親中總統，川普以基地為籌碼

【雙魚之論】
The U.S.–ROK alliance has long revolved around two contentious issues: wartime operational control (OpCon) and the sharing of costs for stationing U.S. forces in Korea. The former, however, is largely a false issue. Even under a combined command structure, each national contingent ultimately reports to its own commander-in-chief. In practice, without presidential authorization, a South Korean general cannot exercise command authority over U.S. forces. This limitation stems not only from sovereignty concerns but also from the fundamental differences in training and operational doctrine. The latter issue—burden-sharing—reflects a more tangible imbalance. For decades, South Korea benefitted disproportionately from the security guarantee provided by U.S. forces on the peninsula. With South Korea’s growing economic and military capacity, Washington’s demand for a more equitable distribution of costs merely restores balance rather than altering the alliance’s fundamentals.
Recently, President Lee Jae-myung rejected the idea of employing U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) in the event of a Taiwan contingency. Yet this, too, constitutes a false debate. A conflict in the Taiwan Strait would automatically escalate into a regional crisis, with the Korean Peninsula inevitably becoming a critical flashpoint. Moreover, given that USFK is structured primarily around ground forces with limited air assets, any large-scale redeployment to Taiwan would undermine deterrence and stability on the peninsula without meaningfully altering the balance in the Strait.
Former President Trump’s proposal to link U.S. basing rights to “land ownership” also warrants closer scrutiny. The ownership and management of military base territories fall squarely within sovereign jurisdiction; they cannot be reduced to simple real estate transactions. Seen in this light, Trump’s rhetoric aligns with his broader pattern of treating territorial arrangements—such as Greenland or parts of Canada—as bargaining chips in national security negotiations. Put differently, if Seoul is unwilling to expand its cost-sharing contributions, Washington may well press for land-based concessions as an alternative.
By contrast, both Japan and South Korea host sizable U.S. deployments, whereas Taiwan has had no American troop presence since the drawdown of the late 1970s and the final withdrawal in 1980. Beyond limited intelligence facilities, the U.S. investment in Taiwan’s security infrastructure remains minimal. This disparity raises a pressing question: have Taiwan’s negotiators ever sought to leverage this fact to argue for trade treatment at least on par with Japan’s?

美韓軍事同盟的核心爭議，長期集中於戰時作戰指揮權（OpCon）以及駐軍經費分攤比例。前者實際上屬於假議題：即便編制為聯軍，各國部隊的指揮鏈最終仍回歸本國三軍統帥。換言之，若無本國總統同意，韓軍司令並無權直接指揮美軍。其理由既涉及主權，也關乎不同的軍事訓練與運作體系。後者則是韓國長期仰賴駐韓美軍防衛而受惠較多，如今韓國國力增強，美國僅要求調整至更為均衡的水準。
近期，韓國新任總統李在明表態，拒絕美國在台海發生衝突時動用駐韓美軍的提議。然而，這同樣是一種假議題：因為台海有事即等同東亞有事，朝鮮半島勢必成為敏感熱區。更何況，駐韓美軍以陸軍為主、空軍為輔，若大規模抽調陸軍支援台海，勢將削弱對朝鮮半島安全的維持，對台海衝突也無直接助益。
至於川普曾提出的「基地領土所有權」構想，也須細加解讀。大部分軍事基地的土地所有或管理權屬於國家主權範疇，並非單純不動產交易。若將此視作川普一貫以領土（如格陵蘭、加拿大部分領域）作為國安談判籌碼的延伸，更能理解其脈絡。換言之，若韓國不願提高軍費分攤，也可能改以土地作為抵充。
與此相較，日韓均有美軍駐防，而台灣自1970年代起美軍大幅裁撤，1980年後更完全無駐軍。除了情報設施外，美國在台安全投資與支出極為有限。此一差異，談判代表是否曾積極爭取，要求至少在關稅待遇上比照日本？

繼格陵蘭、加拿大之後！川普向南韓拋「駐軍基地歸美」    自由 20250826

繼想併吞加拿大成美國第51州、拿下格陵蘭後，美國總統川普向南韓總統李在明（Lee Jae Myung）拋出駐韓基地「土地所有權」構想。據報導，川普表示，他希望美國取得駐韓美軍基地所在土地的所有權，同時敦促韓國為駐紮約2萬8500名美軍支付更多費用。

綜合法新社與韓聯社報導，川普在白宮接待南韓總統李在明，被問到駐韓美軍問題時，川普表示，他想要求首爾當局把租給美國設置軍事基地的土地「所有權」轉讓給美國。

川普稱，也許我想做的事情之一是，要求他們在我們擁有那座軍事基地期間，給我們那塊土地的所有權，我們花費鉅額建造一個要塞，南韓也做出貢獻，看看我們是否能擺脫租約，取得我們大型軍事基地所在土地的所有權。

中媒指出，川普不僅想擁有格陵蘭島、想要巴拿馬運河、想把加拿大變成第51個州，現在還想擁有南韓的軍事基地主權。不得不說，房地產商出身的川普，有一種強烈的土地執念，現在正將國際關係進行生意化的嘗試。