A New Form of Warfare: The Infiltration War Has Already Begun in Taiwan

A New Form of Warfare: The Infiltration War Has Already Begun in Taiwan    HoonTing 20260126

A review of the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan’s operations over the past two years reveals a clear pattern of coordinated, non-accidental actions: unconstitutional legislation, refusal to review budgets, and the rejection of key personnel appointments—collectively and systematically paralyzing state institutions. The damage has targeted critical nodes of national governance, including the National Communications Commission (which plays a key role in countering Chinese cognitive warfare), the Constitutional Court (responsible for invalidating unconstitutional laws), and the Control Yuan (tasked with oversight of the civil service, anti-corruption, and human rights protection).

Ongoing developments are even more alarming. The continued refusal to review the 2026 Central Government General Budget and the rejection of the Special Defense Budget Act have directly obstructed the normal functioning of government and severely undermined U.S. defensive planning within the Indo-Pacific strategy. If this trajectory continues, it is highly foreseeable that the Blue-White camp will next veto appointments to the Central Election Commission and block the U.S.–Taiwan Trade Agreement. The former would place the 2026 local elections—and even the 2028 national elections—at risk of suspension; the latter would critically damage efforts to build a “non-PRC supply chain” between Taiwan and the United States.

There are already clear international precedents. Recently, due to South Korea’s National Assembly failing to pass a trade agreement in a timely manner, the United States accused Seoul of non-compliance and raised tariffs in response. By contrast, in Taiwan, Blue-White legislators are actively discrediting and obstructing precisely the U.S.–Taiwan trade agreement that has delivered substantial results and is widely regarded as a top-tier strategic partnership.

Some commentators remain optimistic, believing that continued political sabotage by the Blue-White camp will inevitably be punished by voters in 2026 and 2028. What they fail to confront is a far more troubling possibility: whether there will even be an opportunity to vote in 2028 at all. While this statement was first voiced by a KMT legislator from Kinmen, similar remarks have been echoed by the party chair and other key figures on multiple occasions. Such repetition can hardly be dismissed as coincidence.

Viewed in isolation, these incidents might be explained away as political maneuvering within a constitutional system. Taken as a whole, however, the actions of the past two years reveal a striking pattern: nearly every move precisely targets the structural foundations of Taiwan’s democracy and economic viability. Even more concerning is the outright refusal to engage with public warnings or dialogue, regardless of consequences. Such conduct fully aligns with the operational logic of a hostile force. Any regime that gains power through the paralysis of government would, by definition, be a pro-Beijing authority.

At the same time, developments within China itself are revealing. Over the past fifteen years, Xi Jinping has used anti-corruption campaigns to purge political and military elites, hollowing out the Central Military Commission—the body responsible for operational command and warfighting. This unprecedented depletion of command capacity clearly undermines preparations for a full-scale military invasion of Taiwan, yet it serves the purpose of regime security and coup prevention.

The only explanation that reconciles these developments is that the Chinese Communist Party has relegated conventional military invasion to a secondary option, while shifting the primary battlefield to infiltration and institutional paralysis—using systematic means to dismantle Taiwan’s governmental functions and ultimately seize political control.

Viewed from this perspective, the Blue-White camp cannot be dismissed as a disorganized collection of actors, nor can labels such as “fifth column” or “local collaborators” adequately capture their role. A more accurate understanding is that, in functional and behavioral terms, they have effectively assumed roles defined within the PLA’s political warfare system, participating in a covert, internalized form of warfare that has been underway in Taiwan for at least two years.