鄭麗文的思路與誤導

從她最近接受DW專訪與公開言論來看，新任國民黨主席鄭麗文給人嚴苛易怒的印象——這或許源於她缺乏政黨領導經驗，或是因為她對政治任務感過於強烈。
她批評台灣與其他自由國家增加國防預算，卻從不提及是中共在積極擴張軍力。鄭麗文拒絕「以實力換和平」的原則，轉而主張對話，並稱台灣目前約佔GDP 3%的國防預算過高。在任何有意義對話前就提議削減預算，既天真又魯莽。
身為國民黨主席，她的發言舉足輕重。當她的論調與中共如此貼近，她恐讓國民黨淪為其同溫層——這對國民黨與台灣皆有害無益。
她對政治權力運作的理解同樣片面。她特別點名1996年後民進黨的內鬥彷彿獨一無二，卻忽略派系鬥爭是全球政治常態，在國民黨與中共內部同樣氾濫。
如此一來，她暗示後兩者代表某種值得追求的理想模式——這或許吸引年輕選民，但毫無事實根據，且極具誤導性。
關於台灣戰後軌跡，鄭麗文將整個歷史簡化為「中國赤化」一章，遠遠不足。台灣未定地位源自太平洋戰爭與《舊金山和約》；中共1949年接管中國是四年後的獨立事件，與前者無關。
執著於國共內戰、抹去更廣泛的太平洋戰爭脈絡，正是兩黨經典宣傳手法，意在縮窄我們的歷史視野、掩蓋真相。
簡言之，鄭麗文的歷史觀——受其世代有限且反覆灌輸的敘事塑造——預設中國對台擁有主權。這既不符史實，也不利國民黨與台灣的利益。
至於普丁是否為獨裁者，問題不在獨裁者能否當選——許多確實當選——而在於他如何逾越憲法限制、獨攬大權。鄭麗文的說法忽略此關鍵區別，暴露她對威權主義的天真或選擇性理解，與中共「強人領導」論調可疑地一致。這既不誠實，也無助於台灣認清真正威脅。

From her recent DW’s interview and public remarks, the new KMT Chairperson, Cheng Li-wen, comes across as harsh and easily agitated—traits that may stem from her inexperience as a party leader or from an intense sense of political mission.

She criticizes Taiwan and other free nations for raising defense budgets, yet never acknowledges that it is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) aggressively expanding its military might. Cheng rejects the principle of “peace through strength,” favoring dialogue instead and calling Taiwan’s defense spending—roughly 3% of GDP—excessively high. Proposing cuts before any meaningful talks is both naive and reckless.
As KMT chair, her words carry significant weight. When her rhetoric so closely mirrors the CCP’s, she risks turning the party into its echo chamber—a development harmful to both the KMT and Taiwan.
Her understanding of political power dynamics is equally selective. She singles out the DPP’s internal struggles after 1996 as if they were unique, ignoring that factionalism is universal in politics and equally rampant within the KMT and CCP.
By doing so, she implies the latter two embody some ideal worth pursuing—a notion that may resonate with younger voters but is factually baseless and dangerously misleading.
On Taiwan’s post-war trajectory, Cheng reduces the entire story to the “communization of China,” which is only one chapter. Taiwan’s unresolved legal status originates in the Pacific War and the San Francisco Peace Treaty; the CCP’s 1949 takeover of China is a separate event four years later with no bearing on that status.
Fixating on the KMT-CCP civil war while erasing the broader Pacific War context is classic propaganda from both parties, designed to narrow our historical lens and obscure the truth.
In short, Cheng’s worldview—shaped by her generation’s limited, repeatedly echoed narratives—presumes Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. This is neither historically accurate nor in the KMT’s or Taiwan’s interest.
On the question of whether Putin is a dictator, the issue is not whether dictators can be elected—many are—but how he operates beyond constitutional limits and monopolizes power. Cheng's framing misses this distinction, revealing a naive or selective grasp of authoritarianism that aligns suspiciously with CCP rhetoric on "strong leadership." This is neither intellectually honest nor helpful for Taiwan's understanding of real threats.