【雙魚之論】
The redesign of the New Taiwan Dollar is, in essence, an entirely
normal—indeed routine—act of state governance. What is striking, however, is
that beyond the loud opposition from Blue–White politicians, China’s Taiwan
Affairs Office (TAO) has also stepped forward to oppose it, inadvertently
revealing that the issue carries political implications far from trivial.
The Blue–White camp claims the redesign is a “waste of money,” but this
argument appears more like a contrived excuse than a serious objection. Globally,
periodic currency redesigns are standard practice, and the costs of redesign
and anti-counterfeiting measures are negligible when weighed against the risks
to financial security. As for the TAO, it accuses Taiwan of using the redesign
to pursue “de-Sinicization.” In response, the Deputy Minister of the Mainland
Affairs Council has made the matter plain: whether Sun Yat-sen appears on the
New Taiwan Dollar has nothing whatsoever to do with so-called
de-Sinicization—after all, Sun Yat-sen does not even appear on China’s own Renminbi.
In reality, the most practical and fundamental reason for currency redesign has
never been ideology, but anti-counterfeiting. As counterfeiters’ techniques
gradually catch up with existing banknote designs, governments must upgrade
security features. This is an entirely ordinary requirement of financial
governance. The real question, then, is: what exactly is the Taiwan Affairs
Office opposing?
History
has long shown that counterfeit currency is not merely a criminal issue; it is
also a national security and wartime instrument. North Korea has for years been
accused of large-scale counterfeiting of U.S. dollars. In India, Prime Minister
Narendra Modi abruptly pushed through a currency overhaul, in part to flush out
hoarded cash linked to corruption, black markets, and the underground economy.
More broadly, on the eve of war or major conflict, hostile states often deploy
state-level resources to produce counterfeit currency, preparing to flood it
into the targeted country once hostilities begin—both to bribe key civilian and
military officials and to disrupt the local financial system and social
stability.
For this reason, when the Chinese Communist Party openly opposes upgrades to
the New Taiwan Dollar’s anti-counterfeiting features, it is difficult not to
reasonably speculate: have they already prepared large quantities of New Taiwan
Dollars, intending to use them in the future to interfere with Taiwan’s
financial order? If so, such preparations would now be rendered futile. At the
very least, this reaction in itself is highly abnormal.
What is even more alarming is that on this issue, Blue–White politicians have
adopted an opposition line perfectly aligned with that of the CCP, jointly
obstructing the advancement of anti-counterfeiting technology for the New
Taiwan Dollar. This is no longer merely a disagreement over policy; it is a
fundamental issue concerning Taiwan’s financial security and its assessment of
national risk.
新台幣改版,本質上是一項極為正常、甚至例行的國家治理措施。令人錯愕的是,除了藍白政客高調反對之外,連中國國台辦也跳出來反對,反而暴露了這件事背後不單純的政治意涵。
藍白政客反對的理由是「浪費錢」,但這種說法更像是硬擠出來的藉口。放眼全球,各國貨幣定期改版早已是常態,改版與防偽成本相較於金融安全風險微不足道。至於國台辦,則指控新台幣改版是台灣在「去中國化」。對此,陸委會副主委已清楚回應:孫中山是否出現在新台幣上,與所謂「去中國化」毫無關聯——甚至連人民幣本身,也沒有孫中山。
事實上,貨幣改版最實務、也最核心的理由,從來不是意識形態,而是防偽。當偽鈔集團的技術逐步追上現行鈔券設計,國家就必須升級防偽機制,這是金融治理中再正常不過的需求。那麼,國台辦究竟在反對什麼?
歷史經驗早已說明,偽鈔從來不只是犯罪問題,更是國安與戰爭工具。朝鮮長期被指為偽造美元的大國;印度總理莫迪則曾以迅雷不及掩耳的方式推動貨幣改版,目的之一正是逼出貪污、黑市與地下經濟所囤積的鈔券。更進一步說,在戰爭或衝突前夕,敵對國家往往會動用國家級資源製造偽鈔,準備在戰事爆發時大量流入被侵略國家,一方面收買關鍵文武官員,一方面擾亂其金融秩序與社會穩定。
正因如此,當中共公開反對新台幣的防偽升級時,我們很難不合理地推測:他們是否早已準備好大量新台幣,意圖在未來用以干擾台灣的金融秩序?這樣一來,他們將前功盡棄。至少,這種反應本身就極不尋常。
更值得警惕的是,藍白政客在此議題上,竟與中共採取完全一致的反對口徑,共同阻擋新台幣防偽技術的進化。這已不只是對政策的不同意見,而是涉及台灣金融安全與國家風險認知的根本問題。
國台辦批新台幣改版去孫中山化 梁文傑訝異:胡攪蠻纏 央廣 20260205