海空封鎖的可能性為60%,並提到了中國對台開戰前可能會有的2個訊號。
紀思道認為的中國開戰訊號
【雙魚之論】
January 11 again? Once more we see the CCP’s favorite numbers “1111.”
The most famous example was when the U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates visited
Chengdu on January 11, 2011, and the CCP announced the successful test flight
of the J-20.
The New York Times report on the massive maneuvers of China’s maritime
militia vessels—does it read like a piece of classical Chinese wuxia fiction,
or the chained ships from a historical romance?
The CCP’s maritime militia vessels look on the surface like fishing boats, yet
they do not fish. They share standardized appearances, receive fixed subsidies,
operate under the command of the PLA (Eastern Theater Command), and conduct
organized drills. They fully meet the definition of a warship under Article 29
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: “a ship
belonging to the armed forces of a State, bearing the external marks
distinguishing warships of its nationality, under the command of an officer
duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose name appears in the
appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under
regular armed forces discipline.”
Earlier, when Trump used military aircraft to strike drug-smuggling vessels
that had been designated as terrorist targets, he was effectively telling the
CCP: you want to wage war or impose a blockade through gray-zone tactics? No
chance. You were the one who first abandoned the rules and blurred the line
between military and civilian—so don’t blame me if I play rough when the time
comes.
Since
these are warships rather than civilian vessels, and are directed from behind
the scenes by the CCP, they should be dealt with directly—using incendiary
weapons—in the defense of Taiwan.
1月11日?又出現中共最愛的1111。最出名的是美國國防部長羅伯特·蓋茨(Robert
Gates)2011年1月11日訪問成都,中共宣布殲-20試飛成功,
紐約時報對中國海上民兵船巨型操演的報導,是中國古典武俠小說,還是演義小說裡面的連環船?
中共的海上民兵船,表面上像是是漁船但不捕魚。它們有一致的外觀、接受固定津貼、聽命於解放軍(東部戰區)命令且進行操演,完全符合了〈聯合國海洋法公約〉第29條「屬於一國武裝部隊、具備辨別軍艦國籍的外部標誌、由該國政府正式委任並名列相應的現役名冊或類似名冊的軍官指揮和配備有服從正規武裝部隊紀律的船員的船舶」的軍艦定義。
先前川普以軍機攻擊被定義為恐怖主義的運毒民船,就告訴中共:你想用灰色地帶遂行作戰或封鎖?門都沒有。是你先不講武德破壞軍民分際,莫怪屆時我耍流氓。
既然是軍艦不是民船,且為中共在背後指揮,在台灣保衛戰就直接使用燒夷彈對付。
漁船不只捕魚?上千中國漁船東海「大規模集結」疑排陣 美媒揭背後意涵 鏡週刊 20260117
美國《紐約時報》日前透過船舶自動識別系統(AIS)資料分析指出,中國近期在東海海域兩度出現罕見的大規模漁船集結行動。上千艘中國漁船於去年聖誕節及今年1月11日,分別在中國沿岸與日本沖繩之間的海域,排列成長距離、具幾何形狀的船陣,迫使部分商船繞道航行,引發國際關注。
報導指出,今年1月11日約有1400艘中國漁船在短時間內離港或中止捕撈,集中於東海特定海域,形成一個長度超過200海浬的長方形陣列。相關航行數據顯示,該區船隻密度極高,部分貨輪必須蛇行穿越或改道避讓,對正常航運秩序造成實際影響。
類似情況早在去年12月25日便已出現。《紐約時報》分析當天的定位資料後發現,約2000艘中國民用船隻在東海排成多個大型陣列,其中北側出現兩個平行長方形,最長達290海浬,南側則形成倒L型配置。專家認為,短短數週內在相同海域重複出現如此規模的集結,顯示並非單純漁業活動。
【雙魚之論】
After the war, having been shaped by the trials of multiple armed conflicts,
residents registered as belonging to “Fujian Kinmen” and “Fujian Matsu” have
long exhibited a wavering stance in both politics and daily life. In terms of
political values, they tend to favor freedom and democracy; yet economically,
in everyday interactions, and in geopolitical reality, they remain closely
connected to Fujian in China. This has produced a clear divergence from
residents of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands. Such a structural contradiction is
not difficult to understand and can, to some extent, be regarded as excusable.
However, figures such as Chen Yu-jen, who almost unabashedly take the Chinese
Communist Party’s position as the guiding standard for their words and
actions—and whose discourse closely echoes Beijing’s talking points—can no longer
be explained merely by geography or lived reality. This phenomenon is all the
more startling and warrants serious vigilance.
We contend that, given Xi Jinping’s inability to reconcile his high-profile
militaristic rhetoric with mounting governance difficulties, opting for a
high-risk political gamble—seeking to seize Kinmen, Matsu (or one of them),
taking local residents as political hostages to coerce Taipei while
simultaneously challenging the United States and Japan—is not a low-probability
scenario. On the contrary, it is one that deserves heightened precaution.
What further merits serious consideration is this: if some political figures in
Kinmen and Matsu, along with their supporters, have already rejected a
“Taiwanese” identity at the level of self-identification, should the number,
qualifications, and powers of their representation in the Legislative Yuan of
the Republic of China be reconsidered? For example, might it be appropriate to
draw on institutional arrangements used in non–fully sovereign territories such
as Guam, whereby elected representatives enjoy the right to speak in the
legislature but do not possess voting rights?
戰後歷經多場戰事洗禮,戶籍屬於「福建金門」與「福建馬祖」的居民,其政治與生活立場長期呈現擺盪狀態:在政治價值上傾向自由民主,但在經濟、日常往來與地緣現實上,卻與中國福建高度相連,因而與台澎地區居民形成明顯差異。這樣的結構性矛盾,本就不難理解,也尚屬情有可原。
然而,如陳玉珍般,幾乎毫不遮掩地以中共立場作為其言行的判準,甚至在論述上與北京口徑高度一致,則已非單純的地緣或生活現實所能解釋,更令人錯愕與警惕。
我們認為,在習近平無法對其高調的軍國主義口號與實際治理困境作出交代的情況下,選擇以高風險的政治豪賭,試圖奪取金門、馬祖(或其一),並挾持當地居民作為政治人質,以此要脅台北、同時向美日叫板,並非低機率情境,反而值得高度防範。
進一步值得嚴肅思考的是:若部分金馬政治人物與支持者自我認同上已否定「台灣人」身分,那麼其在中華民國立法院中的代表數額、資格與職權,是否有必要重新設計?例如,是否可參考關島等非完整主權地區的制度安排,使其民意代表在國會享有發言權,卻不具表決權。
稱對岸只打台北、打賴清德!陳玉珍「我本就不是台灣人」她爆美智庫嚇壞 三立新聞 20260116
國民黨立委陳玉珍強推法案,反紫光奇遊團成員許美華指出,美國智庫友人拜訪陳玉珍,想了解她對兩岸關係的看法,沒想到陳玉珍說,「她不擔心中共打過來,因為中共討厭台獨、討厭賴清德,對岸只會打台北打賴清德,不會打金門」,還直言「我是福建人,我本來就不是台灣人」,令人傻眼。